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The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus: A Study in Comparative Politics c15.s1: Section 5. Ministry the Pivot of National Life

The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus: A Study in Comparative Politics c15.s1

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Section 5. Ministry the Pivot of National Life

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The doctrine of the sovereignty of the *prakriti* is in the thought of the *nîti-śâstras* invariably connected with that of the *amâtya* (ministry) as a check on the possible autocracy of the *svâmin*. One of the earliest landmarks in the history of this doctrine is to be noticed in Vedic writings, the *Aitareya Brâhmaṇa*⁷ and the *Śatapatha Brâhmaṇa*.⁸ In that body of literature the people are “worshipped” by the king at “election”

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⁷ VIII, 175.

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⁸ III, 4, 1, 7; III, 22, 18; V, 3, 1, 6; V, 3, 5, 31—37.

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in and through their representatives, the *Ratnins*,¹ among whom the head of the village elders is one.

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¹ Jayaswal's "Constitutional Aspects of Rituals at Hindu Coronation" in the *Mod. Rev.*, Jan. 1912.

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The *Mahâbhârata*² maintains this tradition in so far at least as it considers the priests to be the "non-official" mouth-pieces of the people, and the councillors as their "natural leaders", the Platonic "guardians". Finally, in a discussion of the *Artha-śâstra* it is even established that the state has its "sole prop" in the ministry (*mantri-pariṣat*).³ The *amâtya* of the Kautilyan theory is in essence an organ through which the folk-will can be brought to bear on the constitution.

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² *Âdi*, Ch. LXXXV, 19—22; *Śânti*, Ch. LXXXIII, 48—50, XCI, 29.

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³ Book V, Ch. IV.

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In a very elementary manner the *Agni Purâṇa*⁴ and the *Matsya Purâṇa*⁵ advise the king "not to decide on the policies alone". The arguments against one-man-rule or exclusive "personal" government are based in the *Śukra-nîti* on the conception that the monarch is not infallible. "Even if the work be a trifling one", aruges Śukra, "it can be done with difficulty by only one individual". "What can be performed by an unfriended person for a kingdom that is considerable?" is therefore his natural query.⁶ Hence his deliberate advice that "even the king who is proficient in all the sciences and a past master in state-craft should never by himself study political interests without reference to ministers. The wise ruler, the ideal "philosopher-king", or the *râjarṣi* as Kautilya would say, should ever abide by the well-thought-out decisions of councillors, office-bearers, subjects, and members attending a meeting, — never by his own opinions."⁷

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⁴ Ch. CCXXV, verse 18.

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⁵ Ch. CCXX, verse 37.

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⁶ Ch. II, lines 1, 2.

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⁷ *Ibid*, lines 3—6.

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This hypothetical case of an "all-knowing" sovereign is well known to students of European political philosophy from Plato to Mill. But the utilitarian creed of the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" on which is erected the legislation of the present day is not prepared to trust itself to the discretion of such an ominiscient benevolent individual. For according to modern political conscience the physical magnitude, if not anything else, is too much for one man. The logic of the *Śukra-nîti* is thus essentially modern. Besides, Śukra is conscious also of the complexity of moral and social relations, as well as of the diversity⁸ of intellectual attainments among the members of a community, — facts which make it all the more improbable that any single intellectual giant should be competent enough to manage a whole state.

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⁸ *Ibid*, lines 9, 12, 13.

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Such also are some of the considerations on which Kautilya, Kâmandaka, Manu and others seek to institute a council of experts as the permanent advisory instrument of monarchical polities. And in regard to their position in the state Śukra's idea is definite and clear. "If the king fears their control", says he, "they are good ministers". It is inconceivable to him that "there could be prosperity in a territory where ministers are not feared by the king".¹ The *amâtyas* in constitutional theory are thus not mere "king's men" like the ministers of England before the introduction of the Cabinet system. They must have an individuality and independence of character in order that they may control the whims and caprices of the monarch and systematically govern the course of the *râjya*. Nay, by the strength of their wisdom they are expected to "deliver a king who has gone astray".² And the acid test of their statesmanship is the "improvement of the state in extent, population, efficiency, revenue and administration".³

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¹ *Ibid*, lines 163—164.

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² *Ibid*, lines 14—18; cf. Kâmandaka, IV, 44—45, 48—50.

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³ *Ibid*, line 166.

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The *nîti*-philosophers have not neglected to consider the other side of the shield. The contingency of an arbitrary Charles I, the Chow of the Mencian radicals in ancient China, the Vena of Hindu tradition, has not been ignored either by Kautilya or by Śukra. The evils of "personal government", with their natural and necessary reactions, have been discussed in all the *śâstras*.⁴ If the monarch follows his own will, say, against the advice of Jâjnavalkya⁵ or of the *Purânas*, he will tend to be the cause of miseries, says the *Śukra-nîti*.⁶ He is likely to "get estranged from the kingdom and alienated from his subjects", in other words, to provoke a revolution. Indeed, he is no longer a "legitimate" king, for by ignoring or defying the counsels of ministers he has made himself into a "thief in the form of a ruler", an "exploiter of the people's wealth", a persecutor, a tyrant.⁷ In all respects, both negatively and positively, the ministry is thus a constitutional check in the Hindu theory of monarchy.

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⁴ Kautilya, Book I, vii; Kâmandaka, II, 60, 64, 71, 73; XI, 75.

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⁵ I, 312.

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⁶ II, lines 7—8.

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⁷ *Ibid*, lines 515—516.

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