A History of Indian Philosophy v2.c19.s6.28

v2.c19.s6.28

The Yoga also agrees with the general conclusion of the Sāṃkhya on the subject. A man who nears the state of emancipation ceases to have doubts about the nature of the self, and begins to re-live the nature of his own self and to discriminate himself as being entirely different from his psychosis (*sattva*); but, as a result of the persistence of some decayed roots of old impressions and instincts, there may, in the intervals of the flow of true discriminative knowledge, emerge other ordinary cognitive states, such as “I am,” “mine,” “I know,” “I do not know”; yet, inasmuch as the roots of the old impressions have already been burnt, these occasional ordinary cognitive states cannot produce further new impressions. The general impressions of cognition (*jñāna-saṃskāra*), however, remain until the final destruction of *citta*. The point here is that, the roots in the world of subconscious impressions being destroyed, and the occasional appearance of ordinary cognitive states being but remnants produced by some of the old impressions, the roots of which have already been burnt, these occasional ordinary cognitive states are like passing shadows which have no basis anywhere; they cannot, therefore, produce any further impressions and thus cannot be a cause of bondage to the saint. With the advance of this state the sage ceases to have inclinations even towards his processes of concentration, and there is only discriminative knowledge; this state of *samādhi* is called *dharma-megha*. At this stage all the roots of ignorance and other afflictions become absolutely destroyed, and in such a state the sage, though living (*jīvann eva*), becomes emancipated (*vimukta*). The next stage is, of course, the state of absolute emancipation (*kaivalya*), when the *citta* returns back to *prakṛti*, never to find the *puruṣa* again¹.