The Inner Conflict of Tradition: Essays in Indian Ritual, Kingship, and Society c15.s1.11

c15.s1.11

This investment in local influence was always a risky one. For whatever was to be added to the central resources in crown lands and the revenue to be derived from them was in fact largely preempted by the demand for salaries and assignments to pay the rising number of mansabdārs. In the case of the Deccan, the conquest conspicuously failed to produce the expected returns and even seems to have created a severe shortage of assignments. Even the newly won crown lands of Golconda, which were left relatively undisturbed by the Maratha inroads, could not remedy the pressing demand created by the expansion of the mansabdār corps.¹⁸ In this way, the effects of direct military failure in open battle were less damaging than the risks of successful conquest—particularly since the Mughal heavy cavalry usually remained master of the battlefield till they were outdated by the firing power and organization of the sepoy battalions. The danger was in the aftermath of conquest.