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Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v2.c82.s1.57

Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v2.c82.s1.57

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v2.c82.s1.57

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, therefore, attempts to refute these earlier theories and set up a peculiar doctrine of aesthetic enjoyment (*bhoga*) which makes the relish of *rasa* possible. He argues (as interpreted by Mammaṭa and others) that (i) the *rasa* cannot be produced as an effect, because the causes (namely, the *vibhāvas*), being non-realities, cannot bring about a real effect; (ii) it can not be inferred, because the real character (e. g. Rāma), not being before the audience, his feeling does not exist, and what does not exist cannot be inferred (*na tattvato rāmasya smṛtiḥ, anupalabdhatvāt*). Nor is it a case of revelation (*abhivyakti*) of something potentially existing (*śakti-rūpa*); for in that case, the potential emotions, once awakened, would occupy their field of action in diverse degrees, thus contradicting the nature of *rasa* as one; moreover, there would be the same difficulty as to whether the *rasa* is revealed in oneself or in another person. To slove these and other difficulties, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (as interpreted by Abhinavagupta) maintains that the *rasa* is enjoyed in connexion with the *vibhāvas* through the relation of the enjoyer (*bhojaka*) and the enjoyed (*bhojya*). This school³¹ postulates three different functions of a word, namely, *abhidhā* (already admitted by the Mīmāṃsakas and grammarians), *bhāvakatva* and *bhojakatva*, and thus ascribes to a poem a threefold potency of its own, namely, the powers of denotation, of generalisation and of enjoyment. The *abhidhā* is not merely the actual Denotation of a word, but is given an extended meaning so as to include *lakṣaṇā* or Indication in its scope (*abhidhā lakṣaṇaiva*), thus embracing the two functions already analysed by previous speculation. It is meant probably that the Denotation (as postulated by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka) also gives to the expressed sense a metaphorical significance as the basis of *rasa*. The *bhāvakatva* (or *rasa-bhāvanā*), which, as Abhinavagupta suggests, is apparently derived from Bharata's general definition of *bhāva*, is described as the power of generalisation which makes the *vibhāvas* as well as the *sthāyi-bhāva*, sensed in their general character without any reference to their specific properties. The *vibhāva*, Sītā, for instance, is understood through this power not as a particular individual but in the general character of a woman, and the *sthāyi-bhāva* (e.g. Rāma's love towards her) is taken as love in general without any reference to the agent or the object. In this way the audience can appropriate the *vibhāvas*, as well as the *sthāyi-bhāva*, as universal. After the *rasa* is thus generalised, comes its enjoyment. By the third function of *bhojakatva*, the *sthāyin* is enjoyed in this general form, accompanied by the *vibhāvas*, sensed also in a general form; and this enjoyment is described as a process of delectation similar to the enlightened self-sufficient and blissful knowledge, arising (in the language of the Sāmkhya philosophers, which is borrowed by these theorists) from the prominence of the attribute of goodness (*sattva*) in a man, and different from what is known as worldly happiness, being divested of personal relations or interests. It is differentiated from the two kinds of knowledge, *anubhava* and *smaraṇa*; and consisting of the qualities of melting, pervading and expanding the mind, it is compared to the indescribable bliss of divine contemplation (*brahmā-svāda-sacivaḥ*). According to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, therefore, the *rasa* consists in the *sthāyi-bhāva* or the permanent mood, experienced in a generalised form in poetry and drama through the powers of *abhidhā* and *bhāvakatva*, and enjoyed by a blissful process, known as *bhoga*, till it is raised to a state of pleasurable relish, which is not worldly (*alaukika*) but disinterested and which is akin to the philosophic meditation of Brahma.

Cites (1)