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History of Dharmashastra (Ancient and Mediaeval Religious and Civil Law in India) v1.c6.s41.3

History of Dharmaśāstra (Ancient and Mediaeval Religious and Civil Law in India) v1.c6.s41.3

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v1.c6.s41.3

ordeals (in all three) are prescribed in disputes for lesser sums.⁴⁸⁰ This is slightly opposed to Nārada (ṛṇādāna verse 336) according to whom the five ordeals from tulā to kośa were prescribed in substantial disputes.⁴⁸¹ The Saṁgrahakāra has in view the seven ordeals spoken of by Nārada (ṛṇādāna verses 252, 337, 343), while Bṛhaspati and Pitāmaha enumerate nine. He defines dāya as the wealth that is handed down through father and mother.⁴⁸² He held that ownership arose from the dictates of śāstra and was not an affair of the world (laukika) and puts forward two reasons in support of his theory, viz. if ownership were laukika, then it would not be possible to make such assertions as 'his wealth has been wrongfully seized by another' and the texts (vide Gautama X. 39) laying down the means of acquisition of wealth for the several varṇas would be meaningless.⁴⁸³ Dhāreśvara held the same view. These views were elaborately criticized by the Mit. According to the Saṁgrahakāra,⁴⁸⁴ partition creates ownership in the son as regards paternal wealth (in which he has no rights by birth). Dhāreśvara entertained the same opinion, which was vehemently controverted by the Mit., holding that partition takes place of that in which one has already ownership. Accordingt o the Saṁgraha,⁴⁸⁵ ownership does not consist in being able to dispose of a thing at one's sweet will, since it is the śāstra that prescribes the proper disposal or application of all things. The Saṁgraha⁴⁸⁶ laid down that the special share given to the eldest son, the practice of niyoga and the offering of a cow are all forbidden in the present age. Dhāreśvara also held the same view about the eldest son's rights and the Mit. also approves of it and quotes anonymously the same verse (on Yāj. II. 117). The Saṁgraha in two verses, apparently following Manu 9. 182-183, lays down that, if of several full brothers one has a son, all thereby have issue and that, if one out of the several wives of a person has a son, all the co-wives may be regarded as putravatī. The Smṛticandrikā says that Devasvāmī explained this dictum of the Saṁgrahakāra. The Saṁgraha says that the widow of a separated coparcener dying childless would inherit his whole estate if she submitted to *Niyoga* at the behests of her elders.⁴⁸⁷ This was also the opinion of Dhāreśvara and was refuted according to the Smṛticandrikā by Viśvarūpa. The Mit. also criticizes this view. He names Manu in connection with the succession of a person dying without leaving any one out of the twelve kinds of sons.⁴⁸⁸ He has in view Manu 9. 185. According to the Saṁgrahakāra the order of succession to a sonless man is :— widow, the daughter who is a putrikā, mother, paternal grandmother, father, full brothers, half-brothers, the line of the father (pitṛsantati), the grandfather's line, the great-grand-father's line, other sapiṇḍas, sakulyas, the preceptor, the pupil, a fellow-student, a learned Brāhmaṇa. The Mit. notes that relying on Manu (9. 217) Dhāreśvara placed the paternal grandmother after the mother and before the father (thus agreeing with the Saṁgraha). The Saṁgraha says that homicide and other offences when commited with force are called *sāhasa*.⁴⁸⁹

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