Republics in Ancient India, c. 1500 B.C.–500 B.C. c9.s5.32

c9.s5.32

Now the question arises — if Buddhaghosa's statement is not accurate, what was his source? We have seen above that many of the problems connected with the names and origin of the peoples² who had preferred the Buddha's doctrine to that of Mahāvīra, Gosāla or the early Brāhmaṇic practices, had become obscure and the commentator gives its own fantastic interpretations to explain away the difficulties. With regard to his statement about the Vesālian procedure of justice, we can only suggest that Buddhaghosa is recording some early tradition which had arisen as a calculated satire on the Licchavian system of justice, under which many criminals and offenders escaped punishment. The similar passage referring to each member of the assembly as a king, with all the equipment of kingship and an *uparājā*, *senāpati* and *bhaṇḍāgārika*¹ seems also to be of satirical purport. It may be that some humourous and imaginative person started a sarcastic joke against the Licchavian system of justice, which was rather cumbrous and inefficient, and that this spread among the people, passing into the Buddhist tradition after the fall of the Licchavis. By the time of Buddhaghosa it was believed in literally and taken quite seriously. We maintain that there was no factual basis for such an elaborate system, any more than there was for the 7,707 *uparājās*, 7,707 *senāpatis* and the like number of *bhaṇḍāgārikas*.²