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Local Government in Ancient India c11: Chapter V. Justice

Local Government in Ancient India c11

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Chapter V. Justice

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ONE of the most important functions of the local bodies was, of course, the administration of justice. According to Bṛhaspati 'Judicial assemblies are of four sorts: stationary, not stationary, furnished with the king's signet ring, and directed by the king. A stationary court meets in a town or village; one not stationary is called movable; one furnished with the king's signet-ring is superintended by the chief judge; one directed by the king is held in the king's presence' (I. 2–3).¹ The relations between these different kinds of courts of justice are thus indicated

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¹ प्रतिष्ठिताप्रतिष्ठिता मुद्रिता शासिता तथा । चतुर्विधा सभा प्रोक्ता सभ्याश्चैव तथाविधाः ॥ प्रतिष्ठिता पुरे ग्रामे चला नामाप्रतिष्ठिता । मुद्रिताध्यक्षसंयुक्ता राजयुक्ता च शासिता ॥

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by Nārada: 'Family meetings (*kula*), corporations (*śreṇī*), village assemblies (*gaṇa*), one appointed by the king, and the king himself are invested with the power to decide law-suits; and of these each succeeding is superior to the one preceding it in order' (I. 7).¹ The significance of this passage from Nārada is thus brought out by the commentator Asahāya: ‘A suit decided in a village goes on appeal to the city (court). What has been decided in the city (court) goes (on appeal) before the king (i.e. the king’s court); but there is no appeal from the decision of the king, whether right or wrong.’² We are not, however, concerned with the higher or king’s courts (forming the last two varieties in Bṛhaspati’s classification of courts) but only with the lower and local or popular courts (the first two classes of courts mentioned by Bṛhaspati). These popular courts were, according to the Smṛtis, constituted by the *kula*, the *śreṇī*, the *gaṇa*, or the *pūga*. The gradation of the courts indicated by Nārada is also indicated by other law-givers. Bṛhaspati states: ‘Relatives, companies (of artisans), assemblies (of co-habitants) and other persons duly authorized by the king should decide law-suits among men, excepting causes concerning violent crimes (*sāhasa*). Meetings of kindred, companies (of artisans) assemblies (of co-habitants) and chief judges are declared to be resorts for the passing of a sentence to whom he whose cause has been previously tried may appeal in succession'. This is further explained thus: 'When a cause has not been (duly) investigated by meetings of kindred, it should be decided after due deliberation by companies (of artisans); when it has not been duly examined by companies (of artisans, it should be decided) by assemblies (of co-habitants); and when it has not been (sufficiently) made out by such assemblies (it should be tried) by appointed (judges)' (I. 28–30).

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¹ कुलानि श्रेणयश्चैव गणाश्चाधिकृतो नृपः । प्रतिष्ठा व्यवहाराणां गुर्वेभ्यस्तूत्तरोत्तरम् ॥

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² ग्रामे दृष्टः पुरे याति पुरे दृष्टस्तु राजनि । राज्ञा दृष्टः सुदृष्टो वा नास्ति पौनर्भवो विधिः ॥

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Yājñavalkya (II. 30)¹ also mentions a similar gradation of local courts such as *kula*, *śreṇī*, and *pūga* arranged in the ascending order of importance, the *kula* being the lowest court composed of kinsmen for arbitration in small matters, from which an appeal lay to the next higher courts.

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The *śreṇī* has been defined by the *Mitākṣarā*² as the court constituted by traders or artisans including men of different castes but pursuing similar means of livelihood, and the *pūga* as the court constituted by men of different castes and occupations but inhabiting the same village or town. It was ruled that if an appeal was lost the appellant must pay double what he was fined by the lower court.

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² पूगाः समूहा भिन्नजातीनां भिन्नवृत्तीनामेकस्थाननिवासिनां यथा ग्रामनगरादयः। श्रेणयो नानाजातीनामेकजातीयकर्मोपजीविनां संघाताः ॥

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The meaning given by the *Mitākṣarā* for the different courts

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नृपेणाधिकृताः पूगाः श्रेणयोऽथ कुलानि च ।
पूर्वं पूर्वं गुरु ज्ञेयं व्यवहारविधौ नृणाम् ॥

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makes it clear that their gradation was determined by their numerical strength and the degree in which they represented the various interests, classes or castes in the community concerned. Thus the *pūga* was the highest court because it was numerically the largest assembly, on which were represented not merely the different castes, as in the *śreṇī*, but also the interests of different crafts, trades, or occupations in the village or township.

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The principle underlying these lower and local courts has been admirably put by the *Śukranīti*. In cases of dispute the best men of the locality concerned can alone be the proper judges.¹ The application of the principle thus laid down is shown in the following passage: 'Foresters are to be tried with the help of foresters, merchants by merchants, soldiers by soldiers, and in the village by persons who live with both parties' (IV. 5. 24). This is indeed an echo of the earlier Smṛti works. Bṛhaspati says: 'For persons roaming the forest, a court should be held in the forest; for warriors, in the camp; and for merchants in the caravan.' Again: 'Cultivators, artisans (such as carpenters and others), artists, money-lenders, companies (of tradesmen), dancers, persons wearing the token of a religious order (such as Pāśupatas) and robbers should adjust their disputes according to the rules of their own profession.’ Further: ‘(the king) should cause the disputes of ascetics and of persons versed in sorcery and witchcraft to be settled by persons familiar with the three Vedas only, and not decide them himself’ (I. 25–7).¹

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¹ **अभियुक्ताश्च ये तत्र यन्निबन्धनियोजनाः ।** **तत्तत्यगुणदोषाणां त एव हि विचारकाः ॥** **आरण्यस्तु स्वकैः कुर्युः सार्थिकाः सार्थिकैः सह ।** **सैनिकाः सैनिकैरेव ग्रामेऽप्युभयवासिभिः ॥**

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¹ कीनाशाः कारुकाः शिल्पिकुसीदिश्रेणीनर्तकाः। लिंगिनस्तस्कराः कुर्युः स्वेन धर्मेण निर्णयम् ॥ तपस्विनां तु कार्याणि त्रैविद्यैरेव कारयेत् । मायायोगविदां चैव न स्वयं कोपकारणात् ॥

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The same principle of neighbourhood and local knowledge is also recognized by Manu when he holds ‘the indigenous (inhabitants of the country, be they) Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas, or Śūdras’ as being alone competent to give evidence (VIII. 62).² The principle was held to be essential in settling disputes regarding boundaries, on which the following rules are laid down: ‘If there be no witnesses let four men who dwell on all the four sides (of the two villages) make a decision concerning the boundary’ (VIII. 258).³ ‘The decision concerning the boundary-marks of fields, wells, tanks, of gardens and houses, depends upon (the evidence of) the neighbours’ (VIII. 262). On failure of the above kinds of witnesses ‘the evidence even of the following inhabitants of the forest’ was admissible on account of their local knowledge, viz., ‘hunters, fowlers, herdsmen, fishermen, root-diggers, snake-catchers, gleaners, and other foresters’ (ibid., 259. 260).¹ Yājñavalkya (II. 150-2)² has also the same regulation: ‘In disputes relating to boundaries of land under cultivation persons residing in surrounding villages, aged men and other (competent persons), cow-herds, persons cultivating boundary lands and all persons who frequent the forest should determine the boundary.’ Again: ‘Or persons from neighbouring villages even in number—four, eight, or ten—should settle the boundary lines.’ Finally, the *Kauṭilīya* (III. ix) will have all disputes regarding the boundary between any two villages settled by neighbours or elders of five or ten villages, and disputes arising in the same village by the elders of the neighbourhood or of the village (*grāma-vṛddhāḥ*). It is also stated that all kinds of disputes shall depend for their settlement on the evidence to be furnished by neighbours.

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² गृहिणः पुत्रिणो मौलाः क्षत्रविट्शूद्रयोनयः। अर्युक्ताः साक्ष्यमर्हन्ति न ये केचिदनापदि ॥

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³ साक्ष्यभावे तु चत्वारो ग्रामाः सामन्तवासिनः। सीमाविनिर्णयं कुर्युः प्रयता राजसन्निधौ ॥

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¹ सामन्तानामभावे तु मौलानां सीम्नि साक्षिणाम् । इमानप्यनुयुञ्जीत पुरुषान्वनगोचरान् ॥ व्याधांश्छाकुनिकान्गोपान्कैवर्तान् मूलखनकान् । व्यालग्राहानुञ्छवृत्तीनन्यौश्च वनचारिणः ॥ क्षेत्रकूपतडागानामारामस्य गृहस्य च । सामन्तप्रत्ययो ज्ञेयः सीमा सेतुविनिर्णयः ॥

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² सीम्नो विवादे क्षेत्रस्य सामन्ताः स्थविरादयः । गोपाः सीमाकृषाणा ये सर्वे च वनगोचराः ॥ नयेयुरेते सीमानं स्थलाङ्गारतुषद्रुमैः । सेतुवल्मीकनिम्नास्थिचैत्याद्यैरुपलक्षिताम् ॥ सामन्ता वा समग्रामाश्चत्वारोऽष्टौ दशापि वा । रक्तस्रग्वसनाः सीमां नयेयुः क्षितिधारिणः ॥

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We may also cite the opinion of Vasiṣṭha: 'In a dispute about a house or a field reliance (may be placed on the depositions of) neighbours' (XVI. 13).¹ As explained by Kauṭilya the decision of these courts was that of the majority of the persons constituting the court.²

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¹ गृहक्षेत्रविरोधे सामन्तप्रत्ययः सामन्तविरोधेऽपि लेख्यप्रत्ययः।

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² क्षेत्रविवादं सामन्तग्रामवृद्धाः कुर्युः। तेषां द्वैधीभावे यतो बहवः शुचयोऽनुमता वा ततो नियच्छेयुः।

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The procedure and rules laid down for the administration of justice by the kings' courts also apply with some necessary modifications to the administration of justice by the local, popular courts. Thus regarding evidence, that to be used by the Pūgas, the Śreṇīs, the Gaṇas and other trades should be 'writing, and not an ordeal, or witnesses'. (*Vyavahāramayūkha* on Pramāṇa-nirūpaṇa). In regard to local disputes calling for witnesses, Nārada has the following: 'among Śreṇīs, the heads of Śreṇīs (Śreṇīpuruṣa), among Vargas heads of Vargas (*vargiṇaḥ*)'. Kātyāyana thus specifies the Vargins or heads of a Varga: 'The Liṅgins (persons wearing a Liṅga or a symbol), the Śreṇīs, the Pūgas, and other communities of traders, so also members of other guilds (Samūhastha): these Bhṛgu calls Vargas. The term Vargin applies to the Nāyakas or leaders or foremen of the guilds (Samūhas), of Dāsas (slaves), the Cāraṇas (bards), the Mallas (wrestlers), those who live by driving of elephants, horses and carriages’ (ibid.). The administration of justice requires, however, officers other than mere judges or assessors. Thus accountants and scribes were attached to the courts who ‘know the principles of grammar, and have studied the lexicons (*śabdābhidhāna*), who were skilled in reckoning, who were pure, and who were acquainted with various scripts’. (Bṛhaspati quoted in *Vyavahāramayūkha*). According to Kātyāyana the accountants or auditors should be appointed from amongst the Vaiśyas. The accountant is ‘to count the money’; the scribe ‘to write the legal proceedings’. Vyāsa (quoted in the *Vīramitrodaya*) wants the *gaṇaka* to be well versed in Astronomy (with its three branches of Horā, Gaṇita, and Saṃhitā) and Vedic study (whence the Śūdra is excluded) and capable of inspiring complete confidence, while he wants the *lekhaka* to be truthful, free from greed and anger, incorruptible, of clear hand-writing and style of composition and having a mastery of words. Besides these officers of the judge’s court, ‘a truthful and confidential man should be appointed subject to the authority of judges to summon witnesses, the plaintiff and the defendant, and to look after them' (Bṛhaspati, ibid.). This appointment seems to have been reserved for the Śūdra, for Vyāsa says ; 'A stout Śūdra whose ancestors were employed in that office acting under the orders of the judges, should be made a *sādhyapāla* to obtain materials for trial.'

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The local courts took cognizance of both civil and criminal cases. In the *Kauṭilīya* there occurs a passage in which power seems to be given to the headman of the village to deport out of it criminals like a thief or an adulterer. In some of the South Indian inscriptions there are given interesting details regarding the administration of criminal law. Thus in no. 64 of 1900 (a Cola epigraph) we have the following : 'A certain individual shot [an arrow at] a man belonging to his own village by mistake. Thereupon the governor and the people of the district to which the village belonged assembled together and decided that the culprit should not die for the offence committed by him through carelessness.' He was not, however, allowed to escape scot-free, but was made to atone for his action by the penalty of providing for a perpetual sacred lamp at the temple, for which he had to assign sixteen cows to the village assembly. There are two other instances of similar trials connected with shooting accidents or unintentional homicide in which the assembly administered justice without troubling the governor, thus showing how the people ‘played a more important part at such trials than even the governor himself’. No. 80 of 1906 records the suicide of a woman whom a village officer had put through an ordeal for her refusal to pay certain taxes for which she did not hold herself liable. A meeting of the people from ‘the four quarters, eighteen districts and the various countries’ was held. The officer was declared guilty and fined. No. 77 of 1900 relates the case of a man who, while hunting, missed his aim and killed a man, whereupon the assembly, without troubling the king’s court or the governor, disposed of this case of accidental shooting by imposing a fine of sixteen cows to provide for a permanent light in the temple. No. 223 of 1902 records a gift, under similar circumstances, of forty-five sheep for a lamp, by the father of a boy of six years who accidentally killed another boy of seven years with his sickle in cutting wood. Two other Cola epigraphs, nos. 188 of 1906, and 257 and 352 of 1909 report similar cases of unintentional homicide similarly atoned for. No. 148 of 1906 reports an interesting case of a woman throwing a stick at her own daughter and accidentally hitting another girl who died on the twentieth day after the accident, whereupon the husband of the offending woman had to endow a lamp as the usual penalty. No. 91 of 1906 registers another tragedy:

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a woman pushed by her husband fell and died, whereupon ‘1,500 men of the four quarters’ declared him guilty in their assembly, and imposed upon him the usual gift as a penalty. Cases of accidental shooting in hunting are reported in nos. 33, 106, 273, and 279 of 1919 (App. C) and of causing accidental death in nos. 67 and 110. The judgment of the assembly in each case inflicted the usual penalty of providing for permanent lights in the temples.

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