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Public Administration in Ancient India c15.103

Public Administration in Ancient India c15.103

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c15.103

For the purpose of drawing conclusions from the evidence offered in court, it was the duty of the judge to weigh such evidence, and not merely to count the number of witnesses and documents on each side.¹ Nārada says: "There are some who give false evidence from covetousness, there are other villainous wretches who resort to forging documentary evidence. Therefore, both sorts of evidence must be tested by the King with great care: documents according to the rules regarding writings, witnesses according to the law of witnesses."² The means of arriving at the truth were regarded as four-fold, namely, (1) visible indications (pratyksha), reasoning (yukti), inference (anumāna), and analogy (upamāna).³ If the witnesses disagreed with one another as to time, age, matter, quantity, shape, and species, such testimony was to be held as worthless. The judges were advised to note the demeanour of a witness in court, and to draw an inference as to his veracity therefrom.⁴ But Nārada, very wisely, cautions judges against accepting indications too readily. “Liars,” says he, “may have the appearance of veracious men, and veracious men may resemble liars. There are many different characters. Therefore, it is necessary to examine (everything).” Proper safeguards were provided against the miscarriage of justice through belief in false evidence. And whenever it was found that the decision in a case was based upon false or insufficient evidence, the judgment was reversed, and all the proceedings in the case were declared null and void.¹