Pre-Buddhist India: A Political, Administrative, Economic, Social and Geographical Survey of Ancient India Based Mainly on the Jataka Stories c4.t6: II. Expenditure
Pre-Buddhist India: A Political, Administrative, Economic, Social and Geographical Survey of Ancient India Based Mainly on the Jātaka Stories c4.t6
- Language
- English
II. Expenditure
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It will have been seen from the above discussion, that the income of the king was sufficiently large to leave a fair surplus. Let us see now what were the items of royal expenditure.
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Nothing is said in the stories directly about the way in which the king's expenses were met. There was no 'Civil List' as in the *Arthaśāstra*,² The revenues and taxes, however, were mainly used to maintain the royal establishment. Of course various officials of the state, though not so large in number as we find them in Kauṭilya's time and later, had to be paid. Some of them were paid in cash (*vetana*),³ as we have seen, while all the important state-officers, such as the *purohita* and the *Senāpati*, were endowed with revenue-villages (*bhogagāmas*).⁴ A considerable amount was spent in charity⁵ towards the aged, the disabled and the starving, and above all to the Brāhmaṇas and the ascetics (*samaṇabrāhmaṇā*).
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² V, 3; Cf. Dikshitar, op. cit., pp. 150-1.
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³ J., III, p. 505; IV, pp. 132, 134-G. 100; V, p. 128; VI, p. 295-G. 1285.
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⁴ J., I, pp. 138, 365; II, p. 429-G. 117; III, p. 105; IV, pp. 80; 473; VI, pp. 344; 462-G 1630; Cf. *Arthaśāstra*, II, 1.
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⁵ J., II, pp. 118, 273, 316; III, p. 79; IV, pp. 176, 355, 361, 402, 444; V, p. 162; VI, p. 42.
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Of other items of expenditure by the state or by the king in person, we have no knowledge. It may be presumed, however, that some of the economic and social functions of the state, of which no direct information is available, must have come in for a large item of expenditure. Works of public utility, comparatively limited in those days, must have entailed an appreciable expenditure.⁶ We have instances, moreover, of the state bearing the cost of, or awarding scholarships to, students who went to far-off universities like Takkasilā for purposes of education.⁷
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⁶ Benches (*pīṭhake*) on the roads for the travellers to rest are referred to : J., I, p. 348; The *sālās* of the city and village gates : J., II, p. 211; IV, pp. 315-6.
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⁷ J., III, p. 238; V, pp. 127, 310, 247, 263.
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The *Jātaka* kings who, not rarely, are found to have indulged in gorgeous luxuries, had obviously a rich treasury at their command. Did we not observe, while discussing the splendour and luxuries of kings,⁸ what a great amount of wealth they possessed in the form of valuable articles like perfumes, cloths and various kinds of pearls and jewels? There were officers employed to guard the various treasures of jewels (nānāratanagopakā).¹ The Heraññaka or the keeper of the king's purse was not an ordinary official.² Similarly the Bhaṇḍāgārika or the treasurer proper, was the superintendent of the storehouse.³ Besides these, there was the Valuater—the Agghakāraka who, on behalf of the king, valued the articles that came to the palace for sale.⁴ Thus it seems that the treasury of the Jātaka kings was richly furnished. To keep it efficient, and in order, accounts and records of income and expenditure must have been maintained, though we have no reference to this in the stories. The king lived amidst unbounded luxuries, while the cultivator groaned under the weight of taxation.
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⁸ Supra, pp. 108-9.
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¹ J, III, p. 505. The treasury of the Mauryas contained pearls from the Pāṇḍya and Kerala countries, from Persia and the Himalayas, gems (maṇi) of different size and value from the Vindhyas and the Malaya mountains, diamonds of various kinds from Kaliṅga, Kosala, and Benares, coral from the isle of the Yavanas: See Arthaśāstra, II, 11; Kalidas Nag, Les Theories Diplomatiques de L'Inde Ancienne, pp. 133-5.
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² J., p. 420.
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³ J., IV, p. 43; V, p. 120; VI, p. 38.
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⁴ J., I, p. 124; IV, p. 137.
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However, the general impression that we form after going through these stories, is that the Jātaka State, being simpler and not concerned with much intricate problems of administration, was far from Financial and Fiscal intricacies and affairs. Revenues and taxes came to the king in the case of Central affairs and were spent, first in maintaining himself and his whole establishment, and then in other administrative purposes which also were not many.
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JUDICIARY AND JUSTICE
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ONE OF THE PRIMARY functions of the State, as we saw before while dealing with the King as an administrator, was the administration of justice. To settle disputes between man and man, and between man and society, must have been the first and foremost duty of those who were chosen to be the heads of society during the earlier stages of its progress. Election or regular succession of a king as the case may be, was preceded by a thoughtful consideration by the people whether, firstly, the man on whom the mantle of sovereignty was to be offered was endowed with the necessary physical fitness and qualities of a leader, and secondly, whether he had the qualifications and the mentality of a careful and competent judge.¹ If he had not these, he was set aside.
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¹ Supra, pp. 101 ff.
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The Jātakas abound in thoughtful instructions and well considered reflections over the importance and necessity of a conscientious discharge of legal duties. Repeated emphasis laid on impartial judgment free of any prejudices shows the high standard of justice set up in those ancient days. Judgment and punishment must not be hasty but full and calm consideration must be given to different sides of the case. The king, who was the fountain of justice, was repeatedly warned to have no regard whatever to his own will or whim in administering justice.² It is wrong for one who bears rule to act without trying the case.³ Let us hear these verses which bear eloquent testimony to the high standard of justice prevailing in those days:
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² J., II, p. 2.
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³ J., III, p. 105—"tasmā avinicchitvā kātuṁ na yuttaṁ rajjaṁ kārentena."
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IDEALS OF JUSTICE.
"No king should punish an offence, and hear no pleas at all,
Not thoroughly sifting it himself in all points, great and small.⁴
The warrior chief who punishes a fault before he tries,
Is like a man born blind, who eats his food all bones and flies;
Who punishes the guiltless, and lets go the guilty, knows
No more than one who, blind, upon a rugged highway goes;
He who all this examines well, in things both great and small,
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⁴ Cf. Dhammapada, p. 341.
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And so administers, deserves to be the head of all. He that would set himself on high must not all-gentle be, Nor all-severe : but both these things practise in company. Contempt the all-gentle wins, and he that’s all-severe, has wrath : So of the pair be well aware, and keep a middle path.”¹
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¹ J., IV, p. 192—GG. 61-7 : *Cf.* Aśoka’s instructions to his Governors : *Separate Kaliṅga Edict I*; Mookerji, *Aśoka*, pp. 218-20.
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The beam of balance (*tulā*) was even then, as it is today, regarded as a symbol of equal and unbiassed justice.² Amongst others, circumspection is an essential quality demanded of a judge (*nisammakāriṇā bhavitabbam*).³ Another sound maxim is that
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² J., I, p. 176—“*Rañño nāma kāraṇagavesakena tulāsadisena bhavitum vaṭṭati.*”
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³ J., III, p. 105; IV, p. 30.
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“A thoughtful act, wherein is careful policy pursued,
Like a successful medicine, the issue must be good.”⁴
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⁴ J., IV, p. 451-G. 208.
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Punishment should be awarded with “careful measure” (*nisamma*) proportionate to the nature and degree of the offence committed.
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“The warrior prince takes careful thought and well-weighed
judgment gives :
When kings their judgment ponder well, their fame for
ever lives.”⁵
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⁵ J., III, pp. 105-G, 128; 154-G. 5; IV, p. 451-G. 210; also *ibid.*, GG. 211-2.
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All these are, no doubt, sound maxims and wise instructions imparted to the kings. They are Ideals preached to be translated into practice.⁶ And ideals, as we have often stated, are both the cause and the effect of actualities. Therefore, neither shall we attach too much importance to these, in considering the real state of affairs, nor shall we wholly pass them off as useless or unnecessary for our purpose. Nevertheless it should be stated here that the general impression that one gets after noticing the various stories connected with this question is, that the judicial arrangements were not sound and efficient, but corrupted and exploited to a degree.
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⁶ And Aśoka did try his best to establish equal and impartial justice within his Empire. See *Pillar Edict IV*. “*Viyohālasamatā, daṇḍa-samatā*”; Mookerji, *op. cit.*, p. 238.
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The king, as will appear, was regarded as the head of justice. In fact the legends would have us understand, that all the cases were heard and decided by the king in person, as it is always to the king or the Khattiya that the sound maxims quoted above are addressed. This could hardly have been the real state of affairs. Of course, as a rule the king used to hear cases, and we may assume that the king “actually went each morning to the Court house” as in
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THE KING AS THE HEAD OF JUSTICE.
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the Epic¹ and heard cases. When not himself, some one or more of his ministers decided the cases, as we see the purohita, the Senāpati and even the Prince acting as judges² in addition to their normal duties in their respective spheres of action. The post of a judge was named that of a ‘Vinicchayā-macca’,³ and that there were more than one justice can be assumed from the term ‘Vinicchayamahāmattā’s sometimes used in the stories.⁴ One Jātaka gives the definite number of five.⁵
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¹ Hopkins J. A. O. S., 13, p. 132.
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² J., II, pp. 2 “amaccāpi dhammen ‘eva vohāraṃ vinicchinentu ;” 186-7; V, p. 1; VI, p. 131.
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³ J., II, p. 181; III, p. 105.
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⁴ J., II, p. 380; VI, p. 45.
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⁵ J., V, p. 228 “Tassa pana rañño pañca amaccā….vinicchaye niyuttā.”
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The Hall of Judgment is frequently mentioned⁶ where the judges, appointed by the king,⁷ sat and attended to their daily duties. There is no reference to a definite Code of Law by which the judges were to be guided in deciding the cases, but we come across such passages as these: “he said, ‘execute justice in this way’ and he had righteous judgment inscribed on a golden plate”⁸ or “then he caused a book of judgments to be written and said ‘by observing this book ye should settle suits.’”⁹ The question of the authorship of such books “is immaterial here, and there is no reason why the existence of such useful works should be doubted, when one of the foremost duties of a government was to administer justice in the strictest sense of the term.”¹⁰ It is also possible that a body of precedents had grown up by that time.¹¹ Still, with all this, the question of deciding cases depended largely upon the personal characteristics of a judge, his nature, whim, temperament and even prejudices. For in the stories, judgment is often almost invariably associated with bribery.¹² It is rather strange to see that there was no orderly or systematic course in which the cases were decided, and the frequent mention of the upsetting of a bad judgment of one by others—like the senāpati, the princes the purohita and even an ascetic, who happened to come upon the scene and to whom the party who had lost his cause appealed for redress—is, to say the least, surprising.¹³ The one who judged rightly was applauded by the people, and then he would be formally appointed by the king as a judge. In one of such instances the king, while appointing the man to judgeship, gives the following directions as to the time and the way in which he should spend his daily routine: “It will be to the advantage of the people if you decide cases: henceforth you are to sit in judgment…. You need not judge the whole day, but….go at early dawn to the place of judgment and decide four cases; then return....and partaking of food, decide four more cases." In this way he was required to decide only 8 cases per day. This arrangement was apparently made for the convenience of an officer whose time was mostly occupied in spiritual work and we have reason to believe here and elsewhere,¹ that the court sat the whole day from morning to sun-set, after which all business was to stop.
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⁶ J., I, p. 176; II, pp. 2, 186, 297; III, p. 505; IV, p. 120.
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⁷ J., V, p. 229; VI, pp. 131-2.
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⁸ J., V, p. 125—“evaṃ vinicchayaṃ pavatteyyāthā ti vinicchayadhammam suvaṇṇapaṭṭe likhāpetvā….”
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⁹ J., III, p. 292—“Vinicchaye piṭṭhakaṃ likhāpetvā’ imaṃ potthakaṃ olokentā affaṃ tireyyātha.”
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¹⁰ Sen, op. cit., pp. 128-9.
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¹¹ Subbarao, op. cit., p. 37. Cf. Hopkins, op. cit., 13, p. 132.
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¹² J., II, p. 186; V, pp. 1228; VI, p. 131.
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¹³ J., II, p. 187; V, p. 229; VI, p. 131.
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¹ J., I, p. 384; 11, p. 2; V, p. 229
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Let us now proceed to have a glimpse of the nature of cases which came before the king or his Court of Justice and the procedure followed in the decision of these.
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The term used for a law suit is 'atto' and the suitors are called atta-kārakās. Ordinarily there was a great bustle (uparavo) among the waiting suitors in the precincts of the royal palace where, presumably, the Court of Law was situated. This is well inferred from the following description of the Court appearing in the Rājovāda Jātaka² which, presenting as it does an exceptional case, proves negatively the ordinary course of affairs: "And as he ruled thus justly, his ministers on their part were also just; thus while all things were justly done, there was none who brought a false suit into court. Presently all the bustle of suitors ceased within the precincts of the palace; all day long the ministers might sit on the bench, and go away without seeing a single suitor. The Courts were deserted."
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² J., II, p. 2.
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Theft and robbery seem to have been the most ordinary cases that came before the court for adjudication.³ Very often an innocent man was arrested on a charge of theft, and brought before the Court. Inflictions of tortures, with a view to elicit confession of a crime, were prevalent.⁴ A simple rustic (Jānapado) perfectly innocent man, is arrested by the King's men (purisā) on a charge of theft of the queen's pearl-necklace and is forced to plead guilty of the charge, only to avoid the crushing and ruthless blows administered to him: "If I deny the charge, I shall die with the beating I shall get from these ruffians. I'd better say I took it."⁵ Thus the man had to confess. And when brought before the king, he naively implicated the Treasurer, the latter in the same manner implicating the Chaplain, the Chief Musician and then a Courtezan who utterly denied ever having received the necklace.⁶ All the five prisoners were however found innocent and released. Another very interesting case¹ is that in which Gāmaṇicaṇḍa, a retired Government servant, ‘the most innocent man that ever was born in the world,’ stood charged of four offences, viz.,
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³ Cf. Hopkins "and trial for theft seems the earliest kind of judicial inquiry in India" : J. A. O. S., 13, p. 134; also C. H. I., I p. 282.
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⁴ J., I, p. 384.
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⁵ Ibid.
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⁶ Ibid., pp. 385-6. The story, moreover, presents a very interesting insight into the mentality of these five undertrial prisoners who, when alone in the look-up, give out the reasons of implicating one another in the charge of which all of them were innocent. The Treasurer questions the rustic who answers: "Worshipful sir, it has never been mine to own aught so valuable even as a stool or bedstead that wasn't rickety. I thought that with your help I should get out of this trouble." Then in answer to the chaplain's question, the Treasurer says: "I only said so because I thought that if you and I, both high officers of State, stand together, we can soon put the matter right." Then the chaplain to the Musician: "I only said I did because I thought you would help to make the time pass more agreeably." Lastly the Musician (a jolly fellow) to the Courtezan: "Why be angry my dear? We five have got to keep house together for a bit: so let us put a cheerful face on it and be happy together."
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¹ J., II, pp. 300-7.
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1. Non-return of oxen taken on loan.²
2. Miscarriage.
3. Murder, and
4. Injury to a horse.
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² Cf. *Rasadānam* of *Arthaśāstra* list of cases, III, 11; N. N. Law, *Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity*, p. 119.
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He is brought before the king together with the plaintiffs. In a perfectly judicial manner the proceedings are related in the story. The plaintiff in each case sets forth his complaint. The king questions Gāmaṇi, the accused, about its correctness. The latter on every occasion replies in the affirmative, but he also places his own story by way of justification of the case without making any secret of it. The king cross-examines the complainants and finds them guilty of ‘wilful suppression or denial of truth.’ Hence both the parties are found guilty, and deserve to be punished. “The decisions contained such conditions as ever took the breath of a Shylock away.”³ The judgment on the first charge runs thus: “You failed to return the oxen, and therefore you are his debtor for them. But this man, in saying that he had not seen them, told a direct lie. Therefore you with your own hands shall pluck his eyes out, and you shall yourself pay him 24 pieces of money as the price of the oxen.” On the second charge the judgment was: “Caṇḍa, you take the man’s wife to your house; and when a son shall be born to you, hand him over to the husband”; on the third: “Caṇḍa, this man must have a father. But you cannot bring him back from the dead. Then take his mother to your house, and do you be a father to him”; and on the fourth: “This man has told a direct lie in saying that he did not tell you to hand back the horse. You may tear out his tongue, and then pay him a thousand pieces for the horse’s price.” All the complainants were however dumbfounded and departed.
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³ Sen, op. cit., p. 126.
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As to the judgments and punishments awarded in these cases, prejudiced as they are, we may safely pass them off as not reliable, but there is absolutely no reason of doubting the existence of such charges and their coming before the Court for decision. From an untoward and natural utterance of Gāmaṇicaṇḍa we learn, that one was to pay fine for causing an untimely birth or compensation for any loss for which one might be liable.⁴
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⁴ J., I p. 302: “....ime mam rañño dassessanti, aham gonamūlam pi dātum na sakkomi, pag eva gabbhapātanadaṇḍam, assamūlam pana kuto lacchāmi.”
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In another instance,⁵ we have a still more interesting case. Here some village boys stand charged of the murder of a doctor. It happened that the boys were playing at the foot of a banyan tree at the entrance of the village.
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⁵ J., III, pp. 202-6.
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A poor old doctor, who had no practice at that time, strayed out of the village to this spot, and saw a snake asleep in the fork of a tree with its head tucked in. He thought, "there is nothing to be got in the village. I will cajole these boys and make the snake bite them, and then I shall get somewhat for curing them." So he said to one of the boys, "If you were to see a young hedgehog, would you seize it?" "Yes, I would," the boy answered. "See, here is one lying in the fork of this tree." The boy climbed up the tree and seized it by the neck and, when he found it was a snake, he did not allow it to turn upon him, but getting a good grip of it, he hastily flung it from him. It fell on the neck of the old doctor, and he fell down dead on the spot. The boys were arrested and placed before the king for trial. The whole matter was carefully investigated, and when their innocence was proved, the boys were set free. How the investigation took place we are not told, but *purisās* must have been sent and ascertained the true facts.
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Elsewhere¹ we witness a curious suit between a villager and a townsman being decided by a judge. The townsman stood guilty of wrongful possession of some ploughshares belonging to the villager who, again, was charged for kidnapping the former's son. The townsman had produced this cause, that the ploughshares were devoured by the mice while the villager, an equal genius, had said that a falcon had carried the child off. The judge presses the townsman to tell the truth and, realising the mischief committed by both, he gives out the judgment:
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¹ J., II, pp. 181-4. The two offences described in this story may correspond to debts and abduction, if we use the legal language.
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"Give back the plough, and after that,
Perhaps, the man who lost the plough
May give your son back to you now."²
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² Ibid., p. 183-G. 135.
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In all these instances,³ we notice that there is nothing like cross-examination as we may understand to have been prevalent at that time. Only the judge himself questions the parties and decides accordingly.
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³ Cf. also J., II, pp. 51-2 (here one of the litigant parties is a vulture).
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Among other cases, those of disputed ownership seem to be of common occurrence, in almost all of which justice is thrown to the winds and bribery succeeds. Several crying figures of rightful owners being defrauded and deprived of their property flit across the pages of these stories.⁴
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⁴ J., II, pp. 186 (*asāmike sāmike karoti*): V, p. 1, 220; VI, p. 131. Cf. Also J., II, p. 75. "*atte sahasam parājito*". Cf. *Arthalāstra*, III, 16 (*Svavāmi sambandha*.)
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Once a Courtezan came to the court to take advice as to whether in the eye of the law she was still bound by the terms of a contract entered three years previously with a man who had since not made his appearance.⁵ The judges advised her to return to her former profession. This makes us feel that such suits involving contractual rights and obligations must have been commonly tried in the law courts.
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⁵ J., II, p. 380; Sen, op. cit., p. 127; Fick, op. cit., p. 148.
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Much more valuable is the reference to a case where a father who does not wish his wicked son to succeed to his property goes to the Court and disinherits his son.¹ This must imply the existence of the necessary written records in possession of the family and also of the Court.
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¹ J., V, p 408 "Atha nam vinicchayam netvā aputtabhāvam katvā niharāpesi.
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There is a vague reference to fire-ordeal for the sake of proving the chastity of a woman,² but it does not seem that it was a prevalent system employed and supported by the government, as even Kauṭilya, though conversant with that institution as recommended by the law-books,³ does not mention it, evidently because he regarded such ordeals as questionable expedients.⁴
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² J., I, p. 294.
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³ See C. H. I., I, pp. 282 ff. P. N. Banerji, Public Administration in Ancient India, pp. 163-4.
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⁴ See Dikshitar, Hindu Adm. Instt., pp. 236 ff; Mauryan Polity, 166.
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In the instances of cases that we noticed before we nowhere see anything like legal proceedings, lawyers defending their clients and raising points against the opposite party. Nevertheless it does not seem proper to hold that there were absolutely no lawyers who could place and defend the cases of their clients before the Court, and earn their livelihood from that profession. For there are some references to 'Vohāra' which, if consistent and correct in their application, would go to prove that some sort of legal practice was followed. Once⁵ we are told that a certain Brāhmaṇa earned his livelihood by following Vohāra. This of course does not give any definite meaning of the term Vohāra. Our hesitation lies only in this, that the meaning of this Vohāra is not always the same. In one place⁶ it clearly applies to trade, whereas in another⁷ it expressly goes with the administration of justice. That it went with the latter is also clear from the expression "So dhammena rajjam kāresi, vinicchayam anusāsi....amaccāpi dhammena 'eva vohāram vinicchinimsu," occurring elsewhere.⁸ Thus the association of Vohāra and Vinicchaya here is unquestionable and unequivocal, and it makes us bolder therefore to state, that vohāra or vyavahāra as meant by the Law books and the Arthaśāstra⁹ was prevalent in the Jātaka times, though not as strictly as later.¹⁰ Though we have no details of hearing suits, the instances already cited at least show that the complainant stated his case, and the accused made his statement in return, probably on oath. The Court was attended by others than the parties to a suit, and applause was not suppressed, but, on the contrary, considered with respect and due weight by the king. Witnesses (Sakkhi) may be produced,¹ though there is no clear indication for this. Perhaps on the evidence of a witness, cases were reconsidered, as the term 'nijjhāpanam' occurring also in Aśokan Edicts seems to show.² On the whole it seems that the Court was a distinct place by itself, with something of legal atmosphere pervading it.³ With the growth of various trades and professions, special judgeships were instituted,⁴ which shows the development of legal affairs.
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⁵ J., II, p. 15 "Tassa pitā vohāram katvā jīvikam kappeti."
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⁶ J., VI, p. 34 "Vohāram katvā dhanam uppādetvā....suvaṇṇabhūmim gatoā
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⁷ J., IV, p. 192-G. 64 "sudittham anusāseya sa ve vohātum arahati."
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⁸ J., II, p. 2.
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⁹ See Dikshitar, Hindu Adm. Instt., pp. 255 ff. Cf. Viyohālasamatā of Pillar Edict IV.
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¹⁰ This is doubted by Fick. op. cit., p. 147 n.
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¹ J., VI, p. 108-G. 453. Sakkhi is equivalent to modern sākṣi.
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² J., IV, p. 495—G. 334. Pillar Edict IV; Barua I. H. Q., II, p. 125.
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³ It would be interesting and also, we think, instructive in this connection to observe the life-like and realistic court-scene of those days represented on a medallion at Barhut. The scene is taken from one of our Jātakas, No. 540. We reproduce here the description of the scene as given by A. Foucher in his "The Beginnings of Buddhist Art," pp. 50-51: "Amarā, the virtuous wife, whose husband is absent, has four suitors to whom she assigns an interview for each of the watches of the same night, and it is also in great esparto baskets that she causes her tricked lovers to be packed by her servants. At the moment chosen by the sculptor we are in the midst of the Court: the king is seated on his throne, surrounded by his ministers, and at his right side one of the women of the harem is waving a fly-flapper. Amarā is standing on the other side, her left hand on the shoulder of her attendant, and at her order the covers of three of the baskets have already been raised and the heads of three of the delinquents uncovered, whilst two coolies bring the fourth." See Ibid., pl. V, 5; Cunningham, Stūpa of Barhut, pl. xxv, fig. 3.
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⁴ Cf. I, IV, p. 43. "Sabbaseninam vicāraṇārahaṃ bhaṇḍāgārikaṭṭhānam". See Mrs. Rhys Davids, J. R. A. S., 1901, p. 865.
Linked texts (4)
- Jātaka — Pāli
- Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra — Kauṭilya, Sanskrit
- Dhammapada — Pāli
- Pillar Edict IV — Prakrit