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A History of Hindu Political Theories from the Earliest Times to the End of the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century A.D. c9: Chapter III. The Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya and the Reconstruction of the Science

A History of Hindu Political Theories from the Earliest Times to the End of the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century A.D. c9

Language
English

Contents

Chapter III. The Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya and the Reconstruction of the Science

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Kauṭilya’s work involves a virtual reconstruction of the Arthaśāstra, but confines itself exclusively to the Art of Government and kindred topics—Theories of Professors H. Jacobi and D. R. Bhandarkar considered—Kauṭilya’s rehabilitation of the four traditional sciences is based upon a just appreciation of the ends and purposes of each science in relation to the needs of human existence—His view of the end of Politics (Arthaśāstra), and the extent of its application—Doctrine of the king’s headship of the seven constituent elements of sovereignty (prakritis)—Kauṭilya’s theory of kingship combines in furtherance of the principle of authority the idea of the king’s divine nature and the theory of his elective origin—G. B. Bottazzi’s view considered—Kauṭilya on the preservation of dominion—His rules on the acquisition of dominion—His attitude towards morality and religion—Kauṭilya and Machiavelli—Kauṭilya’s influence upon the subsequent development of political theory.

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In the course of our survey of Hindu political ideas in the preceding period, we have endeavoured to describe the surviving fragments of the lost literature of Arthaśāstra. The great work which shall occupy our attention in this chapter belongs, as its title indicates, to the same branch of literature as these forgotten treatises. But it is conspicuously distinguished from the rest from the point of view of its general plan and purpose. In the very opening lines the author seems to strike his distinctive note, for he says, “This single Arthaśāstra (work) has been prepared mostly by summarising whatever Arthaśāstra (treatises) were prepared by the early masters regarding the acquisition and the preservation of dominion.” The Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya thus announces itself as an abstract of the earlier literature on the subject. It might appear from the above that Kauṭilya drew the diversified and often conflicting views of his predecessors into a common synthesis. This description, we think, corresponds at the best to one aspect of this author’s performance. The other and the more important aspect is hinted at in the concluding verse which states, “This manual (śāstram) has been written by the person who quickly and angrily rescued (uddhritāni) at once the science (śāstram), the Art of War, and the earth that had passed to the Nanda king.”¹ In so far as the obvious reference to the science of Arthaśāstra in the above passage is concerned, we may perhaps explain it in some such manner as the following. In Kauṭilya’s time the literature of Arthaśāstra had grown to be a tangled maze of divergent views. This condition of the science provoked the indignation of Kauṭilya, an intensely practical teacher if ever there was one, and he undertook at once to sweep away those doubts and difficulties that clogged its progress.

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¹ Kauṭ. p. 431, Prof. Jacobi’s translation, quoted, *Indian Antiquary*, 1918, p. 193. Throughout this work the references to Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra are to the revised edition of Dr. R. Shamasastry (Mysore, 1919).

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If our explanation is correct, it follows that the treatise of Kauṭilya involved some degree of overhauling of the science. This interpretation, we think, is supported by the internal evidence. For we find the author frequently contesting the views of the early schools and teachers whom he quotes, and offering his own solutions of the points at issue—solutions bearing invariably the mark of his superior political insight and practical wisdom.

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Thus the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya is much more than a summary of the earlier literature on the subject : it involves, in the form of a closer analysis of the earlier ideas and notions, a virtual reconstruction of the science. Well may Kāmandaka, himself an enthusiastic disciple of Kauṭilya, acclaim his master as the maker of a new science.∗ But much as Kauṭilya stands high above his fellows, there is one respect, we think, in which he fails. The most obvious attribute of his genius which stamps itself almost upon every page of his work is its intensely practical nature. The same bent of mind which apparently made the author impatient of the conflicting views of the older Arthaśāstra manifested itself in a studied neglect of abstract speculation. Thus Kauṭilya's work strictly corresponds to the definition of Arthaśāstra—it deals not with the theory of the State, but with the Art of Government and kindred topics.†

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∗ Kāmandaka (I 6) applies the term vedhas (creator) to Kauṭilya,—a term justified by the commentator on the ground that Kauṭilya created a new science (pṛthakśāstrapraṇayanāt).

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† The above view of Kauṭilya's place in relation to the early Arthaśāstra is at variance with two theories that have doubtless in a position to know the nature of Kauṭilya's services describes (I 6) his master as having extracted the nectar of nītiśāstra out of the ocean of Arthaśāstra. This remarkable description, we think, can be justified not on the assumption of Kauṭilya's rescue of the science from oblivion, but only on the basis of his reconstruction of the same upon the old foundations.

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The Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya opens with a remark-able rehabilitation of the four traditional branches

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been advanced on the point in recent times. The crux of the problem lies in this case in the meaning of the word ‘uddhritāni’ with reference to its application to the science of Artha-śāstra in the concluding verse of Kauṭilya which has been quoted above. Prof. Jacobi (loc. cit.) explains the term in the sense of ‘reformed,’ and he describes the purport to be that Kauṭilya contemptuously brushed aside the dogmatic views of his *doctrinaire* predecessors. This explanation is evidently a forced one, and we agree with Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar (op. cit., p. 109, footnote 1) in rejecting it. Judging indeed from the meagre extracts cited by Kauṭilya and Kāmandaka, the views of the early teachers of the Arthaśāstra may often appear to be crude and one-sided, but they cannot, we think, be justly charged with being unpractical.

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The second theory bearing on the above point is that of Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar, who explains (op. cit. pp. 108-109) the concluding verse of Kauṭilya to mean that the Arthaśāstra was falling into desuetude in that author’s time and was rescued from oblivion by him. We are not quite sure whether this interpretation conveys the true meaning of the author. It fails, we think, to account for the word ‘amarṣeṇa’ in the text, since it is inconceivable that the mere neglect of the science by his contemporaries roused Kauṭilya’s indignation. It may further be observed that apart from the doubtful testimony of the above verse, Dr. Bhandarkar adduces no evidence in support of his contention. While the case for Kauṭilya’s recovery of the Arthaśāstra from oblivion thus seems to rest on very slender foundations, the theory of his partial reconstruction of the science can, it seems to us, be supported on valid grounds. For besides the internal evidence which we have mentioned above, there is the testimony of literary tradition in our favour. An anonymous verse tagged on to the end of Kauṭilya’s work runs as follows: “Observing the discrepancies in many ways among the commentators of the science (śāstra), Viṣṇugupta (Kauṭilya) himself composed the Aphorism (Sūtra) and its commentary.” Whatever might be the degree of weight attaching to this verse, it at any rate points to the confused condition of the Arthaśāstra in Kauṭilya’s time and mentions that author’s effort to end this confusion. Another point that may be mentioned in this connection is that Kāmandaka who was of knowledge (vidyās). As we have seen elsewhere, the three preceding schools of Manu Brihaspati and Śukra limited the number of these sciences to three, two, and one, respectively.∗ Kauṭilya, while yielding to none of these in his love of realism, emphatically rejects their views †, and he justifies the traditional list of sciences by pointing out the ends and purposes of each in relation to the needs of human existence.‡ Beginning with philosophy (ānvīkṣakī), he writes, "Philosophy viewing the other sciences in the light of reason does good to the world, keeps the mind steady in weal and woe, and bestows skill in knowledge, speech and action. Philosophy is ever declared to be the lamp of all the sciences, the means of accomplishing all deeds and the support of all duties." The triple Veda, he goes on, is useful (aupakārikaḥ) because it establishes the four classes (varṇas) and the four orders (āśramas) in their respective duties: the fulfilment of these duties, Kauṭilya adds, leads to heaven and salvation, while their violation brings about intermixture of the castes and consequent destruction. Vārttā, in its turn, is useful (aupakārikī) because it confers grain, cattle, gold, base metals and forced labour, and because by its means one is able to bring under his control through the instrumentality of the treasury and the army his own and his enemy's partizans.∗ Lastly, punishment (daṇḍa) which is the subject-matter of Daṇḍanīti, Kauṭilya states, promotes the security and the prosperity of the three other sciences, and in fact is their root.†

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∗ Supra, pp. 79-80.

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† Cf. Kauṭ. p. 6: chatasra eva vidyā iti Kauṭilyaḥ.

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‡ Cf. Kāmandaka (III 6) who, after quoting the above view of Kauṭilya as to the number of the sciences, observes that the people depend upon the four sciences for attaining different kinds of results. In this as in other cases, Kāmandaka's text may be safely used as a kind of running commentary upon that of Kauṭilya.

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∗ Kāmandaka expresses the idea more emphatically by saying in the corresponding passage (III 14) that vārttā is life.

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† Kauṭ. pp. 9-10. In translating the above extract we have adopted the version of Mr. Ramaprasad Chaṇḍa (*Indo-Aryan Races*, p. 228), which commences with the words '(Philosophy) viewing the other sciences in the light of reason.' He rightly rejects Dr. R. Shamaśāstry's translation of the above passage ('when seen in the light of reason, the science of ānvīkṣakī' etc.) on the ground of its inconsistency with the following verse in which ānvīkṣakī is said to be the lamp of all the sciences.

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In the above it will be observed, a place is found for each of the four traditional sciences. Philosophy, instead of being merged, as by the school of Manu, in the triple Veda, is lifted to the position of the foremost science, and declared to be the guide philosopher and friend of men. The triple Veda, instead of being looked upon, as it was by the school of Brihaspati, as a superfluity from the point of view of material existence, is observed to embody the essential duties of the castes and the orders. Vārttā, instead of being ruled out from the list of sciences as was done by the school of Śukra, is discovered to be the means of ensuring livelihood and supplying the sinews of the State's existence. On the other hand, Daṇḍanīti is held through punishment which is its essence to be the ultimate condition of the functioning of the other sciences.∗

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∗ Kāmandaka expresses the last idea in the following way. "Philosophy, the triple Veda and Vārttā are called the manifest sciences, but if Daṇḍanīti were to be disturbed they would be evil, even if they could exist" (Ibid III 8). A word may be added here as to the meaning of the term ānvīkṣikī which is grammatically more regular than Kauṭilya's ānvīkṣakī. Kauṭilya defines the term to consist of Sāṁkhya, Yoga, and Materialism (Lokâyata). Later writers, however, use it in a more restricted sense. Vātsyāyana (commentary on Gautama's Nyāyasūtras (I 1, 1) takes ānvīkṣikī and nyāyavidyā or nyāyaśāstra to be synonymous terms. Medhātithi and Sarvajñanārāyaṇa commenting on Manusaṁhitā VII 43 interprets the expression 'ānvīkṣikīm chātmavidyām' as the science of dialectics which gives self-knowledge (cf. S. B. E.. Vol. XXV, Introduction, p. xxxvii). Kāmandaka (III 11) renders ānvīkṣikī as 'ātmavidyā' which means, according to the commentator, the science of the nature of categories, *i.e.* the science of dialectics. The author of the Śukranīti declares (I 153) ānvīkṣikī to involve the science of Logic like the Vedānta and the rest. It has been justly remarked by a recent writer that Kauṭilya's description of the characteristics of ānvīkṣakī better suits the nyāya philosophy than the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga as we have them (vide Ramaprasad Chanda, op. cit., p. 229).

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We are thus able to form some idea of the high function assigned by Kauṭilya to what may be called the science of politics. An equally advanced idea relating to the end of the science is conveyed by the author in two of his concluding verses, where he declares Arthaśāstra to be the means of acquiring and preserving both this and the next world, and states that it promotes and secures the threefold end of life (namely, virtue, wealth and desire), and destroys what is opposed to these. Politics, as thus conceived, is the source of fulfilment of almost the whole life of the individual. We are however bound to state in this place that there are grave doubts as to the degree to which the conception of politics as above described had a practical application in Kauṭilya’s system. The passage bearing on this point which has been just quoted is evidently put in at the end to magnify the importance of the science. Further, and above all, the rules of policy laid down by the author are, as we hope to show presently, dominated by the idea that the State is virtually an end in itself.

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Kauṭilya’s theories relating to the category of the seven elements of sovereignty follow on the whole the lines laid down by his predecessors. Thus he arranges the ‘calamities’ of these elements in a graded scale, reverting to the order of an unnamed authority whom he quotes.∗ Kauṭilya, however, applies in one place† the phrase limb-like (pratyaṅgabhūtāḥ) to the seven elements indicating, we think, in however rudimentary a form, the conception of organic unity of the factors of government.

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∗ Pp. 322-324. In the same connexion, it may be noted, Kauṭilya (p. 324) contemplates the possibility of the ‘calamities’ of one or two elements being counteracted by the ‘healthy’ elements.

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† P. 259.

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The theories of kingship in Kauṭilya occur characteristically enough as an incident in the discussion of concrete problems of statecraft. Thus in the first place, he cites in one passage a discussion of the earlier authors relating to the comparative seriousness of the ‘calamities’ befalling the factors of government (prakṛtis). Rejecting the view of Bhāradvāja, he states in this passage that the king’s ‘calamity’ is more serious than that of the minister (amātya). The king alone, he argues, appoints the ministers, the domestic priest and the servants; he employs the superintendents; he applies remedies against troubles; as is his conduct, so is that of the other factors of government (prakṛtis): the king stands at the head of these factors (tatkūṭasthānīyo hi svāmī).n∗ In this important passage is evidently involved the doctrine of the king’s headship of the elements of sovereignty.n† This view reaches its climax in a later passage of the Arthaśāstra, where Kauṭilya sums up the constituent elements of government (prakṛtis) by declaring that the king is the government (rāja rājyamiti prakṛtisaṃkṣepaḥ).n‡ Government, then, while involving the seven constituent factors, is according to this view, ultimately resolvable into one element, namely the king, that absorbs all the rest.

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n∗ Kauṭ. p. 322.

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n† Other illustrations of this view may be cited. Kauṭilya (p. 259) declares that the self-controlled king can make even the imperfect elements of sovereignty whole, while the king who is not self-controlled destroys even the progressive and loyal elements of sovereignty.

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n‡ Kauṭ. p. 325.

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From this view of the king’s relations with the other factors of sovereignty, let us turn to the broader theory of his relations with his subjects. It is characteristic of the intensely practical nature of the author that for the most part one looks in vain for such a theory in his work. Nevertheless there is at least one remarkable passage which, however much it might be pointed to the practical end of ensuring the internal security of the State, embodies a view of the source and nature of the king's authority. Even this, it seems to us, represents what may be called the current theory of the times rather than an original contribution of Kauṭilya's genius. For it is addressed, as it is hoped to show presently, to the man in the street, as it were.∗ In the chapter in which the above passage occurs Kauṭilya describes the measures that the king should adopt for winning over the friendly as well as the hostile factions within his kingdom. In the course of this description he states that a specific class of spies called the satrins should divide themselves into contending parties and carry on disputations in places of pilgrimage, in assemblies, in residences, in corporate bodies and amid congregations of people.

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One spy should speak, "This kingly class is heard to be endowed with all qualities, but no quality of it is seen which causes the folk in country and town to be burdened with fines and punishments." Another spy should contradict the first and those who concur with the latter by speaking in the following way. People overcome by anarchy (mātsyanyāyābhibhūtāḥ) selected Manu, the son of the Sun, as their king and they fixed one-sixth of the grain, one-tenth of the merchandise as well as gold, to be the king's due (bhāgadheya). Supported by this, the kings become capable of promoting the security and prosperity of their subjects, so that they take away the sins of the latter in the event of their failure to inflict just punishments and levy just taxes. Kings in fact promote the security and prosperity of their subjects. Hence even the hermits living in the forest offer the king one-sixth of the grain gleaned by them, stating that it is a tax payable to the person who protects them. The kings who are the visible dispensers of slights and favours occupy the position of the gods Indra and Yama. He who slights them is afflicted with divine punishment. Therefore the kings should not be slighted. Thus the lowly persons should be contradicted.∗ This extract, we think, is an important landmark in the evolution of the Hindu theories of kingship.

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Kauṭilya here evidently starts with the idea of justifying the king’s authority,—the idea, that inspired in part the theories of kingship in the canonical Dharmasūtras and the secular Arthaśāstra. For the whole point of his story consists in its answering the apparent anomaly involved in the statement of the first spy quoted above, namely that the kingly class is heard to be endowed with all good qualities, but no quality of it is seen which causes the people in country and town to be burdened with fines and punishments. With the above object, then, Kauṭilya invokes the doctrine of the king’s divine nature, interpreting it like the earlier writers in the sense that the dignity pertains to the king’s office. From this follows, as in the earlier examples, the corollary that the subjects are bound to abstain from slighting the king—an obligation which, as before, is sought to be supported by spiritual sanctions. Along with this familiar notion of the king’s divinity is conjoined in the above extract in a kind of incongruous union a remarkable and, as it seems to us, original application of the theory of elective origin of the king. This virtually involves a Brahmanised adaptation of the Buddhist theory of contract. Like the latter it starts with the conception of an original state of nature. While the canonist, however, conceives it to be initially a perfect state, the secular writer considers it to be wholly evil from the first\*.

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∗ An analogous case is presented by a passage of Kauṭilya (p. 367) where he asks the king engaged in a fair fight to address his troops on the eve of battle with the words, "I am a paid servant like yourselves." This shows in our view that the idea of the king being an official was very much 'in the air' in Kauṭilya's time.

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∗ Ibid pp. 22-23. In the above extract the portion relating to the address of the first spy is translated by Dr. Shamasastry as follows :—" This king is said to be endowed with all desirable qualities; he seems to be a stranger to such tendencies as would lead him to oppress citizens and country people by levying heavy fines and taxes." We hold this version to be hardly satisfactory. 'Ayam rāja,' we think, should be interpreted as 'ayam rājapadavāchyo janaḥ' and translated as 'this class of kings,' otherwise the following lines which evidently are of the nature of a contradiction (pratiṣedhana) would be pointless. We are also of opinion that in the words 'yaḥ pīḍayati,' 'yaḥ' stands not for 'ayam,' this class of kings, but for 'guṇaḥ' quality, and that the verb 'pīḍayati' is used in a causative sense. In the latter part of the foregoing extract the term 'bhāgadheya' is translated by Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar (op. cit. p. 119) as share. We think that the term as here used is the technical designation of a specific kind of taxes, such as the sixth part of the agricultural produce. Cf. the following quotation from an unknown Arthaśāstra in Kṣīrasvāmin's commentary on the Amarakoṣa II 8. 27 : rājagrāhyaḥ ṣaḍbhāgādiḥ bhāgaḥ pratyekam sthāvarajaṅgamādādeyaḥ karaḥ niyojyopajīvyo baliḥ.

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¹ \* Mātsyanyāya which is mentioned in the above and in another (Kaut. p. 9) extract as the technical designation of the evil state of nature preceding the creation of kingship is, we think, as here used, a new importation into the vocabulary of Hindu political thought. Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar (op. cit., pp. 116, 119) translates it as the proverb (or the practice) of the greater fish swallowing the smaller—an interpretation that conveys the literal meaning of the term in question. In its figurative sense it refers to the anarchic condition in which Might counts for Right. We quote the following extracts to throw light upon the meaning of the term : yathā prabalā matsyāh nirbalānstān nāśayanti tatha arājake amukadeśe prabalā janāh nirbalān janān nāśayantīti nyāyārthah (Raghunāthavarman, quoted, Col. G. A. Jacob, Laukikanyāyāñjali, Part II pp. 57-58); atra balavantah durbalān hinsyuriti mātsyanyāya eva syādityuktam (Kūlluka's commentary on Manusamhitā VII 20); mātsyo nyāyah balavatā yadabalagrasanam (Śaṅkarāryya's commentary on Kāmandaka V 40).

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This anarchical condition forms in Kauṭilya, as in the Buddhist theory, the immediate prelude to the creation of kingship by popular election. While however this involves in the latter case the formulation of an express contract, in Kauṭilya the contract is tacit and has to be understood from the manner of the king's selection. We may note in passing that the designation of the first king in the Kauṭilyan theory is the surest index of its distinctly Brahminical character, since this is held to be no other than Manu, the son of the Sun, the individual so well known in the Brahminical mythology as the progenitor of the present race of human beings. The last point that has to be mentioned in this connection is that while the Buddhist author is wholly silent about the implications of his theory as fixing the respective rights and duties of the king and his subjects, Kauṭilya suffers from no such omissions. Yet Kauṭilya, while committed to the view of justifying the king's authority, brings out with great clearness the principle involved in one of the Dharmasūtra texts,∗ namely that the king is an official receiving the revenue as his fee for the service of protection, and he carries the idea to the point that the king is spiritually responsible for the faithful discharge of his functions. It is the necessary condition of this relation consisting in the payment of the stipulated taxes by the people, which Kauṭilya boldly forges in the above passage into a weapon in support of the king’s jurisdiction over his subjects.∗

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∗ Supra, p. 65.

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∗ The view of the origin of monarchy embodied in the above extract has been characterised by some scholars (*e.g* Dr. Shamasastry, English translation of Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra, p. 26, footnote; G. B. Bottazzi, *Precursori di Niccolo Machiavelli in Grecia ad in India, Kauṭilya ad Thucidide*, pp. 98-99; and Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar, op. cit. p. 119) as a theory of Social Contract. For the reasons mentioned in the text, namely that Kauṭilya has in view what may be called a governmental contract which again is not expressed but tacit, the above title hardly seems to be apposite. A safer designation probably would be the theory of the human or the elective origin of kingship. This point it is hoped, will be, again considered in connection with our discussion in a later chapter of the alleged resemblances and contrasts between the Hobbesian theory and that of Kauṭilya. We may consider in this place some other remarks relating to the general nature of Kauṭilya's theory as above described. According to Bottazzi (loc. cit) the whole extract that we have just cited from Kauṭilya (pp. 22-23) embodies a complete theory of Social Contract. The king, he further holds, is here declared to be invested with a sacred character solely by virtue of the authority which the people conferred upon him on the ground of his being the only defence of their existence. On the basis of this interpretation he considers the above passage to be completely free from the influence of the Barhminical theory in which, he thinks, the king is held to be a divine emanation. For the reasons that are stated below, the above judgment does not commend itself to our approval. The belief that Kauṭilya propounded a peculiar theory of the king’s sanctity is, we think, based upon a mere assumption, namely that the whole extract which we are now considering represents a complete theory of kingship. This assumption is hardly likely to correspond with the facts, since Kauṭilya’s
* Kauṭ. pp. 10-12. \* Gaut. XI 2-4.

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From the meagre record of political theory that has been presented above, let us turn to consider what forms in Kauṭilya the essence of his philosophy, we mean the branch relating specifically to the art of government. There is little reason to doubt that this is largely based upon the ideas of the older masters of the Arthaśāstra, although only such fragments of those ideas have survived as were quoted by Kauṭilya for the purpose of refutation. However that may be, we may, we think, consider this branch of our subject in its two natural divisions of the acquisition and the preservation of dominion, which

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object in the present case is evidently not to lay down a philosophical theory of kingship, but to justify on as broad a basis as possible the king's jurisdiction over his subjects. It would seem to follow from this that the idea of the king's divine nature is more likely to occur in Kauṭilya as an appendage of the theory of the king's origin than as an integral feature thereof. Nor are we left to depend upon mere surmise in support of our criticism. Doctrines essentially similar to that of Kauṭilya, involving in other words the equivalence of the king's functions and attributes to those of the deities are not unknown to the other teachers of the Arthaśāstra whose views are quoted in the Śāntiparvan. In none of these cases is the king held to be invested with a sacred character by virtue of the popular authority. The authors indeed are completely silent about the theory of the king's elective origin. In these circumstances it seems more reasonable to hold that Kauṭilya adopted the current idea of the king's divine nature than attribute to him an altogether unique interpretation of the same. Regarding the alleged contrast between Kauṭilya's theory and that of the Brahminical canon we agree with the Italian scholar in holding that the king is often conceived by the Brāhmaṇa canonists to be a divine emanation. This idea occurs, for instance, in the Manusamhitā, the Mahābhārata, the later Smritis and the Purāṇas (Chapters IV-V, infra). Along with this notion, however, there occurs in these works, as we hope to show later on, the notion of Kauṭilya, namely that the king is a god by virtue of his functions.

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are embodied in the standard definition of Arthaśāstra. It is under the second head that most of Kauṭilya's rules on the subject of home and foreign policy may be ranged. An examination of the most typical of these rules which is all that can be attempted here exhibits, we think, some remarkable traits of the author's nature. Such are the qualities of profound insight into human nature and into the essential character of government, amazing resourcefulness and ingenuity, and intelligent appreciation of the factors making for the advantage of the State combined with a more or less studied disregard of morality and religion. Kauṭilya begins by urging upon the prince a thorough course of intellectual training and moral discipline, the former involving the study of the four traditional sciences under the guidance of specialised teachers, and the latter centering round the control of the senses which are branded by the author as the six enemies. Kauṭilya sums up his view on this point by saying that the king should avoid injuring the women and the property of others and should shun falsehood, haughtiness, and evil proclivities : he should enjoy pleasure without disregarding virtue and wealth, or else enjoy this in an equal measure with the last. In thus making the king's education and self-control the first requisite of successful government, Kauṭilya or rather the earlier authors whose ideas he is echoing, made, it seems to us, a notable advance in political theory. For the similar, although much shorter, rule in Gautama's Dharmaśāstra\* is laid down merely as part of the general duty (dharma) of the king.

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With all his anxious care to fit the prince by education and discipline for the discharge of his office, Kauṭilya insists that the king should rule with the help of the State officials (amātyas) and consult the ministers (mantrins). In one of his early chapters he specifies the qualifications of the amātyas—a point that was already discussed by the early masters—and he mentions four tests (namely, those of fear virtue wealth and love) by which the fitness of the amātyas is to be detected. Kauṭilya discovers the necessity of the Civil Service in the very nature of government, and he fortifies his conclusion by a homely analogy, for he writes, “Sovereignty can be carried on only with assistance. A single wheel does not move ; hence the king shall employ the ministers and hear their advice.”† In the same connexion Kauṭilya analyses the king’s function as being of a threefold nature, namely the visible, the invisible and the inferential, and he declares the amatya's business to consist in carrying out the invisible work.‡ In a later chapter Kauṭilya considers the ways and means of ensuring proper deliberation,—here again he merely continues a discussion started by the early teachers,—and he mentions what, according to him, should be the composition of the council of ministers. It is noticeable in this connection that Kauṭilya exhibits a just appreciation of the function of deliberation by saying at the outset that all undertakings depend upon it.∗

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† Kauṭ. p. 13.

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‡ Ibid p. 15.

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∗ Ibid, p. 26.

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Kauṭilya urges upon the king as one of his first tasks the necessity of securing to his side, by various methods of diplomacy and force, the friendly and hostile factions within as well as outside his kingdom. In this connection he mentions four classes of people, (namely, the angry, the greedy, the timorous, and the haughty), as being the instruments of the king's enemies, and he states how spies with shaven head or braided hair may win over these classes to the king's side by appealing to that quality which is the leading characteristic of each class.† In another place Kauṭilya urges the king to protect his own person, especially from his sons and wives.‡ The rules under this head, however tedious they might appear, are justified by the author on the very intelligible ground that the king, by protecting his own person, becomes capable of saving the State from those near him as well as from foreign kings.§

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† Ibid, pp. 22-26.

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‡ Ibid, pp. 32-45.

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§ Ibid, p. 32.

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In another part of his book bearing the apt title of the suppression of disturbers of the public peace (kaṇṭakaśodhanam), Kauṭilya enjoins the king to avert eight specific kinds of providential visitations, namely, fire, flood, pestilence, famine, rats, snakes, tigers and demons,—a list which exhibits the author as sharing in the popular superstitions of his time.|| One short precept which he lays down in this connection aptly expresses the spirit of this part of his teaching. The king, he says, should always propitiate the afflicted as the father does his son.∗ In the following chapters Kauṭilya mentions various methods of entrapping by the agency of spies the people of criminal tendencies—methods, which, while doing credit to the author's ingenuity, betray in some measure his moral obliquity.† Rules of a more unscrupulous nature to which we shall presently return, are laid down in the later chapters for the purpose of dealing with those whom Kauṭilya calls the disturbers of the king as well as the kingdom.‡

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|| Ibid, pp. 207-210.

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∗ Ibid, p. 210.

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† Ibid, pp. 210-217.

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‡ Ibid, pp. 237-242, 245-246.

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It is, above all, in his application of foreign policy that Kauṭilya discovers the fullest means for ensuring the interest of the State, and finds ample scope for the display of his peculiar genius. The author, it appears, has a just appreciation of the advantages of foreign policy, for he says in introducing the subject that the traditional sixfold policy is the source of enjoyment (śama) and effort (vyāyāma) which in their turn are the sources of the acquisition (yoga) and security (kṣema)§. In the same connexion he analyses what he considers to be the threefold status of a kingdom, namely, decline, stationary condition, and progress.|| Moreover, he mentions those factors which in his view determine the relative position of two kings, namely their possession, in a greater or a less or the same measure, of the threefold strength (śakti) and its threefold fruition (siddhi).¶

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§ Ibid, p. 259.

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|| Ibid, p. 260

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¶ Ibid, p. 261.

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Running all through the mass of Kauṭilya's rules of foreign policy may be detected the influence of the notion that expediency is the golden rule of politics. This idea is reflected, for instance, in the short list of fundamental rules with which Kauṭilya opens his description. He who is losing strength in comparison with another shall make peace : he who is growing strong shall make war : he who thinks that neither can the enemy hurt him nor he the enemy, shall observe neutrality : he who has an excess of advantages shall march : he who is wanting in strength shall seek protection : he who undertakes work requiring assistance shall adopt the dual policy.∗ In chapter after chapter in the course of the following pages Kauṭilya indulges in a delicate balancing of the circumstances of two or more States so as to discover the exact policy that should be followed. Politics, as thus treated, rises almost to the level of a fine art. The key to this eminently intellectual character of the Kauṭilyan statecraft is to be found, we think, in the author's remarkable appraisement of the three traditional powers (śaktis) of the king. Differing from his unnamed predecessor whom he quotes, Kauṭilya declares the power of deliberation (mantraśakti) to be superior to that of the army and the treasury (prabhuśakti), and the latter to be more important than energy (utsāhaśakti). Regarding the second point Kauṭilya argues with characteristic contempt for the impotent exhibition of energy, "He who has power overreaches by virtue of his strength the king possessing mere energy," and again, "Rulers possessing power (even those that were) women, minors, lame and blind, conquered the earth by defeating or buying up those who had mere energy." As regards the first point, to which reference has been made above, Kauṭilya exhibits his sense of the supreme excellence of intellect by saying that the king who is intelligent and versed in the sciences can apply his skill in deliberation with little effort and can overreach even those enemies who are endowed with energy and power.∗

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∗ Kauṭ. p. 263.

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∗ *Kauṭ. pp. 339-340. [^*]: Kauṭ. pp. 276-277.

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While on the subject of foreign policy Kauṭilya makes some very sensible remarks regarding the manner in which the evil condition of the subjects renders the king open to attack from outside, and he advises how this should be remedied. In the chapter in which he develops this point, he first discusses in a series of pairs the question as to which one of two kings is to be marched against in preference to the other. The alternatives that he considers in this connection are *inter alia* an enemy of virtuous character but under grave troubles and one having a vicious character and disaffected subjects but suffering from less trouble, an enemy whose subjects are impoverished and greedy and another whose subjects are oppressed, and lastly, an enemy that is powerful but of wicked disposition and one who is weak but righteous. After giving his opinion on these cases Kauṭilya launches into a minute analysis of those faults on the king's part that create impoverishment, greed and disaffection, among the subjects. When the people become impoverished, Kauṭilya goes on, they become greedy; when greedy, they become disaffected; and when disaffected, they either go over to the enemy's camp or themselves slay their master. Hence the king, Kauṭilya concludes, should avoid those causes that produce impoverishment, greed and disaffection among his people. Continuing the discussion about the remedies in the following lines, the author considers that the loss of gold and grain on the part of the subjects imperils the whole kingdom and is hard to be remedied, while the loss of efficient men can be made up for by means of gold and grain. The greed of the subjects, Kauṭilya thinks, can be removed by allowing them to plunder the enemy's wealth. Lastly, disaffection can be got rid of by putting down the leaders, for the people deprived of their leaders are easy to be governed, and are incapable of being seduced by the intrigues of the enemy.

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The end to which the application of all his extensive rules of foreign policy is directed by the author is not, it appears, territorial aggrandisement. In one place Kauṭilya cautions the king against coveting the territory, wealth, sons and wives of one who is slain, and he urges that the king should restore to their own position the relatives of the slain prince, and instal on the throne the son of one who has died while helping him. Thus, Kauṭilya argues, would the dependent princes obey even the sons and grandsons of the conqueror. On the other hand, if the conqueror were to slay or bind the dependent prince and covet his territory, property sons and wives, his circle of states (maṇḍala) would become agitated and would rise against him, and even his own ministers would either take refuge with the circle of states or themselves threaten their master's life and throne.∗ While Kauṭilya thus deprecates territorial annexations in the most express terms, it appears from the general tenour of his thought that his ideal is, next to security, the achievement of political influence over the neighbouring kings comprised in the circle of states.†

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∗ Kauṭ. p. 313.

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† Cf. Ibid. p. 262 : nemimekāntaradrājñaḥ etc.

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Although the rules for the preservation of dominion form in Kauṭilya's work the most important branch of his philosophy, he mentions in one short section‡ his ideas relating to the acquisition of territory. The territory, Kauṭilya thinks, may be either newly acquired, or recovered from a usurper, or, lastly, inherited from an ancestor. It is most important to note that in all these cases the author urges kind and considerate treatment of the subjects. The king who acquires new territory, we are told, should put to the shade the enemy's vices by means of his own virtues, and the latter's virtues by doubling his own. He should bestow rewards according to his promise upon those who deserted the enemy's side for his own. For, says Kauṭilya with true insight into human nature, he who fails to fulfil his promise forfeits the confidence of his own and his enemy's people. The king should follow the friends and leaders of the people, for, as Kauṭilya urges in a later passage, he who acts against the will of the people becomes unreliable. The king, moreover, is asked to favour learned men and orators as well as the charitable and the brave, to release all prisoners, and to relieve the miserable, the helpless and the diseased. In the same spirit Kauṭilya advises that the king who recovers a lost territory should give up those faults of his which caused him to lose the throne and increase those virtues through which he regained it. Of the king who inherits a kingdom Kauṭilya likewise says that he should put to the shade his father's vices and display his own virtues.

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‡ Ch. XIII 5.

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Next to the considerate treatment of the subjects Kauṭilya urges in the first case respect for the established customs. The king who acquires a new territory, the author declares, should adopt the same mode of living, the same dress, and the same language and manners as those of his subjects, and should participate in their congregational festivals and amusements. Not that all customs are to be enforced, for the king is asked to abolish those customs which he considers to be injurious to the revenue and the army, or holds to be unrighteous. Along with these wise and beneficent counsels Kauṭilya exhibits in the first case an example of that intellectual cunning which is so characteristic of him. A member of the enemy's family who can wrest the conquered territory, Kauṭilya says, should be provided with a sterile tract or else with a fourth part of a fertile tract on condition of his supplying a fixed sum of money and a fixed number of troops : in raising these he would incur the displeasure of the people and be destroyed by them.∗

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∗ Kauṭ. p.409.

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When we turn from the above survey of the Kauṭilyan statecraft to consider a point involved therein, namely the author’s attitude towards religion and morality, we find him following, as might be expected, in the footsteps of the early masters. We find him, in other words, frequently inculcating rules of a grossly unscrupulous nature on the plea of public interest and without the least pretence of moral disapproval. Thus Politics, distinguished as it is in the system of the Arthaśāstra as a separate science is, as before, further separated from the science of Ethics. Let us quote a few typical examples from Kauṭilya in support of our statement. Speaking of the conduct of a prince who is kept under restraint, Kauṭilya suggests among a number of harmless measures that the prince, having acquired a close intimacy with heretics, rich widows or merchants engaged in ocean traffic, may poison them and rob them of their wealth.∗ Speaking in the same connection with reference to the treatment of a prince kept under restraint, Kauṭilya coolly suggests in one place that secret emissaries may kill the abandoned prince with weapons or with poison. In another part of his book dealing with the suppression of disturbers of the public peace, Kauṭilya states that spies in disguise may mix with thievish foresters, and instigate them to attack companies of merchants and villagers and may contrive the assassination of those people with weapons or with poison.† In a later chapter where the author describes the measures ensuring what he calls the extirpation of disturbers of the king as well as the kingdom, he says that the king may for the sake of righteousness inflict secret punishment upon those wicked persons (dûṣyas), consisting of the royal favourites singly or collectively injuring the kingdom, who cannot be put down openly.∗ This form of punishment comprises, as the immediately following samples show, various methods of compassing the assassination of the culprit by the direct agency of spies as well as by the seduction of the culprits’ brothers, sons and wives.† In another place where he speaks of corporate bodies (saṅghas) Kauṭilya, while conceding that the well-disposed among these should be treated with conciliation and gifts, advises without even the pretence of an apology that the methods of dissension and secret punishment should be applied against those that are ill-disposed, and he proceeds to enumerate various concrete measures suggested to this effect by his remarkably fertile and resourceful intellect. Among these measures assassination in different forms plays an important part.‡ In the following section Kauṭilya declares that a weak king, when he is attacked by a powerful enemy, should avert the invasion either by making an alliance, or by means of the battle of intrigue (mantrayuddha) or treacherous fight (kūṭayuddha).

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∗ Kauṭ. p. 36. I follow the version of R. Shamasastry which, however, is not free from difficulties.

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† Ibid p. 214.

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∗ Kauṭ. p. 237. In our translation of the above we have used the parallel passage of Kāmandaka (IX 9) which may, we think, be safely utilised to throw light on the difficult text of Kauṭilya.

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† Ibid pp. 237-241. Some further rules of the same type are mentioned by Kauṭilya in another place (pp. 245-246) as being applicable to the wicked persons (dûṣyas). Kauṭilya concludes this portion of his subject with the warning that the king should adopt the above line of policy towards the wicked and sinful persons, and none else.

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‡ Ibid, pp. 378-381.

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These last comprise, as we learn from the numerous examples given immediately afterwards, sundry methods of sowing dissensions and of secret assassination. Finally we may mention a long and curious list of drugs and tricks of black magic said to ensure in various ways the destruction of the enemy and the immunity of the king's own troops, which is compiled by the author in the penultimate chapter of his work.† In introducing these rules Kauṭilya justifies them on the plea of welfare of the four castes and confines their application to the sinful persons alone.‡

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† Ibid ch. XIV.

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‡ Ibid p. 410.

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Thus Kauṭilya would seem to betray in his rules of policy a more or less complete indifference towards morality. His attitude towards religion is more complex. As we have seen in another place, Kauṭilya deliberately dissociates himself from those radical schools that eliminated the Vedas from the list of sciences.§ In the same connection he urges the king not to upset the canonical scheme of duties relating to the castes and the orders, on the ground that the performance of these leads to heaven and salvation, while their violation would result in intermixture and destruction of the people. And yet it would seem as if Kauṭilya, in framing his actual system of statecraft could not resist the temptation of turning religion into an instrument of State policy. In the list of spies mentioned by Kauṭilya, for instance, no less than three out of nine specified classes belong to pseudo-religious orders, no doubt because the cloak of religion was held best to ensure the success of espionage.∗ This tendency of the author to indulge in the political exploitation of religion is more clearly exhibited in his section on the replenishment of the treasury.† There Kauṭilya suggests among a number of other measures that the Superintendent of religious institutions (devatādhyakṣa) may set up at night a shrine of the gods or a place sacred to the pious ascetics, and earn his subsistence by holding processions and congregations. Or else, Kauṭilya goes on, he may proclaim the arrival of the gods by pointing to a tree in the temple garden, that has borne untimely fruits and flowers. These suggestions are followed by other rules to the same effect, but we need not concern ourselves with them.‡ As another illustration of the author's attitude towards religion it may be mentioned that he advises the would-be conqueror to afflict the enemy and hearten his friends by proclaiming, through various methods of religious deception which he specifies, the conqueror's association with the gods.§

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^∗ Kauṭ. p. 382 ff.

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§ Supra p. 128.

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∗ Kauṭ. pp. 18-20. The three kinds of spies alluded to in the text are the religious mendicant renouncing his order (udāsthita), the ascetic (tāpasa) and the mendicant woman (bhikṣukī). It may be noted in this connection that Kauṭilya (p. 19) urges the ascetic spy deliberately to delude the people into a belief in his own extreme asceticism and gift of prophecy.

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† Ibid V. 2.

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‡ Ibid p. 244. The translation of this part is incomplete because of the exceptional difficulty of the text.

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§ Ibid pp. 394-395.
* Kauṭ. pp. 33-34.

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It would seem from the above that morality and to a less extent religion had no place in Kauṭilya’s politics. Nevertheless there are some passages in the Arthaśāstra which exhibit the author as deliberately parting company with the extreme exponents, among his predecessors, of an immoral statecraft. Even in these cases, however, we feel that the author is impressed not with the inherent worth of morality, but with the belief that honesty is the best policy. Thus in his chapter relating to the safeguarding of the princes he indignantly and emphatically rejects two extreme views which he quotes. The first is that of Vātavyādhi who advised that the princes might be lured to sensual indulgence, for in that case they would never hate their father. “This,” Kauṭilya retorts, “is death in life. Like a piece of wood eaten by worms, the royal family in which the princes are lacking in discipline perishes as soon as it is touched.” With this rebuke he proceeds to mention what steps, according to him, the king should take for ensuring the prince’s safe birth and training in discipline. The second view criticised by Kauṭilya is that of the Ambhīyas who advised that while one spy should tempt the prince, another should restrain him. Kauṭilya solemnly replies in language indicating a true insight into the principles of child-training, “(It is) a great sin to excite an unawakened (mind), for a fresh object sucks whatever class of things it is smeared with,” and he goes on to recommend that the prince should be instructed in virtue and wealth, not in their opposites.* In another passage, rejecting a characteristic suggestion of Bhāradvāja, namely that the minister (amātya) should usurp the vacant throne on the death of his master, Kauṭilya argues that this would be an act causing provocation to the people, as well as very unrighteous and uncertain. Hence he recommends that the minister should set up a prince who is possessed of self-control.[^asterisk] In a third passage Kauṭilya, rejecting the opinion of one of his unnamed predecessors, declares that a peace or alliance depending merely upon promise or upon oath is immutable in this world and in the next.dagger

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