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Theory of Government in Ancient India (Post-Vedic) c8.s5: Salaries

Theory of Government in Ancient India (Post-Vedic) c8.s5

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Salaries

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sovereigns, together with the treaties and ultimatums which determined them. Corporations or guilds were dealt with by a different section. So, too, provinces, villages, and families, whose customs, professions, and transactions were duly noted. Gems, precious stones, and other such things were registered with meticulous care—"the rate of their price, the rate of their barter, the counterweights used in weighing them, their number, their weight, and their cubical measure." But the most complicated of all branches of accounts was that relating to government factories. "The description of the work carried on, and of the results realised, in several manufactories; the amount of profit, loss, expenditure, delayed earnings, the amount of vyaji (premia in kind or cash) realised,—the status of government agency employed, the amount of wages paid, the number of free labourers engaged pertaining to the investment of capital of any work,"—all must be accurately given.

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Tremendous, indeed, are the salaries which Kautalya prescribes for officers. The highest, 48,000 a year, is given to the preceptor, the High Priest, the teacher, the Chief Minister, the Commander-in-Chief, as also to the Queen, the Queen-mother, and the heir-apparent who, for the purpose, counted as officers of the first rank. The door-keeper, the Superintendent of the harem, the commander, the Collector-general, and the Chamberlain, receive 24,000 panas a year; the prince, his nurse, the Chief Constable, the city-officer, the Superintendent of Commerce, the Superintendent of Manufactories, members of the Council, Superintendents of country parts and boundaries, 12,000; chiefs of military corporations, chiefs of elephants, of horses, of chariots, of infantry and commissioners, 8,000; Superintendents of infantry, of cavalry, of chariots,

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Payment in kind. When the treasury was short of money, payment should be made partly in cash and partly in kind.¹

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¹ Arthaśāstra, 245–47; tr., 307–10.

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Provinces. The kingdom was divided into a number of provinces governed by Viceroys. Each province was partitioned into circles of eight hundred, four hundred, two hundred, one hundred, and ten villages, administered by officers in an hierarchy. The village continued to form the unit of everyday administration, but Kautalya almost completely ignores the village institutions. Probably, he preferred centralisation and was averse to granting any authority to a village council or committee. The provincial and local officials are to be frequently transferred from place to place, or office to office, lest they should strike deep root into the soil. Their departments, like those at the centre, were to be adequately staffed by clerks, accountants, messengers, and so forth.²

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² For the Accounts Department, Ibid., 62; tr., 69.

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Districts.

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Village.

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The Army. Kautalya’s remarks on the army deserve some notice. The military force was bound to cause some anxiety to the civil power. It was probably in order to maintain an effective control over it that Kautalya seeks to break its homogeneity. Regiments of regular nationals rub shoulders with mercenaries. Troops of warriors’ corporations are lined with bands of deserters from hostile territory, or with immigrants from friendly tracts. Lastly, come the recruits from the hardy wild tribes who then, as now, must have proved of immense value in mountain warfare. The chief army corps were split into divisions and sub-divisions with different flags and trumpets, drums and conch-shells.³

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³ Arthaśāstra, 69–70; tr., 78–80.

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³ Arthaśāstra, 189–40; tr., 175–6.

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The spirit of rigid organisation which marked the executive, pervaded the judicial administration as prescribed by Kautalya. Impartial justice was recognised to be the bedrock of sound government. There were two grades of courts, called Dharmasthiya¹ and Kaṇṭakaśodhana.² The former consisted of a bench of three judges well-grounded in law, who dealt with contracts, relations between master and servant, employer and employee, slavery, debts, deposits, rescissions of sales, resumption of gifts, sales of property by other than the owner, rights of ownership, the sale of house property, partnership, inheritance and succession: damage to agriculture, to pasture-lands or to public roads; boundary disputes, gambling, defamation, violence and robbery; conjugal relations; rules of procedure, miscellaneous offences and hindrances. The Kaṇṭakaśodhana courts dealt with the protection of artisans and merchants, measures against national calamities, "suppression of the wicked," detection of criminals by ascetic spies, arrest of robbers on suspicion or in the act, improper social intercourse, and miscellaneous offences. Breaches of discipline in the public services came before them. The trial of homicide formed one of their special prerogatives. They conducted post-mortem examination, could inflict fines and mutilations, and death with, or without, torture. Cross-examination formed the striking feature of their proceedings. The courts should hold their sessions in the big towns at the headquarters of eight hundred villages, four hundred villages, and at the headquarters of village circuits. Below them came village tribunals. In certain important cities and at the boundaries of districts, justice should be administered by three ministers and three other judges well acquainted with sacred law. The whole judicial administration was presided over by the Chief Judge. Above him stood the King, assisted by his ministers and lawyers.¹

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¹ धर्मस्थीय

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² कंटकशोधन

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¹ Arthasāstra, pp. 147, 169, 171, 200; tr., 187—9, 214-15, 218, 252-3. N. N. Law, Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity, 117—121.

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The law which these courts are told to administer is rather flexible, and not without a certain element of vagueness. It was an amalgam of sacred law, contractual relations created by the parties, custom and statutory law. In a conflict of the first two or the last two, the former prevailed over the latter. It is laid down that equity prevailed over the letter of the law.

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The punishments for various offences have already been touched upon in the course of the analysis of state-activity. On the whole the Kautalyan Penal Code must be pronounced a stern one. Ordinary wounding is punished by the corresponding mutilation of the offender, in addition to the amputation of his hand. If the injured person happened to be an artisan devoted to the royal service, the penalty was death. The crime of giving false evidence was visited with mutilation of the extremities; and in certain unspecified cases, offences were punished by the shaving of the offender’s hair, a penalty regarded as specially infamous. Injury to a sacred tree, evasion of the tithe on goods sold, and intrusion on the royal procession going to the hunt, all alike might be capitally punished.

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As a case came up, a preliminary report of the facts was to be drawn up. The year, session, month, fortnight and day of the event should be noted. The place of the occurrence and the exact nature of the complaint should be recorded. If it concerned a debt, the amount alleged was to be registered. The name, occupation, caste, clan, village and district of the plaintiff and the defendant were also to be taken down.

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Both parties should give their statements, which the Court must closely scrutinise. If the defendant was not ready, he was given from three to seven nights to prepare his defence. If he failed, he was fined from three to twelve paṇas, but was allowed further time. If, however, no defence was forthcoming in three fortnights, or if the defence collapsed hopelessly, the amount in question, in a monetary case, was realised from the defendant's property unless he could arrange with the plaintiff for the substitution of some recognised good service for the realisation. As soon as the defendant had stated his case, the plaintiff should rejoin. If he could not, he must be punished. If he failed to substantiate a charge against a deceased person, he must perform some of his funeral rites. If a Brāhmaṇa, he might be commanded to perform the ceremonial called Rakṣoghnarakṣitam. To make a statement wholly unsupported by evidence, was to bear the burden of another sacrifice called Daśabandha. “In cases other than strife, violent and direct seizure of property and disputes among merchants, the defendant could not file a counter-charge against the plaintiff. Two suits against a defendant for the same offence were not allowed.”

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Professional lawyers are not mentioned by Kautalya, but the importance of witnesses is fully realised. Not that the absence of witnesses implied the dismissal of a case. For instance, labourers could sue their employers for non-payment of wages even if they could produce no witnesses. But, on the whole, the practice of evidence was so general that Kauṭalya formulates a regular code on the subject. Certain relations, such as a wife's brother or a helpmate, who could not be expected to tell the whole truth, were generally debarred from the witness-box. Nor were creditors or debtors, poisoners or dependents, enemies or convicts, to be called in. Certain busy people, the king, government servants, scholars and poor peasants, were exempted from the duty of bearing testimony, except, of course, where they were directly concerned. A similar privilege was extended to women, probably on account of their growing seclusion. Lepers, outcastes, and followers of mean avocations, were not considered worthy of bearing witness. But none of the exemptions and exclusions was pressed to the utter detriment of justice. In cases of rape, assault, theft, and so forth, all, except the wife's brother, helpmate, and the enemy, came as witnesses. Then there was the final proviso that except the king or ascetics, any man or woman presumed to possess secret knowledge of a transaction, could be cited before the Court. As the witnesses entered, they were sworn in before Brāhmaṇas, before vessels of water, and before fire, to speak the truth. A Kṣatriya or a Vaiśya should be solemnly informed, "thou wilt not have fulfilment of thy ambition, and wilt have to go a-begging to thy enemies with a skull in hand for a begging-bowl (if thou shouldst speak falsehood)." A Śūdra should be given to understand that "all thy religious merit will go to the king, and all the sins of the king will come to thee (if thou shouldst utter a lie), and moreover, thou wilt be punished. Enquiry will be made as to what has been heard." The plaintiff, the defendant, and the witnesses all should be subjected to a searching cross-examination, during which the judges were closely to observe their behaviour. Some of them broke down. For example, some shifted from point to point, and introduced irrelevant matter. Some recanted or contradicted themselves, or suddenly broke off. Others contradicted their own witnesses, endeavoured secretly to talk to them, or desired to consult a third party. All this was counted an offence and suitably dealt with. If witnesses perjured collusively for more than a week, they were fined twelve paṇas. If they persisted in this course for more than three fortnights, they had to pay the amount in question in a monetary case. If the conduct of the witnesses roused any serious suspicions, the Court held them to answer.¹ Witnesses receive sumptuary and travelling allowances, which in monetary cases are not to exceed one-eighth of the amount in question. These expenses are to be defrayed by the losing party. The multiplicity of witnesses tended to cause some suspicion. It was felt that much inconvenience would be avoided if it was possible to get three witnesses who were approved by both parties, or who were admittedly pure and trustworthy.²

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¹ Arthaśāstra, 149, 176; tr., 189, 224. N. N. Law, Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity, 125–131.

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² Arthaśāstra, 149; tr., 190. N. N. Law, Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity, 131.

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Meanwhile, an army of secret agents was busy ascertaining all possible facts about the case, about the parties, and about the witnesses. On the basis of the proceedings of the Court, supplemented by secret intelligence, the judges ultimately pronounced the sentence. Punishments took the form of fines, imprisonment, lashes and death with or without torture.

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If the judges were suspected of unfairness, they could be brought to book. If they threatened, rebuked, silenced or drove out a party, they received the first amercement. Abuse brought a double punishment. Wilful delays in justice, always so exasperating, were punished with the highest amercement. The repetition of a similar offence brought dismissal and a double fine into the bargain. If the judge inflicted an unduly heavy fine, he was condemned to pay eight times the excess. If he inflicted an unjust corporal punishment, he was condemned to the same suffering, or to the payment of double the monetary equivalent. False concoction on the part of a judge in a monetary case, was punished with a fine eight times the amount involved. We are not told who should try the judges, but probably it is intended that the function should devolve on the Chief Judge or the king with his ministers.

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If the clerks of the court omitted or perverted statements, or rendered them ambiguous, or displayed negligence in their tasks, they were brought to book. So too, the jail officers, who were guilty of inhumanity or remissness, felt the heavy hand of the law. If they let out the prisoners on trial, maltreated or tortured their wards, or received bribes from them, or outraged their female wards, they were severely punished.¹

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¹ Arthaśāstra, 222-4; tr., 231-3. N. N. Law, Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity, 134-5.

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In these aspects of justice the secret service plays no insignificant part. In Kautalya, the secret intelligence department performed four important duties. Its agents noted all trends and shades of public opinion, and sent regular reports thereon—veritable "newspapers." They toured in foreign lands, tried to fathom the intentions of ‘friends’ and the designs of enemies. As such they closely corresponded to spies in modern Europe. They tried to detect sedition and crime in the land, and thus approximated to the modern Criminal Intelligence Department of India. Lastly, they noted the doings of government servants of all ranks and reported to the highest authorities. Here they bear a partial resemblance to the wâqiâh nawisas, or news recorders of the Mughal Empire. The spies were to be drawn from both sexes and from all grades of society. ‘Saints’ and ‘ascetics,’ householders and warriors, scoundrels and prostitutes, Brâhmaṇas, and outcasts,—all found themselves in the same service. They should settle on farms, engage in trade, get into prisons or wander in all conceivable disguises from one end of the country to the other, and in regions far beyond. Or they could stoop lower, commit thefts, regale themselves with drink, or lure notable natives or foreigners alike with their lascivious charms. Their ingenuity and skill were taxed to the utmost when they undertook to discover the spies of foreign states in their native land.¹

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¹ Arthaśâstra, 18—22; tr., 19—25. In the Mughal Empire news-recorders were regular officers as distinguished from secret spies, but the functions of the two overlapped. See Beni Prasad, History of Jahângîr, pp. 115-116.

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Kautalya seems to have realised that the working of his huge governmental machine with its stupendous activity depended in no small measure on facilities of communication. He subjects roads and paths to a minute classification, adopting two bases of division—the destination and the kind of traffic borne. The Râjamârga or the king’s highway, was thirty-two feet in width. Three such roads generally crossed a city from east to west, and three others from north to south. The Rathyâ or the

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The King’s Highway.

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chariot-road, equal in breadth, was only slightly inferior in other respects. So, too, the Râṣṭrapatha, or the state-road. Pillars should be erected at intervals of half a koś, or a little less than a mile, to serve as mile-stones and sign-posts. The paths “for animals,” “for asses and camels,” “cart-tracks,” “foot-paths,” “pasture-paths,” “field-paths,” “shop-paths,” “temple-paths,” “defile-paths,” “cremation paths,” smaller in dimensions and generally unmetalled, should cover the whole countryside. Routes of pilgrimage should be provided with groves.

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All were required to aid, in person or money, in their construction. Some forced labour appears to be sanctioned. The blocking of a path constitutes a grave offence to be punished with a heavy fine.¹ Courtiers, wardens of the marches, herdsmen and workmen, even robbers—all were told not to damage the paths or roads.

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¹ Arthaśāstra, 30, 51, 298; tr., 34, 59, 367-8. Ibid., 47; tr., 53. Ibid., 48-9; tr., 53-4.

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Equal in value and in importance to the roads were the waterways. Indeed, before the railroad revolutionised the whole system of traffic, they formed some of the greatest highways of the country. They were deemed so essential to the community that Kautalya refused to leave the organisation of their use to the unrestricted play of private enterprise. In his system the riverbanks are studded with ferries, controlled by the state. Boats, many of which are owned by the state and are let out on hire, ply in thousands, on rivers and lakes, and often congregate in the vicinity of fortresses, Loads, “quadrupeds,” camels, buffaloes, and carts, crossing the ferries, are to be taxed from one to seven māṣas. Individual persons could obtain a ferry-pass for one māṣas. Natives or foreigners, who tried to cross without a pass, or with forged passes, suffered the confiscation of their property, the highest or first amercement, or a fine of twelve paṇas. From the ferry-tax, however, there were some remarkable exceptions, Brāhmaṇas and ascetics, old or ailing persons, pregnant women, children, and royal messengers should be provided with free passes. Those who served the state, or supplied the community with the necessaries of life, could also pass freely. How these nice distinctions are to be enforced we are not told, but if enforced at all, they would yield a considerable revenue.¹ Besides, a sort of ship-money is prescribed on villages on the sea-shore, or on the banks of rivers or lakes. Fishermen should pay one-sixth of the haul as licence-fee. The Superintendent should keep detailed accounts, and transmit the daily receipts to the treasury. On the other hand, if the passengers suffered accidents or losses owing to heavy loads, bad choice of weather or ferry, inadequacy of crew or lack of repair on the state barges, the government was bound to compensate them. All mishaps should be investigated.

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¹ Arthaśāstra, 294, 298; tr., 363 , 367-8. N. N, Law, Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity, 79-87.

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A similar system obtained in regard to ships on the coastal and high seas. There should be government boats for fishing conch-shells, pearls, and, above all, for passenger and goods-traffic. Private boats which touched at harbours were to be taxed according to custom. The Superintendent was charged to show fatherly kindness to all weather-beaten vessels. The whole system of the regulation of water-traffic served another purpose.

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All who were suspected of seditious designs, or other crimes and misdemeanours, or of flying from justice, could be promptly arrested.

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With the aid of the means of communication, order was to be enforced throughout the kingdom. The teacher of Kautalya had laid down that on Order depended the progress of the world. Kautalya himself perceived the dangers of undue severity but, nevertheless, he proclaimed the sovereign importance of discipline. If the operation of the law were suspended, he says, society would relapse into anarchy; the strong would devour the weak as the fishes devoured each other in water; the entire social structure would collapse. The maintenance of order, then, even with harshness where necessary, was the first aim of all government. A minute code regulated the preservation of peace. Seditious conspiracy and revolt were two of the most serious offences recognised by the state, and punished with death or something worse.¹ All social and economic institutions, the family, the guild, the village, caste organisations, were called upon to aid the state in its supreme task.

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¹ Arthaśāstra, 126–8, 140–1; tr., 156–9, 176. Arthaśāstra, 9; tr., 9–10; 227, tr., 287.

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The splendours of the Court, the salaries of the officers and establishments, the army, and the multifarious activities of the state, necessitated a vast revenue.

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The state itself is the biggest landowner and business-owner in the system of Kautalya. It ran ships and boats, conducted mining operations on sea and land; monopolised salt, and took the whole of the forest produce. But that did not suffice. It claimed a share in the income of every one else. It exacted a large tribute from the feudatories. It appropriated one-sixth of the produce of the land with extra fees for irrigation. Nothing was manufactured, nothing was distributed, nothing was sold or consumed, but something poured into the coffers of the state. Not only human prosperity, but also human degradation, contributed to replenish the treasury. A heavy excise on drink, dice, and prostitution brought some revenue, while justice, in which heavy fines figure so frequently, brought more.

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Kautalya is concerned primarily with the internal arrangements of a state, but the science of government which he had inherited flourished in the days of small states, and devoted an important chapter to inter-state relationships. He could not omit to reflect on the subject. Here, as elsewhere, political thought was based on historic and contemporary experience. Causes of war were always present. At the time of which we are speaking, a considerable part of the country was still covered with forests. The clearing of forests on the boundaries of two or more states often led to complications. The colonisation which followed, and which the state itself often undertook to organise, was another fruitful source of misunderstandings. Irrigation from the long rivers, which traversed more than one state, presented its own difficulties. Then there were all the petty insults, real or imaginary, to the honour and dignity of sovereigns. Frontiers themselves are a difficulty. The interpretation of treaties brings its own troubles. Mere aggression, which public usage had sanctioned in vain expectation of political unity, made confusion worse confounded.

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It was noticed that a given state—call it A—tended to embroil itself with its adjacent neighbours, say, of the circle X. These, in their turn, were at daggers drawn with their adjacent neighbours, say, of the circle Y. It seems to follow that these last would be allies of the state A.

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Foreign Relations.

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The Doctrine of Mandala or Circle of States.

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But as some members of Circles X and Y themselves adjoined one another, and were therefore likely foes, the general rule of political alliance and hostility was disturbed. On a balance of consideration, it appeared that some would be foes, some allies, others neutral, and yet others completely indifferent to A. If you imagine a third circle Z, a more delicate balance will have to be struck; and so forth. This doctrine of Mandala or circle of states has something in it as a rough indication of the course which diplomacy is likely to follow. It was patent that a state would come into conflict only with its neighbours. Non-adjacents would find it difficult to move their forces through foreign territory. But the ingenuity of scholars ran the doctrine to death. In their hands it was subjected to mathematical and mechanical treatment. It gave rise to jig-saw puzzles which strayed from reality as they advanced in ingenuity.

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In inter-state relationships, diplomacy knew no morality. Neither unprovoked aggression, nor the violation of the neutrality of other states, caused any surprise. Spies and secret agents revelled in falsehood and immorality, and freely resorted to poison or to treachery. The justification for all this was sought in the imperative necessity of unifying the country. A strong power was expressly enjoined to embark on a career of conquest, subdue state after state, and stand forth as the one all-embracing sovereign.

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But this was not always possible. States were therefore advised to make treaties and even conclude offensive and defensive alliances. They might also enter into alliances for furthering certain common interests. The plantation of a colony was a case in point. It required a good deal of effort and organisation, and gave rise to any amount of inter-state feeling. It was but effected in concert. The construction of trade-routes across several states was another enterprise in which co-operation should be achieved through treaties. The reclamation of wild tribes was yet another such project. Joint action might also be profitable in building forts at strategic centres, working mines, and clearing forest. The school of real politics, however, never forgot that self-interest was the primary spring of diplomacy. A weak state, driven to extremities, might purchase peace by sacrifice of its honour, by consenting to furnish hostages, paying indemnity, or binding itself to military service. But under favourable circumstances it might violate the treaty imposed by force. There were ways and ways of such action. A hostage might be encouraged to escape in any one of innumerable ways. And so forth. The whole subject is treated with an inexhaustible wealth of detail, supposition and ingenuity. In the infinite complications of foreign affairs, envoys play a high rôle. Kautalya classifies them like everything else.

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After a conquest had been effected, the suzerain should not attempt to bring the new acquisition into uniformity with his original territory. Let him maintain the fallen dynasty on the throne. Let him rescue the dependent princes from misfortunes, redress their grievances, treat them with honour and kindness, and even shower on them wealth and dignity. The suzerain should respect their family rights, their property rights. Nor should he depart from these maxims on the death of the vassal. The latter's son should be duly crowned. The people of the feudatory states should be disturbed as little as possible. Manners and customs corresponded to conveniences and should be respected by the suzerain. What was good for one place might not be good for another. Such was the theory of the protectorates.¹

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¹ Arthaśāstra, Book VII, 261-319; tr., 327-389. Vātsāyana, in his Kāmasūtra (p. 282) adopts Kautalya's system of the classification of envoys for his love messengers.

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Taking a comprehensive view of all relations, internal and external, of a state, Hindu thinkers discovered seven elements which go to make up statehood or sovereignty. This analysis is fully developed in the Arthaśāstra thinkers who preceded Kautalya, to whom he constantly refers but whose dates cannot be precisely determined. They agree that the state consists of seven elements:—(1) The Svāmin or Lord, generally the king; (2) the Amātya or minister; (3) the Janapada or territory; (4) the Durga or fort; (5) Koṣa or treasury; (6) Daṇḍa or army; and (7) Mitra or ally. Henceforward, the doctrine of the seven elements becomes an axiom of Hindu political thought, and is the corner-stone of the theory of the state. Analysed into its various concepts, it is seen to embody a remarkable theory. The state must have a territorial basis. It must provide for adequate protection of its inhabitants, and must have a well-defined foreign policy. It must have a regular administrative system, and must carefully look to its finances. It must be presided over by a chief. Another category treated of the three powers of the king—prestige, energy and good counsel; or as Kautalya puts it, army and treasury, valour and knowledge. But this line of thought ends quickly. It is the sevenfold category which forms the staple of speculation. The ‘calamities,’ or rather the perversions of the elements, form one of the subjects of prolonged debate. There were those who held that perversion of the monarch was the most serious of all; that of the minister next in disaster; and so on until the ally's misfortune was shown to be the least disastrous of all. The gradation of importance varied with different teachers.¹ Turning for a moment to the threefold category, Kautalya's teacher held that the king's energy was the most important of all factors in the state.

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¹ One of the most frequent discussions in which Hindu Political writers indulge, is devoted to measuring the loss which accrues to society by the distress or perversion of the various elements of sovereignty. Kautalya's teacher declared that a distressed or perverted monarch was the most serious of all misfortunes. Next came the perversions of the minister, the people at large, forts, finance, the army, and the ally. Bharadwâj, however, held that the perversion of the minister was the heaviest of all calamities.

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Perversions of the elements of the state.

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"Deliberations in council, the attainment of results as anticipated while deliberating in council, the accomplishment of works, the business of revenue-collection and its expenditure, recruiting the army, the driving out of the enemy and of wild tribes, the protection of the kingdom, taking remedial measures against calamities, the protection of the heir-apparent, and the installation of princes, constitute the duties of ministers. In the absence of ministers, the above works are ill done; and like a bird, deprived of its feathers, the king loses his activity and capacity. In such calamities, the intrigues of the enemy find a ready scope. In ministerial distress, the king's life itself comes into danger, for a minister is the mainstay of the security of the king's life.

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"No, says Kautalya, it is verily the king who attends to the business of appointing ministers, priests and other servants, including the Superintendents of several departments, the application of remedies against the troubles of his peoples, and of his kingdom, and the adoption of progressive measures; when his ministers fall into troubles, he employs others; he is ever ready to bestow rewards on the worthy and inflict punishments on the wicked; when the king is well off, by his welfare and property he pleases the people; of what kind the king's character is, of the same kind will be the character of his people; for their progress or downfall, the people depend upon the king; the king is, as it were, the aggregate of the people.

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In one respect, the Arthaśāstra Theory represents a great advance on the Vedas. The priest has practically dropped out. The state has outgrown the theocratic elements and established itself more or less on secular ground.

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The state had reached maturity. The priestly governess was dismissed. The state became a law unto itself, and emancipated itself from the restraints of morality as well. The existence of a number of states side by side, and the frequency of war, lead, almost of necessity, to a decline in inter-state morality. Necessity knows no law; and reason of state becomes the overmastering principle of conduct. As in medieval Italy, so in Ancient India, diplomacy too often became synonymous with fraud; while unprovoked aggression ceased to excite public disapproval. The cancer spread to the internal affairs of the state, and politics acquired unpleasant associations which have never

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Machiavellianism.

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“Viśālākṣa says that of the troubles of the minister and of the people, the troubles of the people are more serious; finance, army, raw products, free labour, carriage of things, and collection (of necessaries) are all secured from the people, next to the king and his minister.

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“No, says Kautalya, all activities proceed from the minister, activities such as the successful accomplishment of the works of the people, security of person and property from internal and external enemies, remedial measures against calamities, colonization and improvement of wild tracts of land, recruiting for the army, collection of revenue, and bestowal of favour.” And so on. Ibid., 110—113; tr., 135—140.

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The lexicographer Amara Simha (II, 8, 17) also refers to seven Rājyāngāni or members of the state. In Kautalya as in his follower, Kāmandaka (VIII, 4, 20, 25), the term, prakṛiti, denotes not merely the elements proper of a state but also enemies. Chs. III and IV, Book V, of the Arthaśāstra give minute directions on the planning and construction of forts and buildings within.

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disappeared. Behind it all lies an essentially low view of human nature. Almost at the beginning of creation, Manu had protested that the principal difficulty of government arose from human deceitfulness. Those who deemed man generally incapable of noble behaviour, prescribed force and fraud. Bharadwâj held that disaffected princes should be secretly punished. Vâtavyâdhi outraged decency and morality alike by counselling sensual indulgence as the sovereign remedy for keeping princes from sedition and revolt.¹

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¹ Arthaśâstra, 32-33; tr., 37-8.

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Such is the theory of the Arthaśâstra. It constitutes the most complete statement of Hindu ideas on government. It exercised a deep influence on the thought of subsequent generations. Quotations from Kautalya or references to him may be traced in numerous Brahmanic and Jain niti writers, poets and story-tellers. Nor were direct abridgments wanting. For instance, it was on Kautalya that a later writer, Kâmandaka, who flourished probably in the 8th century A.D., based his celebrated versified Essence of Policy. He rearranges the ideas of his master and here and there offers explanations of his own. He thinks that the seven elements of sovereignty are dependent on one another. The king, of course, is the most important of them all. In Kâmandaka, as in other Hindu writers, Râjan or Swâmin often conveys the sense of government or state. Not only economic prosperity but also morality, aye, the very life of the people, depends on the king. The king must protect the people. That is why the people pay him revenue. He dilates on secret as distinct from open punishment. Royal favourites who may grow too powerful and oppressive may be got rid of by poison, secret weapons, etc. Kâmandaka revels in the doctrine of Mandala when he treats of inter-state relationships. He would permit unfairness in war when it may be necessary.¹

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¹ A valuable commentary, called Nayachandrikā, by Mādhava Yajavā (composed perhaps in the South) on some chapters of Kautalya relating to foreign policy, negotiations and war has been discovered and printed in the second volume of Jolly's edition. For Kāmandaka, Nītisāra, XXII, 93; I, 21–60; II, 61–71; V, 37; I, 11, 14; XXXI, 54–68. Kāmandaka starts by saying that his 'Essence' is extracted out of the doctrines of Viṣṇu-Gupta which was another designation of Kautalya (I, 2–7). In the Hindu scheme of authorities, the Smritis are always preferred to Arthaśāstras, but Kāmandaka more than once rejects Manu and the Mānavas in favour of Kautalya. Thanks to his style, Kāmandaka enjoyed considerable vogue, not only in India but also among the Indian emigrants to the island of Bali. See Dr. Frederick's Report on the Sanskrit Literature of Bali to the Batavian Society of Arts and Sciences. R. Mitra, M. N. Dutt and B. K. Sarkar hold that the work was taken to Bali in the 4th century A.D., but J. Jolly (Introduction to Kautalīya Arthaśāstra, pp. 6–8) is inclined to place the author in the 8th century A.D. Winternitz arrives at the same conclusion.

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