History of Dharmashastra (Ancient and Mediaeval Religious and Civil Law in India) v4.c63.1054.3

v4.c63.1054.3

104 which apparently deny ownership (*svāmya*)¹⁰³⁷ to the son during the father's lifetime over property in the hands of the father are to be interpreted only as denying the son's power of independent dealing with such property during the father's lifetime or as referring to the self-acquisitions of the father. On the other hand the Dāyabhāga and the Dāyatattva try to explain away such passages as those of Yāj. II. 121, Viṣṇu and others (quoted above) that speak of the son's ownership by birth. The Dāyabhāga offers two explanations of Yāj. II. 121.¹⁰³⁸ The first explanation offered by it and taken from Udyota is:—If A has two sons B and C of whom C dies first, leaving a son D and then A dies, then Yāj. says that both B (son of A) and D (grandson of A) will be equally entitled to the wealth left by A and not B alone, though he is nearer to A than D, because both B and D offer piṇḍas of the same efficacy to A in the pārvaṇa-śrāddha and so there should be no difference between the two. The words "*sadṛśaṁ svāmyam*" refer to this equality of the son and grandson. The 2nd explanation is that of Dhāreśvara viz. that when the father desires to make a partition, he may distribute his self-acquired property as he likes among his sons, but as to the property he got from his own father (i. e. the grandfather of his sons) he has the same ownership that sons have and he cannot make an unequal division at his sweet will. The Dāyabhāga¹⁰³⁹ rejects the view that Yāj. II.