The Inner Conflict of Tradition: Essays in Indian Ritual, Kingship, and Society c19.s12.2

c19.s12.2

9. J. N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib* (Calcutta, 1912–30), 3: 283–364.
10. Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707–1740* (Aligarh, 1959), xliii–xlvii.
11. Habib, *Agrarian System* 317–51.
12. Richards, *Mughal Administration*, 306–10.
13. M. Athar Ali, “The Passing of Empire: The Mughal Case,” *Moderan Asian Studies* 9 (1975): 385–96.
14. See also articles from the Symposion on the Decline of the Mughal Empire by M. N. Pearson, J. F. Richards, and P. Hardy in *Journal of Asian Studies*, 35 (February 1976): 221–63.
15. H. Dunlop, ed., *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der Oostindische Compagnie in Perzië* (The Hague, 1930), 204. This opinion was not particularly original. For contemporary Turkish opinions to the same effect, see Bernard Lewis, “Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman Empire,” in *The Economic Decline of Empires*, ed. C. M. Cipolla (London, 1970), 215–34. See also Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe 2* 2d ed. (Paris, 1966), 2: 47.
16. Richards, *Mughal Administration*, 316. In this respect the evidence given by Richards for the remarkable recovery of the two main centers of Golconda under a forceful governor in the 1720s after a period of confusion and decay seems indicative of the system’s resilience (ibid., 304ff.).
17. M. Athar Ali, *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb* (London, 1966), 92–94, 173; Habib, *Agrarian System*, 269–73.
18. See Richards, *Mughal Administration*, 157–62.
19. See Habib, *Agrarian System*, 230.
20. Ibid., 242; See also W. H. Moreland, *The Agrarian Systems of Moslem India* (Cambridge, 1929), 107, 133ff.
21. Moreland, *Agrarian Systems of Moslem India*, 204; Habib, *Agrarian System*, 236ff., 249.
22. See W. H. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar* reprint ed. (Delhi, 1962), 126–29; 248–53; Moreland, *From Akbar to Aurangzeb* (London, 1923), 202f., quoting Bernier’s letter to Colbert.
23. W. H. Moreland, *Relations of Golconda* (The Hakluyt Society, 1930), 77. Though the reference is to Golconda, there is no reason to assume that the picture of the countryside in the Mughal area was essentially different.
24. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, 104; also Habib, *Agrarian System*, 78.
25. *AŚ* 4. 1. 65. Perhaps a not unsimilar outlook, stressing the warrior-administrator’s point of view while disregarding commerce, can also be found with the British-Indian administration. For instance, it is remarkable that while Governor-General Wellesley, like a true “warrior-administrator,” discussed the annexations of 1801 exclusively in terms of their strategic importance and their revenue resources, his brother Henry was particularly enthusiastic about their commercial potentialities (see P. J. Marhsall, “Economic and Political Expansion: The Case of Oudh,” *Modern Asian Studies* 9 [1975]: 465–82, esp. 481; cf. also E. Stokes, “Agrarian Society and the Pax Brittania,” ibid., 505–28, esp. 507). Even though “there is no evidence that commercial considerations played a part in his brother’s (the governor-general’s) decision to take teritory,” the two sets of considerations were, of course, to a great extent interdependent. The governor-general’s exclusive emphasis on strategic and land revenue arguments may have been determined by the boundaries of the warrior-administrator’s legitimizing idiom, which precludes the commercial argument’s expression. Generally speaking, the British-Indian administration's marked preferences for peasants and landlords and its disregard or contempt for urban traders and financiers seems to have this background.