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Theory of Government in Ancient India (Post-Vedic) c14.s1: Guilds in Gautama

Theory of Government in Ancient India (Post-Vedic) c14.s1

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Guilds in Gautama

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The Mahābhārata contains numerous allusions to guilds and makes it clear that their headmen occupied an influential position in the community. The Mahābhārata reckons them among the principal supports of the monarchy. It insists on their internal cohesion. No expiation can remove the sin of forsaking one’s duty towards one’s guild. Guilds of warriors appear to have been very important in the heroic age. A king is enjoined to avail himself of Śreṇivala which is described as equal to that of hired soldiers. The Rāmāyaṇa also refers to Sayodhaśreṇis. A passage in the Śāntiparva discusses the conditions which gaṇas must fulfil in order to prosper. But the word gaṇa here refers to political groups, oligarchic republics, which flourished for a while in the north. To the theory of guilds proper, the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa make little contribution.

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The Buddhist records are slightly better. The Vinaya Piṭaka shows that the functions of guilds had transcended the economic sphere. A guild could, on certain occasions at least, arbitrate between a member and his wife. Again, its sanction was necessary for the ordination of the wife of any of its members.¹ A woman thief was not to be ordained without the permission of the king and the guilds. The guild thus tends to become a social corporation. The Jātakas throw some light on guilds. As Fick observes, they reveal clear difference between the organizations of merchants and those of artisans. From the heredity of occupations, the localisation of the different branches of industry and the institutions of jetthakas or aldermen, Fick infers the presence of an administrative organisation. From the very nature of their callings, a group of artizans permanently settled in a definite area were

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¹ Vinaya Piṭaka, J.R.A.S., 1901, p. 865.

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far better organised than a group of wandering merchants. In the Jâtakas there are whole villages of artisans, for instance, a village comprising 1,000 families of dealers in wood. That the office of aldermen carried some authority is clear: that it was sometimes hereditary is apparent, but the Jâtakas do not enable us to determine the exact amount of control which the aldermen exercised in practice or which was allowed to them in theory. Nor again is it possible to ascertain to whom they were responsible. A Jâtaka, indeed, brings before us a state officer, Bhândâgârika, Treasurer or Superintendent of Stores, who also acted as judge for members of merchant guilds.¹ It is thus clear that the guilds were not perfectly autonomous, that the state was entitled to some sort of supervision over them and that in particular it undertook to award justice, at any rate in the more important cases. The Mûgapakkha Jâtaka speaks of 18 guilds, eighteen being a mysterious number in India. But since most of the occupations organised themselves, the actual number of guilds far exceeded that figure. From literary and epigraphic sources, Majumdar has made a list of 27 guilds.²

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¹ Fick, op. cit., Ch. X.

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² Majumdar, Corporate Life in Ancient India, 18-19. The following is the list of guilds:—

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1. Workers in wood (Carpenters, including cabinet-makers, wheelwrights, builders of houses, builders of ships and builders of vehicles of all sorts).
2. Workers in metal, including gold and silver.
3. Workers in stone.
4. Leather-workers.
5. Ivory-workers.
6. Workers fabricating hydraulic engines (Odayantrika).
7. Bamboo-workers (Wasakara).
8. Braziers (Kasakara).
9. Jewellers.
10. Weavers.

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After the Jātakas, the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭalya is the most important source of information on the position of guilds. He stands for a strong energetic state government and is not disposed very favourably towards organisations which divide the allegiance of subjects. He is willing to grant them privileges and concessions. He would reserve accommodation for them in his plan of a city. He would protect local guilds from outside competition. To members of artisan guilds he would grant seven days' grace in fulfilling engagements. He would give them special privileges in the adjudication of law suits. But he wants the state to keep a tight hand on all corporations. The Superintendent of Accounts should keep regular registers for noting the professions, customs and transactions of various guilds. Three ministers or commissioners, enjoying the confidence of guilds, should be appointed to receive their deposits which, he grants,

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11. Potters.
12. Oilmillers (Tilapishka).
13. Rush-workers and basket-makers.
14. Dyers.
15. Painters.
16. Corn-dealers (Dhamñika).
17. Cultivators.
18. Fisher folk.
19. Butchers.
20. Barbers and shampooers.
21. Garland-makers and flower-sellers.
22. Mariners.
23. Herdsmen.
24. Traders, including caravan traders.
25. Robbers and freebooters.
26. Forest police who guarded the caravans.
27. Money-lenders.

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The above list is compiled from the Gautama, the Jātaka and the Nāsik Inscriptions.

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should be returned in times of distress. On the other hand, when the state is in trouble, it may, according to Kauṭalya, surreptitiously depute its secret agents to borrow money from guilds and then have them robbed of the loan by other agents. In another passage, Kauṭalya seriously discusses whether the troubles caused by a guild or its leaders are greater. He concludes that the latter are the more dangerous, because, when backed by popular support they may injure the life and property of others. On the other hand, Kauṭalya wants the state to get some useful service out of guilds. They can be engaged in the colonisation of waste lands. Guilds of warriors can be enlisted in the king's service.¹

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¹ The Arthaśāstra, tr. Shamasastry, pp. 69, 253, 190, 223, 61, 66, 234, 305, 403, 363, 341, 376, ante, Ch. IV.

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Kauṭalya gives some idea of the relation of guilds to the state. It is, on the whole, one of subordination of the former to the imperative demands of the latter. It is, however, not from Kauṭalya but from the Dharma Śāstras that we can extract the theory of the constitution and inner working of guilds. Bṛihaspati observes that the purpose of guilds is to ward off dangers. He counsels written agreements and practical tests of the honesty of members to inspire confidence. During this period the guilds also served as banks, as a number of inscriptions, for instance, the Nāsik Inscription of 120 A.D. and another of the following century prove. The rate of interest, by the way, ranges from 9 to 12 p.c. They receive bequests and undertake to carry out the instructions of the donors. Here is a piece of striking testimony to the stability, efficiency and honesty of these corporations.² testimony is borne out by the Junnar Inscription, the activities of guilds and village communities extend also to the construction of assembly halls, temples, gardens, sheds for water, tanks, and paths, to relief of distress and performance of sacrifices. They acted as subordinate courts of justice in ordinary cases. Bṛihaspati lays down that “relations, guilds, assemblies of cohabitants and other persons duly authorised by the king, should decide law-suits among men, excepting violent crimes.” From each of these an appeal lies to the one above. Inscriptions and seals recently discovered prove that corporations realised their personality. They certainly held a good deal of property in common. Manu, Nārada, Yājñavalkya, Bṛihaspati and others repeat Gautama’s injunctions that the laws of local and functional groups must be respected by the state. Nārada would like their rules of attendance also to be sanctioned by the king. If a person steals the property of a corporation or wantonly breaks an agreement concluded with it, he should, according to Yājñavalkya, not only be banished by the king but his property should also be confiscated. Those who sow dissensions among members of a corporation should be punished with special severity by the king. Such mischief-makers “would prove extremely dangerous, like an (epidemic), if they were allowed to go free.” On the other hand, if a member of a corporation is led by avarice to break a sworn agreement, he should, according to Manu, be exiled. Guilds are not to misuse their power to violate the peace of the country. Resort to arms on their part, says Nārada, is never to be tolerated by the king. If members of corporations combine to defraud the state of its dues, they should, according to Bṛihaspati, be compelled to pay eight times as much and, if they take to flight, they should be punished. A commentary on Nārada emphasises that seditious, immoral or absurd regulations of a guild are not to be recognised by the King. Yājñavalkya is perfectly clear on the point. All groups which have strayed from their own laws, whether they be families, castes, guilds, associations or groups in districts, must be disciplined and established again on the path of duty. It thus falls to the state to keep the guilds within bounds and to ensure fair dealing between them and the community. But according to the Dharma Śāstras it should go further and see that the affairs of guilds are managed properly. Yājñavalkya accords a high position to guild representatives at the royal court but he wants all leaders or executive officers of guilds to conform to guild rules and usages. If they don't, the king should step in and rectify matters. If dissensions arise between leaders and members of guilds, it is, according to Bṛhaspati, for the state to arbitrate and bring every one back to his duty. If the heads of corporations, actuated by hatred, injure the interests of any of their members, they should be restrained by the king. If they do not mend their ways, they should be punished.¹

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² Epigraphia Indica, Vol. VIII, 82–86. Ludwig, No. 1133 ; Manu, VIII, 41, 46 : XIX, 7. Majumdar, op. cit, 34–36. Bṛihaspati, XVII, 11–12 ; I, 28, 30.

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¹ Yājñavalkya Saṃhitā, II, 186–192, 15; I, 361. Manu, VIII, 218, 219, 220, 5. Nārada, X, 2-3, 5-6. Bṛhaspati, XVII, 5–7, 19–21.

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Turning to the internal organisation of guilds, we gather form Nārada and Bṛhaspati that guilds had a general assembly which met from time to time to transact business. But it is to the executive officers of guilds or village communities that the Dharma Śāstras chiefly devote their attention. Bṛhaspati prescribes high qualifications for them. They must belong to noble families, must be self-controlled, able and honest, acquainted with the Vedas and their duty and skilled in business. Their number is fixed

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