The Sultanate of Delhi, 711–1526 A.D. c14.s18: Causes of our defeat
The Sultanate of Delhi, 711–1526 A.D. c14.s18
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Causes of our defeat
c14.s18.1
A curious student might well enquire about the causes of our defeat at the hands of Mahmud of Ghazni early in the eleventh century and at those of Muhammad of Ghur at the end of twelfth century. British writers of Indian history, such as Elphinstone, Lane-Poole and Vincent A. Smith have ascribed Indian defeat to our inferiority as soldiers and to the superiority of the Turks who came from the cold climate of the north, were eaters of meat and used to warfare. This view seems to be superficial and inspired by political considerations. The Indian soldier has been superb all through our history. Even during the period of our slavery and decadence our troops showed their mettle in the fields of battle in various parts of the world. It is a matter of common knowledge that during the World Wars I and II the Indian soldier covered himself with glory in Europe, Africa and Asia. It is too much to believe that his ancestor, who was more free and who fought for a national case, was in any way inferior. The theory that makes the people of a cold climate fighters or that which seeks to show that non-vegetarians are necessarily better fighters need not be examined here at length. Suffice it here to say that it does not stand the test of scientific examination. Moreover, our soldiers in the age of Mahmud of Ghazni and of Muhammad of Ghur were not absolute vegetarians, as they are not even today. The causes of our defeat must, therefore, be sought somewhere else. It will be well to divide them into two categories, namely, (1) general causes and (2) particular causes. As regards the general causes, our political disunity must be held primarily responsible. Each prince had to fight single-handed and he fought for his own kingdom and territory, as it were, and not for his country and people. Even in the moments of our greatest crisis our rulers did not combine to put up a united defence against the invader. Lack of political unity and proper organisation and capable leadership must, therefore, remain the most important general cause of our helplessness and defeat. In the second place, our army organisation was based on out-worn conception. They were ill-organised and ill-equipped. Our military leaders did not keep themselves in touch with the development of tactics. This has been the bane of Indian history through the ages. While foreign countries were forging ahead in the field of military development, our people remained stationary. We were, therefore, out-classed in weapons and outmanoeuvred in tactics. The great Mughul emperor, Babar, noted in his diary in 1526 that Indians knew how to die and not how to fight. That is, they were brave and did not shudder from the thought of sacrificing their lives in the field, but they lacked the capacity of taking advantage of the enemy's weakness and making use of feints and manoeuvres in the battle-field. The Rajputs prided themselves on their swordsmanship and looked upon a battle as a tournament in which to display their skill, bravery and chivalry. The Turks, on the other hand, fought to win and believed that everything was fair in war. Thirdly, the masses of our people did not really co-operate with our leaders and soldiers.
c14.s18.2
Not that they were altogether indifferent to them. On the other hand, they laboured under a mistaken notion that it was none of their business to fight. They seemed to believe that their lot would remain the same, it did not matter who occupied the throne of Delhi. Had the people become the second line of defence behind our troops, the Rajput rulers would not have staked everything on the issue of a single contest and must have made repeated attempts at resistance. Fourthly, both Mahmud of Ghazni and Muhammad of Ghur, the former on a much larger scale than the latter, made use of shock-tactics to dishearten and demoralise our countrymen. With lightning rapidity they swooped down upon our troops and fair cities and devastated the land with fire and sword. These tactics were repeated times out of number and so much terrified our people that they began thinking that Mahmud of Ghazni’s troops were invincible. Political and military demoralisation, therefore, set in among the Indians of that age and made them think that resistance against the Turkish hordes was useless. It was this feeling that paralysed our society in that age. Fifthly, the Turks were inspired by a great religious and military enthusiasm, while our people had no such ideology to sustain them in their hour of trial. Mere physical strength and military weapons do not constitute the total equipment of an army. An inspiring ideology is as essential as military training and equipment.
c14.s18.3
As regards the particular causes, it is not possible to notice them here in detail. The Turkish invader almost invariably acquired a correct knowledge of the strength of his adversary and made full endeavours to exploit his weakness. Our rulers did not care to find loop-holes in the organisation of their common enemy. The Sultans almost every time had the survey of a prospective battle-field made and took the geography into consideration before engaging in a conflict. Our rulers divided their armies into three traditional divisions—right, centre and left—and they almost invariably made a frontal attack on the enemy, whereas the Turkish invaders had five divisions, the two additional ones being the Advance Guard and the Reserve. The Reserve was kept in readiness to launch an attack when the Sultan found our army in its last gasps. One often comes across the Turkish invaders defiling a tank or a river from which our troops drew their water supply or diverting the course of a channel so as to deprive them of water. They ravaged the territory in the vicinity so as to cut off supplies of grain and to starve their opponents. No contemporary Muslim writer, however, makes any mention of any of the Indian rulers of his time having recourse to such tactics or stratagems against the invader. Above all, our rulers committed many a silly mistake. We have already mentioned a few such mistakes committed by king Dahir of Sindh. Similar mistakes were committed by Jayapala of the Panjab and by other rulers of northern India. Jayapala burnt himself on a funeral pyre in order not to survive his disgrace, instead of preparing himself afresh for a further contest. Very often, elephants in a battle, in which arrows were used, proved a liability rather than an asset. They were frightened and fled from the field. Our people fought mainly with sword, while the favourite Turkish weapon was archery. The mobile Turkish cavalry was more than a match for the slow Indian mares and mountain-like elephants.