The State in Ancient India: A Study in the Structure and Practical Working of Political Institutions in North India in Ancient Times c12.154

c12.154

Next to the Mahâmâtras in rank stood the Râjukas or Lâjukas. The derivation of the term implies that the Râjukas were fiscal officers but in the Edicts of Aśoka they perform judicial functions. As no other distinct revenue officials are mentioned, it is probable that the Râjukas combined both revenue and judicial functions, an arrangement which was known to Medieval India and still obtains. To the Râjukas or Lâjukas the king could communicate his commands directly or through his agents, possibly Mahâmâtras. As he puts it in the Fourth Pillar Edict, Delhi-Topra, "the Lâjukas also must obey me. They will also obey the agents who know (my) wishes. And these (agents) will also exhort those (people) in order that the Lâjukas may be able to please me." While their subordination is clear, they seem to have enjoyed wide authority. The Dhauli and Jaugada Edicts show Mahâmâtras exercising judicial functions in cities but the brunt of the judicial work seems to have fallen on the Lâjukas. “My Lâjukas,” says the king, “are occupied with the people, with many hundred thousands of men. I have ordered that either rewards or punishments are left to their discretion, in order that the Lâjukas should perform their duties confidently (and) fearlessly, that they should bestow welfare and happiness on the people of the country and that they should confer benefits on (them).” To their care he entrusted the people as a parent entrusts a child to an intelligent nurse. On them he enjoined that “there should be both impartiality in judicial proceedings and impartiality in punishments.”¹ In the First Separate Rock Edict, Dhauli, he expatiates on judicial fairness and impartiality at greater length. He wants the judges to follow not merely a part but the whole of his injunctions on the subject. “It happens in the administration (of justice) that a single person suffers either imprisonment or harsh treatment. In this case you must strive to deal (with all of them) impartially. But one fails to act thus on account of the following dispositions: envy, anger, cruelty, hurry, want of practice, laziness (and) fatigue. You must strive for this that these dispositions may not arise to you. And at the root of all this is the absence of anger and the avoidance of hurry. He who is fatigued in the administration (of justice) will not rise; but one ought to move, to walk and to advance. He who will pay attention to this must tell you: ‘see that (you) discharge the debt (which you owe to the king); such is the instruction of Devânâmpriya’ . . . If (you) observe this, you will attain heaven, and you will discharge the debt which you owe to me.” Thrice a year or more frequently, this edict was to be studied by the officers