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History of Mediaeval Hindu India (being a History of India from 600 to 1200 A.D.) v3.c36: Chapter XX. Shihabuddin Ghori, and His Conflict with Prithvīrāj.

History of Mediaeval Hindu India (being a History of India from 600 to 1200 A.D.) v3.c36

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Chapter XX. Shihabuddin Ghori, and His Conflict with Prithvīrāj.

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Panjab fell before Mahmud, Turkish king of Ghazni; Northern India fell before Shihabuddin, Afghan king of Ghor. It is, therefore, necessary to give a short account of this king before we proceed to narrate the history of the fall of the Rajput kingdoms of Northern India, in the same way as we gave an account of the rise of the Turkish kingdom of Ghazni, before we gave the history of the downfall of the Panjab.

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Ghor is a mountainous territory to the northwest of Ghazni peopled by Afghans and the king and people of Ghor were originally Hindus, as elsewhere in Afghanistan. They were converted to Mahomedanism before and during the days of Mahmud of Ghazni. The kings of Ghor ruled in subordination to the Sultans of Ghazni for long time, till in the time of Sultan Bahram a quarrel arose between them. Bahram unnecessarily first killed Kutubuddin Ghori and then his brother Saifuddin with the greatest possible indignity at Ghazni. Allauddin, their brother, vowed vengeance and marched on Ghazni, when Bahram marched out of Ghazni to oppose him with a formidable force the chief arm of which was the elephant force. By the bravery of certain heroes, Allauddin was able to defeat the elephant force as also the army of Bahram who fled leaving Ghazni to the tender mercies of Allauddin. A most terrible vengeance was exacted by him from Ghazni which was plundered and burnt for seven days continuously. Every man that was found there was slain and the women and children were made slaves. He destroyed all the palaces of the Mahmudi kings "which had no equals in the world." After that he returned to Ghor with the remains of his brothers and he interred them in the tombs of their ancestors (Tabakat-i-Nasiri E. II p. 289). A terrible vengeance indeed on the people for the fault of their king!!! Bahram fled to India but died on the way. Allauddin Ghori for this act of cruelty is properly called Jahān-soz or burner of the world. After his death his son succeeded him and after his death within a short time Ghiyasuddin Muhammad bin Sam, his cousin, succeeded in Ferozkoh, the capital of Ghor. His brother Muez-ud-din Muhammad bin Sam became king of Ghazni in 1172 A. D. The Gozz Turks who held the possession of Ghazni for twelve years, the Mahmudi Sultan Khusru having fled to India, were driven away by him. He ruled in behalf of his brother Ghiyasuddin but was virtually master. He was an ambitious energetic king and naturally formed the design of conquering all the Indian territory of the Mahmudi Sultans of Ghazni and of conquering Hindustan itself. Muhammad Ghori was also called Shiha-buddin or ‘flaming star of religion.’

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He first conquered Multan and the adjoining territory in 1175; and in 1178 A. D. he led his army by way of Uchh and Multan against Naharwala. The Rai of Naharwala was a minor (the name Bhīma is wrongly given here by the Tabakat, it ought to have been Mūlarāja as we have already seen in Gujarat history; he was, however, elder brother of Bhīma) but the Rai had a large army and many elephants and the Sultan was defeated and compelled to retreat.

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In 1179 A D. he took Peshawar and two years later he advanced against Lahore which was the capital of the Mahmudi Sultan Khusru. The power of the Ghaznavides was on the decline and their glory was departing. Khusru Malek sent his son as hostage and an elephant as present and he was spared this time. Muhammad Ghori thereafter turned his attention towards Sind and conquered Debal and the surrounding country upto the sea. In 1184 he again marched towards Lahore, ravaged the country, founded the town and fort of Sialkot and finally took Lahore. Khusru Malek could offer no resistance; he came forth peacefully to meet the Sultan and was made a prisoner and he was subsequently sent to Ferozkoh the capital of Ghor and thence to a fort with his son in 1191 A. D. and there put to death about 1205 A. D. This conduct and fate of the last Ghaznavide Sultan reminds one of the similar conduct and fate of the Sultan of Bijapur before Auranzjeb. Muezuddin appointed a governor in Lahore and the father of the author of the Tabakat, Kazi of the army of Hindustan a d then returned to Ghazni (E. II p. 295). Thus was substituted in the Panjab a new dynasty of rulers in place of the effete old Mahmudi dynasty and a new ambitious powerful king came to the throne of Ghazni, who had the energy and ambition, though not the greatness, of Mahmud and who fought with the Rajput kings of Northern India as neighbouring kings must always do.

His Conflict with Prithvīrāj.

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The important kingdom in his immediate neighbourhood was the kingdom of Ajmer and Delhi ruled by Prithvīrāj and the two emperors were equally matched in their personal capacities and the extent of their resources. The history of this conflict is differently told in the Rāsā of Chand and the Taj-ul-Ma'sir of Nizamuddin followed by the Tabakat-i-Nasiri. Both sides exaggerate the merits of their heroes; but historically considered, the account of the Taj and the Tabakat, written about 20 and 50 years respectively after the event, is more reliable than the almost fabulous account given in the Rāsā amplified to its present form nearly 300 years after Prithvīrāja. We will, therefore, mainly follow the account of these Mahomedan writers and try to test it historically; though it may be regretted that the Taj is not more detailed and less poetical, in fact is not to be compared with the well-known chronicle of Mahmud by Utbi.

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We may first notice the extract from the Tabakat given by Elliot II (p. 295). The first attack was made by Muhammad Ghori who invaded Hindu territory and seized the fort of Sirhind and placed it under a Mahomedan governor. "Rai Pithaura came up against the fort and the Sultan faced him at Narain. All the Rais of Hindustan were with the Rai Kola (a term of abuse)." Probably Prithvīrāja for this conflict, in order to nip in the bud this aggression by Mahomedans against Hindus, collected a confederate Hindu army and then advanced against the Sultan. But there is no corroborating evidence from epigraphic records to prove this confederacy. "In the fight, the Sultan seizing a lance attacked Govindrai of Delhi who was riding an elephant, the Sultan being on horseback. The Sultan drove his lance into the mouth of Govindrai and knocked down two of his teeth. The Rai, however, by his blow wounded severely one arm of his adversary. The Sultan reined back his horse and turned aside. As the Sultan began to totter on his horse, an intrepid young Afghan sprang upon the Sultan's horse and supported him and took the horse safely away. But the army thinking the Sultan killed, gave way and fled; and thus was inflicted a severe defeat upon the Mahomedans."

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Whether this account is true and whether the defeat was not, in the usual fashion, due to superior numbers or superior tactics or superior heroism, we need not discuss. One thing may be said, however, that the Mahomedans, even according to their account, like the Hindus, fled unbeaten because of the report of the death of their king. This is not strange. Eastern armies fight not for nations but for kings. The Mahomedans were no more fired by a national sentiment than the Hindus; and the substitute of a religious for a national sentiment was equal on both the sides. Certain it is that in this battle, Shihabuddin Ghori was signally defeated (1191 A. D.).

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The tradition among the Hindus is, as recorded in the Rāsā, that the Sultan was captured. The story of Dhira Pundira given in the Rāsā is clearly fictitious; but it is possible that when Govindrai (who is not mentioned in the Rāsā at all and who is represented as killed in the next conflict with Prithvirāj) inflicted a severe wound on the Sultan and he began to totter on his horse, he may have been seized by Pundir and finally captured. The Sultan was allowed to return by Prithvirāj after a ransom of 30 elephants and five hundred horses was taken from him. This much may be historically true. The Taj does not mention this defeat at all but discreetly begins with the Sultan's next advance against Prithvirāja. It is, of course, entirely unbelievable as alleged by the Rāsā that the Sultan was many times captured in battle and at each time released and sent back by Prithvirāja. This is the usual reduplication of events noticeable from the story of Krishna in the Purānas down to the story of Munja by the chroniclers who is supposed to have six times defeated and captured Taila Chālukya of Kalyan (see Vol. II p. 120). But an exaggeration like this generally has some truth behind it and we may believe that Shihabuddin was captured in this battle and released on ransom just as Jaipal was released by Mahmud after his first defeat on a similar ransom.*

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Whatever be the reality of this incident, the fact that the Sultan was defeated in this battle is accepted on both sides. The place of this battle is given as Narain which, in the original, must be Tarain. The scene is said to be on the Sarsuti but Cunningham thinks that the exact site was on the banks of the Raukshi river, four miles south of Tirauri and ten miles to the north of Karnal. "Tirauri is also called Azimābād" (note Elliot II p. 295). The Karnāl Gazetteer (1918) gives the latest information and states (p. 10) that the battle was fought at Nardina a village in the Nai Wafi in the Nardak, 12 miles south of Thanesar and 3 miles from Taraori.

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The Tabakat proceeds to relate that when the Sultan retired, Prithvīrāja invested the fort of Sirhind for 13 months. If this is true it can not be believed that the Sultan was captured in battle and released. For one condition of such release would naturally have been the surrender of the fort which had been wrongly seized by the Sultan; and probably the fight would not have been continued or even renewed so soon. The Sultan according to the Tabakat made fresh preparations and returned to the fight with an overwhelming force.

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The Taj-ul-Ma'sir suppresses all this and begins with the statement that the Sultan sent a venerable reliable man to Ajmer calling upon Prithvīrāja to accept Islam and subordination to the Sultan; thus giving the affair a wholly religious aspect. It does not seem to us that Muhammad Ghori's war upon India was from religious motives as that of Mahmud was, though Mahommedan writers naturally give it this form. The war was waged solely for aggression and extension of dominion as the more truly historical Tabakat describes.

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The Taj gives no details about this final conflict but merely says that the army of Islam was victorious and a hundred thousand Hindus swiftly "departed to the fire of hell." The more truly historical Tabakat gives interesting details. Quoting an eye-witness who was in the army, it states that the army of Islam numbered a hundred and twenty thousand horsemen clad in armour. The numbers on the Hindu side are not given. "Before the Sultan arrived, the fort had capitulated and the Hindu army was encamped in the vicinity of Narain." It thus appears that the site of the second battle was nearly the same as before. The tactics adopted at this battle are described by the Tabakat as follows:—

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∗ Rēzā mentions guns and even canon in this battle which plainly indicates that the Rēzā account was written after Babar who first used guns in India in the 16th century.

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"The Sultan drew up his battle array, leaving his main body in the rear with the banners, canopies and elephants. The light-armoured horsemen were made into four divisions of 10,000 each and were directed to advance and to harass the enemy, on the right, on the left, in the front and in the rear. When the enemy collected his forces to attack, they were to support each other and to charge at full speed. By these tactics the enemy was worsted, the Almighty gave us the victory over them and they fled". (p. 297).

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The manner of fighting adopted by the Mahomedans at this momentous battle as described above appears similar to that adopted by Mahmud in his battles with Jaipal and Ānandapāla; frequent attacks by bodies of cavalry and a final attack by a reserve force, a measure also adopted by Ahmed Shah Abdali. How the Hindus fought cannot be stated as the descriptions in the Rāsā are imaginary and as the author copies the Mahābhārata in describing Vyūhas in the form of birds or animals, and the description is not from an eye-witness but from a poet who wrote centuries afterwards. But that the fighting was tough and the battle was severely contested appears clear from the single sentence of the Tabakat. "The Almighty gave us the victory". There being no superiority of arms as at Assaye or at Plassey, and there being no lack of heroism on the side of the Hindus, we may take it that the battle was not a walk over, as may perhaps be thought. It cannot be gainsaid that Prithvīrāja fought most bravely in this final fight and that fate was against him at this time. The story of the Rāsā that Prithvīrāja after his marriage with Sanyogitā gave himself up solely to pleasure and neglected the army is probably fictitious. And this is doubly true when we remember that Prithvīrāja was not in Delhi as the Rāsā represents but in Ajmer. The importance of Delhi commences from Kutub-uddin. Those who wrote in later centuries, as even Firishta, could not resist the idea of bringing in Delhi, much less could the amplifier of the Rāsā and the whole story of the Rāsā including the names of the fighters on both sides, notably of Samarasinha of Chitod has to be given up as unhistorical.

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But the story of the Rāsā as to how Prithvirāj ended his life is the climax of its unhistorical nature. It is the usual story of vengeance, a story invented after the true account of the death of Muhammad Ghori at the hands of Gakkhar assassins on the south bank of the Indus had been forgotten. The real manner of Prithvirāja’s death, however, still remains a mystery like that of Bhaosaheb or Jankoji Scindia at Panipat The two accounts of the Taj and Tabakat differ. The latter merely records that “Pithaura alighted from his elephant, mounted a horse and galloped off but he was captured near Sarsuti and sent to hell”. The Taj, however, records (p. 215) that the Rai of Ajmer was taken prisoner and his life was spared. At Ajmer where he was taken, he was detected in an intrigue (*which is only obscurely hinted*) and orders were, therefore, given for his being beheaded and a sword accordingly severed the head of that accursed wretch from his body”. In this state of the evidence, it is difficult to decide how Prithvirāj met his death; but we prefer to believe that Prithvirāja was captured on the Sarsuti and immediately put to death as the Tabakat relates.

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NOTE:-1 MUHAMMAD GHORI AND PRITHVIRAJ.

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The translation of the Tabakat by Raverty gives a somewhat different wording from Elliot and states "When the ranks were duly martialled, the Sultan seized a lance and attacked the elephant on which Govindrai of Delhi was mounted and on which elephant he moved about in front of the battle. The Sultan struck Govindrai on the mouth and he launched a javelin at the Sultan and inflicted a very severe wound. The Sultan turned his charger's head round and receded and from the agony of the wound he was unable to continue on horseback any longer. Defeat befell the army of Islam and it was irretrievably routed. The Sultan was very nearly falling from his horse, seeing which a Khilji stripling recognised the Sultan and sprang up behind and supporting him in his arms urged the horse with his voice and brought him out of the field of battle. On the Muhamadan forces not seeing the Sultan, lamentations broke from them and they reached a place where the defeated army was safe from pursuit. Suddenly the Sultan arrived. (p. 431 ).

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Raverty in his note gives here the different account given by later authors and the account of Firishta as also of modern English historians based on the last. Firishta gives the army of Pithora as amounting to two lakhs of men and 3,000 elephants. He also states that the right and left wings had already been defeated and had turned their faces; and that the Sultan in the centre not heeding this led a furious assault. One account lastly states that the Sultan fell from his horse and was not known till night when slaves came searching for him among the slain on the battlefield. All this gives plausibility to the Rāsā account that the Sultan was captured. From the Tabakat even, it is clear that the Sultan was far from his men when wounded and turning back went on somehow for some time. It is likely that Dhira Pundīra, a young Rajput from the Hindu side, seeing his condition rushed on and seized him. That he was set free and asked to fight again is not inconsistent with the chivalrous character of Prithvirāj who perhaps imitated the tradition of Munja releasing his enemy Talla six times. It may further be added that Mahmud had released Jaipāl on ransom though he knew he would have to fight with him again.

Note:-2 Mahomedan Tactics at the Last Battle

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The translation of the Tabakat by Raverty gives the following somewhat different version of the fighting in the last battle with Prithvirāja (p. 467). "The Sultan made the disposition of his forces. The centre division of the army, baggage, banners, canopy and elephants were left several miles behind. He marshalled his ranks and advanced leisurely. The light-armed and unencumbered horsemen he had divided into four divisions and had appointed them to act against the infidels on four sides saying "on the right and left, front and rear, 10,000 mounted archers should keep the infidel force in play and when their elephants, horsemen and foot advanced to the attack, you are to face about and keep the distance of a horse's course in front of them. The Mussalman force kept the instructions and having wearied the unbelievers' force, Almighty God gave the victory to Islam and the infidel host was overthrown."

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Major Raverty, a military officer remarks on this that the tactics above described are not quite clear. It is impossible for us to make any comment from the military point. But it is necessary to remark that in all the three great battles which Mahomedans won (two by Mahmud and one by Shihabuddin) the Mahomedan cavalry did great execution. The Hindus usually relied on their elephant force. Indeed in inscriptions, the usual praise is that the warriors broke open the temples of elephants. But from the days of Alexander elephants in India could not withstand trained cavalry. Elephants were used no doubt by Mahmud against the Turks of Turkestan but their cavalry was unaccustomed to the sight of elephants. Secondly, harassing and attacking the enemy both in front and rear is a great factor in securing victory. Shihabuddin purposely advanced slowly so as to allow his cavalry divisions to reach the enemy's front and rear. The ancient Hindu mode of fighting including Vyūhas of the Mahābhārata has yet to be studied by modern experts but we may remark that the Hindus were straight fighters and did not adopt deceptions or even surprises. Lastly a strong reserve and a final attack in the centre by such reserve is often effective. Elephants, moreover, when defeated are a source of terror and destruction to their own force. Shihabuddin in this battle kept his elephants several miles behind.

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NOTE :-3 THE RASA ACCOUNT OF THE LAST BATTLE.

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It would be interesting to give here a summary of the account given in the Prithvīrāj Rāsā of the final fatal fight of Prithvīrāja with Shihabuddin Ghori, almost wholly imaginary as it is. We have often said that the Rāsā is plainly modelled after the Mahābhārata. Following it, it first gives the numerous evil omens that preceded the fight; it tells even of a curse on Prithvīrāja. It speaks further of Prithvīrāja having entirely neglected state affairs in his infatuation over his new queen Sanyogitā. Also it states that Prithvīrāja had affronted his sardar Hāhulirai who consequently left him, went to Kangra and induced Shihabuddin to attack Prithvīrāja. There is no corroboration of this in Mahomedan accounts. The whole description of this battle seems to indicate that the Rajputs were already overpowered with a sense of the impending doom like the Marathas at Panipat. This is not what Mahomedan accounts would lead us to believe. Prithvīrāja had conquered in the first battle and in overweening confidence had even released Ghori. The fort of Sirhind had also just fallen. But the Rāsā misrepresents the whole story and gives a different time and place to this conflict. We have seen that the battle was fought in the very next year while Prithvīrāj was still before Sirhind. The Rāsā makes the battle come after some years after the capture of Shihabuddin and while Prithvīrāj was whiling away his time with Sanyogitā in Delhi. The place is given as the plain of Panipat; the whole Kurukshetra may be called the plain of Panipat; but though near enough, the battle cannot be called a battle of Panipat.

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The forces of Shihabuddin are described as numbering one lakh horse, nine lakh foot and ten thousand elephants. This is plainly an exaggeration. The Hindu army is estimated once at 80 thousand and again at 70 thousand. This is probably a correct estimate. Prithvīrāja's force must have been reduced by fatalities in the previous fight and also in the investiture of the fort of Sirhind. It seems that in this fight the Mahomedan army given as 125 thousand horse by their own writers outnumbered the Hindu army.

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The disposition of the Hindu army, imaginary as it is, is given as follows:—Samarasinha on the left with 33 thousand supported by many sardars; on the right was Jaitrao Paramāra with 21; in the van was Chāmundarai with 19, and in the centre was Prithvīrāja overlooking the battle with 10 thousand. This is also a description in the Mahābhārata fashion; and many names of noted ancestors of modern Rajput families are given as being with one or other army, a detail which is of perennial interest to the Rajput clans of India.

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The practice of sending proposals of peace at the final moment and making recriminations, old as the Mahābhārata and recent as the modern European war, has also not been neglected. But the unhistorical nature of the messages is apparent when Shihabuddin demands half the Panjab only and delivery of the heir-apparent as hostage. The whole of the Panjab was already in the possession of Ghori. Indeed that province with Lahore was in the possession of the Mahomedans for nearly two hundred years before this battle.

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The actual fight goes on for three or four days and different Vyūhas described in the Mahābhārata are also mentioned. Usually the fight resolves itself into duels between the different chiefs on both sides. In detail of imaginary fighting the Rāsā equals the Mahābhārata. And it follows it even in making repetitions. Prithvīrāja is four times described as captured. Prithvīrāja slays many with his arrows, his sword and finally his dagger before he is seized. He is taken to Ghazni and there kept in prison and blinded. The story of Prithvīrāja killing Shihabuddin even in his blindness by his unerring aim, hearing the mere voice of Shihabuddin is the final embellishment of the Rāsā story which we have already disbelieved as a vengeance story likely to be concocted.

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It may be added that, as in the Mahābhārata fight, all the leading generals on the side of Prithvīrāja are shown as killed in battle after deeds of great heroism. The date of the fight is, however, given correctly as Ānanda Vikrama Samvat 1158 which is equivalent to 1192 A. D.

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