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History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas: A Vanished Indian Religion c24: Chapter XIV. Other Doctrines of the Ājīvikas

History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas: A Vanished Indian Religion c24

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Chapter XIV. Other Doctrines of the Ājīvikas

The Elements

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That the Ājīvikas of South India had a theory of elemental atoms is made clear by all the three chief Tamil sources. This atomic theory does not seem to be connected in origin with the doctrine of *Niyati* ascribed in the *Sāmañña-phala Sutta* to Makkhali Gosāla, but was probably derived from the primitive Eleatic atomism of Pakudha Kaccāyana in the same text. Pakudha must therefore be included with Makkhali Gosāla and Pūraṇa Kassapa among the founders of the community. We have already quoted the relevant passage,¹ which states that there exist seven elemental categories (*kāya*), namely earth (*pathavi-kāya*), water (*āpo-k.*), fire (*tejo-k.*), and air (*vāyo-k.*), with joy (*sukha*), sorrow (*dukkha*), and life (*jīva*) as the seventh. Although all seven are described as *kāya*, in their enumeration this word is not suffixed to the last three; this perhaps indicates that the three latter elements were thought of as different and less solid than the others. Linguistic evidence points to the possibility that they are an addition to the theory by another hand.²

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¹ V. supra, p. 16.

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² V. supra, p. 25.

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The seven elements are described as unmanufactured (*akaṭā*); they are barren (*vañjhā*), which must imply that they do not multiply as do living beings; and they are as firm as mountains and as stable as pillars.³ They do not move nor develop nor affect one another.⁴ As a corollary all change is illusion—No man slays nor causes to slay.⁵ Thus Pakudha’s theory of the seven stable elements leads to the later Ājīvika doctrine of *avicalita-nityatvam*.

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³ *Kūṭaṭṭhā, esika-ṭṭhāyi-ṭṭhitā*. Dīgha i, p. 56.

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⁴ *N' aññamaññaṃ... na aññamaññaṃ vyābādhenti, n'ālam aññamañ-nassa sukhāya vā dukkhāya vā*. Ibid.

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⁵ Ibid.

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In none of the Pāli texts is this theory associated with Makkhali Gosāla, so perhaps it was not his. Yet it is often to be found connected with parts of Makkhali’s teaching, when these are ascribed to some other philosopher. Thus the doctrine of the ancient teacher Guṇa, in *Mahānāradakassapa Jātaka*,¹ contains first a statement of the ineffectuality of all effort, whether human or divine, followed by an enumeration of the seven *kāya* which are indivisible and do not injure one another (*acchejjā avikopino*), and concludes by a statement of Makkhali’s doctrine of automatic salvation in a period of 8,400,000 *mahākappas* through the power of *Niyati*. This teaching is falsely called in the text *ucchedavāda* or annihilationism, but is obviously Ājīvikism, and Guṇa himself is referred to as an Ājīvika.

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¹ *Jāt.* vi, pp. 219 ff. Cf. *Petavatthu* iv, 3, pp. 57–61. V. infra, p. 271.

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These elemental theories seem gradually to have gained in importance at the expense of the doctrine of *Niyati*, which, as we have seen, plays a lesser part in the Tamil than in the Pāli and Prākrit texts.

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The earliest of the three chief Tamil sources, *Maṇimēkalai*, states that the atoms are the chief subject of discussion in the Ājīvika scripture called “the Book of Maṛkali”.² They are described as “atoms of four types, together with life”.³ Thus it is evident that the atom of life is thought to be somewhat different from the four material elements. It is later stated that this element has the special characteristic of perceiving all the other four atoms in their combinations.⁴ The other two categories of Pakudha are included almost as an afterthought in the penultimate line of the Ājīvika elder’s sermon—“Joy and sorrow, even these are atoms”.⁵ The atoms are said to be neither destroyed nor created, and one atom cannot penetrate another. An atom will not split, nor multiply by fission, nor will it expand or grow.⁶

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² *Nūṛ-poruḷkaḷ*. *Maṇi.* xxvii, 112.

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³ *Uyir ōṭ’ oru nāl-vakai aṇu*. Ibid., xxvii, 113.

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⁴ *Av vakai-y aṛivat’ uyir enpa paṭum ē*. Ibid., 119.

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⁵ *Inpam un tuṉpam um ivai-y um aṇu-v eṉa*. Ibid., 163.

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⁶ *Ciḷaivatu ceyyā puṭitāy-piṟaṉ’ oṉṟ’ oṉṟir pukuṭā. . . Oṉṟ’ iraṇṭ’ āki-p piḷappaṭuṉ ceyya-v aṇi-yum avar poṟ parappaṭuṉ ceyyā*. Ibid., 127–131.

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Unlike the bodies (*kāya*) of Pakudha Kaccāyana the atoms in *Maṇimēkalai* do move and combine, at least on the lower level of truth. They may come together densely to form a diamond, or loosely, as in a hollow bamboo.¹ These combinations seem to have been thought of as mere juxtapositions of atoms of various types,² and not as the mingling of one atom with another.³ Thus the character of the atoms of Pakudha is in one particular maintained in Maṇimēkalai, although the latter text does not confirm their immobility.

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¹ Vayiram āy-c cerintu varpam um ām vēy āy-t tuḷai paḻum. Ibid., 133–6.

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² Cerintu. Ibid., 135.

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³ Oṉṟ oṉṟir pukuṭā. Ibid., 128.

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The combination of atoms occurs in fixed ratios of "one, three-quarters, half, and one-quarter—according to their combinations in this ratio so do they receive their names".⁴ This passage may be elucidated by a comparison with a similar passage in Civañāṉa-cittiyār. This text states that the atoms will only combine in fixed proportions, into a sort of molecule, that of earth containing four atoms of earth, three of water, two of fire, and one of air.⁵ These proportions, 4 : 3 : 2 : 1, are the same as those of Maṇimēkalai, 1 : ¾ : ½ : ¼, and it seems probable that both refer to the same doctrine. Buddhist atomic theory allows no molecule of one element only, but teaches that all gross matter is to some extent adulterated by the presence of atoms of other elements.⁶ We may believe that the Ājīvikas held similar views. The molecule of earth was constituted in the above proportions, and no doubt the molecules of the other elements were similarly constituted, but with the relative preponderance appropriately changed. To this doctrine of molecular combination Maṇimēkalai adds that the atoms cannot be seen in their pure state, but only when they form aggregates as bhūtas or objects.⁷

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⁴ Oṉṟu muk-kāl arai kāl āy uṟun tuṉṟum ik-kaṭaṉāṟ peyar cola-p paḻum ē. Ibid., xxvii, 140–1.

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⁵ Kūṭu-neṟi nila’ nāṉku, nīr mūṉṟ’ iṉṟ’, iraṇṭ’ aḷal, kāl oṉṟ’ āy. CṄC., p. 262, v. 7. I am much indebted to Mr. M. S. H. Thompson for valuable advice on this point.

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⁶ V. infra, p. 269.

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⁷ Pūṭatt’ iraṭci-y uḷ. Maṇi. xxvii, 1, 147.

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It is nowhere in the text stated whether all atoms of one class were thought of as being identical, or whether it was considered that special differences existed within each genus of atom, to account for the great differences in the material contents of the world. It would seem, however, that the macroscopic differences in the structure and texture of matter were thought of as caused by the variation of the densities of the microscopic *aṇu*s which composed it.¹ The diminutive size of the atom is clearly stated. A single atom can only be detected by a divine eye,² but a large aggregate of atoms may be seen, just as a single hair is invisible in the twilight, while a number of hairs together may be perceived.³

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¹ V. supra, p. 264, n. 1.

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² Ōr aṇu-t teyva-k-kaṇṇōr uṇarkuvar. Maṇi. xxvii, 1, 146.

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³ Mālai-p-pōtil oru mayir ariyār, cālatt' iraṇ-mayir tōrrutal cālum. Maṇi. xxvii, 148–9.

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The four material elements are said to have characteristic properties and tendencies. Earth is hard, and has a downward tendency; water is cold, and has a similar tendency to descend and find its level upon earth; fire burns and moves upwards; while air has the attribute of motion in a horizontal direction.⁴

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⁴ Varpam āki-y uṟu nilan tāḻntu cor paṭu; cītatt' oṭu cuvai-y uṭaillāy iḻin eṇa nilaṉ cērnt' āḷvatu nīr; tī-t teṟutal u' mēr cēr iyalpum uṭaittāṉ; kārru v ilaṅki-y acaittal kaṭaṉ. Ibid., 120–4.

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*Nīlakēci* confirms most of the statements of *Maṇimēkalai*. Here, however, the elements are only five in number, and joy and sorrow are nowhere mentioned as being atomic in nature. Their characteristics are expressed somewhat differently. Here earth has all sense qualities except sound⁵; water, coolness (*taṉmai*); fire, burning (*erittal*), wind, blowing and howling (*ceritta virai-y oṭ*); and life, instructing and knowing (*arittal arital*).⁶ The elements are not said to combine in regular ratios, as in *Maṇimēkalai*. They are without *guṇa*,⁷ which the commentator Vāmaṉamuni translates as *iyalpu*, quality or characteristic. The sensual qualities of the elements thus do not appear to have been thought of as present in the individual atoms, but were latent in them, emerging only on their combination. Atoms could not interpenetrate.⁸

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⁵ Pulam āk oli-y oṇ' oḷiya mutark' āṉ. Nīl. 675.

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⁶ Ibid., 676.

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⁷ Kuritta poruḷiṉ kuṇam āl ivai-y ē. Ibid.

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⁸ Ibid., v. 677.

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*Civañāṉa-cittiyār* repeats the doctrine of *Maṇimēkalai*, with few significant variations. The atoms are the usual five, to which virtue and vice are added, apparently as an afterthought, in the final verse of the ten which expound Ājīvika doctrine.⁹

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⁹ Puṉṉiya pāvam eṉṉum iraṇṭiṉ um porunt' avaittē. CÑC. p. 265, v. 10.

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The change from the "joy and sorrow" of Pakudha and Maṇimēkalai to "virtue and vice" indicates a movement towards orthodoxy, and brings the Ājīvika classification of the elements nearer to the six Jaina categories of soul, matter, space, time, dharma, and adharma. We have already pointed out that Aruṇandi, the author of Civañāṉa-cittiyār, seemed to look upon the Ājīvikas as an unorthodox branch of Jainism,¹ and the alteration in the names of the two last categories seems to be a further indication of the direction in which the sect was moving. The characteristics of the atoms, as described in this text, are substantially the same as those mentioned in Maṇimēkalai.

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¹ V. supra, p. 203.

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The two later texts, Nīlakēci and Civañāṉa-cittiyār, put forward arguments to refute the atomic theories of the Ājīvikas. Nīlakēci attacks Ājīvika atomism, as she does the theory of Niyati, with appeals to experience and common sense. The arguments of Civañāṉa-cittiyār are somewhat subtler. If atoms have tendencies to move in different directions ² they must be mutually repulsive, and cannot hold together. If they do not join or interpenetrate, interstices must exist between them, and therefore they should fall apart.³ The Ājīvika apparently had his answers to these two objections; the elements, including the atom of life, are held together by wind or air (vaḷi), whose atoms move horizontally, and thus tend to counteract the upward tendency of fire and the downward tendencies of earth and water; the elements are united by "eternal action" (nīta-viṉai), which seems to be a synonym of Niyati.⁴ This term viṉai (Skt. karma) is used in the commentary to refer to what is called ūḻi (Skt. Niyati) in the statement of doctrine,⁵ thus giving yet another indication of the gradual merging of the Ājīvika Niyati theory with the orthodox doctrine of karma.

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² V. supra, p. 265.

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³ CÑC., pp. 272-3, vv. 4-5.

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⁴ Ibid., p. 274, v. 6.

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⁵ V. supra, p. 238.

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In Civañāṉa-cittiyār the Śaivite has the last word in the argument. Neither air nor eternal action can unite body and soul, for both lack intelligence. "So seek ye the one Lord. He is the creator."⁶

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⁶ Teḷāy Oruvaṉai nī-y, ivai Ceyvāṉ uḷaṉ. CÑC., loc. cit.

Ājīvika Atomism in Relation to Other Indian Atomic Doctrines

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If we compare Ājīvika atomism with other Indian atomic theories we find significant agreements and differences. With the Jainas the atom (*paramāṇu*) is not differentiated according to elements; it is permanent and unchanging in its substance, but liable to change in its qualities. Atoms are susceptible to taste, smell, colour, and touch, and combine into aggregates or molecules (*skandha*). The atom is the minutest separable portion of the ultimate undifferentiated matter (*pudgala*), of which the universe is formed, and its classification by elements is not fundamental.¹ While differing from Ājīvika atomism in this very important respect, Jaina theory agrees in its tendency to conceive categories as material which by other sects are thought of as abstract or spiritual. Thus both *dharma* and *karma* are looked on by the Jainas as atomic.² But with the Jainas *jīva*, the soul, is not *paudgalika*, or material, and thus Ājīvikism goes further than Jainism in its materialism. For the Jaina *jīva* is *amūrta* and *arūpa*³; the Ājīvikas of the sect described in *Nīlakēci* certainly thought otherwise,⁴ and the inclusion of *jīva* as one of the elements in both Pakudha’s doctrine in the *Sāmañña-phala Sutta* and in all three Tamil sources indicates that it was generally looked on as material by all Ājīvikas.

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¹ Jacobi, in *ERE*, ii, pp. 199-200. Cf. also his *Jainas*, pp. 88 ff.

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² *ERE*, ii, loc. cit. Schubring, op. cit., p. 12 13. Cf. Guérinot, *La Religion Djaïna*, pp. 142-5.

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³ Guérinot, op. cit., p. 117.

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⁴ V. infra, pp. 270 ff.

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The atomism of the orthodox Vaiśeṣika school differs from both that of the Ājīvikas and that of the Jainas. The claim of the Jainas to have first formulated an Indian atomic theory may be found in their attribution of the foundation of Vaiśeṣika physics to the schismatic Rohagupta, the leader of the Trairāśika school, with which the Ājīvikas held their logic in common.⁵ This claim is not made until the late *Avaśyaka Sūtra*, and while the doctrine there attributed to Rohagupta contains the nine substances, seventeen qualities, five forms of motion, and other elements of Vaiśeṣika theory,¹ it is nowhere stated that the *aṇus* are divided into categories according to the elements. From the point of view of the text the atom of Rohagupta is still the undifferentiated atom of the Jainas, and not that of the Vaiśeṣika.

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⁵ *Avaśyaka Sūtra*, niryukti, 2490 ff., quoted *Abh. Rāj.* s.v. Terāsiya. V. supra, pp. 174 ff.

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¹ V. Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 14. Jacobi, Introduction to *SBE*. xlv, p. xxxv f.

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The Vaiśeṣika atoms have specific qualities according to the elemental categories to which they belong,² and in this respect they resemble those of the Ājīvikas. The Vaiśeṣika classification is more complete and thorough than that of the Ājīvikas. The attributes of the four material elements are distributed as follows : earth possesses odour, savour, colour, touch or temperature, gravity, velocity, and fluidity; in water odour is replaced by viscosity; fire has temperature, colour, fluidity, and velocity; and air, touch and velocity.³ This classification is much more detailed than that of the Ājīvikas; but it is to be noted that *Nīlakēci*'s version of the Ājīvika atomic theory states that "earth has all sense qualities except sound" ⁴; this gives promise of a detailed classification such as that of the Vaiśeṣika, with an immaterial *ākāśa* to be the vehicle of sound, but the promise is not fulfilled, and the remaining elements are in no way related to the senses. Vaiśeṣika agrees with Ājīvikism in stating that the qualities of the atoms can only be discerned in aggregates; in the isolated atom qualities and characteristics are potential, only emerging on juxtaposition.⁵

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² Keith, op. cit., p. 212.

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³ Ibid., p. 220.

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⁴ V. S. Aiyar, p. 285.

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⁵ *Ibid.*

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A third Indian atomic theory is that of the Sarvâstivādin school of Buddhism. In this the four elements are given qualities and functions on principles rather different from those of the Vaiśeṣika :—

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| | *Attribute.* | *Function.* |
| Earth . | Solidity | Supporting |
| Water . | Moisture | Cohesion |
| Fire . | Heat | Ripening |
| Air . | Motion | Expansion ⁶ |

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⁶ Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Philosophy*, vol. i, p. 115.

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The atom of Buddhism is not eternal, as in the other three systems, since Buddhism dogmatically asserts the impermanence of all things. It is conceived as " flashing into being ; its essential feature is action or function and therefore it may be compared to a focus of energy ".¹ The atoms constitute molecules (*saṃghāta*, *paramāṇu*, *kalāpa*), which must include at least one atom of all four elements, and which acquire their characteristics according to the atoms predominantly composing them. As well as atoms of the four elements, the molecules also contain atoms of a special type related to the five senses, which are responsible for their perception by the sense organs. They cohere by virtue of the atoms of water in each.²

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¹ K. N. Jayatilleke, *op. cit.*, 161.

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² *Ibid.*

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It will be seen that the qualities of atoms in Buddhism are more like those of the Ājīvika atomic system than those of the Vaiśeṣika and closely correspond to the system described in *Maṇimēkalai*, which is, however, silent on the functions of the atoms. The doctrine of *Maṇimēkalai*, that atoms combine in fixed proportions, with its apparent corollary that no element may exist in its pure state, is similar to that of the Buddhists. Buddhist atomic theory also agrees with that of the Ājīvikas in attributing the function of cohesion to one element only, although in the former system this is water, and in the latter air.

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Of all the theories so far discussed that of Pakudha Kaccāyana seems to be the most primitive, the parent of the theories of later times, unless indeed the theory outlined in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* is itself the refinement of an earlier theory which admitted only four elements.³ Pakudha's atomic system was preserved in its purest form by the Ājīvikas, who at all periods of their history seem to have maintained the material nature of the soul, and who are more than once referred to in the Pāli Scriptures as holding Pakudha's theory. It has been suggested that Jaina, Vaiśeṣika, and Buddhist theories all look back to Pakudha,⁴ and hence to Ājīvikism. This view is probably correct. The subtleties and refinements are the work of the philosophers of the respective sects; but the conception of the world as divided into an enormous number of indivisible entities is the heritage of Pakudha, and of other nameless contemporaries and predecessors of the Buddha, who were loosely called Ājīvikas, and whose spiritual descendants merged with the school of Makkhali Gosāla.

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³ *Ibid.*

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⁴ *Ibid.*, Keith, op. cit., p. 161.

The Soul

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Nīlakēci’s criticism of Ājīvika doctrines contains a verse giving surprising information about the nature of the soul (uyir, Skt. jīva). As we have seen, the material atoms were thought of as being too minute to be visible to mortal eyes.¹ Jīva, however, was the colour of a pālai fruit, and reached to the height of 500 yojanas.² We are nowhere told how the Ājīvikas justified this bizarre theory, which is quickly and easily disposed of by Nilakeci as being inconsistent with reason and common sense. The strange doctrine is not found in other Tamil sources, and we would be tempted to dismiss it as a fantastic invention of the Ājīvikas’ opponents, if it were not for the fact that the identical theory is to be found in a statement of heretical doctrine in the Pāli scriptures.

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¹ V. supra, p. 265.

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² Pālai-ppalaṭṭin irattaṇa vāy ppala māṭṭ’ oṭu kaṇ Nālē-t tunaiy um ak aṇr’ aintu nūrum pukai-y uyarntu Ñalatt’ iyaṇ ṟana nall-uyir eṇpatu nāṭṭukiṉṟay. Nil. 712. The pālai is blue (Chakravarti, Neelakesi, p. 240).

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In the Buddha’s day speculation about the nature of the soul was widespread. The Brahmajāla Sutta of the Dīgha refers to heretics who declare the soul to have form and to be unharmed after death, while others maintain its formlessness.³ Buddhaghosa declares the Ājīvikas and others to be in the former category, while the Nigaṇṭhas or Jainas were in the latter.⁴ His obscure phrase ādisu kasiṇa-rūpam attā, may imply that the former school thought of the soul as having a complete form, or that Ājīvikas on the lower levels of spiritual development endowed it with form as a kasiṇa, or help to meditation. We have seen already that the Ājīvika soul theory did in fact differ from that of the Jainas in the manner stated by Buddhaghosa.⁵ The Petavatthu passage, which we have already mentioned in various contexts,⁶ confirms his statement.

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³ Rūpī attā hoti arogo param maraṇā saññī. Dīgha, i, p. 31.

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⁴ Sum. Vil. i, p. 119.

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⁵ V. supra, p. 267.

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⁶ Petavatthu, iv, 3, p. 57. V. supra, pp. 20, 146.

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This passage contains reminiscences of the fatalism of Makkhali Gosāla, the antinomianism of Pūraṇa, and the positivism of Ajita; it also contains a reference to the seven-element theory elsewhere ascribed to Pakudha. It is impossible to slay another being, because the sword-cut passes between the interstices of the seven (scil. elements), which are thus literally atomic in structure. Life (jīva) cannot be cut or split, it is of eight parts, or octagonal (aṭṭhaṃso), circular, and 500 yojanas in extent.¹ Thus we find the enormous size of the soul according to the Tamil text confirmed by an independent source from a different sectarian tradition. Since the doctrine is not mentioned in other parts of the Pāli canon, and only occurs in one of the three chief Tamil sources, we may infer that it was only held by a small sub-sect of the community. If it had been widely held this fantastic theory would surely have attracted more attention than it actually did.

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¹ Acchejjabhejjo jīvo aṭṭhaṃso guḷaparimaṇḍalo Yojanāni satā pañca. Ko jīvaṃ chetum arahati? Petavatthu, iv, 3, v. 29, p. 57.

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The term aṭṭhaṃso is rendered "octagonal" in the English translation of the text.² No corresponding word or phrase occurs in the Tamil source; and it will be seen that it involves contradiction, since the soul is in the next word said to be guḷa-parimaṇḍalo, which must mean "round like a ball". The commentary to the Petavatthu tries to solve the paradox by explaining that according to this theory the soul is sometimes octagonal and sometimes circular.³ The commentary further states that the immense size of the jīva is found only in souls in their last stage before nirvāṇa.⁴ It is possible that the author of Nīlakēci intended to express this by the nall' (good), which is prefixed to the word uyir in the relevant verse.⁵ A further contradiction is to be found in the Pāli reference in the word -aṃso, which implies divisibility, while in the same line the soul is said to be indivisible (acchejjabhejjo). The Ājīvika soul theory is so strange that it may indeed have included these paradoxes, but since they are only to be found in one source they must be accepted with great caution.

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² Vimānavatthu and Petavatthu, tr. J. Kennedy and H. S. Gehman, p. 233.

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³ Aṭṭhaṃso guḷaparimaṇḍalo ti eso pana jīvo kadāci aṭṭhaṃso hoti, kadāci guḷaparimaṇḍalo. Paramattha-dīpanī, iii, p. 253.

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⁴ Yojanāni satā pañca ti kevalī-bhāvaṃ patto pañca yojana-sat'-ubbhedo hoti. Ibid.

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⁵ V. supra, p. 270, n. 2.

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Equally questionable is the Tamil statement of the soul's blue colour, which is not confirmed by the Pāli text. That the *jīva* should have a permanent colour is scarcely compatible with the doctrine of the six spiritual colours, especially as blue, according to *Nīlakēci* the soul's natural colour, occurs very low in the list of *abhijātis*.¹

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¹ V. supra, p. 243.

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The enormous size of the soul, whether at all times or in the last stages of its progress, is identical in both sources, and may therefore be accepted. *Jīva* seems to have been thought of as an aura, extending far beyond the individual's body. Its structure was atomic, and, as we have seen, atoms could not interpenetrate. It is difficult to suggest how the Ājīvikas accounted for the fact that living bodies were capable of approaching one another; doubtless some answer was found to this problem, but it is now lost to us.

The Gods

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The *Bhagavatī Sūtra* names two divinities who were worshipped by the simpler folk of North-Eastern India at the time of the great teachers, and who filled a comparatively humble place in the pantheons of the greater communities, but who seem to have been given a special status by the Ājīvikas. These are Punnabhadda and Māṇibhadda, or, in their Sanskrit forms, Pūrṇabhadra and Maṇibhadra. We meet them first as the divinities whose duty it is to test the dying ascetic on the last night of his final penance; if he yields to their caresses he is born again, if he resists he is saved.² The same two appear again as the generals of the fierce Ājīvika king, Mahāpaüma, the reincarnation of Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta.³ The Tamil text *Nīlakēci* mentions two *devas*, Okkali and Ōkali, who, according to the mythology of the Dravidian Ājīvikas, are said to have instructed men in the scriptures, presumably having received them from the divine Markali.⁴

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² V. supra, p. 128.

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³ V. supra, p. 142.

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⁴ *Nil.* v, 681. V. supra, p. 215.

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Pūrṇabhadra and Maṇibhadra are well known yakṣas, popular divinities of the period in the Ganges valley. The Mahāniddesa refers to worshippers of Vāsudeva, Baladeva, Puṇṇabhadda, and Maṇibhadra.¹ Thus they appear to have been coupled in popular devotion with the rising Vaiṣṇavite heroes. In Jainism they are chiefs of the demigods, Pūrṇabhadra of the Southern horde of yakṣas and Maṇibhadra of the Northern.² The Mahābhārata refers to Maṇibhadra as a king of the yakṣas, and he seems to have been a tutelary deity of travellers.³ In the epic his companion Pūrṇabhadra does not appear as a yakṣa, but as a nāga, one of the hundred sons of Kadru.⁴ Despite this discrepancy, it is clear that the two demigods were popular objects of worship among the inhabitants of a wide area of Northern India. A relic of the cult is a large statue of Maṇibhadra, set up by a guild of his worshippers at Pāwayā, Gwalior, in the first century B.C., which is among the earliest examples of Indian sculpture in the round.⁵ Okkali and Ōkali, the Tamil counterparts of the two devas of the Northern Ājīvikas, were probably popular local Dravidian demigods of a similar type, other record of whom has now vanished, who took the place of Pūrṇabhadra and Maṇibhadra when Ājīvikism spread to the south.

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¹ Mahāniddesa, i, pp. 89, 92.

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² Sthānāṅga, 9, teste Abh. Rāj. s.vv. Punnabhadda, Māṇibhadda.

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³ Vana, 61, 123 (Poona edn.), and refs. in Sörensen, Index of Names in the Mbh., s.v. Maṇibhadra.

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⁴ Ādi, 35, 12 (Kumbhakonam edn.). The Poona edn. (Ādi, 31, 12) gives the name as Pūrṇadamṣṭra.

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⁵ Coomaraswamy, Yakṣas, pt. i, p. 38, and pl. I.

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As well as of these two there is every reason to believe that Ājīvikism, like Buddhism and Jainism, accepted the reality of the chief Hindu deities. Gosāla, in defining the Ājīvika heavens, in each of which the soul resides during its last transmigrations, mentions Brahmaloka among the Mānasas and Māṇusuttaras.⁶ This indicates that he recognized the existence of the god Brahma, and we may infer that the rest of the Hindu pantheon of the time was accepted by Ājīvikism.

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⁶ V. supra, p. 250.

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Dr. Barua would go further than this. "The same chapter" (of the Bhagavatī Sūtra), he writes, "also points to an age when many Vedic and non-Aryan deities were affiliated to the Ājīviya pantheon, e.g. Punnabhadda, and Māṇibhadda, Sohamma, Sanakkumāra, Bambha, Mahāsukka, Aṇaya, and Āraṇa.” 1 We can only agree with him as regards the first two names, and that of Bambha or Brahma. Admittedly these names and some others do occur in the relevant chapter of the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, but they are there spoken not by Gosāla, but by Mahāvīra,² who, after Gosāla’s death, prophesies that the soul of his renegade disciple will, after a long period of births in purgatories, attain divinity in the Jaina heavens; the names mentioned by Barua are merely those of some of the twelve Jaina Kalpas,³ and give no indication whatever of the divinities worshipped by the Ājīvikas. We have already seen that the Ājīvika classification of the heavens was very different. Therefore our attempts at reconstructing an Ājīvika pantheon must stop with Pūrṇabhadra, Maṇibhadra, and Brahma. Other gods there must have been, but we have no evidence of their names.

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² Bh. Sū. xv, sū. 560, fol. 693.

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³ V. supra, p. 250, n. 3.

Ājīvika Logic

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The evidence of the Jaina commentators shows that the Ājīvikas had their own epistemology and logic, which had much in common with that of the Jaina sect of Trairāśikas.⁴

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⁴ V. supra, pp. 174 ff.

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The distinctive characteristic of the Ājīvika system of epistemology, like that of the Trairāśika Jainas, was the division of propositions into three categories, in contrast to the orthodox Jaina system, which allowed seven. Some information on this system may be gathered from the commentaries to the *Nandi Sūtra* and to the *Samavāyāṅga*, which do not significantly differ:—

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“The Ājīvika heretics founded by Gośāla are likewise called Trairāśikas, since they declare everything to be of triple character, viz.: living, not living, and both living and not living; world, not world, and both world and not world; real, unreal, and both real and unreal. In considering standpoints (*naya*) (they postulate that an entity may be) of the nature of substance, of mode, or of both. Thus, since they maintain three heaps (*rāśi*), they are called Trairāśikas.” ⁵

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¹ JDL. ii, pp. 58-9.

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⁵ *Tathā ta eva Gośāla-pravarttitā Ājīvikāḥ pāṣaṇḍinas Trairāśikā ucyante, yatas te sarvam vastu tryātmakam icchanti, tad yathā jīvo ’jīvo jīvājīvaś ca, loko*

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The Ājīvikas thus seem to have accepted the basic principle of Jaina epistemology, without going to the over-refined extreme of *saptabhaṅgi*, as in the orthodox Jaina *syādvāda* and *nayavāda*. The Ājivika postulate of a third possibility, neither being nor not being, must have formed a convenient logical basis for the unusual doctrine that some souls were compelled to return even from *nirvāṇa*.¹ These would be classified in the third category, *sadasat*—emancipated from *saṃsāra* and yet not emancipated.

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¹ V. supra, p. 259.

The Status of Makkhali Gosāla

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In the course of the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*’s account of his last days Gosāla is twice said to have claimed for himself the status of the twenty-fourth and last *tīrthaṅkara* of the current *Avasarpiṇī* age.² The terminology of the phrase is distinctly Jaina, and the same words might equally well be applied to Mahāvīra. The Ājīvika system of chronometry, outlined elsewhere in the *Bhagavatī*,³ makes no mention of the Jaina *Utsarpiṇī* and *Avasarpiṇī*, or phases of universal development and decline. Furthermore the Buddhist description of the Ājīvika *abhijātis*, or spiritual colours, places only three individuals, not twenty-four, in the highest rank.⁴ Yet Jainism and Ājīvikism were so close in their origins, that it is possible that the two held a theory of *tīrthaṅkaras* in common. It is unlikely that the Ājīvikas, with their doctrine of immensely long *mahākalpas*, were content with only three *tīrthaṅkaras*, and twenty-four seems a more probable figure.

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² V. supra, pp. 64, 68.

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³ V. supra, pp. 253–54.

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⁴ V. supra, pp. 243 ff.

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Whatever the total number of *tīrthaṅkaras* it is evident that Gosāla enjoyed a status among his followers comparable to that of Mahāvīra among the Jainas, and was treated with great respect. Like Mahāvīra, he seems to have been considered omniscient by his devotees, for Ayampula, who visited him in his last delirium, refers to him as such.⁵ Already in the

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⁵ V. supra, p. 62.

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'loko lokālokaś ca, sad asat sadasat. Naya-cintāyāṃ dravy’-astikam paryāyāstikam ubhayāstikam ca. Tatas tribhi rāśibhiś carant’ iti Trairāśikāḥ. Nandi comm., fol. 113, quoted Weber Verzeichniss, ii, p. 685. Cf. Samavāya comm., fol. 129.

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*Bhagavatī Sūtra* certain pious Ājīvikas are referred to as *arihanta-devatā-gā*, which possibly implies that they invested their *arhants*, Makkhali and others, with divine status.¹

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¹ *Bh. Sū.* viii, sū. 329, fol. 369. V. supra, p. 140.

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The earliest of our Tamil sources, *Maṇimēkalai*, mentions Maṛkali only as the author of the Ājīvika scriptures. *Civañāṉa-cittiyār* refers to him as omniscient,² and the commentator Tattuvappirakācar describes him as the *arukaṉ* or *arhant*. The latter text does not mention him by name, but it is evident that only Maṛkali can be meant. In these two sources his status is still that of a Jaina *tīrthaṅkara*.

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² *Civañāṉa-cittiyār*, *NC.* p. 255, v. 2.

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*Nilakēci*, however, seems to represent another school of Ājīvikism, wherein the hagiology has become a theology. Maṛkali, the *Āptaṉ*, is, as in the other sources, the all-knowing Lord. He is perfectly motionless and silent, lest he injure minute living creatures by his speech.³ He is free from age and decay, his form is incomprehensible (*terivill-uruvam*), and he is like the rainbow.⁴ Yet he seems to be by no means completely removed from his followers, as were the Jaina *arhants*, but to appear to them from time to time, as unexpectedly and unpredictably as the rainbow,⁵ if we are to accept Vāmaṇamuni’s very probable interpretation of the obscure passage in the text. The latter also refers to Maṛkali as *tēvaṉ*, the God. With this we must compare the verse quoted by the Jaina commentator Malliṣeṇa, which declared that the Ājīvikas believe that the *tīrthaṅkaras* return to earth when their doctrine is in danger.⁶

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³ *Nil.*, 672.

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⁴ *Ibid.*, v. 673.

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⁵ *Ibid.*, v. 673, *terivill-uruvam*... *tonrum*. Comm. to above.

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⁶ *Syādvādamañjarī*, p. 105.

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The *Vāyu Purāṇa* shows us Ājīvikas worshipping *Piśācas* with costly ceremonies,⁷ while *Nilakēci* depicts Maṛkali as a sort of god, manifesting himself to his devotees in sudden and brilliant theophanies. Both Śīlāṅka and Malliṣeṇa, as well as the *Civañāṉa-cittiyār* suggest that, like Viṣṇu, he was thought of as occasionally performing *avatāras*.⁸ We have here evidence of a school of Ājīvikism which had developed a devotional cult, which may have had much in common with the less orthodox sects of Vaiṣṇavism, such as the Pāñcarātras.⁹

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⁷ *V. supra*., pp. 162 ff.

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⁸ *V. supra*, p. 260.

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⁹ *V. supra*, p. 260.

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The Ājīvikism represented by *Maṇimēkalai*, and also by *Civañāṇa-cittiyār*, if we exclude the verse of the latter text referred to above, would seem to be that of a purer school, wherein the importance of Maṅkali is like that of Mahāvīra in Jainism and of Buddha in Hīnayāna Buddhism. The more orthodox terminology in the latter text, for instance the employment of the word *viṇai*, or *karma*,¹ and the absence of emphasis on determinism in this, the most recent connected account of Ājīvika teaching, suggest that one branch of the small Ājīvika community was in the fourteenth century merging with the Jainas. This is the substratum of truth in Hoernle’s theory, that the Ājīvikas and Digambaras were identical, and is the basis of the belief of such Tamil scholars as Schomerus, who, quoting Pope, believed that the Ājīvika atomic doctrines expressed in *Civañāṇa-cittiyār* were the product of an heretical Jaina sect.² We have reason to believe that other Ājīvikas were, from the days of Utpala onwards,³ drawing close to Vaiṣṇavism. No doubt the last followers of Makkhali Gosāla, the heretic of Sāvatthi, forgot their master for either Kṛṣṇa or Mahāvīra, according to the branch of Ājīvikism to which they belonged.

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¹ V. supra, pp. 238–39, 266.

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² *Der Śaivasiddhanta*, pp. 104–5.

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³ V. supra, pp. 168 ff.

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