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The Sultanate of Delhi, 711–1526 A.D. c14.s18.1

The Sultanate of Delhi, 711–1526 A.D. c14.s18.1

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English

c14.s18.1

A curious student might well enquire about the causes of our defeat at the hands of Mahmud of Ghazni early in the eleventh century and at those of Muhammad of Ghur at the end of twelfth century. British writers of Indian history, such as Elphinstone, Lane-Poole and Vincent A. Smith have ascribed Indian defeat to our inferiority as soldiers and to the superiority of the Turks who came from the cold climate of the north, were eaters of meat and used to warfare. This view seems to be superficial and inspired by political considerations. The Indian soldier has been superb all through our history. Even during the period of our slavery and decadence our troops showed their mettle in the fields of battle in various parts of the world. It is a matter of common knowledge that during the World Wars I and II the Indian soldier covered himself with glory in Europe, Africa and Asia. It is too much to believe that his ancestor, who was more free and who fought for a national case, was in any way inferior. The theory that makes the people of a cold climate fighters or that which seeks to show that non-vegetarians are necessarily better fighters need not be examined here at length. Suffice it here to say that it does not stand the test of scientific examination. Moreover, our soldiers in the age of Mahmud of Ghazni and of Muhammad of Ghur were not absolute vegetarians, as they are not even today. The causes of our defeat must, therefore, be sought somewhere else. It will be well to divide them into two categories, namely, (1) general causes and (2) particular causes. As regards the general causes, our political disunity must be held primarily responsible. Each prince had to fight single-handed and he fought for his own kingdom and territory, as it were, and not for his country and people. Even in the moments of our greatest crisis our rulers did not combine to put up a united defence against the invader. Lack of political unity and proper organisation and capable leadership must, therefore, remain the most important general cause of our helplessness and defeat. In the second place, our army organisation was based on out-worn conception. They were ill-organised and ill-equipped. Our military leaders did not keep themselves in touch with the development of tactics. This has been the bane of Indian history through the ages. While foreign countries were forging ahead in the field of military development, our people remained stationary. We were, therefore, out-classed in weapons and outmanoeuvred in tactics. The great Mughul emperor, Babar, noted in his diary in 1526 that Indians knew how to die and not how to fight. That is, they were brave and did not shudder from the thought of sacrificing their lives in the field, but they lacked the capacity of taking advantage of the enemy's weakness and making use of feints and manoeuvres in the battle-field. The Rajputs prided themselves on their swordsmanship and looked upon a battle as a tournament in which to display their skill, bravery and chivalry. The Turks, on the other hand, fought to win and believed that everything was fair in war. Thirdly, the masses of our people did not really co-operate with our leaders and soldiers.