Public Administration in Ancient India c19.24

c19.24

In Chānakya’s military philosophy warfare was of three kinds, namely, open (prakāśa), treacherous (kūṭa), and silent (tūṣṇīm). “Open warfare consists of threatening, assault, creating confusion in the enemy’s ranks, and divert attack. Treacherous warfare consists in keeping up good relations by gifts, etc., and attacking at the same time. Silent warfare is the attempt to win over the officers of the enemy.” ¹ Enthusiasm, superiority in strength, and skilful diplomacy were regarded as the three great requisites for success in war, and of these, the second was held better than the first and the third the best of all. “The arrow shot by an archer,” says Chānakya, “may or may not kill one person; but the skilful diplomacy of a wise man kills even those who are not yet born.” ² Chānakya advises a would-be conqueror to ascertain, before marching to battle, the comparative strength and weakness of his own army and that of his enemy, and to carefully consider the advantages and disadvantages likely to result from the undertaking, the possibility of the recruitment of new soldiers, the expenditure both in men and money, the dangers of the undertaking, and the probable consequences. The conqueror is also advised to commence his march during a favourable season of the year,¹ and to leave one-third or one-fourth of the army in the capital for protection against rearward enemies and wild tribes.² If the enemy offered battle, he was to be vanquished on the battle-field, but should he take shelter in a fort, he was to be besieged. The five means of capturing an enemy's fort, in the opinion of Kautilya, were: intrigue (upajāpa), employment of spies (upasarpa), winning over the people (vamana), siege (paryupāsana), and carrying by assault (avamarda).³