The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c10: Chapter VI: Artillery
The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c10
- Language
- English
Chapter VI: Artillery
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THE MARATHAS, like other Indians, never excelled in artillery. Of its efficiency as an offensive weapon of long range they had early become aware. It was to his artillery tactics that Babar owed his decisive victories over his Rajput and Pathan opponents; it was their superior knowledge of artillery that had made the Portuguese so formidable in Southern India. It became, therefore, an imperative necessity for the Indian potentates of the North and the South to furnish themselves with the new arms. Portuguese and other European adventurers were on this account warmly welcomed by Indian princes, but some enterprising Hindus had also learnt the novel science. A quaint account of an artillery duel between a Brahman gunner named Rama and a Portuguese artilleryman, fought as early as 1571, has come down to us. The Brahman’s gun was baptised the ‘butcher’, while the machine of his Christian rival was called the ‘lion’, and the two men grimaced, grinned and made faces at each other before they fired.¹ There were, therefore, some Indian gunners even before the rise of the Marathas.
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¹ R. S. Whiteway, *The Rise of the Portuguese Power in India*, p. 40.
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Shivaji had a regular artillery department called the *Tophkhana* and among his state departments is mentioned the *Darukhana*,² the exact Persian synonym of the Portuguese ‘Casa de Polvora’. This was quite in the fitness of things, for in the Deccan the Portuguese had at one time figured as the greatest masters of artillery, and Shivaji might have been consciously copying their methods. The real or pseudo-Portuguese in his service were not improbably employed in this department. For his supply of guns and cannons, however, he was entirely dependent on the European trading companies, for it does not appear that he had any gun-foundry of his own. For this deficiency we need not blame him. He was a pioneer in many things. During his short but eventful life he had attempted much and he had to leave much unattempted. It was impossible for him to accomplish everything.
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² Sen, *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 133.
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The European merchant companies carried on a regular trade in artillery and ammunition, and Shivaji, like his neighbours, naturally looked towards them for this much needed weapon. It was probably with this intent that he had permitted the French to build a factory at Rajapore, and this was undoubtedly one of the advantages that he expected from the settlement of an English factory at the port, for we read in a Surat letter dated 30 September 1671, that Mr. Stephen Ustick and Ram Sinay were instructed to let him know ‘if he gives us such encouragement that wee againe setle in his port he may obtain from us those advantages that other nations doe in whose ports we trade, but we would not positively have them promise him those granadoes, mortar pieces and ammunition he desires, nor absolutely deny him in regard wee do not think itt convenient to help him against Danda Rajpore which place if it were in his possession would prove a great annoyance to the port of Bombay, and on the other side our denyall is not consistent at present with our interest, in respect wee believe the keeping in suspence will bring him to a speedier conclusion of the treaty hoping thereby to be furnish(ed) with those things he desires’. ¹ From the French he purchased 2,000 maunds of lead and 88 iron guns in 1673, ² but although he approached the English with similar proposals from time to time they avoided compliance with various excuses. On 5 September 1670, the Bombay factors wrote to Surat: ‘we know that Sevagee may furnish himself with lead or guns from the French factoryes at Rajapore but wee will not bring ourselves into any intrigues, but keepe to such orders as you have and shall appoint us'.¹
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¹ Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 87, fol. 1.
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² Surat Letter, dated 12 January, 1673-4. Ibid, Part II, fol. 77.
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¹ Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 105, fols. 20-1.
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The excuse generally offered was that the English could not afford to offend the Delhi Government by supplying their enemies with warlike stores; but Shivaji was quite willing and even anxious to keep the transactions secret. In September 1671, Bombay informed Surat that 'an Engineer, mortar piece, grandos and a great gun or two are the assistance he expects which he thinks may be privately conveyed to him'.² How this could be managed we learn from another Bombay letter dated 9 November 1671, 'If Your Honour, etc., approve of spareing Sevagee 3 or 4 great gunns he sayes he will finde Portugues that shall buy them of us; as if for their owne use; and soe our name not brought in question'.³ In 1674, Shivaji again sent an envoy 'with an extraordinary kinde letter from him to the President together with a present of five loads of ordinary stuffs and a confirmation of the order for the payment of the money at Rajapore and other priviledges which hath granted to the English in his country and desired to be supplied with 60 big iron guns and two big brass guns'.⁴ The English at that moment did not possess any iron gun that they could spare but the two brass guns were for sale. The Surat authorities were, however, afraid that "soe publique an action as that would be must needs provoke this King, who being already made sensible by his ministers Bauder Ckaun⁵ and others as we hear, that his enemy is furnished with provisions from our island, might be incensed to ruine our trade in his dominions should wee assist him with such ammunition".⁶ In December 1676, the Surat council again addressed a letter to their Bombay colleagues positively forbidding them to sell the two brass guns that Shivaji was anxious to purchase. ‘Though Sevagee should profer you ready money’, the letter ran, ‘for your two brass gunns yet wee should not have you part with them without a positive order from us; for it is a matter of great consequence, and we know not how farr he may be trusted.’¹
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² Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 106, fol. 9.
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³ Ibid, fols. 32-3.
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⁴ Letter dated 8 November, 1674, Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 107, fol. 6.
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⁵ Bahadur Khan, the foster brother of Emperor Aurangzib.
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⁶ Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 88, fol. 244, letter dated 13 November, 1674.
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¹ Ibid, Vol. 89, fol. 90.
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These repeated importunities on Shivaji’s part clearly indicate the extent of his need, and in spite of all the caution of the English factors, the resourceful Maratha chief did, at least once, succeed in securing some of their guns. In a Bombay letter dated 7 April 1673 (1671?), we read ‘the two gunns formerly mentioned, the Deputy Governor hath sold to a Frenchman, who sold them to a Fidalgo at Tannah and he sent them as wee since heare to Sevagy’.² These guns were sold by their weight and were naturally of very poor quality, for the English and the Portuguese would not, for very good reason, part with their best artillery. Of the two guns that Shivaji obtained from Bombay in 1671, through the assistance of his French and Portuguese agents, the English factors write: ‘they are very bad within, yet with their powder and stone shott they may last a good while’.³ In a letter dated Surat, 12 November 1672, we read of the defects of some guns disposed that year: ‘we have sold all the gunns sent up hither and what are not yet taken on per shoare, from the Loyall Merchant: at the price of 5¼ Rupees per maund: 4 months time, but coming to prove them there are 6 broake in the tryall; being old defective gunns, some of them with great holes in them: others that have had new mettall dopt into holes, which appeared plainly at their breaking’.⁴ In another Surat letter, written on 5 February 1673-74, some of the guns intended for sale are described as ‘old and defective many of them being honey combe’.⁵ Yet Shivaji was not the only potentate who was eager to purchase these machines. The Governor of Surat, the Raja of Sunda, the Generals of Bijapur, all vied with each other for their possession and Prince Shah Alam sent a *nishan* to the Bombay Government to supply ammunition to his fleet.¹ Familiar with artillery and ammunition, as Indian princes had been for more than a century, they had done very little or nothing for their improvement and manufacture. The guns of Indian manufacture were notoriously crude and clumsy.²
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² Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 105, fol. 164. The year is wrongly indicated in the manuscript: it should be 1671. The mistake is probably due to the copyist’s error.
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³ Ibid, Vol. 105, fols. 20-1.
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⁴ Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 87, fol. 90.
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⁵ Ibid, Part II, fol. 110.
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¹ Surat consultation, 10 August, 1670, Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 3, fols. 79-80.
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² One type of gun commonly used in Southern India is thus described by Phillip Baldeus, the Dutch Missionary: ‘they are made of long and broad Bars of Iron, joined together with Iron Hoops’; Churchill’s *Voyages* Vol. III, p. 652. The other type was not much better. For a learned account of Indian cannons see Irvine, *Army of the Indian Moghuls*, pp. 113-32.
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Besides artillery of European manufacture, Shivaji also possessed some light pieces of Indian make called *Jejala* and *Zanburak* or *Shutarnal*. The shots were generally of stone or iron, but Shivaji did not possess a sufficient number of guns and cannons, for when he wanted to strengthen the fortress of Panhala, he had to weaken his strongholds in the Konkan by denuding them of their guns although he had purchased no less than 40 new pieces from the French that year.³ The Carwar factors actually thought that he had decided to leave the Konkan altogether, to such an extent were his fortresses in that part depleted of their protecting artillery, as appears from their letter to Surat dated 24 November 1679: ‘there is sent by Sevagee Sumjee Punditt, Anajee’s brother, for takeing of severall pieces of ordnance out of these castles as Ancholah, Carwar, Symisecre and Pundah to the amount of 30 which by the strength of men and buffaloes are to be drawne up to Pornollah, that it is supposed he intends to deliver up the Cocon⁴ to the Duccanees’.⁵
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³ Rajapore letter, dated 30 December 1679. Factory Records, Vol. 108, fol. 37.
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⁴ The Konkan.
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⁵ Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 108, fol. 76.
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Though Shivaji had employed Portuguese agents for purchasing artillery and ammunition for him, there is no mention whatever of these necessary articles of war in his two treaties with the Portuguese Government; but that does not necessarily mean that the Portuguese dealers were unwilling to supply their powerful neighbour with these requisites of war. Sambhaji, however, was at first more fortunate than his father, for both the English and the Portuguese were willing to sell these much needed commodities to him. On 10 February 1681-82, the Surat authorities wrote to their Bombay subordinates: ‘If Sambajee Rajah should desire anything from you, wee shall not forbid you oblidging him but be cautious and private in such a case’.¹ The Portuguese Government was equally willing to oblige Sambhaji. In a letter addressed to him on 28 July 1682, the Viceroy informed the Maratha Prince that he could purchase his munition and arms from Portuguese territories. He wrote: ‘After the envoy Esaji Gambhir Rao had delivered to me Your Highness’s letter, he informed me that Your Highness had ordered two farms under the jurisdiction of Bicholy and Curalle to manufacture powder and purchase artillery, sulphur, saltpetre and other things ordered to be manufactured in the ports of Canara and Malabar, requesting me to direct the Captains of the Armada of this State not to obstruct those ships (carrying munition) and to let them, and also the provision that Your Highness’s subjects may take from Canara for the ports of Vingurla and Banda, pass freely. As I desire to maintain friendship with Your Highness, I have given to Your Highness’s envoy the necessary order to that effect, in conformity with Your Highness’s request’.² Sambhaji’s good relations with his Portuguese neighbours did not last long, and it is needless to say that during the critical period following his death the Marathas had hardly the time or the opportunity of making their own guns, though a portion of their powder and shot had always been manufactured in the country. In the second decade of the eighteenth century the Marathas still depended on the Europeans for their supply of artillery. Early in his reign Shahu had applied to Sir Nicholas Waite, Governor of Bombay, for arms and ammunition, and in 1713 Kanhoji Angria had sent the following requests to Governor Aislabie: ‘If I have occasion for powder and shott you shall supply on my paying for the same. I desire also a place to make powder for which I shall send saltpetre and brimstone’.³ To both of these requests, however, an answer in the negative was returned. It is not at all difficult to understand why Kanhoji was unwilling to part with the guns of the ships he had captured, though he was willing to restore the vessels.
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¹ Ibid, Vol. 90, Part III, fol. 51.
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² Livros dos Reis Visinhos (Goa), Vol. II, fol. 16. Sen, *A Preliminary Report on the Historical Records at Goa*, pp. 27-8.
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³ Bombay Public Consultation, Range CCCXLI, No. 4 Consultation, 14 February, 1712-13.
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In the Peshwa period some efforts were made to manufacture their own artillery and ammunition. Baji Rao had his own foundry, which was visited by Captain William Gordon, the English envoy, in 1739. He wrote on 30 June: ‘I visited the foundry, where I saw many coehorns and bomb shells said to have been cast there, and a form of a thirteen inch mortar. I was told they make such with great ease, and have learned the art of running iron for making shot’.¹ During the administration of Madhav Rao I, a cannon-ball factory was established at Ambegavan near Votur in the province of Junnar in 1765-66, and another factory was established at Poona four years later for manufacturing cannons.² But this did not mean that they were seriously thinking of dispensing with foreign arms. On the contrary they steadily looked for such supply and provided for them in their treaties with European nations.
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¹ Forrest, Selections From State Papers, Maratha Series, Vol. I, p. 79. ² Peshwas’ Diaries, Vol. IX, pp. 333 and 335. ³ Biker, Tratados da India, Vol. VI, p. 11. ⁴ Ibid, p. 177. ⁵ Ibid, Vol. VIII, p. 236.
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By the fifth Article of the treaty concluded between the Portuguese Government and the Peshwa on 9 January 1722, Baji Rao was entitled to purchase powder, ball, cannon and other military stores at a just price in the Portuguese territories.³ Another treaty was concluded between Krishna Rao Mahadev, Governor of Kalyan, and Martinho da Silveira de Menczes, Captain General of the Province of the North, on 30 January/10 February 1731-32, and Article 10 of this new treaty again permitted the Marathas to buy, as they had always done, what powder, ball, sulphur and lead they might require in the territories of the Portuguese Government.⁴ In 1786 the Poona authorities requested the Portuguese agent to furnish them with a few bronze guns of the latest type with all the necessary materials and they also wanted some powder and ball.⁵ The Portuguese Government generally complied with such requests as best as they could. In 1782 they had promptly found a quantity of sulphur for Anand Rao Dhulap the Maratha Admiral.¹ While engaged in the siege of Dharwar, Parashram Bhau Patwardhan had received from Goa 500 maunds of powder, and as this quantity was supplied from Government stock no price was charged.² During the first Maratha war, Mahadaji Sindhia³ also purchased ammunition from the Portuguese, and even in the nineties of the eighteenth century the Peshwa’s army was still dependent on the English for their heavy artillery and small firearms, although Sindhia had by that time established a fairly efficient factory for such articles under European supervision. As usual these guns and muskets purchased from the English and the Portuguese were neither of the best type nor in a very good condition. Only arms rejected as useless were offered for sale, and when the English authorities decided to stop this practice, Colonel Tone protested against the measure in very strong terms. ‘The late regulations of the Company’, he wrote, ‘respecting the return to Europe of all unserviceable arms, may for a time prevent the increase of infantry corps, but then it will drive them to the expedient of making their own firelocks, as Scindeah has done, and his are very excellent ones, far superior to the ordinary Europe arms to be met with in the bazars. I for my own part very much doubt the policy of the orders in question. In the first place, I lay it down as a postulatum, that arms will be sold while a good price is given for them in defiance of all the regulations that can be made; and if they must be disposed of, the Company had better receive the value than any individual. In the next place, the arms purchased in the interior, are of that description which is denominated unserviceable, and generally are so. In this case it is of very little consequence in whose hands they are, since if they are useless to the Company, who have excellent Karkonnas to repair them, they can be of no great use to a native power, which has not the same means of mending them.’¹ It may be asked why the Peshwas did not try to remove a deficiency, the danger of which was so obvious. Their financial difficulties do not fully explain this indifference. The feudal organisation of the army was not wholly responsible for it; the fact is that they always sought the easiest way out of every difficulty, forgetting that the easiest was not always the safest or the shortest.
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¹ Livros dos Reis Visinhos, Vol. XI.
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² Biker, Tratados da India, Vol. IX, p. 212.
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³ Livros dos Reis Visinhos (Goa), Vol. X. It should not be supposed that the Marathas relied on the Portuguese alone for their supply of artillery and ammunition. The Government often sent their agents to purchase guns and war stores at Bombay, and provincial Governors also followed the example of their masters. One Balaji Mahadev was sent to Bombay to purchase guns in 1753-4 (Peshwas’ Diaries, Vol. III, p. 179) and again in 1764-5, 36,000 balls were sought from Bombay, (Peshwas’ Diaries, Vol. IX, p. 328). The Bombay Government were reluctant to supply their neighbours with war stores, as will be apparent from the following extract from Bombay Public Consultations, Range CCCXLI, No. 14A, pp. 334-5, dated 23 July, 1745. ‘When Mr. Sedgewicke was at Bassen in April last the Maratha Governour (Sancrajee Punt) acquainted him he should be much obliged if we would spare him about ten thousand shot of different sizes, as also some Cohorn shells and Granadoes, since when Sancrajee wrote the President to the same import. As the giving him an entire refusal may create some disgust and the sparing him large shott and . . . is by no means proper, the President proposes to the Board let him have about one hundred and fifty hundred weight of shot from 11 lb. to 4 lb. weight at the price the black . . . and to write him accordingly, making a proper excuse for not assisting him with larger shott or any shells.’
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¹ Tone, Illustrations of some Institutions of the Maharatta People, pp. 54-5. ² Ibid, pp. 56 and 57. ³ Scott, History of the Dekkan, Vol. II, p. 82.
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‘The guns’ of the Maratha armies, we learn from Tone, were ‘tolerably well cast, but the carriages’, says he, ‘are in general very clumsily and badly constructed. A march of a few days shakes the carriages to pieces’. ‘The cannon’, the same writer informs us, ‘are never made of any precise calibre, but are cast indifferently by all diameters and the ball afterwards adapted to the bore. They never use cast shot, but those of wrought iron, hammered to any dimensions; the many angles, consequently on the surface of the shot in a very small course of service, destroy the smoothness of the bore and they can never be fired with that precision that a cast ball can.’²
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Shivaji, as we have already seen, had a very limited supply of artillery for his forts and fleet and he had no field artillery, although he had used cannons against Janjira and Phonda. The Marathas long suffered from this want. In 1692 Dalpat Bundela defeated a numerically superior Maratha force because, as the author of Dilkusha suggests, he had some artillery.³ It was the lack of field artillery again that prevented Baji Rao I from reaping the maximum advantage of his strategic victory over the Nizam's army at Tal Bhopal. It was his artillery that saved the Mughal general from utter ruin and destruction. The Maratha army was better furnished with field artillery during the Peshwaship of Balaji Baji Rao probably when the *gardi* force was organised and the necessity of the trained battalions of infantry was recognised. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Marathas had attained some familiarity with the use of artillery, as Grose¹ tells us, but the department was still largely manned by Portuguese and Indian Christians. The pay of an ordinary Portuguese gunner varied from Rs. 12-8 to Rs. 30 per month in 1753,² as a letter addressed to Shripat Bapuji in that year shows. The following artillery men were sent to serve under him and he was instructed to pay them on the first of each month the salary shown against their name.
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¹ Grose, *Voyage to the East Indies*, pp. 108-9.
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² *Peshwas' Diaries*, Vol. III, p. 177.
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Joki (Joachim?) Rs. 30. Manki (Manuk?) Rs. 25. Pharasis Rudrak (Francisco Rodrigues?) Rs. 12-8. Jacob Rujel (Rozario?) Rs. 12-8. Malak Malkar (Melchoir?) Rs. 15. Manvel (Manoel?) Rs. 15.
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In a document dated 1754-55 one Madhav Rao Shivdev is mentioned as the Chief of the Artillery department and the civil administration of the department was vested in him and the *Dewan*, *Majumdar*, *Fadnis* and *Sabnis*.³ The *Tophkhana*, like other departments, must have been furnished with the usual *Darakhdar* staff of eight officers, although only four are mentioned in the document quoted above. A fifth officer, the *Potnis*, is mentioned in a letter of 1765-66, where we read that the *Potnis* of the artilley commanded by one Bhikan Khan attached to the army of Raghunath Rao had an annual salary of Rs. 150 only.⁴
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³ Ibid, Vol. III, p. 180.
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⁴ Ibid, Vol. IX, p. 331.
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In 1777 a Portuguese officer named Noronha commanded part of the Peshwa's artillery and he had a number of European artillerymen under him.⁵ In 1782 one Musa Naraj (Monsieur Noronha?
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⁵ Forrest, *Selections from State Papers*, Maratha Series, p. 294.
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or George?) held a similar command.¹ The most will known Maratha artillery officer was Bhim Rao Panshe. He came into prominence during the first Maratha war and in acordance with the usual Maratha custom obtained a large *saranjam*, which was held by his descendants after him.
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¹ *Peshwas’ Diaries*, Vol. VI, p. 190. The son of this Musa Naraj afterwards entered Holkar’s army. See *Maheshwar Darbarchin Batmi Patren*, Vol. II, p. 218.
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The trained battalions in the Peshwa’s service had their contingents of artillery. With the old battalions of Boyd were employed 8 Portuguese gunners, who got a monthly salary of Rs. 60 each, 2 *Jamadars* on Rs. 30 each, 2 *Havaldars* at the rate of Rs. 18 each, 42 *Golandazes* or gunners at Rs. 12 each and 24 *Khalasis* on Rs. 10 each. In the artillery department there were 32 mechanics, namely, 9 carpenters, 8 blacksmiths, 10 stonecutters and 5 campfollowers. This force was much increased when a new regiment was added to Boyd’s two old battalions.²
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² *Peshwas’ Diaries*, Vol. V, pp. 184-7.
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In 1812 John Ford had the following staff for the artillery of his battalions:³
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³ *Itihas Sangraha*, Peshave Daftarantil Nivadak Kagad Patra, pp. 94-95.
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2 Serjeants at a monthly salary of Rs. 35-12 annas each. 4 Gunners .. .. Rs. 25-12 annas each. 2 Serangs .. .. Rs. 30 2 Tandels .. .. Rs. 12 4 Drummers .. .. Rs. 10-4 annas. 2 Water Suppliers .. .. Rs. 9-8 annas. 60 Laskars .. .. Rs. 8-8 annas. 1 Master Carpenter .. .. Rs. 25 2 Carpenters .. .. Rs. 18 1 Master Blacksmith .. .. Rs. 25 2 Blacksmiths .. .. Rs. 18 2 Armourers .. .. Rs. 18 1 Hammerer .. .. Rs. 10 1 Bellower .. .. Rs. 8 1 Water Supplier (for the smithy) Rs. 14 3 Clerks — one for writing Marathi. one for writing English. one for attending the court.
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1 Shroff for testing coins. 10 Pioneers at a monthly salary of Rs. 8-8 annas each. 1 Havaldar .. .. Rs. 12
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It is to be noticed that the *laskars* of Ford's artillery got a lower salary than Boyd's *golandazes* and *khalasis*, but the four gunners under Ford were much better paid, probably because they were of European origin or Indian Christians from Goa.
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The record left by the Maratha artillerymen cannot be regarded as a glorious one. On their performance at Panipat, Kasiraj Pandit, an eye-witness, has left the following comment: 'Mahratta guns being very large and heavy and their level not easily altered, their shot began to pass over our troops, and fell a mile in the rear'.¹ The inferiority of the Maratha artillery was responsible for the conversion of a sure victory at Arras² into a defeat, but Bhim Rao Panshe earned some credit by his operations in the Bhore Ghat region against the badly led army of Colonel Egerton. The operations of Parashram Bhau's artillery during the siege of Dharwar left an unfavourable impression on the mind of an English observer, Lieutenant Moor. He writes: 'From the method of proceeding adopted by the Mahrattas, we are convinced they would not, with twenty guns against the present garrison, approach and breach Darwar in seven years. A gun is loaded, and the whole of the people in the battery sit down, talk, and smoke for half an hour, when it is fired, and if it knocks up a great dust it is thought sufficient; it is reloaded, and the parties resume their smoking and conversation. During two hours in the middle of the day, generally from one to three, a gun is seldom fired on either side, that time being, as it would appear, by mutual consent set apart for meals. In the night the fire from guns is slackened, but musquetry is increased on both sides, and shells are sparingly throwin into the fort with tolerable precision.'³ This may have marked an advance from the early Mughal days, when the gunner frequently had his beard singed when he fired his gun; but such clumsy methods and slow firing could hardly be expected to secure any advantage in a battle against a European enemy, as was demonstrated in their final struggle with the English.¹
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¹ *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. III, p. 119.
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² Forrest, *Selections from State Papers*, Maratha Series, pp. 227-9.
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³ Moor, *A Narrative of the Operations of Captain Little's Detachment*, p. 30.
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¹ Sindhia’s artillery caused great loss to the English at Assye but it was not well supported by cavalry and infantry. See Notes Relative to the Transactions in the Marhatta Empire, Fort William, 15 December 1803, pp. 61-3. It should not be forgotten that Sindhia’s artillery was the creation of European experts and not of the Marathas.
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The Marathas had great faith in their artillery and always carried with them a large number of guns. This was supposed to add to their prestige² in the eyes of other Indian powers, but their artillery often proved a source of great and unmixed inconvenience. However old and useless, their honour demanded that they should not allow any of their guns to fall into the hands of their enemies or to be left behind, while the transport of heavy pieces was necessarily slow, as they were drawn by bullocks on very clumsy gun-carriages. Major Dirom, an eye witness, has left the following pen picture of the slow movement of these heavy and often useless machines: "The park of artillery, where all their guns are collected, made an extraordinary appearance. The gun-carriages, in which they trust to the solidity of the timber, and use but little iron in their construction, are clumsy beyond belief; particularly the wheels, which are low, and formed by large solid pieces of wood united. The guns are of all sorts and dimensions; and, having the names of their gods given to them, are painted in the most fantastic manner; and many of them, held in esteem for the services they are said to have already performed for the state, cannot now be dispensed with, although in every respect unfit for use. Were the guns even serviceable, the small supply of ammunition with which they are provided, has always effectually prevented the Mahratta artillery from being formidable to their enemies. On a marching day, the guns and the infantry move off soon after daylight, . . . the guns and tumbrels, sufficiently unwieldy without further burden, are so heaped with stores and baggage, that there does not seem to be any idea of its ever being necessary to unlimber, and prepare for action on the march. As there are no pioneers attached to the Mahratta artillery to repair the roads, this deficiency is compensated by an additional number of cattle, there being sometimes a hundred or a hundred and fifty bullocks, in a string of pairs, to one gun’.¹ Lt. Moor says that ‘The gun is so heaped up with baggage of every description, that it could not be cleared ready to fire, under, at least, half an hour; nor could anyone from its appearance, in its travelling state, were it not for the number of bullocks dragging it, conceive it to be a gun; fifty, sixty, and sometimes a hundred couple of bullocks, drag one of these guns; and in very heavy roads, where the cattle have been hard worked and ill fed, an elephant is posted in the rear, who pushes it with its head over difficult passages’.² Besides the heavy artillery the Peshwa’s army was furnished with a large number of Shutarnals, small swivels mounted on swift camels.³ These had the advantage of speed but were otherwise of little use. The Maratha chroniclers and Mannuci mention swivels mounted on elephants as commonly used by the Mughals, but this practice seems to have been unknown in the Maratha army.
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² Itihas Sangraha, Aitihasik Kirkol Prakaranen, p. 3.
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¹ Dirom, *A Narrative of the Campaign in India*, 1792, pp. 10-12.
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² Moor, *A Narrative of the Operations of Captain Little’s Detachment*, pp. 78-9.
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³ Victor de Saint-Genis, a biographer of De Boigne, wrongly attributes the invention of camel-swivels to that officer. See *Une Page inedite de l’histoire des Indes*, p. 203. For camel-swivels before De Boigne see Churchill’s *Voyages*, Vol. IV, p. 250.
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Their artillery among other things ensured the supremacy of the English in India. To the Marathas it afforded little or no advantage in their final struggle for the empire. The weapon was not ineffective. It had a great future and its possibilities had not yet been exhausted. But the Marathas had borrowed a scientific weapon without mastering its science and unintelligent imitation seldom leads to success. Assimilation of new ideas is always fruitful, for assimilation signifies complete comprehension of the underlying principles and ability to make further contribution in the same line. Since the introduction of firearms in Europe immense improvement had been made in their mechanism, weight, range and frequency of firing. But the Marathas were unwilling and unable to make any improvement. They were quite satisfied with the weapons rejected by their rivals as useless, their factories turned out a number of antiquated guns of a type hopelessly out of date. The result was that the Marathas lost their speed and mobility which constituted their superiority in offensive and defensive operations without gaining any corresponding advantage. They were compelled to fight their English rivals on their own terms, in their own fashion and with inferior weapons. This was not the only disadvantage. Their army consisted of forces of different character, with different traditions, different equipments and different methods of warfare not yet reconciled to their old tactics. Their confidence in artillery and trained infantry led the Maratha leaders to neglect their cavalry, and the result was disastrous.¹ It was like a combat of the eagle and the lion. So long as the noble bird kept in its own elements it could with safety and effect harass the mighty beast, but compelled to fight the lord of the forest in his chosen ground with wings cleft and talons shorn the eagle had no chance. It had to yield to its enemy and give up the unequal contest.
c10.69
¹ Sir Thomas Munro condemned the Marathas for neglecting their cavalry. See Gleig, Life of Sir Thomas Munro, Vol. I, p. 354-5.
Linked texts (1)
- Itihāsa-saṅgraha — Marathi