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The Administration of the Sultanate of Dehli c10: Chapter V: The Ministers

The Administration of the Sultanate of Dehlī c10

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Chapter V: The Ministers

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" THE bravest of men require arms, and the wisest of kings need ministers," says the Arab adage.¹ The elementary political principle that one man cannot govern a kingdom was also recognized by the Hindus. "Sovereignty," says Kautilya with the characteristic Hindu facility for simile, "is possible only with assistance; a single wheel will never function; hence the king shall employ ministers and listen to their opinion."² The value of deliberation and counsel was fully understood.³ Timūr is reported to have compared a government devoid of these virtues to "a foolish man, who erreth in all that he sayeth and doeth," whose "actions and words bring forth no fruit but shame and repentance."⁴ Two of the most famous Muslim writers on politics point out that the Prophet, in spite of his great wisdom and inspiration, was ordained by God to consult his disciples in his undertakings; hence they argue that rulers and monarchs with their limited vision and foresight cannot dispense with the advice of others.⁵ This argument is based on a verse of the Qur'ān which enjoins on Muslims deliberation and mutual consultation in conducting their affairs.⁶ Thus it becomes a religious duty for a monarch to seek counsel from others.

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¹ *Nihāyat-u'l-arab*, p. 92.

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² *Arthaśāstra*, p. 13.

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³ *Sirāj-u'l-mulūk*, f. 67a; *Fatāwā-i-jahāndārī*, f. 19a. *Tāj*, ff. 18b, 19a; also, vide *Inshā-i-Māhrū*, Letter I where a governor is officially advised to consult the wise and the experienced. The importance of consultation is also emphasized in letters patent appointing a provincial *wazīr*, *idem*, Letter II.

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⁴ *Tuzūkāt-i-Timūrī*, p. 5.

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⁵ *Siyāsat-nāmah*, p. 85; *Qābūs-nāmah*, p. 27.

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⁶ Holy Qur'ān, XLII, 38. This verse provided the sanction for the establishment of parliaments in Turkey and Persia in modern times.

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A constructive effort to put this injunction into practice could, perhaps, have resulted in the establishment of representative bodies, but nowhere is the limitation of the Muslim jurists so apparent as in the failure to organize well-defined institutions in accordance with the democratic principles of Islam. Their essentially practical outlook prevented speculation; besides they could not rise above their environment. The physical difficulty of geographical distance, if nothing else, would completely rule out such an effort; still, an unambiguous verse of the Qur'ān could not be lightly dismissed, and, though not given a legal form, it was commended as a moral consideration. A despotic command was not *ipso facto* inoperative or invalid; though the obligation to seek counsel was freely conceded and its exercise advocated, the right to be consulted was neither demanded nor bestowed. During the days of the Republic the caliph consulted the important companions of the Prophet in all their undertakings; but there was no right to tender advice.¹ The caliphs in the capital and their representatives in the provincial cities took the community into confidence by reporting to the state of affairs and explaining the new measures. This practice fell more and more into abeyance; though whenever a cause needed popular support, the pulpit was, and has ever been, used to convass public opinion.² But, for advice in administrative affairs, the monarchs, after the fall of the Republic, turned more and more to their courtiers and servants. Influential and powerful elements were naturally represented at the court; for the government could not be carried on without their co-operation. Even this representation was informal and arbitrary. Its most perfect form was attained under Māmūn when, for the first time, a council of state representing various groups owing allegiance to the caliph was established and given full freedom in the expression of their opinions; but no scientific or democratic method of selecting these representatives was devised.¹ Even this council deteriorated into a synod of divines and doctors of law when the caliphs lost all effective power.² At the court of Dehlī the sovereign was surrounded by the wisest and the most experienced men in the realm; he had wonderful opportunities of seeking advice and counsel and keeping in touch with public opinion; he had to bow before the will of strong elements or in face of widespread opposition; but there were no representative institutions. The ministers, therefore, were just the servants of the crown and responsible only to it. It should not be thought, however, that a minister had no real authority, for his position and powers were well defined by law and sanctified by tradition.

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¹ History of the Saracens, pp. 56-57.

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² E.g., Yazīd III's inaugural speech; also, Minhāj, p. 195.

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¹ History of the Saracens, p. 406. ² Ibid. ³ Persian in origin, vide Ancient Persia and Ancient Persian Civilization, p.

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The chief minister was called the *wazīr*.³ Muslim political thinkers attach great importance to this office. “The *wazīr*,” says al-Fakhrī, “stands midway between the sovereign and his subjects.”⁴ Fakhr-i-Mudabbir calls a *wazīr* a partaker in sovereignty; indeed his own technical domain must be left alone by the monarch.⁵ “No empire,” continues the same author, “can be stable or prosperous without a *wazīr*.”⁶ In the words of an Indian ruler of this period, “Sovereignty and dominion could not attain the pinnacle of their height without the help and co-operation of a *wazīr*, whose wise deliberations would result in promoting the welfare of the country and the prosperity of the people.”⁷ Such a person was not easy to find, but if Divine Providence raised the right man to this office, it was the duty of the people to be deeply thankful for such a blessing.⁸

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¹⁴¹ In Islamic History, the office was the creation of the Abbasids; J.Z., p. 112. ⁴ V.K., p. 220 (footnote). ⁵ A.M., ff. 36a, b. ⁶ Also, Tāj, ff. 9b, 248a. ⁷ Humāyun Shāh Bahmanī, quoted in Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī, iii, pp. 35-36. ⁸ Naṣā’iḥ Niẓām-u’l-mulk, f. 218 (a).

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The legal aspects of the institution have been discussed by the jurists. Legally, they say, *wizārat* is the lieutenancy of the monarch or the caliph.¹ A *wazīr*, therefore, enjoys delegated authority, which, by its very nature, is of two kinds. According to Māwardī, a *wazīr* could either be a *wazīr-u’t-tafwīḍ* or a *wazīr-u’t-tanfīdh*. The first enjoyed unlimited authority and could exercise the power and prerogatives of the sovereign with only a few restrictions. He was required to inform the monarch of all his measures and could not, without special permission, dismiss or transfer an officer appointed by the ruler. He could, however, appoint officers in the name of the sovereign and hear complaints against all officials whether appointed by the monarch or not. If the sovereign and the *wazīr* both gave orders regarding the same matter in ignorance of each other's action, the command which had been issued first would stand. The sovereign, however, had the right to over-ride his minister when there was a serious difference of opinion. Another limitation was that the *wazīr*, under the well-known legal dictum—*delegatus non potest delegare*—could not appoint his own successor or representative. This kind of *wizārat* could be given only to a Muslim because otherwise the Muslim community would be governed by a non-Muslim who might not respect the laws of Islam. The monarch cannot appoint several *wazīrs* with unlimited authority simultaneously unless their work and jurisdiction are defined exactly, or unless they are to act as an administrative board.² The *wazīr-u’t-tanfīdh* was merely an assistant of the sovereign whose orders it was his duty to carry out.³ In actual practice he also had a great deal of power, for he was the head of the administration and exercised official control over the bureaucracy and the people. All the orders issued by the monarch passed through his hands and received the final form in his office. The jurists permit non-Muslims to hold this office. This legal definition is based upon practical considerations; but the lawyers generally miss the more flexible and uncertain element of human relationship. The personal factor counts for so much. In the sultanate of Dehlī both these types of wazīrs are found; most wazīrs possessed special and limited powers, a few enjoyed unlimited authority and ruled the empire in the name of the sultans, and some monarchs were under the tutelage of the chief noble who had usurped all power.² It was only under feeble monarchs that wazīrs wielded complete authority.³ Their duties scarcely call for discussion, since the entire burden of government rested on their shoulders. It is the wazīr with specified powers and duties whose functions invite investigation.

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¹ *Sulūk-u’l-mulūk*, f. 17b.

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² *Idem*, ff. 17b, 18a; *Aḥkām-u’s-sulṭāniyah*, pp. 21-28; J.Z., p. 114.

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³ J.Z., pp. 115-116.

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¹ V.K., p. 224.

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² Wazīrs with unlimited powers, e.g., Khān Jahān in the later portion of Fīrūz Shāh’s reign; Tārīkh-i-Mubārakshāhī, pp. 135-136.

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³ A.M., ff. 36a, b.

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His duties.

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The Ādāb-u’l-mulūk gives the normal functions of a wazīr in the following passage: “The kings know well how to lead expeditions, conquer countries, give rewards and shine in the assembly or the battlefield; but it is in the domain of the wazīr to make a country prosperous, to accumulate treasures, to appoint officials, to ask for accounts, to arrange the stock-taking of the commodities in the kārkhānās and the census of the horses, camels, mules and other animals, to assemble and pay the troops and artisans, to keep the people satisfied, to look after the men of piety and of fame and to give them stipends, to take care of the widows and the orphans, to provide for the learned, to administer the affairs of the people, to organize the offices and look after their efficiency, in short, to transact the business of the state.”⁴ An analysis of this passage will show that the wazīr was the head of the entire machinery of the government. The central finance office was his immediate concern; but he was also responsible for the other offices at headquarters. He appointed and superintended the civil servants, and organized the agency for the collection of the revenue; he also exercised complete control over the various channels of expenditure. His assistants examined all the accounts submitted by the various departments of the government; it was in his office that the statements were compared, checked and passed. The wazīr took measures—sometimes humiliating and unpleasant—to recover money illegally spent by local officials. All the requirements of the military department had to be referred finally to him; his office kept accounts, disbursed salaries and allotted assignments. His department paid the stipends to deserving scholars and men of learning and distributed doles to the poor and needy. No branch of public administration was outside his purview, and every subject from the mightiest governor to the lowliest peasant in the land had dealings with him or his assistants.

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The very nature of the wazīr's office demanded that the ruler should co-operate with him and maintain his dignity.¹ Monarchs have seldom failed to support their wazīrs in enforcing discipline on recalcitrant nobles or subordinates, even when the offenders happened to be royal favourites.² The government could not be carried on if there existed any palpable difference of opinion between the sovereign and his prime minister: there was no *via media* between agreement and dismissal.³ Whenever the wazīr was distrusted and yet kept in office, the result was disorganization of the administration.⁴ It was by no means easy to dismiss a wazīr, for very often he was irreplaceable. The post required great technical knowledge, wisdom and experience.⁵ The ruler, therefore, took great care in choosing his wazīr and expected a very high standard of attainment and character from him.¹ Once he was appointed, it was considered necessary to endow him with great authority.²

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¹ *Qābūs-nāmah*, p. 168.

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² E.g., Mas'ūd and Abū-'l-Qāsim Kathīr (Baihaqī, pp. 447, 448), Fīrūz Shāh and 'Ain-u'l-mulk ('Afīf, pp. 413-414).

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³ *Qābūs-nāmah*, p. 163

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⁴ E.g., Abū Rijā's elevation and usurpation of the wazīr's powers under Fīrūz Shāh; 'Afīf, pp. 458-492.

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⁵ A.M., ff. 35b-37b; *Qābūs-nāmah*, p. 159. 'Ain-u'l-mulk, the wazīr's greatest enemy, himself advised Fīrūz Shāh against dismissing Khān Jahān; 'Afīf, pp. 415-416.

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¹ Vide Māmūn's views, quoted in Islamic Civilization, pp. 266-267.

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² A.M., ff. 37a, b.

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In spite of this, the wazīr's position was by no means easy to maintain against a jealous master.³ Envious courtiers were always on the look out for an opportunity to poison the sovereign's mind by insinuating that power had turned the wazīr's head.⁴ The wazīr had to exercise great power and yet allay all suspicion. A wise man took care that no one should undermine his influence with his master.⁵ It was an elementary precaution to keep himself informed regarding all the happenings in the court and the palace.⁶ Probably the most difficult men to control were the courtiers, for they always surrounded the sovereign and had great influence over him. They generally possessed large assignments and were not always very careful in their financial dealings; with them may be classed the governors of provinces and military chiefs. If they owed money to the state, it was the wazīr's duty to extract it from them. If he were not strict, the exchequer would suffer, and he could not make a success of his tenure of office. As practically the whole bureaucracy had financial dealings with the state, an exacting wazīr would soon have all officialdom against him and he could not hold out for long. "These men the wazīr could neither befriend nor alienate with safety."⁷ Great judgment was required to maintain the balance between the demands of the state and the capacity of the taxpayer, but fortunately it was widely recognized that the stability of the state and the prosperity of the people were interdependent.¹ It was exacting to act as the monarch's chief counsellor. The wazīr was called upon to advise the sultan on matters of very diverse nature; therefore he had to be a man of almost encyclopædic knowledge. The monarch might pose a question of strategy or foreign policy, or he might ask for an opinion on the merits of a new mathnawī. It was, therefore, the wazīr's duty to keep himself well informed regarding the happenings in neighbouring states; he was expected to have sound knowledge of military science; a liberal education was his least attainment. Most of the wazīrs under the sultans of Dehlī were men of culture and refined taste: even the ill-educated Khān Jahān Maqbūl—one of the most capable of ministers—was considered to be the wisest of men.² He was the only wazīr in the history of the sultanate who had not received a good literary education; other wazīrs were men fit to adorn a court which was, for most of the period, the greatest patron of learning in the eastern world.³

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³ Vide Abū Naṣr Mishkān's remarks to Sulṭān Maḥmūd, Jawāmi'-u'l-ḥikāyāt, I, XII, 9.

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⁴ E.g., 'Ain-u'l-mulk's remarks to Fīrūz Shāh, 'Afīf, p. 411.

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⁵ Qābūs-nāmah, p. 163.

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⁶ Idem, p. 164.

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⁷ Naṣā'iḥ Niẓām-u'l-mulk, f. 227a. Muḥadhdhab-u'd-dīn was killed by nobles, Minhāj, p. 198. Also, vide 'Afīf, pp. 415-416 where nobles almost brought about Khān Jahān's fall.

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¹ Qābūs-nāmah, p. 159.

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² Idem, p. 161; Minhāj, p. 144; ‘Afīf, pp. 394-399.

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³ Vide Chapter IX.

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The wazīr was paid handsomely. Foreign observers were struck with the vastness of his assignment and the large salaries of his assistants.⁴ The splendour of his camp sometimes deceived even the experienced courtier, so little was the difference between his entourage and that of the sultan.⁵ As a mark of their complete confidence, the sultans often made all inquiries in public audience through the wazīr.⁶ In spite of these outward signs of trust and favour, the wise monarch did not fail to keep an eye on the actions of his minister, for the misuse of such authority might even bring down the empire.⁷

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⁴ E. & D., iii, p. 578.

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⁵ ‘Afīf, pp. 410-411.

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⁶ E.g., Fīrūz Shāh, ‘Afīf, pp. 282-284.

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⁷ Siyāsat-nāmah, pp. 19-27.

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The *wazīr*'s department was called the *dīwān-i-wizārat*, and mainly dealt with finance.¹ He was assisted by a *nā'ib wazīr* who acted as his general assistant.² Next to him was the *mushrif-i-mumālik* who was the accountant-general for the empire.³ The *mustaufī-i-mumālik* was the auditor-general. Originally the *mushrif*'s duty was to enter up the accounts received from the provinces and the various departments and the *mustaufī* audited them. Separate copies of the statements of accounts were sent to the *mushrif* as well as to the *mustaufī* and naturally resulted in unnecessary duplication of work; though there was the advantage that the accounts were checked by two independent authorities.⁴ In Fīrūz Shāh's reign, however, the work was redistributed. The *mushrif* dealt with income and the *mustaufī* with expenditure; the text seems to imply that this division of work had taker place some time before and that Fīrūz Shāh only clarified a situation which had been somewhat obscure and undefined.⁵ The *mushrif* was assisted by a *nāzir* who supervised, through a large staff distributed all over the empire, the collection of revenue; he also audited the local accounts.⁶ Sulṭān Jalāl-u'd-dīn Khaljī, anxious to find a pōst for a relation in the *dīwān-i-wizārat* and being faced with the situation that there was no vacancy, created the office of the *waqūf* who was given the duty of supervising the expenditure incurred by local authorities. The office proved so useful that the staf was soon increased and the institution made permanent.⁷ The *wazīr* received the reports from the *mustaufī* and the *mushrif*; his staff compared them with each other and with the fuller reports submitted direct by local agencies.¹ The *mushrif-i-mumālik* and the *mustaufī-i-mumālik* were both officers of ministerial rank and had direct access to the monarch. Under Fīrūz Shāh's scheme the *waqūf* must have been placed under the *mustaufī-i-mumālik*, though the fact has not been mentioned. Al-Qalqashandī's informants probably refer to the chief *mushrif*, the chief *mustaufī*, the *nāzir* and the *waqūf* when they speak of the *wazīr*'s four deputies. Each of these officers is said to have about three hundred clerks under him.² This number was by no means too large, for the passage refers to the reign of Muḥammad bin Tughluq. The *wazīr* was generally styled *ṣadr-i-ʿālī* which was gradually replaced by the more honorific *khwājah-i-jahān*.³

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¹ This department was directly under the *wazīr*: *'Afīf* gives a good description, pp. 419-420.

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² E.g., *'Afīf*, p. 419; Baranī, p. 24.

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³ *Vide* infra.

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⁴ A.M., ff. 40b-41b; *'Afīf*, pp. 409-410.

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⁵ *'Afīf*, pp. 409-410. Fīrūz Shāh only confirmed the contention of his wazīr which means that the tradition was already in existence. There are traces of this tradition under the Abbasids who maintained autonomous departments of salaries and expenditure, Mez., pp. 76, 77.

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⁶ *'Afīf*, p. 420; *I'jāz-i-Khūsrawī*, ii, p. 55.

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⁷ *'Afīf*, p. 420.

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¹ *Afīf*, p 409.

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² S.A., p. 68. *Masālik-u'l-abṣār* (pp. 31-32) has a slightly different version which seems to be somewhat confused.

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³ *Tāj*, f. 25a; I.B., ii, p. 74. The titles *sharf-u'l-mulk*, *niẓām-u'l-mulk*, *tāj-u'l-mulk*, etc. were personal, though they were mostly enjoyed by *wazīrs* or their assistants; e.g., *Tāj*, ff. 35b; *Tārīkh-i-Alfī*, ii, f. 256.

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Other ministers. There were three other main ministries, which, together with the *dīwān-i-wizārat*, were compared to four pillars supporting the vault of the state. The first in importance was the *dīwān-i-risālat* which dealt with religious matters, pious foundations, stipends to deserving scholars and men of piety. This office was presided over by the *ṣadr-u'ṣ-ṣudūr*, who, generally, was also the *qāḍī-i-mumālik*; in this capacity he controlled the department of justice.⁴ The *dīwān-i-risālat* and the *dīwān-i-qaḍā* were mostly looked upon as the branches of a common department. The *dīwān-i-ʿarḍ* was the office of the *ʿāriḍ-i-mumālik* who was the controller-general of the military department. His department maintained the descriptive rolls of the horses and men, while he himself was the inspector-general of the forces. This officer or his provincial assistants enlisted recruits and fixed their pay.⁵

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⁴ *Vide* Chapter VIII.

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⁵ *Vide* Chapter VII.

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So important were the functions of this department that the sultan himself might perform some of the duties of the *‘āriḍ-i-mumālik*.¹ The third office was the *dīwān-i-inshā* which dealt with royal correspondence. It has rightly been called ‘the treasury of secrets,’ for the *dabīr-i-khāṣ*, who presided over this department, was also the confidential clerk of the state.²

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¹ E.g., Sher Shāh, vide Sarwānī, ff. 68b, 69a.

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² ‘Utbī, p. 30; *Khazā’in-u’l-futūḥ*, p. 184; *Inshā-i-Mahrū*, Letter CV., Tāj, ff. 59b, 142a; *Qaṣā’id-i-Badr-i-Chāch*, p. 14:

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The *dīwān-i-risālat* and the *dīwān-i-‘arḍ* will be described more fully in subsequent chapters. The *dabīr-i-khāṣ* was assisted by a number of *dabīrs*, men who had already established their reputation as masters of style, for letter-writing was a highly cultivated art at this time, and the courts vied with one another in the excellence of their communications.³ All the correspondence, formal or confidential, between the sovereign and the rulers of other states or his own tributaries and officials passed through this department. Mu‘āwiyah first organized a correspondence office on a regular basis and called it *dīwān-i-khātam*, or the department of the royal seal.⁴ It gradually came to be known as *dīwān-i-rasā’il*, or the department of correspondence.⁵ The Ghaznavids also had a similar department which they called *dīwān-i-risālat*.⁶ There can be no doubt that this office dealt with royal correspondence and was under the *dabīr-i-khāṣ*.⁷ How was it that another department, already mentioned, came to be known by this name under the sultans of Dehlī? Nothing definite is on record; but the following appear to be the most probable reasons. The department of the pious foundations

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³ E.g., Baranī, p. 91; Baihaqī, p. 6. Bib. Ind. edition has *ḥājib-i-dīwān-i-risālat* which is wrong. The correct reading is *ṣāḥib* instead of *ḥājib*, (p. 333).

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⁴ V.K., p. 193.

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⁵ History of the Saracens, p. 414.

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⁶ Baihaqī, pp. 164, 165, 333, etc.

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⁷ Also styled *munshī-i-ḥaḍrat*, e.g., ‘Utbī, pp. 362-363.

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دبیر خاص خسرو را ز واهب این خطاب آمد
که زلف عارض مه باد تحریرات ارقامش

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and religious establishments was under the *qāḍī-i-mumālik* in most of the Muslim states of the period. It is not certain what name it was given by the Ghaznavids; indeed a historian of Sulṭān Maḥmūd's life and exploits does not even mention it in his list of the main government departments.¹ A Muslim government had twofold functions: it exercised control in mundane matters and it also ministered to spiritual needs. The former was the kingly function and was called *salṭanah*; the latter was a continuation of the prophetic mission, the *risālat*. When the sultans of Dehlī organized a partially self-contained department of religious affairs and pious foundations as distinguished from the department of justice, they could not have fixed on a happier name than *dīwān-i-risālat*. What had hitherto been called by this name was now called *dīwān-i-inshā*. Every order emanating from the sovereign was first drafted in this department and then taken to him for sanction, after which it was copied in a register and dispatched.² The *dabīr-i-khāṣ* was always at hand so that he could be summoned to draft an urgent letter or even take down notes of any conversation worth recording.³ It was he who wrote the grandiloquent descriptions of conquests which were termed 'letters of victory' and sent to neighbouring courts and important cities of the realm, where they were read out to the public to impress the people with their sovereign's prowess in war.⁴ These *fatḥ-nāmahs* were collected in volumes like any other literary works; they served as models to aspiring *dabīrs* and others who, unfortunately, introduced the rhetoric and bombast of these proclamations into sober prose.⁵ Such was the familiarity acquired by the *dabīr-i-khāṣ* with the affairs of state that his post sometimes proved a stepping stone to the wizārat.¹ Indeed some sovereigns confided more in their secretaries than in their wazīrs and often the dabīr was required to collect secret information regarding the doings of the prime minister.²

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¹ Nāẓim, p. 130.

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² V.K., pp. 193, 194. *Mez*., (p. 77) points out that the same department was called *dīwān-u'r-rasā'il* under the Abbasids and *dīwān-u'l-inshā* under the Fatimids.

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³ *Qābūs-nāmah*, pp. 156, 157; Baranī, p. 95.

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⁴ *Tāj*, ff. 59b, 81a, 142a, etc.; *Baranī*, pp. 91, 361, etc.; *Inshā-i-Māhrū*, Letters LXXV, XCIX.

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⁵ E.g., *‘Utbī*, p. 23; *Baranī*, pp. 91, 361.

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¹ Qābūs-nāmah, p. 158.

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² Qābūs-nāmah, pp. 156, 157. The dabīr-i-khāṣ was assisted by several dabīrs who were styled in accordance with their duties; hence one comes across terms like shab-nawīs (the writer for the night), khāṣah-nawīs (personal writer), etc.; Inshā-i-Māhrū, Letters LXXXII, LXXXIII.

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The royal commands issuing from the dīwān-i-inshā were classified according to their nature and importance. It appears that all grants of land were sealed with the royal ṭughrā, the sovereign's name and titles elaborated in a highly ornamental form.³ Such a document was called farmān-i-ṭughrā and was registered in the wazīr's office.⁴ All administrative orders were sealed with the royal motto, called tauqī‘; these included appointment orders, new ordinances and directions to officers, and were known as aḥkām-i-tauqī‘.⁵ Minor orders were issued by the departments concerned under their own seal. If the sovereign wanted to show special favour to a noble or attach urgent importance to a matter, he would add a few words in his own handwriting.⁶ The farmāns were dispatched by the kharīṭahdār; his dīwān, which was a branch of the dīwān-i-inshā, was given by Muḥammad bin Tughluq the name of dīwān-i-ṭalab-i-aḥkām-i-tauqī‘.⁷ The kharīṭahdār was only a subordinate officer and does not seem to have had direct access to the sultan. Two members of the dīwān-i-inshā acted as the sultan's private secretaries and dealt with his private correspondence.⁸ Each of them was styled kātib-i-khāṣ.

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³ For reproductions of some ṭughrās belonging to the Mughuls, vide Journal Royal Asiatic Society, 1938, plate V.

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⁴ Baranī, p. 439.

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⁵ Baranī, p. 470; Minhāj, p. 127; Baihaqī, p. 9.

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⁶ Baihaqī, p. 6

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⁷ Baranī, p. 470. Kharīṭah=a bag in Arabic; used for silk or leather bags used as envelopes. He was also in charge of stationery; I.B., ii, p. 65 mentions a kharīṭahdār who was the governor of Hānsī and Sarswatī.

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⁸ Qaṣā'id-i-Badr-i-Chāch, p 14.

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A minister of great importance was the *barīd-i-mumālik* who was the head of the state news-agency. It was his duty to keep himself informed of all that was happening in the empire; ubiquitous agents reported all news which had any significance or importance.¹ The headquarters of every administrative sub-division had a local *barīd* who sent regular news-letters to the central office.² Men of known probity and honesty were appointed to this post; sometimes learned men with an outstanding reputation for piety and impartiality were forced to accept it against their will as a matter of public duty.³ So great was the responsibility that if a *barīd* failed to report a misdeed or some act of gross injustice committed by a well placed official, he sometimes paid for his shortcoming with his life.⁴ There are instances when *barīds* exercised great ingenuity in sending messages in spite of the vigilance of a rebel chief.⁵ Nothing was outside the cognizance of the *barīd*: he was the confidential agent of the central government to report on every aspect of public administration. The government officials, the condition and finances of the area under his jurisdiction, the state of agriculture, the welfare of the peasants and the purity of the coinage alike came under his secret investigation. He was present at reviews of troops so that he might send his own impressions to the court. He attended all important functions, kept his informers everywhere, and let nothing escape his argus-eyed vigilance. Having gathered all the information he could, he classified it and put it into separate reports so that each document could be referred by the central office or the monarch to the department concerned.⁶ This system of universal espionage assured the obedience of the provincial governors to the central government so long as the sovereign was strong enough to deal with powerful nobles who were inclined to be refractory.¹ It also provided a safeguard against the oppression of the people by the officials: indeed it was one of the most important functions of the barīd to report any instance of oppression.² A well-organized news-agency was a prime necessity for the successful administration of justice in the realm since thus the monarch got prompt news of the deeds of his servants; hence the department was compared to the windows in a house which admit light from the outside.³ Muslim writers on politics hold that it is an act of piety to take up the responsibilities of a barīd and discharge them properly.⁴ It was not surprising, therefore, that only men of recognized worth were appointed. They were required to investigate all matters fully and report the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.⁵ The post was well paid, for it was wisely considered necessary to keep the barīd immune from the temptation of accepting bribes.⁶

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¹ A.M., ff. 41b, 42.

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² V.K., pp. 230-232.

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³ Barani, p. 45; Siyāsat-nāmah, p. 43.

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⁴ E.g., Barani, p. 40. The *barīd* was hanged because he failed to report a misdeed of a governor. Also, *Tuzūkāt-i-Tīmūrī*, p. 168.

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⁵ Baihaqī, p. 398.

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⁶ V.K., p. 232; A.M., ff, 41b-42b.

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¹ Siyāsat-nāmah, pp. 68-69.

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² Idem, p. 58.

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³ Tauqīʿāt-i-Kisrū, f. 31b.

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⁴ Siyāsat-nāmah, p. 43.

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⁵ A.M., f. 42a. These words are mine.

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⁶ Siyāsat-nāmah, p. 58.

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This system was based on the conception of a monarch as the embodiment of benevolent vigilance. Its history. A big empire in those days of meagre communications had to invest its local officials with considerable power which could be misused in oppression or rebellion; therefore it was essential that an institution be devised to keep the centre informed of all that was happening in the provinces. Muslim writers recognized the antiquity of the system.⁷ Later investigation has shown that even the Achæmenid emperors of ancient Persia had officers known as the king's eyes and ears who went to the distant corners of the empire to make investigations and report to the court.⁸

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⁷ Ibid.

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⁸ Ancient Persia and Ancient Persian Civilization, pp. 74-75.

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The system was revived by Mu‘āwiyah; the Abbasids attached great importance to the barīd and an early ruler of that dynasty is reported to have called him ‘a pillar of the state.’¹ The Ghaznavids had the department, from whom it was adopted by the Ghurids.² Quṭb-u’d dīn Aibak possessed his staff of news-writers, so the sultanate of Dehlī had its barīds from the beginning.³ Like some other departments, the system appears to have deteriorated under the Shamsī rulers, but Balban developed it to its utmost capacity, and his success in enforcing obedience and order can be partly attributed to a well-organized news-agency.⁴ ‘Alā-u’d-dīn Khaljī also depended for the success of his reforms on a highly developed system of espionage.⁵ Ibn Baṭṭūṭah pays a high tribute to the efficiency of the news service under Muḥammad bin Tughluq.⁶ The Lodīs and the Sūrs also developed to a high level their means of securing information; indeed Sikandar Lodī was credited with supernatural powers in this respect by some of his subjects.⁷

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¹ A.M., f. 42a, says it was the second caliph; V.K., p. 226, says it was the third.

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² Baihaqī, pp. 85, 139, etc.

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³ Tāj, f. 183a.

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⁴ Baranī, p. 45.

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⁵ Idem, pp. 318-319.

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⁶ I.B., 11, pp. 2, 3.

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⁷ Da’ūdī, ff. 37b, 38a, 103b; Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī, (i), p. 337; (ii), p. 106.

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In no Muslim country did the central government depend only upon the barīd for secret information; the state also employed a large number of actual spies who attached themselves to princely households or wandered about the land as travellers, traders or religious mendicants.⁸ These men mixed with the populace and acquainted themselves with the views of the people on various matters, so discovering secrets which official agencies did not possess. It was particularly important to keep an eye on the doings of powerful chiefs and nobles;

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⁸ Nāẓim, pp. 144-145; Siyāsat-nāmah, p. 68; Masālik-u’l-abṣār, p. 53. Nāẓim erroneously believes that the mushrif-i-mumālik was the head of the spy system. This is based on a wrong interpretation of the word mushrif.

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nor were the neighbouring courts immune from attention.¹ Ambassadors and messengers sent to foreign princes were instructed to keep their eyes open and gather as much information as they could.² Sometimes trustworthy courtiers were sent in disguise as special spies to investigate some complicated affair.³ The knowledge that there were spies abroad who would be sending reports to the monarch kept the regular news-writers efficient and careful. It seems that there was a body of spies attached to the court, but the other secret agents were probably under the control of the central barīd office. No separate controlling agency is mentioned under the sultans of Dehlī.

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¹ Siyāsat-nāmah, pp. 68, 69. I.B (ii. p. 66) says, "It is customary among the monarchs of India that they keep a slave as a spy with every noble; similarly there are slave girls in every noble's household who pass on the information to the sweepers. They, in their turn, report everything to a superior official."

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² Idem, p. 87.

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³ Idem, p. 119.

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The foregoing, together with the wakīl-i-dar, were the principal ministers who were in charge of well-organized dīwāns or secretarial offices. There were other officers, whose posts did not involve so much clerical work, in charge of certain subordinate departments of the administration. They too had direct access to the sultan but they cannot be styled ministers in the proper sense of the word. To this class belonged the amīr-i-dād who looked after the executive side of judicial business and the kotwāl who was responsible for maintaining peace. These officials enjoyed great prestige and occupied eminent positions in the order of precedence at court. Their voice carried considerable weight in the sultan's councils. The ministers were servants of the crown and responsible only to the sultan. Muslim political writers postulate that the more important ministers should be acquainted with the shar' so that they might not be accomplices in illegal exactions or injustice, but there was no method by which their protest could be made immediately effective.⁴ There are instances where ministers threatened to resign with good effect.¹ Mostly, however, the ministers would rather acquiesce. A minister's actual power depended on his own capability and the influence he wielded over the sovereign; the wiser monarchs knew the worth of an efficient minister and were willing to yield to him if he expressed his views emphatically. There was no question of the ministers acting as a team to resist the sultan's will. They had little force at their command to coerce a monarch, nor did they form a class with special privileges like the nobles. In the council, too, they were outnumbered by powerful and strong nobles. There was no council of ministers: the sultan's full council was attended by far too many people to be a proper instrument either of deliberation or of conducting business.² Real business was transacted in the informal consultations which the monarch had with his chosen counsellors. To these meetings the sultan invited only the officials concerned and his most trustworthy advisers who were not necessarily ministers. Some of them were high military officials or dignitaries of the royal household.

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⁴ A.M., ff. 40a, b.

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¹ E.g., Khān Jahān, 'Afīf, p. 405.

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² 'Afīf, pp. 277-280.

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Under the caliph a'r-Rāḍī, the wazīr was supplanted by the amīr-u'l-umarā. This change upset the legal theories, though the jurists could say with some justification that the chief noble now enjoyed the authority of the wazīr-u't-tafwīḍ.³ The office soon found a place in the hierarchy of Muslim states. In the Sultanate of Dehlī, a noble was generally selected to be the nā'ib-u'l-mulk or lord lieutenant of the realm, but his authority varied according to the character of the monarch. Sometimes it was an empty title; at other times it invested the holder with practically absolute authority.⁴ He was the head of the military organization and was entrusted with the government of the centrally administered areas.¹ A noble was selected to act as *nā'ib-i-ghaibat* during the absence of the sultan.² This official was the representative of the sovereign at the capital and dealt with all emergent and routine business. Powerful though these two deputies were, they were not ministers in the strict sense of the word; yet, except for the *wazīrs* with unlimited powers, no minister enjoyed so much authority. The ordinary ministers were only strong as heads of departments.

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³ V.K., p. 226.

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⁴ He was also called malik nā'ib. Of the first type was Quṭb-u'd-dīn 'Alī under Sulṭān Jalāl-u'd-dīn Khaljī (Baranī, p. 202) and of the latter Balban before he became the sultan (Baranī, p. 26), and Ikhtiyār-u'd-dīn Aitkin under Mu'izz-u'd-dīn Bahrām (Minhāj, pp. 191, 192).

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¹ S. A., pp. 67, 68; *Masālik-u'l-abṣār*, pp. 30, 31; these authorities call him *amriyat*.

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² *Baranī*, pp. 85, 213, etc. Muḥammad bin Tughluq put the office in commission; *Tārīkh-i-Alfī*, ii, f. 99.

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