The Inner Conflict of Tradition: Essays in Indian Ritual, Kingship, and Society c15.s1.30

c15.s1.30

In this context, we can perhaps better understand the problems involved in the dual aim of conquest and careful management of already controlled areas. As already pointed out, the precariousness of the agrarian resource base often made conquest a likely or even unavoidable proposition. But we also saw that conquest could well turn into a self-defeating venture. The Mughals must have been perfectly aware of this risk. That they nevertheless gave prominence to conquest seems to have another reason. This is that there was not just an external frontier, which one could either choose to round off and secure or to push further out. The real frontier was a ragged and shifting internal one, dividing *ra'īyatī* and *mawās*. On the one hand, control of the main trade routes had to be followed through to their end. Stopping at a particular point, say half-way across the Deccan, would not only impair the use of the routes, which would then depend on what happened at the end beyond the empire's control, but, what is more important, uncontrolled forces would find sanctuary there and be able to interfere with traffic even on the Mughal side. On the other hand, with the extension of control along the trade routes, the interstitial areas grew *pari passu*. Both faces of the dilemma were amply demonstrated by Aurangzeb's experiences in conquering the Deccan, but by the same token, it seems doubtful whether he had much of a real choice between continuing his costly campaigns or limiting his efforts to the areas conquered earlier.⁴¹