Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v2.c83.29

v2.c83.29

Now the question has been hotly discussed as to whether it is necessary to postulate this separate function of *vyañjanā*, or whether it may not be comprehended in other recognised functions like *abhidhā* or *lakṣaṇā*, and in other intellectual processes like *anumāna* or inference. Jayaratha cites (p.9) a verse which enumerates twelve different ways in which the problem of Suggestion may be and perhaps was explained away; but broadly speaking, we need notice, as Ānandavardhana and his followers have done, only the principal attempted explanations. The first verse of the *Dhvanyāloka* summarises these antagonistic views into three groups. One sceptical school entirely denies the suggested sense in poetry. A second school, which is agnostic in this respect, holds that it is beyond the province of words (*kecid vācām sthitam aviṣaye tattvam ūcus tadīyam*), and can only be perceived by a man of refined discernment (*sahṛdaya-hṛdaya-saṃvedyam*, Ānanda p.10). A third school would try to trace it back to the recognised functions like *abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇā* and *tātparya*, or to some such means of knowledge as *anumāna* or syllogistic reasoning. These three schools naturally divide themselves into two distinct standpoints: the one absolutely denies or ignores the concept of *dhvani* and thus does away with the necessity of *vyañjanā*; the other, admitting the *dhvani*, attempts to explain away the necessity of *vyañjanā* as being sufficiently accounted for by the ordinary recognised functions.