The Army of the Indian Moghuls: Its Organization and Administration c23.41

c23.41

*Defeat*. In case of a reverse the heavy guns were generally abandoned, as they could not be removed. We are told that in such cases they were spiked and rendered useless (Blacker, “War”, 128). One instance where this was done was at Gūlkandah in 1097 H. (1685-6) by ‘Ālamgīr, Khāfī Khān, ii, 355, last line, *mīkh zadah nābūd sākhtand*. Generally, on the retreat of an Indian army, so great was the dispersion that some days elapsed before the direction of flight taken by the principal body could be ascertained. There were no dispositions taken to cover its escape, no stratagems to mask its route, cover its baggage, gain an advance, lay an ambuscade, or mislead a pursuer. All impediments to flight were successively abandoned, and a retreat became a *sauve qui peut*. This result is attributable partly to the want of discipline and to defective leadership, which leaves every individual to rely more on himself than on his commander (Blacker, “War”, 162).