Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan, or the Central and Western Rajput States of India v2.c30.t2.184

v2.c30.t2.184

The Treaty of Alliance.—Its inequality requires no demonstration ; the objects to be attained by it to the respective parties having no approximation to parity. The advantages to Jaisalmer were immediate; and to use the phraseology of the treaty, were not only of “great magnitude,” but were vitally important. From the instant the treaties were exchanged, her existence as a permanent State, which was not worth half a century’s purchase, was secured. Her power had been gradually declining, and reign after reign was narrowing her possessions to the vicinity of the capital. One State, Bahawalpur, had been formed from her northern territory; while those of Sind, Bikaner, and Jodhpur, had been greatly aggrandized at her expense; and all were inclined, as occasion arose, to encroach upon her feebleness. The faithless character of the minister, Salim Singh [272], afforded abundant pretexts for quarrel, and the anarchy of her neighbours proved her only safeguard during the later years of her independent existence. Now, the British Government having pledged itself to exert its power for the protection of the principality, in the event of any “serious invasion,” her fears either of Sindis, Daudputras, or of Rathors, are at rest. The full extent of this pledge may not have been contemplated when it was given; like all former alliances, it is the base of another step in advance. Instead of restricting the vast circle of our political connexions, it at once carried us out of India, placing us in actual contact and possible collision with the rulers of Sind and the people beyond the Indus. Marwar and Bikaner being already admitted to our alliance, the power of settling their feuds with the Bhattis is comparatively simple; but with Daudputra we have no political connexions, and with Sind, only those of “perpetual friendship and mutual intercourse”; but no stipulation ensuring respect to our remonstrances in case of the aggression of their subjects on our Bhatti ally. Are we then to push our troops through the desert to repel such acts, or must we furnish pecuniary subsidies (the cheapest mode), that she may entertain mercenaries for that object? We must view it, in this light, as an event, not only not improbable, but of very likely occurrence. Our alliance with Cutch involved us in this perplexity in 1819. Our armies were formed and moved to the frontier, and a declaration of war was avoided only by accepting a tardy amende in no way commensurate with the insult of invading, massacring, and pillaging our allies.¹ In this instance, our means of chastisement were facilitated by our maritime power of grappling with the enemy; but if the insult proceeds from the government of Upper Sind (only nominally dependent on Haidarabad), or from Bahawalpur, how are we to cope with these enemies of our ally? Such wars might lead us into a terra incognita beyond the Indus, or both the spirit and letter of the treaty will be null.