The Inner Conflict of Tradition: Essays in Indian Ritual, Kingship, and Society c15.s1.1

c15.s1.1

The first thing that strikes us is—in contradistinction to, for example, China—the virtual absence of a long-established empire commanding active and unquestioning allegiance. There was, of course, the Mughal Empire. But what was the extent of its effectualness, what the reality covered by its prestigious name? It is not that its origin in conquest by Central-Asian warriors in any way impaired its acceptance and legitimacy, nor was its explicit Islamic character a serious impediment to acceptance by its largely non-Muslim subjects. In both respects, the Mughal Empire had old and venerable precedents in the Delhi Sultanate. The truth is that—again in contradistinction to China—no ruler, whether Hindu rājā or Muslim pādshāh, could have ultimate authority and legitimacy. For these belonged to the ideal brahmin, that is, to the ultramundane renouncer, and only on condition that he kept himself free from entanglement in society, so that the ruler was barred from access to the source of ultimate authority.⁴ A comparable situation obtains in Islam where the separation of secular power and spiritual authority also keeps the ruler under a cloud of suspicion. Paradoxically, where no grave questions of the divine right of kings, the mandate of heaven, or similar transcendental concepts were directly involved, the position of the ruler was unproblematic. Whatever his origin or confession, he could be accepted with comparative ease and even enjoy a modicum of effective allegiance. So there never was a serious problem of the Mughal’s legitimacy. Whatever legitimacy and authority were possible under these circumstances he certainly possessed. If we may attach any value to the reaction of an old man in a Rajput town, who, when told of the British departure from Delhi, ponderously supposed that in that case the Mughals would be back in power,⁵ the legitimacy of Mughal rule vastly outlasted even the twilight of its declining presence.