Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v2.c83.31

v2.c83.31

This brings us to the consideration of the views of those who accept the concept of *vyaṅgya artha* but dispense with the necessity of such a separate and unauthorised *vṛtti* as *vyañjanā*, and regard it as included in other functions of sound and sense. Some Mīmāṃsakas hold, for instance, that the so-called suggested sense is conveyed by the *abhidhā-vṛtti* or the denotative power of a word. In this connexion, the *dīrgha-vyāpāra-vādins*¹⁶ are said to have maintained that as a single arrow, discharged by a strong man, destroys by a single movement, called velocity, the armour of the enemy, pierces through his body and takes away his life, so a single word, used by a good poet, brings before us by a single power, called *abhidhā*, the sense of the word, teaches us its logical connexion (*anvaya*) and makes us apprehend the suggested sense. The substance of this graphic description appears to be that such is the more and more expanding function of *abhidhā* that it is not to be measured in the balance and confined to the single business of making us understand the *saṃketita artha*, but it is competent to express whatever sense is apprehended after a word is heard. But it is urged in reply that the *abhidhā* has not the power to give us the perception of a matter (*vastu*), an imaginative fact (*alaṃkāra*) or an emotional mood (*rasa*), because it ceases, in the orthodox opinion, after conveying the conventional (i. e. literal) sense, and the *rasa* etc. are not matters of mere convention. Nor is the denoting, for instance, of component *vibhāvas*, which give rise to the *rasa*, a denotation of the *rasa* itself; for it is acknowledged that the *rasa* is not realised by a mere naming thereof but partakes of the nature of a self-manifested joy, which can at most be suggested. These facts cannot be satisfactorily explained unless we assume with the *dīrgha-vyāpāra-vādins* an all-comprehensive power for the *abhidhā*, for which there is hardly any authority. Moreover, if we assign such extensive powers to Denotation, why even admit the power of Indication, since the sense conveyed by the latter might be understood from the Denotation itself?