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A History of Indian Philosophy v3: Volume 3

A History of Indian Philosophy v3

Language
English

Contents

Volume 3

Front matter

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OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

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BY SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA, M.A., Ph.D. (Cal. et Cantab.), D.Litt. (Hon.) (Rome) F.R.S.L., I.E.S.

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VOLUME III

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CAMBRIDGE AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

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PUBLISHED BY THE SYNDICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

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London Office: Bentley House, N.W. I American Branch: New York

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Agents for Canada, India, and Pakistan: Macmillan

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*First published* 1940 *Reprinted* 1952

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*First Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge* *Reprinted by offset-litho by Percy Lund Humphries & Co. Ltd.*

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*To the*

Hon. Sri Jawaharlal Nehru

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who went through great sufferings and hardships all his life in the cause of the liberation of his countrymen, and who is still labouring with almost superhuman effort for the unification of the subcontinent of India, and who is working with steady devotion and faith for the establishment of peace at home and among the nations of the world, the foremost Indian who is piloting the progress of the country through troubled waters in the most hazardous period of India's history, this work is most respectfully dedicated as a tribute of personal gratefulness This page appears to be entirely blank, containing no printed text, headings, figures, or page furniture.

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The second volume of this work was published as long ago as 1932. Among the many reasons which delayed the publication of this volume, one must count the excessive administrative and teaching work with which the writer is saddled; his continued illness; the regrettable failure of one eye through strenuous work, which often makes him depend on the assistance of others; and the long distance between the place of publication and Calcutta. The manuscript of the fourth volume is happily ready.

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In writing the present volume the author has taken great trouble to secure manuscripts which would present a connected account of the development of theistic philosophy in the South. The texts that have been published are but few in number and the entire story cannot be told without constant reference to rare manuscripts from which alone the data can be collected. So far, no work has been written which could throw any light on the discovery and interpretation of a connected history of Vaiṣṇava thought. It would have been well if the Tamil and Telegu works could have been fruitfully utilized in tracing the history of Vaiṣṇavism, not only as it appeared in Sanskrit but also as it appeared in the vernaculars of the South. But the author limited himself as far as possible to Sanskrit data. This limitation was necessary for three reasons: first, the author was not master of the various vernaculars of South India; secondly, the inclusion and utilization of such data would have made the present book greatly exceed its intended scope; and thirdly, the inclusion of the data from the vernacular literature would not have contributed materially to the philosophical problems underlying the theistic speculations dealt with in this work. Looked at from the strictly philosophical point of view, some of the materials of the present book may be regarded as somewhat out of place. But, both in the present volume and the volume that will follow it, it will be impossible to ignore the religious pathology that is associated with the devotional philosophy which is so predominant in the South and which so much influenced the minds of the people not only in the Middle Ages but also in the recent past and is even now the most important element of Indian religions.

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Philosophy in India includes not only morality but religion also. The most characteristic feature of religion is emotion or sentiment associated with a system of beliefs, and as such in the treatment of the dominant schools of philosophy that originated in South India one cannot help emphasizing the important pathological developments of the sentiment of devotion. The writer hopes, therefore, that he may be excused both by those who would not look for any emphasis on the aspect of *bhakti* or religious sentiment and also by those who demand an over-emphasis on the emotional aspect which forms the essence of the Vaiṣṇava religion. He has tried to steer a middle course in the interest of philosophy, which, however, in the schools of thought treated herein is so intimately interwoven with religious sentiment.

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The writer has probably exceeded the scope of his treatment in dealing with the Āḻvārs, whose writings are in Tamil, but there also he felt that without referring to the nature of the devotional philosophy of the Āḻvārs the treatment of the philosophy of Rāmānuja and his followers would be historically defective. But though the original materials for a study of the Āḻvārs are in Tamil, yet fortunately Sanskrit translations of these writings either in manuscript or in published form are available, on which are almost wholly based the accounts given here of these Tamil writers.

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The treatment of the Pañcarātra literature offered some difficulty, as most of these works are still unpublished; but fortunately a large volume of this literature was secured by the present writer in manuscript. Excepting Schrader’s work, nothing of any importance has been written on the Pañcarātra School. Though there are translations of the *bhāṣya* of Rāmānuja, there has been no treatment of his philosophy as a whole in relation to other great philosophers of his School. Practically nothing has appeared regarding the philosophy of the great thinkers of the Rāmānuja School, such as Veṅkaṭa, Meghanādāri and others, most of whose works are still unpublished. Nothing has also been written regarding Vijñānabhikṣu’s philosophy, and though Nimbārka’s *bhāṣya* has been translated, no systematic account has yet appeared of Nimbārka in relation to his followers. The writer had thus to depend almost wholly on a very large mass of published and unpublished manuscript literature in his interpretation and chronological investigations, which are largely based upon internal evidence;

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though, of course, he has always tried to utilize whatever articles and papers appeared on the subject. The subjects treated are vast and it is for the scholarly reader to judge whether any success has been attained in spite of the imperfections which may have crept in.

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Though the monotheistic speculations and the importance of the doctrine of devotion can be traced even to some of the Ṛg-veda hymns and the earlier religious literature such as the *Gītā* and the *Mahābhārata* and the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, yet it is in the traditional songs of the Āṛvārs and the later South Indian philosophical writers, beginning from Yāmuna and Rāmānuja, that we find a special emphasis on our emotional relation with God. This emotional relation of devotion or *bhakti* differentiated itself in many forms in the experiences and the writings of various Vaiṣṇava authors and saints. It is mainly to the study of these forms as associated with their philosophical perspectives that the present and the succeeding volumes have been devoted. From this point of view, the present and the fourth volumes may be regarded as the philosophy of theism in India, and this will be partly continued in the treatment of Śaiva and Śākta theism of various forms. The fourth volume will deal with the philosophy of Madhva and his followers in their bitter relation with the monistic thought of Śaṅkara and his followers. It will also deal with the theistic philosophy of the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* and the theistic philosophy of Vallabha and the followers of Śrī Caitanya. Among the theistic philosophers the followers of Madhva, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha occupied a great place as subtle thinkers and dialecticians. In the fifth volume, apart from the different schools of Śaiva and Śākta thinkers, the Tantras, the philosophy, of grammar, of Hindu Aesthetics, and of Hindu Law will be dealt with. It is thus expected that with the completion of the fifth volume the writer will have completed his survey of Hindu thought so far as it appeared in the Sanskrit language and thus finish what was begun more than twenty years ago.

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A chapter on the *Cārvāka* materialists has been added as an appendix, since their treatment in the first volume was practically neglected.

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The writer has a deep debt of gratitude to discharge to Dr F. W. Thomas—the late Boden Professor of Sanskrit at Oxford, and a highly esteemed friend of his who, in spite of his various activities, pressure of work and old age, has been a true *jñānabandhu* to the author, helping him with the manuscript and the proofs, and offering him valuable suggestions as regards orthography, punctuation and idiomatic usage. Without this continued assistance the imperfections of the present work would have been much more numerous. The author is specially grateful to his wife, Dr Mrs Surama Dasgupta, Śāstrī, M.A., Ph.D. (Cal. et Cantab.) for the continued assistance that he received from her in the writing of this book and also in reading a large mass of manuscripts for the preparation of the work. Considering the author's great handicap in having only one sound eye it would have been impossible for him to complete the book without this assistance. He is also grateful to Dr Satindra Kumar Mukherjee, M.A., Ph.D., for the help that he received from him from time to time.

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*June* 1939

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CHAPTER XV

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THE BHĀSKARA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

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| | | PAGE |
| 1 | Date of Bhāskara . . . . . . . . | 1 |
| 2 | Bhāskara and Śaṅkara . . . . . . . | 3 |
| 3 | The Philosophy of Bhāskara's *Bhāṣya* . . . . . | 6 |

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CHAPTER XVI

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THE PAÑCARĀTRA

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| 1 | Antiquity of the Pañcarātra . . . . . . . | 12 |
| 2 | The Position of the Pañcarātra Literature . . . . | 14 |
| 3 | The Pañcarātra Literature . . . . . . . | 21 |
| 4 | Philosophy of the *Jayākhya* and other *Saṃhitās* . . . | 24 |
| 5 | Philosophy of the *Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā* . . . . . | 34 |

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CHAPTER XVII

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THE ĀṞVĀRS

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| 1 | The Chronology of the Āṟvārs . . . . . . . | 63 |
| 2 | The Philosophy of the Āṟvārs . . . . . . . | 69 |
| 3 | Āṟvārs and Śrī-vaiṣṇavas on certain points of controversy in religious dogmas . . . . . . . . . | 85 |

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CHAPTER XVIII

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AN HISTORICAL AND LITERARY SURVEY OF THE VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

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| 1 | The Aṟagiyas from Nāthamuni to Rāmānuja . . . . | 94 |
| 2 | Rāmānuja . . . . . . . . . | 100 |
| 3 | The Precursors of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Philosophy and the contemporaries and pupils of Rāmānuja . . . . . | 105 |
| 4 | Rāmānuja Literature . . . . . . . . | 114 |
| 5 | The Influence of the Āṟvārs on the followers of Rāmānuja . | 134 |

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CHAPTER XIX

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF YĀMUNĀCĀRYA

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| 1 | Yāmuna's doctrine of Soul contrasted with those of others . | 139 |
| 2 | God and the World . . . . . . . . | 152 |
| 3 | God according to Rāmānuja, Veṅkaṭanātha and Lokācārya . | 155 |
| 4 | Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrine of Soul according to Rāmānuja and Veṅkaṭanātha . . . . . . . . . | 159 |
| 5 | Acit or Primeval Matter: the *Prakṛti* and its modifications . | 162 |

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CHAPTER XX

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PHILOSOPHY OF THE RĀMĀNUJA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

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| | | PAGE |
| 1 | Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja on the nature of Reality as qualified or unqualified | 165 |
| 2 | Refutation of Śaṅkara's *avidyā* | 175 |
| 3 | Rāmānuja's theory of Illusion—All knowledge is Real | 179 |
| 4 | Failure of theistic proofs | 189 |
| 5 | Bhāskara and Rāmānuja | 192 |
| 6 | Ontological position of Rāmānuja's Philosophy | 195 |
| 7 | Veṅkaṭanātha's treatment of *Pramāṇa* | 201 |
| 8 | Veṅkaṭanātha's treatment of Doubt | 207 |
| 9 | Error and Doubt according to Veṅkaṭanātha | 210 |
| 10 | Perception in the light of elucidation by the later members of the Rāmānuja School | 220 |
| 11 | Veṅkaṭanātha's treatment of Inference | 225 |
| 12 | Epistemology of the Rāmānuja School according to Meghanādāri and others | 235 |
| 13 | The Doctrine of Self-validity of Knowledge | 247 |
| 14 | The Ontological categories of the Rāmānuja School according to Veṅkaṭanātha | 251 |
| | (a) Substance | 251 |
| | (b) Criticism of the Sāṃkhya Inference for Establishing the Existence of *Prakṛti* | 256 |
| | (c) Refutation of the Atomic Theory of *Nyāya* in relation to Whole and Part | 262 |
| | (d) Criticism of the Sāṃkhya Theory of *Sat-kārya-vāda* | 265 |
| | (e) Refutation of the Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness | 268 |
| | (f) Refutation of the Cārvāka criticism against the Doctrine of Causality | 276 |
| | (g) The Nature of the Senses according to Veṅkaṭanātha | 280 |
| | (h) The Nature of *ākāśa* according to Veṅkaṭanātha | 282 |
| | (i) Nature of Time according to Veṅkaṭanātha | 284 |
| | (j) The Nature of Soul according to Veṅkaṭanātha | 286 |
| | (k) The Nature of Emancipation according to Veṅkaṭanātha | 292 |
| 15 | God in the Rāmānuja School | 296 |
| 16 | Dialectical criticism against the Śaṅkara School | 304 |
| 17 | Meghanādāri | 346 |
| 18 | Vātsya Varada | 349 |
| 19 | Rāmānujācārya II alias Vādi-Haṃsa-Navāmvuda | 352 |
| 20 | Rāmānujadāsa alias Mahācārya | 361 |
| 21 | Prapatti Doctrine as expounded in *Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa* of Lokācārya and Saumya Jāmātṛ Muni's Commentary on it | 374 |
| 22 | Kastūrī-Raṅgācārya | 381 |
| 23 | Śaila Śrīnivāsa | 384 |
| 24 | Raṅgācārya | 395 |

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CHAPTER XXI

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THE NIMBĀRKA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

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PAGE 1 Teachers and Pupils of the Nimbārka School . . . . . 399 2 A General Idea of Nimbārka's Philosophy . . . . . 404 3 Controversy with the Monists by Mādhava Mukunda . . . . 416 (*a*) The Main Thesis and the Ultimate End in *Advaita Vedānta* are untenable . . . . . . . . . 416 (*b*) Refutation of the Śaṅkara Theory of Illusion in its various Aspects 422 (*c*) Refutation of the Śaṅkarite View of *Ajñāna* . . . . 424 4 The *Pramāṇas* according to Mādhava Mukunda . . . . 426 5 Criticism of the views of Rāmānuja and Bhāskara . . . . 429 6 The Reality of the World . . . . . . . 435 7 Vanamālī Miśra . . . . . . . . 440

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CHAPTER XXII

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIJÑĀNA BHIKṢU

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1 A General Idea of Vijñāna Bhikṣu's Philosophy. . . . . 445 2 The Brahman and the World according to Vijñānā-mṛta-bhāṣya . . 454 3 The Individual . . . . . . . . 460 4 Brahma-Experience and Experience . . . . . . 465 5 Self-Luminosity and Ignorance . . . . . . . 468 6 Relation of Sāṃkhya and Vedānta according to Bhikṣu . . . 471 7 Māyā and Pradhāna . . . . . . . . 476 8 Bhikṣu's criticism of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga . . . . . 479 9 *Īśvara-gītā*, its Philosophy as expounded by Vijñāna Bhikṣu . . 482

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CHAPTER XXIII

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PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATIONS OF SOME OF THE SELECTED PURĀṆAS

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1 *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* . . . . . . . . . 497 2 *Vāyu Purāṇa* . . . . . . . . . 502 3 *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* . . . . . . . . 506 4 *Nāradīya Purāṇa* . . . . . . . . 507 5 *Kūrma Purāṇa* . . . . . . . . 509

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APPENDIX TO VOLUME I

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The *Lokāyata*, *Nāstika* and *Cārvāka* . . . . . . 512–550

Chapter XV. The Bhāskara School of Philosophy

Date of Bhāskara

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UDAYANA, in his *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, speaks of Bhāskara as a commentator on the Vedānta in accordance with the traditions of the *tridaṇḍa* school of Vedānta and as holding the view that Brahman suffers evolutionary changes¹. Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita also, in his *Tattva-viveka-ṭīkā-vivaraṇa*, speaks of Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara as holding the doctrine of difference and non-difference (*bhedābheda*)². It is certain, however, that he flourished after Śaṅkara, for, though he does not mention him by name, yet the way in which he refers to him makes it almost certain that he wrote his commentary with the express purpose of refuting some of the cardinal doctrines of Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. Thus, at the very beginning of his commentary, he says that it aims at refuting those who, hiding the real sense of the *sūtra*, have only expressed their own opinions, and in other places also he speaks in very strong terms against the commentator who holds the *māyā* doctrine and is a Buddhist in his views³. But, though he was opposed to Śaṅkara, it was only so far as Śaṅkara had introduced the *māyā* doctrine, and only so far as he thought the world had sprung forth not as a real modification of Brahman, but only through *māyā*. For both Śaṅkara and Bhāskara would agree in holding that the Brahman was both the material cause and the instrumental cause (*upādāna* and *nimitta*). Śaṅkara would maintain that this was so only because there was no other real category which existed; but he would strongly urge, as has been explained before, that *māyā*, the category of the indefinite and the unreal, was associated with Brahman in such a transformation, and that, though the Brahman was substantially the same identical entity as the world, yet the world as it appears was a *māyā* transformation with Brahman inside as the kernel of truth. But Bhāskara maintained that there was no *māyā*, and that it was the Brahman which, by its own powers, underwent a real modification; and, as the Pañcarātras also held the same doctrine in so far as they believed that Vāsudeva was both the material and the instrumental cause of the world, he was in agreement with the Bhāgavatas, and he says that he does not find anything to be refuted in the Pañcarātra doctrine¹. But he differs from them in regard to their doctrine of the individual souls having been produced from Brahman².

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¹ *Tridaṇḍa* means "three sticks." According to Manu it was customary among some Brahmins to use one stick, and among others, three sticks. Paṇḍita Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda Dvivedin, in his Sanskrit introduction to Bhāskara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, says that the Vaiṣṇava commentators on the *Brahma-sūtra* prior to Rāmānuja, Taṅka, Guhadeva, Bhāruci and Yāmunācārya, the teacher of Rāmānuja, were all *tridaṇḍins*. Such a statement is indeed very interesting, but unfortunately he does not give us the authority from which he drew this information.

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² "*Bhaṭṭabhāskaras tu bhedā-bheda-vedānta-siddhānta-vādī*"; Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita's *Vedānta-tattva-ṭīkā-vivaraṇa*, as quoted by Paṇḍita Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda in his Introduction to Bhāskara's commentary.

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³ *sūtrā-bhiprāya-saṃvṛtyā svābhiprāyā-prakāśanāt* *vyākhyātaṃ yair idaṃ śāstraṃ vyākhyeyaṃ tan-nivṛttaye.* Bhāskara's Commentary, p. 1. Also "*ye tu bauddha-matāvalambino māyā-vādinas te’ pi anena nyāyena sūtra-kāreṇai’ va nirastāḥ.*" *Ibid.* II. 2. 29. In another place Śaṅkara is referred to as explaining views which were really propounded by the Mahāyāna Buddhists—*vigītaṃ vicchinna-mūlaṃ māhāyānika-bauddha-gāthitaṃ māyā-vādaṃ vyāvarṇayanto lokān vyāmohayanti. Ibid.* I. 4. 25.

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¹ *Vāsudeva eva upādāna-kāraṇaṃ jagato nimitta-kāraṇaṃ ceti te manyante... tad etat sarvaṃ śruti-prasiddham eva tasmān nātra nirākaraṇīyaṃ paśyāmaḥ.* *Bhāskara-bhāṣya*, II. 2. 41.

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² *Ibid.*

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Again, though one cannot assert anything very positively, it is possible that Bhāskara himself belonged to that particular sect of Brahmins who used three sticks as their Brahminic insignia in preference to one stick, used more generally by other Brahmins; and so his explanation of the *Vedānta-sūtra* may rightly be taken as the view of the *tridaṇḍī* Brahmins. For in discussing the point that fitness for Brahma-knowledge does not mean the giving up of the religious stages of life (*āśrama*), with their customs and rituals, he speaks of the maintenance of three sticks as being enjoined by the Vedas³.

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³ *Ibid.* III. 4. 26, p. 208; see also Paṇḍita Vindhyeśvarī's Introduction.

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Mādhavācārya, in his *Śaṅkara-vijaya*, speaks of a meeting of Śaṅkara with Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara, but it is difficult to say how far this statement is reliable⁴. From the fact that Bhāskara refuted Śaṅkara and was himself referred to by Udayana, it is certain that he flourished some time between the eighth and the tenth centuries. Paṇḍita Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda refers to a copper-plate found by the late Dr Bhāwdājī in the Mārāṭhā country, near Nasik, in which it is stated that one Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa of the lineage (*gotra*) of Śāṇḍilya, son of Kavicakravartī Trivikrama, who was given the title of Vidyāpati, was the sixth ancestor of Bhāskarācārya of Śāṇḍilya lineage, the astronomer and writer of the Siddhānta-śiromaṇi; and he maintains that this senior Vidyāpati Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa was the commentator on the *Brahma-sūtra*¹. But, though this may be possible, yet we have no evidence that it is certain; for, apart from the similarity of names², it is not definitely known whether this Vidyāpati Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa ever wrote any commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. All that we can say, therefore, with any degree of definiteness, is that Bhāskara flourished at some period between the middle of the eighth century and the middle of the tenth century, and most probably in the ninth century, since he does not know Rāmānuja³.

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⁴ *Śaṅkara-vijaya*, xv. 80.

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¹ Paṇḍita Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda's Introduction.

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² We hear of several Bhāskaras in Sanskrit literature, such as Lokabhāskara, Śrāntabhāskara, Haribhāskara, Bhadantabhāskara, Bhāskaramiśra, Bhāskaraśāstrī, Bhāskaradīkṣita, Bhaṭṭabhāskara, Paṇḍita Bhāskarācārya, Bhaṭṭabhāskaramiśra, Trikāṇḍamaṇḍana, Laugākṣibhāskara, Śāṇḍilyabhāskara, Vatsabhāskara, Bhāskaradeva, Bhāskaranṛsiṁha, Bhāskarāraṇya, Bhāskarānandanātha, Bhāskaraseṇa.

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³ He makes very scanty references to other writers. He speaks of Śāṇḍilya as a great author of the Bhāgavata school. He refers to the four classes of Māheśvaras, Pāśupata, Śaiva, Kāpālika and Kāṭhaka-siddhāntin, and their principal work *Pañcādhyāyī-śāstra*; he also refers to the *Pāñcarātrikas*, with whom he is often largely in agreement.

Bhāskara and Śaṅkara

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There is a text of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI. I. I, which is treated from two different points of view by Śaṅkara and Bhāskara in connection with the interpretation of *Brahma-sūtra*, II. I. 14⁴. Śaṅkara's interpretation of this, as Vācaspati explains it, is that, when clay is known, all clay-materials are known, not because the clay-materials are really clay, for they are indeed different. But, if so, how can we, by knowing one, know the other? Because the clay-materials do not really exist; they are all, and so indeed are all that pass as modifications (*vikāra*), but mere expressions of speech (*vācārambhaṇam*), mere names (*nāmdheyam*) having no real entities or objects to which they refer, having in fact no existence at all¹.

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⁴ *tad-ananyatvam ārambhaṇa-śabdādibhyaḥ. Brahma-sūtra*, II. I. 14. *yathā saumya ekena mṛt-piṇḍen asarvaṁ mṛṇmayaṁ vijñātaṁ syādvācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyaṁ mṛttike'ty'eva satyaṁ* (Ch. VI. I. I).

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¹ *Bhāmatī, Brahma-sūtra,* II. 1. 14. Rāhu is a demon which is merely a living head with no body, its sole body being its head; but still we use, for convenience of language, the expression "Rāhu's head" (*Rāhoḥ śiraḥ*); similarly clay alone is real, and what we call clay-materials, jugs, plates, etc., are mere expressions of speech having no real objects or entities to which they can apply—they simply do not exist at all—but are mere *vikalpa; vācā kevalaṃ ārabhyate vikāra-jātaṃ na tu tattvato'sti yato nāmadheya-mātraṃ etat;…yathā rāhoḥ śiraḥ…śabda-jñānā'-nupātī vastu-śūnyo vikalpa iti; tathā ca' vastutayā anṛtam vikāra-jātam.*

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Bhāskara says that the passage means that clay alone is real, and the purport of speech depends on two things, the objects and the facts implied and the names which imply them. The effects (*kārya*) are indeed the basis of all our practical behaviour and conduct, involving the objects and facts implied and the expressions and names which imply them. How can the cause and effect be identical? The answer to this is that it is true that it is to the effects that our speech applies and that these make all practical behaviour possible, but the effects are in reality but stages of manifestation, modification and existence of the cause itself. So, from the point of view that the effects come and go, appear and disappear, whereas the cause remains permanently the same, as the ground of all its real manifestations, it is said that the cause alone is true—the clay alone is true. The effect, therefore, is only a state of the cause, and is hence both identical with it and different from it². The effect, the name (*nāmadheya*), is real, and the scriptures also assert this³.

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² *vāg-indriyasya ubhayaṃ ārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyam…ubhayaṃ ālambya vāg-vyavahāraḥ pravartate ghaṭena udakaṃ āhare' ti mṛṇmayaṃ ity asya idaṃ vyākhyānam…kāraṇaṃ eva kāryā-tmanā ghaṭavad avatiṣṭhate…kāraṇasyā'vasthā-mātraṃ kāryaṃ vyatiriktā'vyatiriktaṃ śukti-rajatavad āgamāpāyadharmitvāc ca anṛtam anityaṃ iti ca vyapadiśyate. Bhāskara-bhāṣya,* II. 1. 14.

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³ *atha nāma-dheyaṃ satyasya satyamiti, etc. Ibid.*

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Bhāskara argues against Śaṅkara as follows: the arguments that the upholder of *māyā* (*māyāvādin*) could adduce against those who believed in the reality of the many, the world, might be adduced against him also, in so far as he believes in monism (*advaita*). A person who hears the scriptures and philosophizes is at first under the veil of ignorance (*avidyā*); and, if on account of this ignorance his knowledge of duality was false, his knowledge of monism might equally for the same reason be considered as false. All Brahma-knowledge is false, because it is knowledge, like the knowledge of the world. It is argued that, just as from the false knowledge of a dream and of letters there can be true acquisition of good and evil or of certain meanings, so from the false knowledge of words and their meanings, as involved in the knowledge of monistic texts of the Upaniṣads, there may arise right knowledge. But such an argument is based on false analogy. When from certain kinds of dreams someone judges that good or evil will come to him, it is not from nothing that he judges, since he judges from particular dream experiences; and these dream experiences are facts having particular characters and features; they are not mere nothing, like the hare's horn; no one can judge of anything from the hare's horn. The letters also have certain shapes and forms and are definitely by common consent and agreement associated with particular sounds; it is well known that different letters in different countries may be used to denote one kind of sound. Again, if from a mistake someone experiences fear and dies, it is not from nothing or from something false that he dies; for he had a real fear, and the fear was the cause of death and was roused by the memory of a real thing, and the only unreality about it was that the thing was not present there at that time. So no example could be given to show that from false knowledge, or falsehood as such, there could come right knowledge or the truth. Again, how can the scriptures demonstrate the falsehood of the world? If all auditory knowledge were false, all language would be false, and even the scriptural texts would be non-existent.

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Further, what is this "*avidyā*," if it cannot be described? How can one make anyone understand it? What nonsense it is to say that that which manifests itself as all the visible and tangible world of practical conduct and behaviour cannot itself be described¹. If it is beginningless, it must be eternal, and there can be no liberation. It cannot be both existent and non-existent; for that would be contradictory. It cannot be mere negation; for, being non-existent, it could not bring bondage. If it brings bondage, it must be an entity, and that means a dual existence with Brahman. So the proposition of the upholder of *māyā* is false.

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¹ *yasyāḥ kāryam idaṁ kṛtsnaṁ vyavahārāya kalpate* *nirvaktuṁ sā na śakye' ti vacanaṁ vacanār-thakam. Bhāskara-bhāṣya.*

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What is true, however, is that, just as milk gets curdled, so it is God Himself who by His own will and knowledge and omnipotence transforms Himself into this world. There is no inconsistency in God's transforming Himself into the world, though He is partless;

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for He can do so by various kinds of powers, modifying them according to His own will. He possesses two powers; by one He has become the world of enjoyables (*bhogya-śakti*), and by the other the individual souls, the enjoyers (*bhoktṛ*); but in spite of this modification of Himself He remains unchanged in His own purity; for it is by the manifestation and modification of His powers that the modification of the world as the enjoyable and the enjoyer takes place. It is just as the sun sends out his rays and collects them back into himself, but yet remains in himself the same¹.

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¹ *Bhāskara-bhāṣya*, II. 1. 27, also I. 4. 25.

The Philosophy of Bhāskara's Bhāṣya

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From what has been said above it is clear that according to Bhāskara the world of matter and the selves consists only in real modifications or transformations (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman's own nature through His diverse powers. This naturally brings in the question whether the world and the souls are different from Brahman or identical with him. Bhāskara's answer to such a question is that "difference" (*bheda*) has in it the characteristic of identity (*abheda-dharmaś ca*)—the waves are different from the sea, but are also identical with it. The waves are manifestations of the sea's own powers, and so the same identical sea appears to be different when viewed with reference to the manifestations of its powers, though it is in reality identical with its powers. So the same identical fire is different in its powers as it burns or illuminates. So all that is one is also many, and the one is neither absolute identity nor absolute difference².

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² *abheda-dharmaś ca bhedo yathā mahodadher abhedaḥ sa eva taraṅgādy-ātmanā vartamāno bheda ity ucyate, na hi taraṅgā-dayaḥ pāṣāṇā-diṣu dṛśyante tasyaiva tāḥ śaktayaḥ śakti-śaktimatoś ca ananyatvam anyatvam co-palakṣyate yathā'gner dahana-prakāśanā-di-śaktayaḥ....tasmāt sarvam ekā-nekā-tmakam nā'tyantam abhinnam bhinnam vā. Ibid.* II. 1. 18.

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The individual souls are in reality not different from God; they are but His parts, as the sparks of fire are the parts of fire; but it is the peculiarity of these parts of God, the souls, that though one with Him, they have been under the influence of ignorance, desires and deeds from beginningless time³. Just as the *ākāśa*, which is all the same everywhere; and yet the *ākāśa* inside a vessel or a house is not just the same *ākāśa* as the boundless space, but may in some sense be regarded as a part of it; or just as the same air is seen to serve different life-functions, as the five *prāṇas*, so the individual souls also may in some sense be regarded as parts of God. It is just and proper that the scriptures should command the individual souls to seek knowledge so as to attain liberation; for it is the desire for the highest soul (*paramātman*) or God or Brahman that is the cause of liberation, and it is the desire for objects of the world that is the cause of bondage¹. This soul, in so far as it exists in association with ignorance, desires and deeds, is atomic in nature; and, just as a drop of sandal paste may perfume all the place about it, so does the atomic soul, remaining in one place, animate the whole body. It is by nature endowed with consciousness, and it is only with reference to the knowledge of other objects that it has to depend on the presence of those objects². Its seat is in the heart, and through the skin of the heart it is in touch with the whole body. But, though in a state of bondage, under the influence of ignorance, etc., it is atomic, yet it is not ultimately atomic in nature; for it is one with Brahman. Under the influence of *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra*, the five senses and the five *vāyus* it undergoes the cycle of rebirths. But though this atomic form and the association with the *buddhi*, etc., is not essential to the nature of the soul, yet so long as such a relation exists, the agency of the soul is in every sense real; but the ultimate source of this agency is God Himself; for it is God who makes us perform all actions, and He makes us perform good actions, and it is He who, remaining within us, controls all our actions.

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³ *Ibid.* I. 4. 21.

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¹ ^1 *rāgo hi paramātma-viṣayo yaḥ sa mukti-hetuḥ viṣaya-viṣayo yaḥ sa bandha-hetuḥ. Bhāskara-bhāṣya.*

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² ^2 *Ibid.* II. 3. 18, 22, 23.

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In all stages of life a man must perform the deeds enjoined by the scriptures, and he cannot rise at any stage so high that he is beyond the sphere of the duties of work imposed on him by the scriptures³. It is not true, as Śaṅkara says, that those who are fit to have the highest knowledge are beyond the duties of life and courses of ritualistic and other actions enjoined by the scriptures, or that those for whom these are intended are not fit to have the highest knowledge; in other words, the statement of Śaṅkara that there cannot be any combination (*samuccaya*) of knowledge (*jñāna*) and necessary ritualistic duties of life (*karma*) is false. Bhāskara admits that pure *karma* (ritualistic duties) cannot lead us to the highest perception of the truth, the Brahman; yet knowledge (*jñāna*) combined with the regular duties, i.e. *jñāna-samuccita-karma*, can lead us to our highest good, the realization of Brahman. That it is our duty to attain the knowledge of Brahman is also to be accepted, by reason of the injunction of the scriptures; for that also is one of the imperative duties imposed on us by the scriptures—a *vidhi*—the self is to be known (*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ*, etc.). It is therefore not true, as Śaṅkara asserted, that what the ritualistic and other duties imposed on us by the scriptures can do for us is only to make us fit for the study of Vedānta by purifying us and making us as far as possible sinless; Bhāskara urges that performance of the duties imposed on us by the scriptures is as necessary as the attainment of knowledge for our final liberation.

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³ ^3 *Bhāskara-bhāṣya*, I. 1. 1. In holding the view that the *Brahma-sūtra* is in a sense continuous with the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, which the former must follow—for it is after the performance of the ritualistic duties that the knowledge of Brahman can arise, and the latter therefore cannot in any stage dispense with the need for the former—and that the *Brahma-sūtras* are not intended for any superior and different class of persons, Bhāskara seems to have followed Upavarṣa or Upavarṣācārya, to whose commentary on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* he refers and whom he calls the founder of the school (*śāstra-sampradāya-pravartaka*). *Ibid.* I. 1. 1, and II. 2. 27. See also I. 1. 4: *ātma-jñānā-dhikṛtasya karmabhir vinā apavargā-nupapatter jñānena karma samuccīyate.*

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Bhāskara draws a distinction between cognition (*jñāna*) and consciousness (*caitanya*), more particularly, self-consciousness (*ātma-caitanya*). Cognition with him means the knowledge of objective things, and this is a direct experience (*anubhava*) arising out of the contact of the sense organ, *manas*, and the object, the presence of light and the internal action of the memory and the sub-conscious impressions (*saṃskāra*). Cognition is not an active operation by itself, but is rather the result of the active operation of the senses in association with other accessories, such that whenever there is a collocation of those accessories involving the operation of the senses there is cognition¹. Bhāskara is therefore positively against the contention of Kumārila that knowledge is an entity which is not directly perceived but only inferred as the agent which induces the intellectual operation, but which is not directly known by itself. If an unperceived entity is to be inferred to explain the cause of the perceived intellectual operation, then another entity might be inferred as the cause of that unperceived entity, and another to explain that and so on, and we have a vicious infinite (*anavasthā*). Moreover, no unperceived entity can be inferred as the cause of the perceived intellectual operation; for, if it is unperceived, then its relation with intellectual operation is also unperceived, and how can there be any inference at all? Thus, cognition is what we directly experience (*anubhava*) and there is no unperceived entity which causes it, but it is the direct result of the joint operation of many accessories. This objective cognition is entirely different from the subjective consciousness or self-consciousness; for the latter is eternal and always present, whereas the former is only occasioned by the collocating circumstances. It is easy to see that Bhāskara has a very distinct epistemological position, which, though similar to Nyāya so far as the objective cognition is concerned, is yet different therefrom on account of his admission of the ever-present self-consciousness of the soul. It is at the same time different from the Śaṅkarite epistemology, for objective cognition is considered by him not as mere limitation of self-consciousness, but as entirely different therefrom¹. It may also be noted that, unlike Dharmarājādhvarīndra, the writer of the Sanskrit epistemological work, *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, Bhāskara considers manas as a sense-organ². On the subject of the self-validity of knowledge Bhāskara thinks that the knowledge of truth is always self-valid (*svataḥ-pramāṇa*), whereas the knowledge of the false is always attested from outside (*parataḥ pramāṇa*)³.

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¹ *jñāna-kriyā-kalpanāyāṃ pramāṇā-bhāvāt....ālokendriya-manaḥ-saṃskāreṣu hi satsu saṃvedanam utpadyate iti tad-abhāve notpadyate, yadi punar aparaṃ jñānaṃ kalpyate tasyāpy anyat tasyāpy anyad ity anavasthā; na ca jñāna-kriyānumāne liṅgam asti, saṃvedanam iti cen na, agṛhīta-sambandhatvāt. Bhāskara-bhāṣva*, I. I I.

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¹ *kecid āhuḥ ātmā pramāyāṁ indriya-dvāropādhi-nirgama-viṣayeṣu vartate... tad idaṁ asaṁyag darśanam;...ālokendriyādibhyo jñānaṁ utpadyamānam... cānyad iti yuktam. Bhāskara-bhāṣya.*

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² *Ibid.* II. 4. 17.

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³ *Ibid.* I. 4. 21.

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As has already been said, Bhāskara does not think that liberation can be attained through knowledge alone; the duties imposed by the scriptures must always be done along with our attempts to know Brahman; for there is no contradiction or opposition between knowledge and performance of the duties enjoined by the scriptures. There will be no liberation if the duties are forsaken⁴. The state of salvation is one in which there is a continuous and unbroken consciousness of happiness⁵. A liberated soul may associate or not associate itself with any body or sense as it likes⁶. It is as omniscient, omnipotent and as one with all souls as God Himself¹. The attachment (*rāga*) to Brahman, which is said to be an essential condition for attaining liberation, is further defined to be worship (*samārādhana*) or devotion (*bhakti*), while *bhakti* is said to be attendance on God by meditation (*dhyān previous *karmas*, the duties assigned to the particular stage of life (*āśrama*) to which the man belongs have to be performed; but his difference from the ordinary man is that, while the ordinary man thinks himself to be the agent or the doer of all actions, the wise man never thinks himself to be so. If a man could attain liberation during lifetime, then he might even know the minds of other people. Whether in *mukti* one becomes absolutely relationless (*niḥsam-bandhaḥ*), or whether one becomes omniscient and omnipotent (as Bhāskara himself urges), it is not possible for one to attain *mukti* during one's lifetime, so it is certain that so long as a man lives he must perform his duties and try to comprehend the nature of God and attend on Him through meditation, since these only can lead to liberation after death¹.

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⁴ *Ibid.* III. 4. 26.

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⁵ *Ibid.* IV. 4. 8.

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⁶ *Ibid.* IV. 4. 12.

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¹ *Bhāskara-bhāṣya*, III. 4. 26.

Chapter XVI. The Pañcarātra

Antiquity of the Pañcarātra

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THE Pañcarātra doctrines are indeed very old and are associated with the *puruṣa-sūkta* of the Ṛg-veda, which is, as it were, the foundation stone of all future Vaiṣṇava philosophy. It is said in the *Śata-patha Brāhmaṇa* that Nārāyaṇa, the great being, wishing to transcend all other beings and becoming one with them all, saw the form of sacrifice known as pañcarātra, and by performing that sacrifice attained his purpose¹. It is probable that the epithets "*puruṣo ha nārāyaṇaḥ*" became transformed in later times into the two ṛṣis Nara and Nārāyaṇa. The passage also implies that Nārāyaṇa was probably a human being who became a transcending divinity by performing the Pañcarātra sacrifice. In the later literature *Nārāyaṇa* became the highest divinity. Thus Veṅkaṭa Sudhī wrote a *Siddhānta-ratnāvalī* in about 19,000 lines to prove by a reference to scriptural texts that Nārāyaṇa is the highest god and that all other gods, Śiva, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, etc., are subordinate to him². The word *Brahman* in the Upaniṣads is also supposed in the fourth or the last chapter of the *Siddhānta-ratnāvalī* to refer to Nārāyaṇa. In the *Mahābhārata* (*Śānti-parvan*, 334th chapter) we hear of Nara and Nārāyaṇa themselves worshipping the unchanging Brahman which is the self in all beings; and yet Nārāyaṇa is there spoken of as being the greatest of all. In the succeeding chapter it is said that there was a king who was entirely devoted to Nārāyaṇa, and who worshipped him according to the *sātvata* rites³. He was so devoted to Nārāyaṇa that he considered all that belonged to him, riches, kingdom, etc., as belonging to Nārāyaṇa. He harboured in his house great saints versed in the Pañcarātra system. When under the patronage of this king great saints performed sacrifices, they were unable to have a vision of the great Lord Nārāyaṇa, and Bṛhaspati became angry.

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¹ *Śata-patha Brāhmaṇa* XIII. 6. 1.

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² The *Siddhānta-ratnāvalī* exists only as a MS. which has not yet been published.

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³ We have an old *Pañcarātra-saṃhitā* called the *Sātvata-saṃhitā*, the contents of which will presently be described.

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Other sages then related the story that, though after long penance they could not perceive God, there was a message from Heaven that the great Nārāyaṇa was visible only to the inhabitants of Śveta-dvīpa, who were devoid of sense-organs, did not require any food, and were infused with a monotheistic devotion. The saints were dazzled by the radiant beauty of these beings, and could not see them. They then began to practise asceticism and, as a result, these holy beings became perceivable to them. These beings adored the ultimate deity by mental *japa* (muttering God's name in mind) and made offerings to God. Then there was again a message from Heaven that, since the saints had perceived the beings of Śveta-dvīpa, they should feel satisfied with that and return home because the great God could not be perceived except through all-absorbing devotion. Nārada also is said to have seen from a great distance Śveta-dvīpa and its extraordinary inhabitants. Nārada then went to Śveta-dvīpa and had a vision of Nārāyaṇa, whom he adored. Nārāyaṇa said to him that Vāsudeva was the highest changeless God, from whom came out Saṅkarṣaṇa, the lord of all life; from him came Pradyumna, called *manas*, and from Pradyumna came Aniruddha, the Ego. From Aniruddha came Brahmā, who created the universe. After the *pralaya*, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are successively created from Vāsudeva.

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There are some Upaniṣads which are generally known as Vaiṣṇava Upaniṣads, and of much later origin than the older Pāñcarātra texts. To this group of Upaniṣads belong the *Avyaktopaniṣad* or *Avyakta-nṛsiṁhopaniṣad*, with a commentary of Upaniṣad-brahmayogin, the pupil of Vāsudevendra, *Kali-santāraṇopaniṣad*, *Kṛṣṇopaniṣad*, *Garuḍopaniṣad*, *Gopālatāpainī Upaniṣad*, *Gopālottara-tāpanī Upaniṣad*, *Tārāsāropaniṣad*, *Tripād-vibhūti-mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, *Dattātreyopaniṣad*, *Nārāyaṇopaniṣad*, *Nṛsiṁha-tāpinī Upaniṣad*, *Nṛsiṁhottara-tāpinī Upaniṣad*, *Rāmatāpinī Upaniṣad*, *Rāmottarottara-tāpinī Upaniṣad*, *Rāma-rahasya Upaniṣad*, *Vāsudevopanisad*, with the commentaries of Upaniṣad-brahmayogin. But these Upaniṣads are mostly full of inessential descriptions, ritualistic practices and the muttering of particular *mantras*. They have very little connection with the Pāñcarātra texts and their contents. Some of them—like the *Nṛsiṁha-tāpinī*, *Gopālatāpanī*, etc.—have been utilized in the Gauḍīya school of Vaiṣṇavism.

The Position of the Pañcarātra Literature

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Yāmuna, in his *Āgama-prāmāṇya*, discusses the position of the Pañcarātras as follows. It is said that any instruction conveyed through language can be valid either by itself or through the strength of the validity of some other proofs. No instruction of any ordinary person can be valid by itself. The special ritualistic processes associated with the Pañcarātra cannot be known by perception or by inference. Only God, whose powers of perception extend to all objects of the world and which are without any limitation, can instil the special injunctions of the Pañcarātra. The opponents, however, hold that a perception which has all things within its sphere can hardly be called perception. Moreover, the fact that some things may be bigger than other things does not prove that anything which is liable to be greater and less could necessarily be conceived to extend to a limitless extent¹. Even if it be conceived that there is a person whose perception is limitless, there is nothing to suggest that he should be able to instruct infallibly about the rituals, such as those enjoined in the Pañcarātra. There are also no *āgamas* which prescribe the Pañcarātra rites. It cannot be ascertained whether the authors of the Pañcarātra works based them on the teachings of the Vedas or gave their own views and passed them on as being founded on the Vedas. If it is argued that the fact that the Pañcarātra, like other texts of *Smṛti* of Manu, etc., exist proves that they must have a common origin in the Vedas, that is contradicted by the fact that the Pañcarātra doctrines are repudiated in the *smṛti* texts founded on the Vedas. If it is said that those who follow the Pañcarātra rites are as good Brahmins as other Brahmins, and follow the Vedic rites, the opponents assert that this is not so, since the Pañcarātrins may have all the external marks and appearance of Brahmins, but yet they are not so regarded in society. At a social dinner the Brahmins do not sit in the same line with the *Bhāgavatas* or the followers of the Pañcarātra.

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¹ *atha ekasmin sātiśaye kenāpyanyena niratiśayena bhavitavyam iti āhosvit samāna-jātīyenā'nyena nir-atiśaya-daśām adhirūḍhena bhavitavyam iti :* > *na tāvad agrimaḥ kalpaḥ kalpyate'nupalambhataḥ* > *na hi dṛṣṭaṃ śarāvādi vyomeva prāpta-vaibhavam.* > *Āgama-prāmāṇya*, p. 3.

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The very word *sātvata* indicates a lower caste¹, and the words *bhāgavata* and *sātvata* are interchangeable. It is said that a *sātvata* of the *pañcama* caste who by the king's order worships in temples is called a *bhāgavata*. As a means of livelihood the sātvatas worship images and live upon offerings for initiation and those made to temple gods; they do not perform the Vedic duties, and have no relationship with the Brahmins, and so they cannot be regarded as Brahmins. It is also said that even by the sight of a man who takes to worship as a means of livelihood one is polluted and should be purified by proper purificatory ceremonies. The Pāñcarātra texts are adopted by the degraded sātvatas or the bhāgavatas, and these must therefore be regarded as invalid and non-Vedic. Moreover, if this literature were founded on the Vedas, there would be no meaning in their recommendation of special kinds of rituals. It is for this reason that Bādarāyaṇa also refutes the philosophical theory of the Pāñcarātra in the *Brahma-sūtra*.

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¹ Thus Manu says:

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It may, however, be urged that, though the Pāñcarātra injunctions may not tally with the injunctions of Brahminic *Smṛti* literature, yet such contradictions are not important, as both are based upon the Vedic texts. Since the validity of the Brahminic *Smṛti* also is based upon the Vedas, the Pāñcarātra has no more necessity to reconcile its injunctions with that than they have to reconcile themselves with the Pāñcarātra.

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The question arises as to whether the Vedas are the utterances of a person or not. The argument in favour of production by a person is that, since the Vedas are a piece of literary composition, they must have been uttered by a person. The divine person who directly perceives the sources of merit or demerit enjoins the same through his grace by composing the Vedas for the benefit of human beings. It is admitted, even by the Mīmāṃsakas, that all worldly affairs are consequent upon the influence of merit and demerit. So the divine being who has created the world knows directly the sources of merit and demerit. The world cannot be produced directly through the effects of our deeds, and it has to be admitted that there must be some being who utilizes the effects of our deeds, producing the world in consonance with them. All the scriptural

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*vaiśyāt tu jāyate vrātyāt sudhanvācārya eva ca*
*bhāruṣaś ca nijaṅghaś ca maitra-sātvata eva ca.*
@H *Āgama-prāmāṇya*, p. 8.

v3.c25.s2.8

texts also support the admission of such an omnipotent and omniscient God. It is this God who, on the one hand, created the Vedas, directing the people to the performance of such actions as lead them to mundane and heavenly happiness, and on the other hand created the Pañcarātra literature for the attainment of the highest bliss by the worship of God and the realization of His nature. There are some who deny the legitimate inference of a creator from the creation, and regard the Vedas as an eternally existent composition, uncreated by any divine being. Even in such a view the reason why the Vedas and the consonant *Smṛtis* are regarded as valid attests also the validity of the Pañcarātra literature. But, as a matter of fact, from the Vedas themselves we can know the supreme being as their composer. The supreme God referred to in the Upaniṣads is none other than *Vāsudeva*, and it is He who is the composer of the Pañcarātra. Further, arguments are adduced to show that the object of the Vedas is not only to command us to do certain actions or to prohibit us from doing certain other actions, but also to describe the nature of the ultimate reality as the divine person. The validity of the Pañcarātra has therefore to be admitted, as it claims for its source the divine person Nārāyaṇa or Vāsudeva. Yāmuna then refers to many texts from the *Varāha*, *Liṅga* and *Matsya Purāṇas* and from the *Manu-saṁhitā* and other *smṛti* texts. In his *Puruṣanirṇaya* also, Yāmuna elaborately discusses the scriptural arguments by which he tries to show that the highest divine person referred to in the Upaniṣads and the Purāṇas is Nārāyaṇa. This divine being cannot be the Śiva of the Śaivas, because the three classes of the Śaivas, the Kāpālikas, Kālamukhas and Pāśupatas, all prescribe courses of conduct contradictory to one another, and it is impossible that they should be recommended by the scriptural texts. Their ritualistic rites also are manifestly non-Vedic. The view that they are all derived from Rudra does not prove that it is the same Rudra who is referred to in the Vedic texts. The Rudra referred to by them may be an entirely different person. He refers also to the various Purāṇas which decry the Śaivas. Against the argument that, if the Pañcarātra doctrines were in consonance with the Vedas, then one would certainly have discovered the relevant Vedic texts from which they were derived, Yāmuna says that the Pañcarātra texts were produced by God for the benefit of devotees who were impatient of following elaborate details described in the Vedic literature. It is therefore quite intelligible that the relevant Vedic texts supporting the Pañcarātra texts should not be discovered. Again, when it is said that Śāṇḍilya turned to the doctrine of *bhakti* because he found nothing in the four Vedas suitable for the attainment of his desired end, this should not be interpreted as implying a lowering of the Vedas; for it simply means that the desired end as recommended in the Pañcarātras is different from that prescribed in the Vedas. The fact that Pañcarātras recommend special ritual ceremonies in addition to the Vedic ones does not imply that they are non-Vedic; for, unless it is proved that the Pañcarātras are non-Vedic, it cannot be proved that the additional ceremonies are non-Vedic without implying argument in a circle. It is also wrong to suppose that the Pañcarātra ceremonies are really antagonistic to all Vedic ceremonies. It is also wrong to suppose that Bādarāyaṇa refuted the Pañcarātra doctrines; for, had he done so, he would not have recommended them in the *Mahābhārata*. The view of the Pañcarātras admitting the four *vyūhas* should not be interpreted as the admission of many gods; for these are manifestations of Vāsudeva, the one divine person. A proper interpretation of Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahma-sūtras* would also show that they are in support of the Pañcarātras and not against them.

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