Theory of Government in Ancient India (Post-Vedic) c14.s1.13

c14.s1.13

Kauṭalya gives some idea of the relation of guilds to the state. It is, on the whole, one of subordination of the former to the imperative demands of the latter. It is, however, not from Kauṭalya but from the Dharma Śāstras that we can extract the theory of the constitution and inner working of guilds. Bṛihaspati observes that the purpose of guilds is to ward off dangers. He counsels written agreements and practical tests of the honesty of members to inspire confidence. During this period the guilds also served as banks, as a number of inscriptions, for instance, the Nāsik Inscription of 120 A.D. and another of the following century prove. The rate of interest, by the way, ranges from 9 to 12 p.c. They receive bequests and undertake to carry out the instructions of the donors. Here is a piece of striking testimony to the stability, efficiency and honesty of these corporations.² testimony is borne out by the Junnar Inscription, the activities of guilds and village communities extend also to the construction of assembly halls, temples, gardens, sheds for water, tanks, and paths, to relief of distress and performance of sacrifices. They acted as subordinate courts of justice in ordinary cases. Bṛihaspati lays down that “relations, guilds, assemblies of cohabitants and other persons duly authorised by the king, should decide law-suits among men, excepting violent crimes.” From each of these an appeal lies to the one above. Inscriptions and seals recently discovered prove that corporations realised their personality. They certainly held a good deal of property in common. Manu, Nārada, Yājñavalkya, Bṛihaspati and others repeat Gautama’s injunctions that the laws of local and functional groups must be respected by the state. Nārada would like their rules of attendance also to be sanctioned by the king. If a person steals the property of a corporation or wantonly breaks an agreement concluded with it, he should, according to Yājñavalkya, not only be banished by the king but his property should also be confiscated. Those who sow dissensions among members of a corporation should be punished with special severity by the king. Such mischief-makers “would prove extremely dangerous, like an (epidemic), if they were allowed to go free.” On the other hand, if a member of a corporation is led by avarice to break a sworn agreement, he should, according to Manu, be exiled. Guilds are not to misuse their power to violate the peace of the country. Resort to arms on their part, says Nārada, is never to be tolerated by the king. If members of corporations combine to defraud the state of its dues, they should, according to Bṛihaspati, be compelled to pay eight times as much and, if they take to flight, they should be punished. A commentary on Nārada emphasises that seditious, immoral or absurd regulations of a guild are not to be recognised by the King. Yājñavalkya is perfectly clear on the point. All groups which have strayed from their own laws, whether they be families, castes, guilds, associations or groups in districts, must be disciplined and established again on the path of duty. It thus falls to the state to keep the guilds within bounds and to ensure fair dealing between them and the community. But according to the Dharma Śāstras it should go further and see that the affairs of guilds are managed properly. Yājñavalkya accords a high position to guild representatives at the royal court but he wants all leaders or executive officers of guilds to conform to guild rules and usages. If they don't, the king should step in and rectify matters. If dissensions arise between leaders and members of guilds, it is, according to Bṛhaspati, for the state to arbitrate and bring every one back to his duty. If the heads of corporations, actuated by hatred, injure the interests of any of their members, they should be restrained by the king. If they do not mend their ways, they should be punished.¹