The Inner Conflict of Tradition: Essays in Indian Ritual, Kingship, and Society c12.24

c12.24

The same problem is expressed in a different way in the so-called contract theory of kingship also taught by Bhīṣma.⁵⁷ At the entreaty of the people, who feel fatally threatened by anarchy, the supreme deity appoints the patriarch Manu to be king. But here again the appointee, fearing the cruelty of the task and the sins of man, fights clear of the royal function. Only after a covenant has been made with the people, which guarantees the king a share in the people's material resources as well as an even bigger share in the merit of their righteous acts, does Manu agree to be their king. After what has been said about the interdependence of king and people, the idea of a covenant or contract is not very surprising. The striking point here is, however, the stipulation that Manu does not share in the demerit of his subjects' evil deeds. This stipulation—contrary to the idea referred to above of the king's share in and responsibility for both merit and demerit—does set the king free from the oppressive material and moral bonds with the people, but it is hardly fair. The trouble is that once the king is no longer affected by the world's evil ways, he is freed from responsibility for them. It is then hard to see why he should bother to correct the wrongs of the world. He virtually withdraws from the world, like the first three kings in the previous account, the difference being that the latter at least took the full consequence of their withdrawal and renounced all claims to their subjects' material and moral resources. So Manu's covenant does not offer a solution either; rather, it offers another formulation of the same problems.