Republics in Ancient India, c. 1500 B.C.–500 B.C. c9.s5.1

c9.s5.1

The Licchavian procedure of justice has been a favourite theme of modern historians of the Buddhist republics. A single passage of Buddhaghosa’s Commentary,⁴ first translated by Turnour,⁵ has been used as the sole evidence to reconstruct the judicial procedure practised at Vesālī. Before discussing the views of these scholars, we shall reconstruct the procedure as recorded by the commentator himself.⁶ Buddhaghosa says that it was an ancient custom with the Vajjis (*porāṇam vajjidhammam*) that if a thief (*cora*) was caught he was brought to trial before the justices (*vinicchaya-mahāmattānam denti*). If they decided that he was not a thief (*acoro hoti*), they set him free; but if found guilty, he was turned over to the lawyers (*vohārikānaṁ denti*). If, in turn, they decided that he was not a thief, they let him go; but if they found him guilty they handed him over to the rehearsers of the law maxims (*suttadharās*). When the latter determined that he was not guilty, he was freed; but if proven to the contrary they handed him over to the council of eight clan representatives (*aṭṭhakulikas*). These also had the right either to acquit him or to direct him to the general (*senāpati*). The latter could set the prisoner free if found not guilty, but, if he was convinced of his guilt, he sent the prisoner to the viceroy (*uparājā*). The viceroy, when convinced of his guilt, made him over to the king (*rājā*). If the king decided that the prisoner was truly guilty he consulted the *Book of Precedents* (*paveṇī potthakaṁ vācāpeti*) and inflicted punishment according to his guilt.¹