Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v2.c82.s1.59
Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v2.c82.s1.59
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v2.c82.s1.59
It will be noticed that these different theories about *rasa*, though applied to drama and poetry, are yet generally tinged with the doctrines of the various schools of Indian philosophy. Lollaṭa, it is clear, is a Mīmāṃsaka who believes in the far-reaching function of the Denotation of a word and thinks that it is capable of expressing all other implied or suggested sense in the shape of the *rasa*. Śaṅkuka, on the other hand, is a Naiyāyika or logician who would demonstrate the *rasa* by means of syllogistic reasoning. He believes that the implied *rasa* can be reached by the logical process of inference from the expressed sense, although he has to admit that the inferred mood is cognised differently from the objects of ordinary inference, being sensed by the spectator through the force of its exquisite charm. In Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka we mark a further development. In his theory there is not only a transition from what may be called the objective to the subjective view of *rasa*, and an understanding that the whole phenomenon should be explained in terms of the spectator's inward experience, but also the fact that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in his peculiar theory of aesthetic enjoyment (*bhoga*) is substantially following the teachings of the Sāṃkhya philosophers. We need not enter here into the details of Sāṃkhya psychology or metaphysics, but we may indicate briefly the application of its main teachings to the conception of poetry and the artistic delight resulting from it³². The purpose of evolution in Sāṃkhya is the attainment of *bhoga* (experience of pleasure and pain) and *apavarga* (spiritual emancipation through right knowledge). The enjoyer of *rasa* in poetry is like the knower of Brahma, but the aesthetic attitude is different from the philosophic. The aesthetic attitude is indeed one of *saṃvit* (or *cit-svabhāva*), i.e., pure contemplation dissociated from all personal interests, and results in *viśrānti* or composure; but in the philosophical attitude there is complete detachment or aloofness from pleasure and pain and egoistic impulses, for the knower becomes impersonal by transcending his *buddhi*. This comes about through the predominance of the *sāttvika guṇa* in both cases; but in the spiritual attitude the *buddhi*, which contains in it *vāsanās* or acquired impulses, modifying its intrinsic *sāttvika* character, is purged of all its egoistic tendencies, and the true knower, realising the intrinsic disparateness of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, transcends the empirical plane. Such complete detachment is not possible in the aesthetic attitude. The world of poetry, being idealised, is different from the natural world and does not evoke egoistic impulses; for the objects contemplated in poetry have no reference to any one in particular but are entirely impersonal. These impersonalised forms, therefore, afford to the enjoyer of poetry escape from the ills which arise from personal relations, but they are the means only of temporary release from the natural world, for he