Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v2.c83.24

v2.c83.24

But there is a limited class of writers who postulate another function, called *tātparya* or Purport, which leads us to apprehend the connexion among the meanings of the constituent words in the form of the import of the whole sentence. This function conveys the connected meaning of the several words and therefore differs from *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā* which convey the meaning of a particular word, the *tātparyārtha* being manifested, not by word, but by a whole sentence, and therefore remaining distinct from the meanings denoted or indicated by individual words. The words have, according to this view, the power of denoting or indicating things and not the connexion (*anvaya*) among things, which is known not from the import of words as such, but from their relations of compatibility (*yogyatā*), proximity (*sannidhi*) and expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*). When the logical connexion or *anvaya* is thus known, a special sense arises which is called *tātparya*. Mammaṭa explains (ii 1, *vṛtti*) the position of these Abhihitānvaya-vādins, as they are called, thus¹³: "When the meanings of the words, to be hereafter explained, are connected in accordance with expectancy, compatibility and proximity, another sense arises, called purport, which has a distinct form and which, though not constituting the sense of words is yet the sense of the sentence---this is the view of the Abhihitānvaya-vādins”. The theory of this school is rejected by another school of Mīmāṃsakas, called the Anvitābhidhāna-vādins, who deny the necessity of postulating a special function like tātparya; for they hold that words have a power to denote not only things but also their purport or connexion along with them. To put it in another way, words do not express their sense generally but connectedly. In ordinary life, for instance, we first understand meanings from sentences, and words convey ideas not absolutely but relatively, i.e., as having a connexion with another. *Mutatis mutandis*, the theory would remind one of Berkeley’s denial of abstract ideas.