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History of Mediaeval Hindu India (being a History of India from 600 to 1200 A.D.) v3.c33.s6: Note.—Was Mahmud or Shivaji a Bandit?

History of Mediaeval Hindu India (being a History of India from 600 to 1200 A.D.) v3.c33.s6

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Note.—Was Mahmud or Shivaji a Bandit?

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The greatest condemnation of Mahmud is contained in the Oxford History of India by Sir Vincent Smith which states (p. 194). "So far as India was concerned, Mahmud was simply a bandit, operating on a large scale. He did not attempt to effect any permanent conquest except in the Panjab and his raids had no lasting results beyond the destruction of property and priceless monuments". Mahmud's plundering expeditions into India were so many and so successful like those of Shivaji, that one's attention is fixed on these plunders and one is led to look at Mahmud as at Shivaji as a great plunderer, a successful bandit. Many historians have written in the same strain and said in derogation of him that he merely plundered and did not annex, suggesting therein that annexation is less heinous than plundering. But is it really so? Is it not practically plundering other people of their immovable property, especially of their land which is the most valuable of all properties? And even if annexation mean stable government, it does always mean better government. Indeed Mahomedan government was not and could not have been better government than Hindu government. For that matter any foreign government is worse than native government, for it always leads to heavy taxation which is equivalent to continuous, systematic and legalised plundering of the people. That Mahmud did not annex but merely plundered Indian territories would be rather praiseworthy than otherwise. As a matter of fact, however, this statement itself is not correct as we proceed to show.

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Let us see how like a consummate diplomat or statesman, Mahmud slowly extended his empire from Ghazni by gradual annexations, as the British did from their centres in Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta. Mahmud was originally king of Zabulistan or the territory round Ghazni which again formerly belonged to the Rajputs and he was also governor of Khorasan on behalf of the Samani emperors. When the Samani empire fell owing to the attacks of the Turkish hordes beyond the Oxus, he annexed Khorasan and allowed Ilek-khan, the Turk, to annex the northern portion of the Sāmāni kingdom beyond the Oxus, or Mawarannahar. Thus these two powerful kings accommodated each other. From Zabulistan, Mahmud extended his dominion eastward and from Khorasan westward by the gradual absorption of the adjoining kingdoms. Even this was not done all at once. Mahmud or his father first acquired Kabulistan, then he annexed the lower part of the present N. W. Frontier Province viz. Bannu and the adjoining territory and subsequently the northern portion viz. Peshawar and Wahind. These three provinces belonged, as we have seen, to Jaipal, the Brahmin Shahi king of Kabul who was also the ruler of the whole of the Panjab. We see how adroitly Mahmud deprived Jaipal of his provinces one by one without driving him to sudden despair like the British who from Bombay gradually acquired one district after another of the Brahmin ruler of the Deccan. Ānandapāla, like Bajirao, was for a time left in the possession of the Panjab after the loss of his provinces to the west of the Indus, subject to a tribute. But the final collision came as it was bound to come and both Ānandapāla and Bajirao lost their kingdoms which were finally annexed by the conquering power. When Sir Vincent Smith makes an exception of the Panjab, the largest part of Mahmud's dominions in the east, he practically admits that Mahmud as a result of his various raids up to the twelfth expedition did annex vast territories and effected permanent occupation. Nay more, Mahmud attempted to consolidate his dominions by the forcible conversion to Islam of the people of the annexed provinces. He probably realised the necessity of unity of religious belief in the people as an important factor in the consolidation of kingdoms; and systematically carried out the forcible conversion of the people; for example of Ghor on the west and Swat and Bajaur in the north-eastern corner of Afghanistan on the west side of the Indus. On the east side, that is in the Panjab, it appears that the rigour of the policy of conversion was not continued though even in the Panjab he converted forcibly many peoples especially in the westen part contiguous to the river Indus. Mahmud's statesmanship as a Mahomedan king in forcibly converting the people of the annexed territories immediately in the vicinity of his kingdom cannot be denied and Mahmua thus not only annexed but consolidated territories.

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But it may be objected that Mahmud's later expeditions to Mathura and Kanauj and to Somnath were mere plundering expeditions undertaken with no desire of annexation or permanent occupation. Even this is not correct. Distant provinces like Antarbed or Oudh or Gujarat could not be at once occupied. It was necessary to gradually absorb them by the usual method of absorption viz. first exaction of tribute and then final overthrow, when the intervening territory was fully absorbed. Thus the British first absorbed Bengal, then Bihar, then Oudh, and then the Panjab. It must be remembered that when Rājyapāla first merely escaped, Mahmud reinvaded Oudh, conquered Bāri and finally subjected him to a tribute. It appears that this tribute was long paid by the Kanauj kingdom to Ghazni, for we have epigraphic evidence which shows that the charge of this tribute was distributed over the whole kingdom of Kanauj as a permanent tax in excess of the usual land tax. It is strange that scholars have not understood the real nature of the tax called "Turushkadanda" mentioned in the grants of this period coming from the territory of Kanauj only. The Jhusi grant of Trilochanapāla dated 1026 A. D. does not mention this Turushkadanda; but all later grants, even those of the Gāhadavālas, mention it, who though independent of Ghazni continued to exact this tax, as despotic kings rarely give up an impost which has become usual and of long standing, though the necessity of it no longer exists. In this Turushkadanda, we are reminded of the chauth of the Marathas, for the realisation of which they regularly maintained officers in the provinces of the Mogul empire. It is likely that Turkish soldiers and officers also remained in the country of Kanauj to collect this tribute and it is these Turks whom Bhoja or Karṇa drove away as we shall relate in their history. We have actually ascertained the fact that Turushkadanda is mentioned only in grants found in the Kanauj kingdom and not in any grants found in the Chedi or Bengal territory and certainly not in Paramāra or Solankhi territory viz. Malwa and Gujarat. We are, therefore, assured that Mahmud did subject Kanauj to a permanent tribute* which would naturally have led, in future years, to the annexation of that kingdom had the succeeding kings at Ghazni possessed his vigour and continued his policy in the manner in which British policy consistently worked throughout the nineteenth century. With regard to the raid on Somnath, even therein Mahmud had apparently an intention of permanent occupation in the distant future. Such raids, even if for plunder only, undermine the power of the plundered kingdom and make way for future annexation. We, therefore, think that it is unhistorical to look upon Mahmud as a mere plunderer without any design of permanent occupation. It is not only against human nature, but also against history, when we see that he annexed and permanently occupied the whole of the extensive territory of the Shahis from Kabul to Lahore in the east and extensive provinces of the Samanis in the west.

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But granting that Mahmud led merely plundering expeditions into India without any intention of permanent conquest, would it be proper to describe him as a bandit as many historians have done? Such wrong descriptions have actually led to wrong theories and to baneful results as is well-known and historians should use such terms with care and depict persons in their proper light. Two persons in history have suffered much in this way. Mahmud and Shivaji have usually been called bandits and plunderers, in consequence of, the large number of their plundering expeditions and of their uniform success resulting in fabulous accumulation of riches. But we forget that correctly speaking neither Mahmud nor Shivaji can be called a bandit or a robber and if we do use the terms, we do so without attributing to them the moral degradation connoted by them. It must always be remembered that murder or dacoity is not only legally but morally reprehensible. The story of Alexander and the robber may be a very witty one but it inculcates a wrong theory. A robber when he robs a fellow citizen acts against the tacit agreement which he has entered into in acknowledging allegiance to a government that he would not deprive a fellow citizen of his property except in due course of law or of his life except in self-defence exercised within legal limits. The relations of nations or peoples are subject to no such tacit agreement. Indeed international law or custom has always recognized, from the most ancient times down to the present, the right of the stronger nation to attack the weaker and deprive it even of its independence. The law of the brute, to speak plainly, or of the fish as it is actually called in an inscription of Pāla kings of Bengal, has always been followed by nations. The Digvijayas in ancient Indian history can only be justified on this admitted right of the strong to humble the weak. There are no doubt instances in history, of noble sovereigns who refused to benefit by this law and who rose superior to the temptations of power, a Maria Theresa who refused to attack Poland because it was weak or an Aśoka who after slaughtering a lakh of people in conquering Kalinga was so seized by the feeling of remorse that he gave up war for all time to come. But these rare instances only prove the rule. It is only after the last European War that nations have become alive to the necessity and the propriety of conceding the right of the weak to live undisturbed. But throughout past history, we see that nations and kings have generally followed the law of brute force by which the strong can at any time and for any reason pounce upon the weak and deprive him of his land, property and even independence. While, therefore, the robber is legally or morally reprehensible, Alexander and many of his compeer conquerors cannot be considered morally depraved, when they deprived other nations of their liberty or property. And when Shivaji or Mahmud are described in historical writings as bandits or plunderers, it must always be understood that these terms do not convey the ordinary sense of condemnation connoted by them.

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∗ Turushkadanda is explained by some as a tax on Turkish settlers but it was not a tax on Turks but on all cultivators in the village, as appears clear from the grants of Inam villages of the time in Kanauj territory.

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It must further be remembered that Shivaji never committed murder,[*] even in his high mission of establishing Swaraj. And he plundered rich cities in the Mogul or Bijapur territory only when he was at war with them, and only after setting himself up as a de facto independent sovereign. The right of belligerents to plunder the enemy has been recognised even in the west. Indeed plundering weakens the weaker nation's power of defence and increases the stronger's power of offence. England herself has plundered enemies many a time. Drake and Hawkins plundered the ships of Spain carrying gold from America to Spain when England was at war with the latter country. Drake even plundered the cities of Chili and Peru without the excuse of war and he has not been described by English historians as a bandit. The British have plundered the French at Pondichery in Indian history and have massacred and plundered the townspeople of Jhansi when that city fought and stood a siege in the mutiny of 1857. And yet these acts cannot, legally and even morally, be described or denounced as murders or dacoities. Mahmud or Shivaji never plundered their own subjects, and they both punished robbers in their territories severely. Shivaji so far recognised his duty as a king that he recompensed his subjects whenever his own soldiers or even the soldiers of an enemy plundered them.

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∗ The true account of Afzalkhan's death shows that Shivaji killed him in self defence. Shivaji did not instigate the murder of Chandrarao More as he is believed by many including Jadunath Sarkar to have done. A historical document recently found shows that the Chandrarao More supposed to have been murdered an adopted minor at that time and he escaped to Rairi when Jawali was attacked. For further details we may refer the curious reader to our Marathi paper on Chandrarao More and Shivaji.

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It is, in fine, wrong both historically and philosophically to describe Mahmud or Shivaji as a bandit in the ordinary sense of the term. Their acts were committed as sovereigns and when there was an actual state of war and they, therefore, do not come under the code of ordinary law or morality. The law of nations as understood hitherto in the east and even in the west has always conceded the right of the strong to attack the weak for any ostensible reason and the victor has always exercised the right to plunder the vanquished. The destruction of Hindu temples and idols may no doubt be condemned from the higher stand-point of humanity as acts of bigotted intolerance. But the plundering of cities and temples being an act of war committed by one sovereign against another cannot be described or denounced as dacoity even though it led to ‘the destruction of priceless monuments’ and we are constrained to record our view that even Mahmud, much more Shivaji cannot be properly described as a bandit.

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DOWNFALL OF THE PANJAB AND KABUL

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-APPARENT CAUSES.

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Sind fell before the Arabs under Muhammad Kasim in 712; the Panjab fell before the Turks under Mahmud in 1009, and Northern India fell before the Afghans under Ghori from 1193 to 1200 A. D. The causes of the downfall in each of these three cases were not the same; were in fact extremely different. We have discussed the causes of the downfall of Sind in Volume I and shown that Sind fell chiefly owing to the treachery of some feudatories of Chach and the pusillanimity of the Buddhists. Sind was then ruled by a Brahmin and Panjab also was ruled by a Brahmin king; but both Dāhar and Ānandapāla fought with the bravery of Rajputs. These ruling Brahmin dynasties were practically Kshatriyas. And from the most ancient times when Droṇa fought in the Mahābhārata war down to the time of the Peshwas, Brahmin kings and chiefs fought as bravely as the Kshatriyas. Indeed Brahmin soldiers also such as the Pandes of Northern India in the days of the mutiny fought as valiantly as other soldiers in the British army. Curiously enough the same accident befell Dāhar as befell Ānandapāla in their final hard contested battles and the elephant of Dāhar left the battlefield as that of the latter did and would not stop until it had thrown itself into a lake and alloyed its fever. But accidents befall every man in his life and are not the real causes of downfalls; as stated before fate is an over-riding and common factor in all the concerns of this world and in a historical survey of causes it may be excluded from consideration. Though these two facts in the case of Sind and the Panjab are almost identical yet the real causes of the fall of the Panjab are different from the causes of the fall of Sind. In the case of the former we read of treachery or defection of no Indian king or feudatory. Perhaps the Mahomedan historian Utbi, the Secretary of Mahmud, who must have known all secrets omitted purposely the mention of such cases. But as in even Mahomedan histories of Sind we have such a mention, we may safely say that in the case of the Panjab treachery was not one of the causes of its downfall. Nor was there any great difference of religion in the Panjab causing pusillanimity of the people. As explained in the last chapter of Volume II, India at this time was under one and the same religion viz. Hinduism, without the feuds between ‘Vaishnavism’ and ‘Saivism’ which later distracted that religion. As stated therein, India at this time was in the happiest condition of having one religion, Buddhism being dead and Mahomedanism being yet far off. India was also blessed in other respects in the tenth century A. D. and was at the height of its strength and prosperity from which as from a summit there was bound to be a descent by the laws of nature. The historian has to find how this descent came on.

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Various causes are assigned by historians or are usually imagined by people in this connection; but most of these in our view were non-existent or are not the real causess. Thus Lane-Poole remarks “To the contrast of union and disunion, north and south, race and climate was added the zeal of the Moslem and the greed of the robber”. Sachau thinks that the princes of Northern India were too narrowminded to see the danger and to unite (preface to Al-Beruni). Sardesai states that Mahmud knew that there were small kingdoms in India which were constantly fighting with one another and that he had a large army which he had to feed and employ somehow. How these various views are, in our opinion, not well-founded, we proceed to discuss at length.

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That the Hindu kingdoms in India were not alive to the danger and did not unite is not a fact, as we actually see in the history recorded by Mahomedans themselves. A new and dangerous religion had come to the frontiers of India long ago viz. in Sind in 712 and the Hindus then, under the first Rajput warriors of Mewad and Sambhar, as shown in Vol. II pp. 5 and 91, offered a most stubborn resistance to the Arabs and stayed their onward march for ever. Three hundred years later came the Turks fired with the fanaticism of new proselytes and establishing themselves at Ghazni began to harass the Hindus and destroy their temples. Nay the Hindus had an experience of what was coming on, 60 years before, when Zabulistan was first taken by Yakub-i-Lais and his governor destroyed a famous Hindu temple at Sakhāwand and Rai Kamlu of Kabul was staggered at the sacrilege (E. II. p. 172). The Hindu kings were, therefore, alive to the danger from long experience and did thrice combine, brought large armies larger than those which Mahmud could oppose to them, yet failed. The idea, therefore, that the Hindu kings were oblivious of the peril and did not unite is entirely against the facts.

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Nor was there any real need for this union. The idea that Hindu kingdoms of this time were small is not correct. The Shahi kingdom of Kabul and the Panjab was far more extensive than the small kingdom of Ghazni which was ruled by Sabuktagin or in his early days by Mahmud himself. That kingdom should alone have been able to destroy Ghazni if it had been well prepared. The kingdom of Kanauj was more extensive and more powerful still. Indeed that kingdom, as Arab travellers relate, kept four armies constantly in the field which were so powerful that they could have taken even Multan and driven the Arabs out of Sind. The kingdom of the Chandel king Dhanga was not insignificant and though Rājyapāla of Kanauj had fallen from the example of his great ancestor Bhoja, Dhanga the king of Kalangar and Gwalior was powerful enough to be able himself alone to destroy Mahmud. It is generally not known that Mahmud's kingdom at this time was small and his army also was comparatively inconsiderable. It was also not drawn from one nation, the soldiers being Turks, Afghans, Kurds and Persians who were often at war with one another. Mahmud indeed did not come with an overpowering force of barbarians like Zangis or Timur who with Mogul horsemen of one race numbering seven or four lakhs swept like tornedoes over Asia from the Caspian to the Indus and wrought destruction in five years which five hundred years were unable to repair (Gibbon). Mahmud's army was undoubtedly small compared with the army of Jaipal, as even Mahomedan historians relate, in the first great battle and even in the second with Anadapāla. Nor was it more united than the Hindu army so as to oppose union to disunion. The contrast of north and south also did not exist for Ghazni was opposed to Kabul; and the soldiers of Jaipal of Kabul were unquestionably Afghans yet unconverted and unconverted Afghans could not have been less valiant than Moslem Afghans. Even a difference of race Turk and Aryan did not, in our view, make any difference in the fighting qualities of the two armies. It is indeed a common fallacy by which barbarians from the north, Turks and Afghans, are believed to be more hardy and valiant than the Aryans of the Panjab and Rajputana. This difference of race may have been one of the causes of the defeat of the Marathas at the battle of Panipat at the hands of the Afghans of Abdali, for as a matter of fact the inferiority of the Maratha compared with the Afghan in physique, ferocity and valour may be admitted. But no such difference existed or exists between the Turks and Afghans beyond the Indus and the Aryans of the Panjab and Rajputana so far as history or even present facts tell us. The Jats and Rajputs of the Panjab, whether Sikh, Mahomedan or Hindu are even now among the finest soldiers not only in India but in the whole world; and they were all Hindus in the days of Mahmud. Even now the Panjab is the chief recruiting ground for British Indian Army. The Amritsar Gazetteer states (p. 33) that the Sikh Jats of the Manjha territory can show men who in any country in the world could be deemed fine specimens of the human race. And as for the Rajputs of Rajputana, they have signalised themselves against Turks and Afghans and Moguls and Persians in many battles. The Rathods of Jaswantsing had even held Afghanistan under their sway for several years, in the days of Aurangjeb. We may believe, therefore, that so far as physical strength and valour were concerned the soldiers of Jaipal or Anandapala were not at all inferior to the Turks and Afghans of Mahmud.

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Sir Vincent Smith, without actually discussing the causes of the fall of the Panjab, suggests them in the remark ‘a new power, novel in religion, in social customs, ideas and methods of warfare appeared on the scene’. Superiority of arms and of discipline is one of the most potent causes of the prevalence of one nation over another, and it may be mentioned here that India was bound to be conquered by the British owing to their superiority in arms and discipline, their artillery and their battalions. But this factor did not exist in favour of the Mahomedans at this time. Firishta is guilty of anachronism when he mentions ‘tops’ (cannon) as being used by Mamud in the same way as he mentions Delhi and Aimer as opposing Mahmud, since cannon had no existence in the days of Mahmud as much as Delhi or Aimer. From the article “Gunpowder” in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the following facts appear: 1 Gunpowder is believed to have been invented either by a German about 1345 or by Roger Bacon about 1225 A. D. 2 Gunpowder was not known to the ancient Greeks, Hindus or Arabs. They no doubt knew some incendiary process which they used in war but they did not know explosives and had neither guns nor cannon. 3 History does not record the use of firearms in India except at the battle of Panipat by Babar. We are thus assured that Mahmud had no firearms and relied on the same weapons of war swords, scimitars and lances, as the Hindus; and Mahomedan poet-historians expatiate on the merits of these only (Elliot Vol. II) as may be seen in Utbi or Baihaki. Indeed if there was superiority in weapons it was on the side of the Hindus. They knew it is clear, how to make good steel. The iron pillar at Delhi is a wonder even to the moderns (who are surprised at its manufacture in a way that it does not rust); and Indian swords were prized by the soldiers of Mahmud. Utbi poetically makes the sword of a Turkish soldier exclaim “I am a Hindu of a good family” (p. 216) thereby referring to the better steel of that weapon made in India, and we find that in the plunder of battle-fields swords and arms of the slain Hindu soldiers were objects of special attention.* We do not think there was any superiority of discipline on the side of the Mahomedans or that the Mahomedan army had been disciplined in the modern sense. Their horses might have been better as Afghanistan and Persia produce better horses as even Rājaśekhara notes. But Rajputana horses were not bad and imported Arabian and Persian horses could be had in plenty. In fact the Pratihāra emperors of Kanauj, coming from Rajputana as they did, were well-known for their cavalry and they were for that reason called Hayapatis. And the Hindus had one powerful arm in addition viz. the elephant which the Mahomedans did not possess. Even the Turks subsequently coveted this arm and developed it; for we see Sabuktagin and Mahmud using elephants against the Turks of Kashgar and using them with effect (Utbi). It is curious to note that while the Hindus could not use the elephants against the Turks of Mahmud, Mahmud could use the same elephants against the Turks of Ilek-khan with great effect. This is sufficient to prove the great generalship of Mahmud and the incompetence of India's commanders. How Mahmud made the Hindu elephant arm ineffectual we are not told by Mahomedan writers though we are told by Greek historians how Alexander discomfited the same arm of Porus. It may be noted that even after Sabuktagin and Mahmud had begun to use elephants in their armies their drivers remained Hindus. In fact during a succeeding reign at Ghazni the Hindu drivers of elephants were remiss in their duty and were severely punished (Baihaki). Strangely enough at the present day this art is wholly lost by the Hindus and elephant-drivers are all Mahomedans now (E. II 143).

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∗ Panjab produces iron at Kalabagh and Bhera and Nizamabad are well-known for the excellant swords which are manufactured there even now as may be known from specimeus placed in the Lahore museum.

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It is, therefore, difficult to conceive how the method of warfare of the Turks was different from that of the Hindus unless we take into account the extreme cruelty with which the Turks treated the vanquished. It is undeniable that of all nations the Hindus in their history behaved with the greatest humanity towards their conquered foes. They never massacred even the fighting population as the Turks under Mahmud did. When we say that Mahmud was not cruel, we compare him with other Mahomedan conquerors, especially the Mogul Zangis or Timur. Compared with the conduct of Hindus when conquering, his method must indeed have struck terror into the hearts of the less cruel people of India. Fighting men were usually massacred and innocent people were enslaved and carried into captivity and towns and villages were often destroyed. Even in European history we find war conducted with far more cruelty both in ancient and modern times. Even the Greeks and the Romans were very cruel in the treatment of conquered foes and massacre and enslavement were the constant concomitants of conquest in war. In this sense Mahmud's method of warfare was novel; but this cannot be treated as one of the causes of the downfall of the Panjab. We are trying to find out why the Hindu armies were defeated; though no doubt the terrible consequences of one defeat might impair the morale of Hindu soldiers in subsequent encounters.

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The political ideas of the Turks and the Hindus were almost exactly the same. Both had no idea of representative government, though the Hindus may have had them in pre-Gupta days of rights of people or of responsibilities of kings. They knew only one form of government viz. the despotic and had no idea of a nation in the modern sense. There was no feeling of nationality or of patriotism. The kings became kings by heirship or by the favour of God manifested by giving success in battle. Neither the Turks of Mahmud nor the Hindus of Jaipal fought as the Germans and the French fought in the last European War under the high impulse of nationality and patriotism. It cannot, therefore, be supposed that a feeling of strong nationality which always prompts stubborn fighting gave the Turks the success which they invariably achieved; for such feeling never existed among the Turks who only fought for Mahmud. They were fighting not for a nation but for a king. No doubt the zeal of Mahomedanism supplied the place of patriotism and the religious fervour of the newly converted Turks and Afghans was a great factor in the success of Mahmud. But this does not constitute a novelty of ideas nor would it have been a cause of the downfall of the Panjab had it been opposed by an equally strong religious zeal of the Hindus. Lastly we do not see any novelty in the social manners of the Turks that contributed to the downfall of the Hindus. Even in manners as in ideas the Turks were practically like the Hindus who opposed them. The Hindus of the Panjab and Kabul then were flesh-eaters and not vegetarians and even at this day Panjab is less vegetarian than the other provinces of India. The Hindus were not beaf-eaters no doubt, but that can not, in our view, have contributed to any extent to the fall of Kabul and the Panjab.

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DOWNFALL OF THE PANJAB-PROBABLE CAUSES.

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The causes of the downfall of nations, peoples, or kingdoms, have always been a subject of deep interest to historians both in ancient and modern times; and historians have formulated different theories in different cases which cannot have universal application. The fall of Greece before Rome, of Rome before the Goths and of Constantinople before the Turks present different aspects and must necessarily be assigned to different causes. Even in India, as said before, the causes of the fall of Sind in 712, of the Punjab in 1009, of Northern India in about 1200, and of Southern India about 1300 A. D., are different and Indian historians have the difficult task of explaining in each case the probable causes of the downfall of each. Yet the general observations of the great historian of the downfall of the Roman Empire have a perennial interest and supply maxims which are of universal application. Although the causes of the fall of the Roman Empire in the West are actually different from the causes which can properly be assigned for the fall of the Panjab, the observations of Gibbon will help us in our present inquiry to a great extent.

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The natural impulse to "assign fortune of Rome as the cause of the misfortune of Greece" had to be first overcome in the manner in which Polybius a great historian of the Greeks did it by showing the deep foundations of the greatness of Rome. "The unique constitution of Rome which united the freedom of popular assemblies with the wisdom of a senate and the executive powers of a regal magistrate, the oath of military service of ten years imposed on every citizen in the cause of the country which continually poured into the field young freemen and soldiers, the military system of Rome with its remarkable legion superior in active strength to the Macedonian phalanx, these institutions of peace and war explain according to Polybius the success of a people incapable of fear and impatient of repose. The ambitious design of conquering the world was attempted and achieved and the perpetual vjolation of justice was maintained by the political virtues of prudence and courage". But even this great world empire declined and fell. "It was the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness. Prosperity ripened the principle of decay. The causes of destruction multiplied with the extent of conquest. The victorious legions in distant wars acquired the vices of mercenaries and first oppressed the republic and then violated the purple. The emperors were reduced to the expedient of corrupting the discipline which rendered the legions formidable alike to the enemy and the sovereign, the vigour of the military government was relaxed and the Roman world was overwhelmed by a deluge of barbarians".

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"The introduction or at least the abuse of Christianity had some influence on the fall of the Roman Empire. The clergy successfully preached the doctrines of patience and pusillanimity and the active virtues of society were discouraged; the last remnants of the military spirit were buried in the cloister; a large portion of public and private wealth was consecrated to the specious demands of charity and devotion; the soldiers' pay was lavished on the useless multitudes of both sexes who could only plead the merit of abstinence and chastity. The Church and even the State were distracted by religious factions, the attention of emperors was diverted from camps to synods. The Roman world was oppressed by a new species of tyranny and the persecuted sects became the secret enemies of the country." (Gibbon by Bury IV p. 172-5). This extract is rather long but these observations and some others in this chapter are of everlasting interest and validity; and although the causes of the fall of the Panjab with which we are immediately concerned are entirely different from the causes which led to the fall of the Western Roman Empire, they afford indications which are valuable not only in the inquiry before us but in the more important question of the causes of the fall of India in the days of Prithviraj with which we shall have to deal at the end of this volume.

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If we take into view the condition of the Hindus of the Panjab and the Moslems of Ghazni and see how far the former were inferior or superior to the latter in those respects which contribute to the strength or weakness of kingdoms, we shall be able to arrive at a correct idea of the probable causes of the downfall of the Panjab. We have seen that the Turks were not more united than the Hindus; indeed disunion was as much a bane of the Turks as of the Hindus and Utbi, describing the disunion among the Turks beyond the Oxus, quotes the verses of the Koran "Their power is very great between them if they are united but their hearts are diverse. We have sent enmity between them and hatred for ever". The Turks were again as civilized or rather uncivilized as the Hindus using the same weapons, having no popular assemblies and no national spirit and without legions or phalanxes. The Hindu kingdom of the Panjab was not again so large, like the Roman empire, as to fall by its own weight. The Turks did not attack India in overwhelming swarms like the Goths and the Vandals. Moreover the Turks were not more warlike or of stronger physique or more inured to toil and exertion than the Afghans of Kabul and the Rajputs of the Panjab who opposed them in the beginning. Indeed the Hindus of the Panjab were used as soldiers by Mahmud himself and his successors in their battles and in the battle fought by Mahmud against Ilek-khan king of the Turks beyond the Oxus Hindus fought bravely on the side of Mahmud. The Hindu kingdom of the Panjab was not further ill-governed and there were no traitors who assisted the Moslems. And finally Mahmud's kingdom of Ghazni in the beginning was small compared with the kingdom of Kabul and the Panjab ruled by Jaipal and his army must have been also comparatively smaller than that of the latter. There even do not appear to be any factions, religious or political, to distract the attention of Jaipal. These apparent causes of superiority in the one and decay in the other being absent may be kept out of mind and we will see in what respect the Turks were superior to the Hindus or the latter inferior to the former.

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I The foremost superiority of the Turks was in the personality of their general Mahmud. We do not generally realise the value and power of personalities. As stated before, nature produces from time to time men who by their mental and physical power change the destinies of kingdoms or the face of the human world. One Buddha or one Jesus was powerful enough to turn half the world towards peace, one Mahomet could turn the other half towards the principle of force in the propragation of truth. In the field of politics we see the immense influence of one Shivaji who secured independence to the Maratha people for two centuries and established their reputation for ever. It is our firm conviction that without the personal factor of Shivaji the Marathas could not have achieved what they achieved and it is our firm opinion that without Mahmud the Turks could not have overthrown the Hindus of the Panjab. The case of Mahmud is exactly similar to that of Shivaji. Endowed with indomitable courage and indefatigable energy they both formed great designs and had the necessary resourcefulness and resolution to put their conceptions into execution. Nobody at the time of Shahaji could have thought it possible to free Mahārāshtra from the yoke of Mahomedan rule by destroying the Bijapur power in its immediate vicinity and defeating the immense imperial Mogul armies of distant Delhi. And yet Shivaji formed that seemingly impossible plan and carried it out in his own life-time by his unique powers of organization and his immense moral force. Nobody similarly could then have thought that the small kingdom of Ghazni could destroy the powerful kingdom of Kabul in its vicinity or defeat the imperial armies of distant Kanauj. Yet Mahmud in his high ambition conceived that bold design and by his energies and personal influence put it into execution. Shivaji stands no doubt on a higher moral pedestal than Mahmud as he devoted his energies to the noble task of freeing his people from the thraldom of a foreign power and religion, while Mahmud conceived and carried out the project of enslaving other people, of conquering other kingdoms and imposing upon them a foreign religion. All the same, almost impossible purposes were formed by both and achieved by both by unique qualities. Both had in the beginning only a small army and a nucleus kingdom; but both increased them by their recourcefulness and their power of organization. Shivaji indeed had a very small army inherited from his father; yet he eventually organised a striking force that could defeat even the imperial Mogul armies and plunder rich Mogul cities. Mahmud did the same and created an army which at the close of his life amounted to a lakh of foot, half a lakh of horse and 1300 elephants as stated before.

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Mr. Sardesai thinks that Mahmud had already a large force which he had perforce to feed and employ in conquering India. But this does not seem to be true though probably he had at the beginning a larger force than Shivaji had. But even if he had a large force, if he had been incapable, what was there to prevent him from disbanding it gradually? And whence was the money to come, even if Turk or Afghan turbulent spirits were available in numbers? The plunder of temples and idols came in later. And whence did Shivaji get his resources? Even the men whom he had at hand for turning into soldiers were peaceful Māvalas. The greatness of great men lies indeed in their power to find men and money and to train them and use them in the proper way. The greatness lies in the unshaking resolve and the burning desire. "Get up" says Vidulā, in the famous Mahābhārata episode, to her whining son defeated and dispossessed of his kingdom. "Get up with the firm resolve of fighting and getting your kingdom back and you will find the men and the money you want." The organizing power and the moral ascendancy of both Shivaji and Mahmud are apparent in their training up their people so as to fit them for tough fighting and make them ready to die for them and further in keeping the trenchant weapon they had forged under due control. For, as Gibbon has said, legions become dangerous not only to the enemy but also to their master. Where national feeling does not exist to restrain or defeat the ambition of traitorous governors and generals, they can only be kept in their proper sphere by the overpowering personality of the master. When the dominating personality is removed, the formidable army becomes the destroyer of its own master as we actually find happening later on in the case of the incapable successors of Mahmud himself. Many feudatories became independent and a king of Ghazni was seized and blinded by his own generals. The very formidable nature of the striking machine forged by Mahmud or Shivaji and the successful use of it by them for their own purposes, prove the immense power which they wielded over the hearts of their soldiers and captains.

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Looking to the opponents of Mahmud, we do not find any men of great capacities as general or organiser. Jaipal no doubt acquitted himself honourably and valiantly in the task before him. But what was there to prevent him from organising a strong army when he became aware of the danger? Indeed what was there to prevent him from the beginning from maintaining a powerful army against all eventualities? It is the first duty of every king or state to maintain a strong army capable of defending the people against internal foes or external enemies. And Jaipal had ample materials at hand in men and money. Indeed Harsha who began with a moderately sized kingdom and who eventually conquered the whole of Northern India maintained an army, only one arm of which consisted of 60000 elephants. And he maintained this vast army without plundering any towns or temples. And yet he had immense riches to bestow in charity on Brahmins and Śramaṇas at his five-yearly alms-giving festivals at Prayāga. The great defect of the Hindu kings opposed to Mahmud both in Kabul and Kanauj was that they appear to have neglected their armies unlike their predecessors Bhima and Bhoja. The soldiers' pay, in the immortal words of Gibbon, was perhaps lavished on the endowment of temples and the decoration of idols; for we read of no large standing armies at both places. The Arab travellers of the tenth century A. D. recorded that India was famous for its armies. That fame was belied by the Indian kingdoms in the eleventh century. The kingdom of Kabul and the Panjab was extensive enough to support a strong army and Jaipal need not have sought the aid of neighbouring kings and collected a confederate force.. Even this confederate force failed because it had not a great general to lead it; a Duke of Wellington to match Napoleon.∗ It is sometimes thought that a confederate army can not fight with the strength of a single army. This is not true, as we actually find that confederate armies won on the plains of France both in the past and in the present century. There must be no doubt one controlling mind and we have stated that the confederate armies of India were under the single leadership of Jaipal or Anandapāla. But they failed because they were no match for Mahmud and they failed for other reasons also which we proceed to notice.

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∗ The Oxford history of India by Smith states that the confederate army was led in 1008 by Visaladeva of Ajmer. Unfortunately we find no authority for this. And this Visala even if he led is not known as a great conqueror.

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I. The weakness of the religious feeling of the Hindus had a great deal to do with their defeat in the Panjab. The dominant binding sentiment on either side was not national but religious, as has already been stated. But while the religious zeal of the Mahomedans was stubborn and overpowering, the religious sentiment of the Hindus was weak and almost apathetic. It was to be expected that the zeal of the Moslem and the greed of the robber would be equally met by the fervour of the Hindu and the indignation of the robbed. Not only were temples plundered and idols rifled of their jewels but hundreds and thousands of Hindus were forcibly converted. It is, therefore, natural to expect that the Hindus would have fought with all the exasperation and the courage of the defiled and the despoiled. And equally matched as they were in number and civilization, perhaps even superior, they should not have accepted defeat. But the zeal of the Hindus has always been mild for various reasons. For one, he is usually tolerant. It is a common experience that while a Mahomedan's exasperation is most acute at the least insult offered to the Koran or to the great Prophet, a Hindu quietly listens to any abuse of the Veda or of Rāma and Kṛiṣhṇa. A Hindu is again by habit inaggressive. The Hindu religion has always preached Ahinsā and the Hindu is accustomed to pacific modes of life. Thirdly, the Hindus had wrong notions about their idols; and probably still have. As stated before, images have no miraculous powers and when the idols themselves were found to be powerless, it would be superstitiously thought useless for man to resist where even the deity has thought fit to submit. But it must be remembered that an image after all is an emblem and if the emblem is insulted it is not the metal or the stone that is insulted nor the deity which it represents, for it is above all insult. It is they who are really insulted, who believe in that emblem. When the face of the statue of Queen Victoria was tarred in Bombay, it was not the marble that was insulted nor the good Queen Victoria but it was the British nation which was, and which was intended to be, insulted which had set up the statue. But by a wrong philosophy or rather by superstition the Hindus thought the deities powerless against Mahmud who was bound to succeed as it was destined that the Sanātana Dharma was to suffer in the Kali age. Such reasoning naturally acted upon the minds of the Hindus more forcibly when accidents actually happened which worked against them and they did not fight with that resentment and exasperation which should have animated those whose temples had been desecrated and whose houses had been dishonoured.

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II. Secondly, the fall of the Panjab may also be attributed to the political apathy of its people. Unfortunately for twelve centuries before this, Panjab had been ruled by foreign kings. It may be said that for twenty centuries from the time of Porus down to the time of Ranjitsingh, Panjab had no kings of its own. It was ruled by foreign Hindu or Mlechchha rulers from the time of Alexander to that of Mahmud, by Macedonians, by Mauryas, by Śakas, by Bactrian Greeks, by Kushans, by Huns, by Kashmirians, by Sindhis, and lastly by the Shahi kings of Kabul and after Mahmud by Mahomedan kings of Ghazni and Delhi for eight centuries more till the Sikhs gave to the Panjab native kings after a foreign rule extending over two thousand years. When Mahmud conquered the Panjab, there was no political consciousness awake in the minds of its people. Though Aryans the people had lost all desire, even if they had the ability, to enjoy self-rule or independence and they did not demur to be ruled by a Moslem Turk from Ghazni instead of a Brahmin Afghan from Kabul. They were apathetic to the change of rule that was coming upon them and they did not resist with that stubbornness which belongs to a people fighting to preserve independence. Panjab was thus lost to Mahomedans in one battle. Kingdoms have no doubt been lost in one battle in western history also. England indeed was acquired by William the Conqueror in one battle. But while the people of England made the Norman kings their own, the people of the Panjab were made their own by the Mahomedan kings of Ghazni and the Panjab was practically sliced off from India in 1009 as Sind was in 712 A. D.

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It may here be objected that these two causes can be assigned as the causes of the downfall, not only of the Panjab, but of all Indian kingdoms; indeed of most Asiatic people. This is no doubt true and we shall have to mention these causes also when discussing the causes of the downfall of Northern India at the end of Book VII in this very volume. The weakness of the religious feeling of the Hindus and their political apathy are their dominant characteristics over the whole of India. But what we wish to emphasize here is that while those other causes which chiefly led to the downfall of the Rajput kingdoms of Northern India about 1200 A. D. as we shall show later on, did not exist in the Panjab viz. internecine fighting and rigidity of caste, these two causes which alone existed in the Panjab operated with greater force there than elsewhere and are thus the only causes which can be assigned to its downfall. How this is so we proceed to explain at length. The religious or political tendencies of peoples are the results of historical development and are capable of examination and explanation.

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The Panjab had no doubt been the home of Vedic Aryans from the most ancient days; the place where the Vedic hymns were mostly composed and sung at sacrifices, the place where even later Vedic civilisation developed. Gāndhāra and Madra are the lands of Pāṇini and Aśvapati the teachers of grammar and philosophy. The Upanishads contain many references to the Brahmins and Kshatriyas of these famous lands on the west and the east of the Indus. But the "land of the five rivers and the sixth Indus" subsequently became a home of Buddhism, next only to Magadha. Buddha himself preached successfully in Afghanistan and the Panjab and later on Mahāyāna Buddhism was evolved under Kanishka in this land. Purushapura and Takshaśilā two places of Vedic fame became centres of Buddhist learning. The Panjab, therefore, though originally the home of Indo-Aryans (and even now it is pre-eminently Indo-Aryan as Sir H. Risley found from facial measurements taken at the census of 1901) was less strong in the Hindu sentiment than the rest of India even in the days of the present Mahābhārata of 250 B. C. (See note). It continued to be so in the days of Hiuen Tsang who in 630 A. D. recorded that Kapisa or Kabul with Nagar (Jalalabad) and Udyāna (Swat) with Taxila were entirely Buddhist, while Peshawar and the Panjab were half Buddhist (see Vol. I p. 48). Caste which was weak even in Vedic times became still weaker in Buddhist days. Brahmanism developed in the land of the Sarasvati and caste gathered strength in Upper India, while it remained fluid in the Panjab "where a Brahmin would become a barber one day and a Brahmin again on the next" (See note). When, after Harsha, Buddhism was overthrown in India by the efforts of Kumārila and Śaṅkara and modern Hinduism was evolved, Buddhism no doubt disappeared even from the Panjab, but the Hindu influence from the south was too distant to correct the laxity of caste and food prevailing there. And we can thus see why at the time when Mahmud conquered the Panjab, the Hindu sentiment among the people was particularly weak. The people lacked that intensity of faith in the Varṇāśrama Dharma which characterised the people of the Gangetic valley and they consequently did not resist forcible conversion with stubbornness and ceased to worship the idols which Mahmud broken with more ease than could have been expected of a Hindu population possessing all the physical superiority of the Aryan race.

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