The Inner Conflict of Tradition: Essays in Indian Ritual, Kingship, and Society c13.s1.38

c13.s1.38

The only means for the king to achieve control seems to be all-embracing espionage. But how to pay and control the agents? In fact, the king is reduced to operating the system of personal relationships from within, as a participant in it, by balancing the different factions that jealously watch each other. Not only does the king have to spy on his officers, but everybody has to spy on everybody else. Pervasive watching and spying may well be the truth behind Kauṭilya’s presentation of espionage as an independent means of control in the hands of the king alone. It is typically a factional system in which the king represents no more than one faction among many others. The only way to stay on top is for the king to play the factions against each other and to have them keep each other in check. Thus Kauṭilya recommends that the administrative departments be headed, not by one, but by many officers.⁵⁸ In the same way, he advises that there be more than one commander in the garrisons, so that out of fear for each other they will abstain from entering into deals with the enemy.⁵⁹ Under the circumstances, this certainly is a sound policy, but it can hardly contribute toward bureaucratic efficiency of government and administration.