History of Dharmashastra (Ancient and Mediaeval Religious and Civil Law in India) v4.c63.t2.616

v4.c63.t2.616

Very difficult questions arise in regard to the relative force of śruti, smṛti and sadācāra and numerous rules have been laid down in cases of apparent and real conflicts among them. As Manu II. 6, Vas. I. 4-5 and Yāj. I. 7 mention the sources of dharma to be śruti, smṛti and sadācāra in that order, the Mitākṣarā remarks¹⁶⁷⁴ that 'in case of conflict, each preceding one of those three has more force (or binding character) than each succeeding one.' Śruti or Veda is recognised by all smṛti writers as the highest or supreme authority for those who desire to know what dharma¹⁶⁷⁵ is (vide Manu II. 13 and Yāj. I. 40). If two vedic texts of equal authority are in conflict, then Gaut¹⁶⁷⁶ I. 5, Manu II. 14 and Jābāli declare that there is an option. For example, there are two Vedic texts 'he takes the ṣoḍaśin cup in the Atirātra sacrifice' and 'he does not take the ṣoḍaśin cup in the Atirātra'. In this case there is an option. Similarly Vedic texts say that the daily Vedic agnihotra may be performed after sunrise, or before sunrise or when neither the sun nor stars are visible. Therefore there is an option, viz. the daily agnihotra offering may be made at any one of the three times specified (Manu II. 15). But a vedic text which is in apparent conflict with another is not always of equal force with that other. In such a case there is no option, and various rules are laid down in the Pūrvamīmāṁsā some important ones among which will be discussed at length in the section on Pūrvamīmāṁsā. Such texts may be explained by holding that one lays down a general rule (sāmānya), while the other lays down a special rule (viśeṣa) or an exception, or that one is a *vidhi* and the other merely an *arthavāda* or that the two texts have different scopes or refer to different ages &c. All these rules about the interpretation of Vedic texts have been held to apply to smṛti passages. For example, Manu VIII. 381 is a general rule absolutely prohibiting the killing of a brāhmaṇa. While Manu VIII. 350 allowing the killing of a brāhmaṇa in self-defence is a special rule or may be regarded as a mere arthavāda (viz. even a guru who is really not to be killed on any account may be killed when he is an ātatāyin, what of others, as the Mit. on Yāj. II. 21 explains). Similarly Manu VIII. 351 saying that there is no fault (i. e. no sin, no punishment and no prāyaścitta) in slaying an ātatāyin has restricted scope as applying only to an ātatāyin who is not a brāhmaṇa. A few more examples will be given immediately below.