History of Dharmashastra (Ancient and Mediaeval Religious and Civil Law in India) v4.c63.t2.10

v4.c63.t2.10

¹²⁷⁷ Nigada means 'a sentence or sacrificial formula' and 'hetuvat' means 'containing a word or words (like 'hi') which are generally used to indicate a reason' for a statement already made. In preparing food from grains, the *śūrpa* is required for winnowing them to free them from husk &c. as also are required the pan or pot for boiling the grains and a ladle for stirring the grains when they are being boiled. The Śruti passage provides that with the help of a *śūrpa* the homa is made of Karambhapātras (pots full of husked grains of *yava* slightly fried on the Dakṣiṇa fire, ground and mixed with curds) in the Varuṇapraghāsa, one of the *cāturmāsyas*. Vide H. of Dh. vol. II. pp. 1095-96 and 1098 for the *śūrpa* used as a *juhū* ladle. If the latter part of the passage contains a reason for the first part, then it would follow that the pot or ladle (both of which are useful in getting food ( *Continued from the last page* ) prepared) may equally be used instead of the śūrpa. But the object of the latter half is not to assign a reason, but rather to praise and recommend the śūrpa as the means of making the homa and so nothing but the śūrpa can be employed in making the offering. The Veda is the final authority in all matters pertaining to sacrifice; it does not stand in need of giving reasons for its prescriptions but it may eulogise an act to induce people to perform it. Therefore in the hetuvan-nigadādhikaraṇa Jaimini does not lay down (as thought by Mandlik and by the High Court in 14 All. 67, pp. 73, 84, 125) that when a text is supported by a clause containing words of reason, it should be regarded as merely recommendatory (and not obligatory), but what Jaimini lays down is that clauses containing words generally meaning 'reason' are to be construed as *arthavādas* (praises) of the obligatory rule contained in a previous clause. Mr. Mandlik says (p. 499 of his 'Hindu Law') 'It is a rule of the Pūrvamīmāṁsā that all texts supported by the assigning of a reason are to be deemed not as *vidhi* but simply as *arthavāda* (recommendatory). When a text is treated as an arthavāda it follows that it has no obligatory force whatever. Śabarasvāmin constructs an adhikaraṇa on this head which he calls 'hetuman-nigadādhikaraṇa' (quoted in 14 All. 67 at p. 73). This is entirely wrong as shown above and the adhikaraṇa is not called 'hetuman etc.' but 'hetuvan etc.'. Acc. to Jaimini's rule the words of Vas. 15. 3 'naikaṁ putram' contain a vidhi (an obligatory rule), while the following clause containing the word 'hi' (indicative of a reason) '*sa hi santānāya pūrveṣām*' is merely an arthavāda, which praises the vidhi by emphasizing the importance of a son. Sarkar in his 'Mīmāṁsā Rules' (pp. 175-176) correctly represents the meaning of Jaimini, though in somewhat obscure language. The decisions in 14 All. 67 and 26 I. A. 113 are correct so far as the Mit. and the Mayūkha are concerned, though the judgments in the former case are wrong in what is regarded to be the meaning of Jaimini's aphorisms constituting 'hetuvan-nigadādhikaraṇa'. The Privy Council in 26 I. A. 113 at p. 146 refer to the supposed rule of Jaimini that all precepts supported by the assignment of a reason are to be taken as recommendations only, but they express themselves guardedly and say that the rule is rather startling and they would not admit it to be true unless they made an intimate study of the smṛtis. The commentaries will make the Pūrvamīmāṁsā position clear. अस्मत्पक्षे पुनः शूर्पं स्तूयते । तेन ह्यन्नं क्रियत इति वृत्तान्तान्वाख्यानं न च वृत्तान्तज्ञापनाय किं तर्हि बरोचनार्थैव । तस्माद्धेतुवन्निगदस्यापि स्तुतिरेव कार्यमिति । शबर on जै. I. 2. 30. The शास्त्रदीपिका states 'न च वेदेनोच्यमाने शूर्पस्य होमसाधनत्वं हेतुमपेक्षते वेदस्यैव तत्र प्रमाणत्वात् । अर्थवादस्त्वपेक्षितः प्ररोचनार्थत्वेन । तस्मादर्थवादत्वम्।'