Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan, or the Central and Western Rajput States of India v2.c30.t2.188

v2.c30.t2.188

ander, Mahmud, and Timur, as utterly visionary, by an army encumbered with all the *matériel* necessary to success, and thus the valley of Sind presents the only practicable route. But it would be a grand error, both in a political and military point of view, to possess ourselves of this valley, even if an opportunity were again to occur. It is true, the resources of that fertile region, so analogous to Egypt, would soon, under our management, maintain an army sufficient to defend it; and this would bring us at once into contact with the power (Persia) which clings to us for support, and will be adverse to us only when rendered subservient to Russia. It were well to view the possible degradation and loss of power to Russia, in Europe, as likely to afford a fresh stimulant to her ancient schemes of oriental aggrandizement. By some these schemes are looked upon as Quixotic, and I confess myself to be of the number. The better Russia is acquainted with the regions she would have to pass, the less desire will she evince for an undertaking, which, even if successful in the outset, would be useless; for if she conquered, she could not maintain India.¹ But, to me, it still appears imperative that this power should formally renounce such designs; the state of perpetual preparation rendered necessary by her menacing position, being so injurious to our finances, is worse than the actual attempt, which would only entail upon her inevitable loss. We lost, through our unwise economy, a noble opportunity of maintaining an ascendancy at the court of Kabul, which would have been easily prevailed upon, for our pecuniary aid, to make over to us the sovereignty of Sind (were this desirable), which is still considered a grand division of Kabul.