The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c7.44

c7.44

The reason was obvious. The saranjam-holder had a twofold duty to perform. He was not only a military commander, but also a civil administrator and in this latter capacity he had to finance the army under his command. Whenever he was called upon to lead or take part in an expedition, he mobilised his army, enlisted new recruits if necessary, and took the field as early as possible. Before, however, he could leave his headquarters, he had to advance his *Silhedars* a part of their pay under the style of *nalbandi*. He had to purchase arms and ammunition and cattle for transport purposes. The Peshwa's Government did not advance the necessary funds and the saranjam-holder had generally to raise it as best as he could. As a rule he contracted a loan which he expected to pay out of the proceeds of war; but all campaigns were not equally profitable, and, when the campaign was concluded, he had to submit his accounts to the examination of the Peshwa's accounts department. But even when it was clearly established that he was entitled to financial relief, the *saranjamdar* could not hope for anything but an addition to his *jahgir*. He was by the terms of his appointment bound to render an account of his civil stewardship as regularly as possible and to give a muster of his forces; but this was done at long intervals. Thus was created a vicious circle whereby military needs affected the efficiency of the civil administration and the inefficiency of the civil government reacted disastrously upon military efficiency. Both Sindhia and Holkar found it necessary to raise money by mortgaging the future revenue of their provinces and selling governorships to their creditors.¹ But even these makeshifts could not indefinitely postpone the final disaster and there came a day when the great chiefs found themselves unable to meet the just