The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus: A Study in Comparative Politics c16.s1.t1.52

c16.s1.t1.52

But, on the other hand, *danda* is also a most potent instrument of danger to the ruler himself, to the powers that be. For, "unweary lies the head that wears the crown", in more sense than one. The mal-administration of *danda*, says Kâmandaka,⁴ leads to the fall of the ruler. If the ruler is wise enough to manipulate it carefully, as Manu observes,⁵ it is surely conducive to the greatest good of the people. But what is the guarantee that the holder of the weapon would not bungle with it and handle it thoughtlessly or arbitrarily? Should that be the case, the *danda* would lead to the ruin of the state. And would the office-bearer, the king, got scot-free? By no means. Manu is an advocate of regicide. He does not hestitate to declare that *danda* would smite the king who deviates from his duty, from his "station in life". It would smite his relatives too together with his castles, territories and possessions. The common weal depends, therefore, on the proper exercise of the *summa potestas*, the *aiśvarya*.