Republics in Ancient India, c. 1500 B.C.–500 B.C. c9.s5.9

c9.s5.9

Smith,⁴ in support of his theory of the Tibetan origins of the Licchavis, relies implicitiy on Turnour's account. Like the later historians, he accepted Turnour's unreliable indication as an absolute truth. Jayaswal also relies mainly on Turnour and makes no criticism of the eight stages of the trial. While discussing the Licchavian safeguards for the liberty of the citizen, he enthusiastically remarks that the "liberty of the citizen was most jealously guarded. A citizen could not be held guilty unless he was considered so by the *Senāpati*, the *Uparājā* and the *Rājā*, separately and without dissent”.¹ He then goes on to enumerate the five earlier stages, giving them modern names—e.g., “Court of Justice,” “Lawyer-Judges,” “Court of Appeal,” “High Court,” “Doctors of the Law,” “Council of Final Appeal,” “Court of Eight,” and finally comments that “if all the Courts held him guilty, the matter was still subject to the decision of the members of the Executive Cabinet mentioned above”.² We do not think modern legal institutions can explain the ancient system of the Vesālians. Moreover, it is inconceivable that such an elaborate system could have ever been put into practice at Vesāli.