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A History of Indian Philosophy v4: Volume 4

A History of Indian Philosophy v4

Language
English

Contents

Volume 4

Front matter

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BY SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

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VOLUME IV INDIAN PLURALISM

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CAMBRIDGE AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

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PUBLISHED BY THE SYNDICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Bentley House, 200 Euston Road, London, N.W. 1 American Branch: 32 East 57th Street, New York 22, N.Y.

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| *First Edition* | 1949 |
| *Reprinted* | 1955 |
| | 1961 |

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*First printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge* *Reprinted by offset-litho by* *Percy Lund Humphries & Co. Ltd., Bradford*

To the Sacred and Blessed Memory of Surendranath Dasgupta

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THE LATE MAHĀTMĀ MOHANDAS KARAMCHAND GANDHI,

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THE POET RABINDRANATH TAGORE,

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*and those martyrs and patriots who have* *died or worked* *for the liberation and elevation of* *India*

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THIS HUMBLE WORK, WHICH SEEKS TO DISCOVER INDIA AT ITS BEST AND HIGHEST, IS DEDICATED WITH SINCEREST REVERENCE AND HUMILITY

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THE third volume of the present series was published in 1940. The manuscript of the fourth volume was largely ready at that time and it would have been possible to send it for publication at least by 1942. But the second world-war commenced in 1939 and although the Cambridge University Press was prepared to accept the manuscript even during war-time, the despatch of the manuscript from Calcutta to Cambridge and the transmission of proofs to and fro between England and India appeared to me to be too risky. In 1945, after retiring from the Chair of Philosophy in the Calcutta University, I came to England. But shortly after my arrival here I fell ill, and it was during this period of illness that I revised the manuscript and offered it to the University Press. This explains the unexpected delay between the publication of the third volume and the present one. The promises held out in the preface to the third volume, regarding the subjects to be treated in the present volume, have been faithfully carried out. But I am not equally confident now about the prospects of bringing out the fifth volume. I am growing in age and have been in failing health for long years. The physical and mental strain of preparing a work of this nature and of seeing it through the Press is considerable, and I do not know if I shall be able to stand such a strain in future. But I am still collecting the materials for the fifth volume and hope that I may be able to see it published in my life-time.

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The present volume deals with the philosophy of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, the philosophy of Madhva and his followers, the philosophy of Vallabha and the philosophy of the Gauḍīya school of Vaiṣṇavism. So far as I know, nothing important has yet been published on the philosophy of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* and that of Vallabha. Two important works by Mr Nāgarāja Śarmā of Madras and by Professor Helmuth von Glasenapp on the philosophy of Madhva have been published in English and German respectively. But so far nothing has appeared about the philosophy of the great teachers of the Madhva school such as Jaya-tīrtha and Vyāsa-tīrtha. Very little is known about the great controversy between the eminent followers of the Madhva school of thought and of the followers of the Śaṅkara school of Vedānta. In my opinion Jaya-tīrtha and Vyāsa-tīrtha present the highest dialectical skill in Indian thought. There is a general belief amongst many that monism of Śaṅkara presents the final phase of Indian thought. The realistic and dualistic thought of the Sāṃkhya and the *yoga* had undergone a compromise with monism both in the Purāṇas and in the hands of the later writers. But the readers of the present volume who will be introduced to the philosophy of Jaya-tīrtha and particularly of Vyāsa-tīrtha will realize the strength and uncompromising impressiveness of the dualistic position. The logical skill and depth of acute dialectical thinking shown by Vyāsa-tīrtha stands almost unrivalled in the whole field of Indian thought. Much more could have been written on the system of Madhva logic as explained in the *Tarka-tāṇḍava* of Vyāsa-tīrtha. In this great work Vyāsa-tīrtha has challenged almost every logical definition that appears in the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa, which forms the bed-rock of the new school of Nyāya logic. But this could have been properly done only in a separate work on the Madhva logic. Of the controversy between the monists of the Śaṅkara school and the dualists of the Madhva school, most people are ignorant of the Madhva side of the case, though there are many who may be familiar with the monistic point of view. It is hoped that the treatment of the philosophy of Madhva and his followers undertaken in the present volume will give new light to students of Indian thought and will present many new aspects of dialectical logic hitherto undiscovered in Indian or European thought.

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The treatment of the philosophy of Vallabha which is called *viśuddhādvaita* or pure monism, presents a new aspect of monism and also gives us a philosophical analysis of the emotion of devotion. Though readers of Indian philosophy may be familiar with the name of Vallabha, there are but few who are acquainted with the important contributions of the members of his school.

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I have not devoted much space to the philosophy of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*. Much of its philosophical views had already been anticipated in the treatment of the Sāṃkhya, *yoga* and the Vedānta. As regards the position of God and His relation to the world the outlook of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* is rather ambiguous. The *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* has therefore been referred to for support by the Madhvas, Vallabhas and thinkers of the Gauḍīya school.

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The Gauḍīya school seems to make the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* the fundamental source of its inspiration.

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The chief exponent of the Gauḍīya school of thought is Caitanya. He, however, was a religious devotee and very little is known of his teachings. He did not produce any literary or philosophical work. But there were some excellent men of letters and philosophers among his disciples and their disciples. The treatment of the Gauḍīya school of Vaiṣṇavism thus gives a brief exposition of the views of Rūpa Gosvāmī, Jīva Gosvāmī and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa. Dr S. K. De has contributed a number of important articles on the position of Jīva Gosvāmī, though it does not seem that he cared to put an emphasis on the philosophical perspective.

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In writing the present volume I have been able to use the huge amount of published materials in Sanskrit as well as a number of rare manuscripts which I collected from South India on my journeys there on various occasions.

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My best thanks are due to my old friend, Dr F. W. Thomas, who, in spite of his advanced age and many important preoccupations, took the trouble to revise some portions of the manuscript and of revising and correcting the proofs, with so much care and industry. But for his help the imperfections of the present work would have been much greater. I also have to thank Dr E. J. Thomas for the many occasional helps that I received from him from the time of the first inception of the present series. My best thanks are also due to my wife, Mrs Surama Dasgupta, M.A., Ph.D. (Cal. et Cantab), Śāstrī, for the constant help that I received from her in the writing of the book and also in many other works connected with its publication. I am also grateful to Dr Satindra Kumar Mukherjee, M.A., Ph.D., my former pupil, for the help that I received from him when I was preparing the manuscript some years ago. I wish also to thank the Syndics of the University Press for undertaking the publication of this volume at a time when the Press was handicapped by heavy pressure of work, and by great difficulties of production.

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*Trinity College, Cambridge* *August*, 1948

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CHAPTER XXIV

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THE BHĀGAVATA PURĀṆA

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| | | | PAGE |
| 1 | The *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* | . . . . . . . . | 1 |
| 2 | Dharma | . . . . . . . . | 2 |
| 3 | Brahman, Paramātman, Bhagavat and *Parameśvara* | . . . . | 11 |
| 4 | Kapila’s philosophy in the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* | . . . . . | 24 |
| 5 | Eschatology | . . . . . . . . | 49 |

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CHAPTER XXV

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MADHVA AND HIS SCHOOL

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| 1 | Madhva’s life | . . . . . . . . | 51 |
| 2 | Madhva Gurus | . . . . . . . . | 56 |
| 3 | Important Madhva works | . . . . . . . | 57 |
| 4 | Teachers and writers of the Madhva School | . . . . . | 90 |
| 5 | Rāmānuja and Madhva | . . . . . . . | 94 |

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CHAPTER XXVI

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MADHVA’S INTERPRETATION OF THE *BRAHMA-SŪTRAS

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| 1 | Interpretation of *Brahma-sūtra*, I. 1. 1 | . . . . . . | 102 |
| 2 | Interpretation of *Brahma-sūtra*, I. 1. 2 | . . . . . . | 121 |
| 3 | Interpretation of *Brahma-sūtra*, I. 1. 3–4 | . . . . . | 127 |
| 4 | A general review of the other important topics of the *Brahma-sūtras* | . . | 129 |

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CHAPTER XXVII

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A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MADHVA

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| 1 | Ontology | . . . . . . . . | 150 |
| 2 | *Pramāṇas* (ways of valid knowledge) | . . . . . . | 160 |
| 3 | *Svataḥ-prāmāṇya* (self-validity of knowledge) | . . . . . | 168 |
| 4 | Illusion and Doubt | . . . . . . . | 173 |
| 5 | Defence of Pluralism (*bheda*) | . . . . . . . | 178 |

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CHAPTER XXVIII

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MADHVA LOGIC

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| | | | PAGE |
| 1 | Perception | . | 181 |
| 2 | Inference (*Anumāna*) | . | 184 |
| 3 | *Tarka* (Ratiocination) | . | 188 |
| 4 | Concomitance (*Vyāpti*) | . | 197 |
| 5 | Epistemological process in Inference | . | 200 |
| 6 | Various considerations regarding Inference | . | 200 |
| 7 | Testimony | . | 202 |

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CHAPTER XXIX

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CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE DUALISTS AND THE MONISTS

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| 1 | Vyāsa-tīrtha, Madhusūdana and Rāmācārya on the Falsity of the World | . | 204 |
| 2 | Nature of Knowledge | . | 230 |
| 3 | The World as Illusion | . | 246 |

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CHAPTER XXX

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CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE DUALISTS AND THE MONISTS (*cont.*)

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| 1 | A refutation of the definition of *Avidyā* (nescience) | . | 259 |
| 2 | Perception of *Ajñāna* (ignorance) | . | 264 |
| 3 | Inference of *Ajñāna* | . | 276 |
| 4 | The theory of *Avidyā* refuted | . | 279 |
| 5 | *Ajñāna* and Ego-hood (*ahaṃkāra*) | . | 294 |
| 6 | Indefinability of World-appearance | . | 301 |
| 7 | Nature of Brahman | . | 305 |
| 8 | Refutation of Brahman as material and instrumental cause | . | 308 |
| 9 | Liberation (*mokṣa*) | . | 315 |

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CHAPTER XXXI

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALLABHA

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| 1 | Vallabha's interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtra* | . | 320 |
| 2 | The nature of Brahman | . | 327 |
| 3 | The Categories | . | 332 |
| 4 | The *Pramāṇas* | . | 336 |
| 5 | Concept of *bhakti* | . | 346 |

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8 Life of Vallabha (1481–1533) . . . . . . 371 9 Works of Vallabha and his disciples . . . . . 373 10 Viṣṇusvāmin . . . . . . . . . 382

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CHAPTER XXXII

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CAITANYA AND HIS FOLLOWERS

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1 Caitanya’s biographers . . . . . . . 384 2 Life of Caitanya . . . . . . . . 385 3 Emotionalism of Caitanya . . . . . . 389 4 Gleanings from *Caitanya-Caritāmṛta* on the subject of Caitanya’s philosophical views . . . . . . . 390 5 Some companions of Caitanya . . . . . . 393

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CHAPTER XXXIII

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF JĪVA GOSVĀMĪ AND BALADEVA VIDYĀBHŪṢAṆA, FOLLOWERS OF CAITANYA

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1 Ontology . . . . . . . . . 396 2 Status of the World . . . . . . . 405 3 God and His Powers . . . . . . . 409 4 God’s relation to His devotees . . . . . . 410 5 Nature of *bhakti* . . . . . . . . 415 6 Ultimate Realization . . . . . . . 428 7 The joy of *bhakti* . . . . . . . . 430 8 The philosophy of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa . . . . 438

Chapter XXIV. The Bhāgavata-Purāṇa

The Bhāgavata-purāṇa

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THE *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* shares with the *Bhagavad-gītā* a unique position in the devotional literature of India. It cannot however claim the same antiquity: before the tenth century A.D. no references to it have been discovered by the present writer. Even Rāmānuja (born in A.D. 1017) had not mentioned its name or made any quotations from it. But by the time of Madhva the work had become famous: one of the principal works of Madhva (thirteenth century A.D.) is called the *Bhāgavata-tātparya*, in which he deals with the principal ideas of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, and lays emphasis on them so far as they support his views. The thoughts of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* are loftily poetic, but the style is more difficult. The present writer is of opinion that it must have been composed by a Southerner, as it makes references to the Āḷvars, who have probably never been referred to by any writer in Northern or Upper India. The *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, however, was so much appreciated that immediately commentaries were written upon it. Some of these commentaries are:

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*Amṛta-raṅgiṇī*, *Ātmapriyā*, *Kṛṣṇa-padī*, *Caitanya-candrikā*, *Jaya-maṅgalā*, *Tattva-pradīpikā*, *Tātparya-candrikā*, *Tātparya-dīpikā*, *Bhagavallīlā-cintāmaṇi*, *Rasa-mañjarī*, *Śukapakṣīyā Prabodhinī*, a *ṭīkā* by Janārdana Bhaṭṭa, a *ṭīkā* by Narahari, *Prakāśa* by Śrīnivāsa, *Tattva-dīpikā* by Kalyāṇa Rāya, a *ṭīkā* by Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, a *ṭīkā* by Kaura Sādhu, a *ṭīkā* by Gopāla Cakravartī, *Anvaya-bodhinī* by Cūḍāmaṇi Cakravartī, *Bhāva-prakāśikā* by Narasiṃhācārya, a *ṭīkā* by Yadupati, *Subodhinī* by Vallabhācārya, *Pada-ratnāvalī* by Vijayadhvaja-tīrtha, a *ṭīkā* by Viṭṭhala Dīkṣita, *Sārārtha-darśinī* by Viśvanātha Cakravartī, a *ṭīkā* by Viṣṇusvāmin, *Bhāgavata-candrikā* by Vīrarāghava, *Bhāvārtha-dīpikā* by Śivarāma, *Bhāvārtha-dīpikā* by Śrīdhara-svāmī, *Sneha-pūraṇī* by Keśavadāsa, a *ṭīkā* by Śrīvāsā-cārya, a *ṭīkā* by Satyābhinava-tīrtha, a *ṭīkā* by Sudarśana Sūri, a *ṭīkā* by Braja-bhūṣaṇa, *Bhāgavata-purāṇārka-prabhā* by Hari-bhānu, *Bhāgavata-purāṇa-prathama-śloka-ṭīkā* by Jayarāma and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, *Pañcama-skandha-ṭīkā* by Vallabhācārya, *Subodhinī* by Bālakṛṣṇa Yati, *Vaiṣṇava-toṣiṇī* by Sanātana Gosvāmī, *Budharañjinī* by Vāsudeva, *Nibandha-prakāśa* by Viṭṭhala Dīkṣita, *Anukramaṇikā* by Vallabhācārya, *Ekādaśa-skandha-tātparya-candrikā* by Brahmānanda, *Anukramaṇikā* by Vopadeva. Many other works also have been written on the diverse subjects of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* and some have also summarized it. Some of these works are by Rāmānanda-tīrtha, Priyādāsa, Viśveśvara, Puruṣottama, Śrīnātha, Vṛndāvana Gosvāmī, Viṣṇu Purī and Sanātana.

Dharma

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The word *dharma*, ordinarily translated as “religion” or “virtue,” is used in very different senses in the different schools and religious traditions of Indian thought. It will be useful to deal with some of the more important of these notions before the reader is introduced to the notion of *dharma* as explained in the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*. The *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* begins with an enquiry regarding the nature of *dharma*, and defines it as that good which is determinable only by the Vedic commands.¹ According to Śabara’s and Kumārila’s interpretation, the good that is called *dharma* means the Vedic sacrifices that lead to good results—the attainment of Heaven and the like. The fact that the Vedic sacrifices may bring about desirable results of various kinds can neither be perceived by the senses nor inferred from other known data: it can be known only from the testimony of the Vedic commands and directions. *Dharma*, therefore, means both the good results attainable by the Vedic sacrifices and the sacrifices themselves, and, as such, it is determinable only by the Vedic injunctions. Desirable results which are attained by rational and prudent actions are not *dharma*: for by definition *dharma* means only those desirable results which are attainable by operations which are performed strictly in accordance with Vedic injunctions. But in the Vedas are described various kinds of sacrifices by the performance of which one may take revenge on his enemies by destroying them or causing grievous injuries of various kinds to them, but action causing injury to any fellow-being is undesirable, and such action cannot be *dharma*.

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¹ *athāto dharma-jijñāsā. Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, I. I. I. *codanā-lakṣaṇo’rtho dharmaḥ. Ibid.* I. I. 2.

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*Dharma* in this sense has nothing to do with God, or with ordinary or customary morality, or any kind of mystical or religious fervour as we understand it now. It simply means Vedic rituals and the good results that are supposed to follow from their performances; it has but little religious or moral application; and such a *dharma* can only be known through scriptural injunctions¹. It contains however just a little germ of the idea of non-injury, inasmuch as the performance of rituals for injuring others is not included within its content. *Dharma* also definitely rules out all kinds of emotion, mystic feeling, and exercise of intellect or thought of any description, and merely presupposes a strict loyalty to external scriptural commands; there is not the slightest trace here of any internal spiritual law, or rational will, or loyalty to God’s will. The scriptural command however is categorically imperative in some cases, whereas in others it is only conditionally imperative, i.e. conditioned by one’s desire for certain good things. Kumārila, in interpreting this idea, says that any substance (*dravya*), action (*kriyā*) or quality (*guṇa*) which may be utilized to produce happiness, by a particular kind of manipulation of them in accordance with Vedic commands, is called *dharma*². Though these substances, qualities etc. may be perceived by the senses yet the fact that their manipulation in a particular ritualistic manner will produce happiness for the per-

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¹ *ya eva śreyas-karaḥ, sa eva dharma-śabdena ucyate; kathaṁ avagamyatām; yo hi yāgam anutiṣṭhati, taṁ dhārmika iti samācakṣate; yaśca yasya kartā sa tena vyapadiśyate; yathā pāvakaḥ, lāvaka iti. tena yaḥ puruṣaṁ niḥśreyasena saṁyunakti, sa dharma-śabdena ucyate… ko’rthaḥ—yo niḥśreyasāya jyotiṣṭomādiḥ. ko’narthaḥ—yaḥ pratyavāyāyaḥ. Śabara-bhāṣya* on *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra*, I. 1. 2. Prabhākara however gives a different interpretation of this rule, and suggests that it means that every mandate of the Vedas is always binding, and is called *dharma* even when by following it we may be led to actions which are injurious to other people: *tataḥ sarvasya vedārthasya kōryatvaṁ arthatvaṁ ca vidhīyata iti śyenādi-niyogānām api arthatvaṁ syāt.* *Śāstra-dīpikā*, p. 17, Nirṇaya-sāgara Press, Bombay, 1915. Kumārila, further interpreting it, says that an action (performed according to the Vedic commands) which produces happiness and does not immediately or remotely produce unhappiness is called *dharma*.

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² > *phalaṁ tāvad adharmo’sya śyenādeḥ sampradhāryate*

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*yadā yeneṣṭa-siddhiḥ syād anuṣṭhānānubandhinī*
*tasya dharmatvam ucyeta tataḥ śyenādi-varjanam*
*yadā tu codanā-gamyaḥ kāryākāryānapekṣayā*
*dharmaḥ prīti-nimittaṁ syāt tadā śyene’pi dharmatā*
*yadā tvaprīti-hetur yaḥ sākṣād vyavahito’pi vā*
*so’dharmaś codanātaḥ syāt tadā śyene’py adharmatā.*
*Śloka-vārttika*, on *sūtra* 2, *śloka* 270–273.

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former can be known only by Vedic injunctions; and it is only with regard to this knowledge that the *dharma* is dependent on the Vedas¹. Doing an injury to one's enemy may immediately give one happiness, but by its nature it is bound to produce unhappiness in the future, since it is prohibited by the Vedic injunctions. [But injury to the life of animals in the performance of sacrifices does not produce any sin, and must be regarded as being included within *dharma*.]

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¹ > *dravya-kriyā-guṇādināṃ dharmatvaṃ sthāpayiṣyate* *teṣām aindriyakatve'pi na tadrūpyeṇa dharmatā* *śreyaḥ-sādhanatā hy eṣāṃ nityaṃ vedāt pratīyate* *tādrūpyeṇa ca dharmatvaṃ tasmān nendriya-gocaraḥ.* @H *Śloka-vārttika, sūtra* 2. 13, 14.

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On the other hand, there are actions performed with the motive of injuring one's enemies, which are not commanded by the Vedas, but the methods of whose performance are *described* in the Vedas only in the case of those who are actuated by such bad motives; these actions alone are called *adharma*. Thus not all injury to life is regarded as sinful, but only such as is prohibited by the Vedas: whereas those injuries that are recommended by the Vedas are not to be regarded as sin (*adharma*) but as virtue (*dharma*). By nature there are certain powers abiding in certain substances, actions or qualities which make them sinful or virtuous, but which are sinful and which can only be known by the dictates of the scriptures². *Dharma* and *adharma* are thus objective characters of things, actions, etc., the nature of which is only revealed by the scriptures. It has already been noted above that Prabhākara gave an entirely different meaning of *dharma*. With him *dharma* means the transcendental product (*apūrva*) of the performance of Vedic rituals which remains in existence long after the action is completed and produces the proper good and bad effects at the proper time³.

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² > *dharmādharmārthibhir nityaṃ mṛgyau vidhi-niṣedhakau* *kvacid asyā niṣiddhatvāc chaktiḥ śāstreṇa bodhitā...* *vidyamānā hi kathyante śaktayo dravya-karmaṇām* *tad eva cedaṃ karmeti śāstram evānudhāvatā.* @H *Ibid.* 249, 251.

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³ *na hi jyotiṣṭomādi-yāgasyāpi dharmatvam asti, apūrvasya dharmatvā-bhyupagamāt. Śāstra-dīpikā*, p. 33, Bombay, 1915.

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The *smṛti* literature is supposed to have the Vedas as its sources, and therefore it is to be regarded as authoritative; even when its contents cannot be traced in the Vedas it is inferred that such Vedic texts must have existed¹. It is only when the *smṛti* is directly contradicted by the Vedas in any particular injunction or statement of fact that the former is to be regarded as invalid. The *smṛti* works are therefore generally regarded as a continuation of the Vedas, though as a matter of fact the *smṛti* works, written at different times at a later age, introduce many new concepts and many new ideals; in some of the *smṛtis*, however, the teachings of the *Purāṇas* and *Smṛtis* are regarded as possessing a lower status than those of the Vedas². On the relation of the *Smṛtis* and the Vedas there are at least two different views. The first view is that, if the *Smṛtis* come into conflict with the Vedas, then the *smṛti* texts should be so interpreted as to agree with the purport of the Vedic texts; and, if that is not possible, then the *smṛti* texts should be regarded as invalid. Others hold that the conflicting *smṛti* text should be regarded as invalid. Mitra Miśra, commenting on the above two views of the Śavara and Bhaṭṭa schools, says that, on the first view, it may be suspected that the author of the conflicting *smṛti* texts is not free from errors, and as such even those non-conflicting *smṛti* texts which cannot be traced in the Vedas may be doubted as erroneous. On the second view, however, *smṛti* is regarded as valid, since no one can guarantee that the non-conflicting texts which are not traceable to the Vedas are really non-existent in the Vedas. Even in the case of irreconcilably conflicting texts, the *smṛti* directions, though in conflict with the Vedic ones, may be regarded as optionally valid³. The Vedic idea of *dharma* excludes from its concept all that can be known to be beneficial, to the performer or to others, through experience or observation; it restricts itself wholly to those ritualistic actions, the good effects of which cannot be known by experience, but can only be known through Vedic commands⁴. Thus the digging of wells, etc., is directly known by experience to be of public good (*paropakārāya*) and therefore is not *dharma*. Thus nothing that is *dṛṣṭārtha*, i.e. no action, the beneficial effects of which may be known through experience, can be called *dharma*. The Aṅgiraḥ *smṛti* echoes this idea when it says that, excepting efforts for attaining self-knowledge, whatever one does out of his own personal desire or wish is like child's play and unnecessary¹.

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¹ *virodhe tvanapekṣyaṃ syād asati hyanumānam. Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, I. 3. 3.

v4.c36.s2.14

² *ataḥ sa paramo dharmo yo vedād avagamyate* *avaraḥ sa tu vijñeyo yaḥ purāṇādiṣu smṛtaḥ* *tathā ca vaidiko dharmo mukhya utkṛṣṭatvāt, smārtaḥ anukalpaḥ apakṛṣṭatvāt.* Vyāsa-*smṛti* as quoted in *Vīramitrodaya-paribhāṣāprakāśa*, p. 29.

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³ See *Vīramitrodaya*, Vol. I, pp. 28, 29.

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⁴ *tathā pratyupasthita-niyamānām ācārāṇām dṛṣṭārthatvād eva prāmāṇyam... prapās taḍāgāni ca paropakārāya na dharmāya ity evā'vagamyate.* *Śabara-bhāṣya* on *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, I. 3. 2.

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¹ > *svābhiprāya-kṛtaṃ karma yatkiṃcij jñāna-varjitam*

v4.c36.s2.18

Many of the important *Smṛtis* however seem to extend the limits of the concept of *dharma* much further than the pure Vedic commands. As Manu's work is based entirely on the purport of the Vedas, he is regarded as the greatest of all *smṛti* writers; whatever *smṛti* is in conflict with Manu's writings is invalid². Manu defines *dharma* as that which is always followed by the learned who are devoid of attachment and antipathy, and that to which the heart assents³. In another place Manu says that *dharma* is of four kinds; the observance of the Vedic injunctions, of the injunctions of *smṛti*, the following of the customary practices of good people, and the performance of such actions as may produce mental satisfaction (*ātmanas tuṣṭiḥ*) to the performer⁴. But the commentators are very unwilling to admit any such extension of the content and meaning of *dharma*. Thus Medhātithi (9th century), one of the oldest commentators, remarks that *dharma* as following the Vedic injunctions is beginningless; only the Vedic scholars can be said to know *dharma*, and it is impossible that there should be other sources from which the nature of *dharma* could be known. Other customs and habits and disciplines of life which pass as religious practices are introduced by ignorant persons of bad character (*mūrkha-duḥśīla-puruṣa-pravarttitāḥ*): they remain in fashion for a time and then die out. Such religious practices are often adopted out of greed (*lobhān mantra-tantrādiṣu pravarttate*)⁵. The wise and the good are

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² > *vedārthopanibandhṛtvāt prādhānyaṃ hi manoḥ smṛtam*

v4.c36.s2.20

³ > *vidvadbhiḥ sevitaḥ sadbhir nityam adveṣa-rāgibhiḥ*

v4.c36.s2.21

⁴ > *vedo'khilo dharma-mūlaṃ smṛti-śīle ca tadvidām*

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⁵ Medhātithi says that such practices as those of besmearing the body with ashes, carrying human skulls, going about naked or wearing yellow robes, are adopted by worthless people as a means of living. *Ibid.* II. 1.

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*krīḍā-karmeva bālānāṃ tat-sarvaṃ niṣ-prayojanam.*
*Vīramitrodaya-paribhāṣāprakāśa*, p. 11.

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*manvartha-viparītā tu yā smṛtiḥ sā na praśaṣyate.*
Bṛhaspati quoted in *Vīramitrodaya, ibid.* p. 27.

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*hṛdayenābhyanujñāto yo dharmas taṃ nibodhata.*
*Manu-saṃhitā*, II. 1.

v4.c36.s2.26

*ācāraś caiva sādhūnām ātmanas tuṣṭir eva ca.* *Ibid.* II. 6.

v4.c36.s2.27

only those who know the injunctions of the Vedas, who carry them into practice out of reverence for the law, and who are not led astray into following non-Vedic practices out of greed or antipathy to others. And, though a man might be tempted in his mind to perform many actions for his sense-gratification, real contentment of the heart can come only through the performance of Vedic deeds¹. Consistently with his own mode of interpretation Medhātithi discards not only the Buddhists and the Jains as being outside the true Vedic *dharma*, but also the followers of Pañcarātra (i.e. the Bhāgavatas) and the Pāśupatas as well, who believed in the authority of the authors of these systems and in the greatness of particular gods of their own choice. He held that their teachings are directly contrary to the mandates of the Vedas: and as an illustration he points out that the Bhāgavatas considered all kinds of injury to living beings to be sinful, which directly contradicts the Vedic injunction to sacrifice animals at particular sacrifices. Injury to living beings is not in itself sinful: only such injury is sinful as is prohibited by the Vedic injunctions. So the customs and practices of all systems of religion which are not based on the teachings of the Vedas are to be discarded as not conforming to *dharma*. In interpreting the phrase *smṛti-śīle ca tad-vidām*, Medhātithi says that the word *śīla* (which is ordinarily translated as “character”) is to be taken here to mean that concentration which enables the mind to remember the right purports of the Vedic injunctions². By customary duties (*ācāra*) Medhātithi means only such duties as are currently practised by those who strictly follow the Vedic duties, but regarding which no Vedic or *smṛti* texts are available. He supposes that minor auspices and other rituals which are ordinarily performed by the people of the Vedic circle have also ultimately originated from the Vedic injunctions. Similarly it is only the feeling of self-contentment of those persons who are habituated to work in accordance with the Vedas that can be regarded as indicating the path of *dharma*. It simply means that the instinctive inclination of the true adherents of the Vedas may be relied on as indicating that those actions to which their minds are inclined must be consistent with the Vedic injunctions, and must therefore conform to *dharma*. Other commentators however take a more liberal view of the meaning of the words *śīla*, *ātmanas tuṣṭi* and *hṛdayeṇa abhyanujñāta*. Thus Govindarāja explains the last phrase as meaning "absence of doubt" (*antaḥ-karaṇa-cikitsā-śūnya*), and Nārāyaṇa goes so far as to say that, unless the heart approves of the action, it cannot be right: Rāmānanda says that, when there is any doubt regarding two conflicting texts, one should act in a way that satisfies his own mind. The word *śīla* has been interpreted as "character" (*vṛtta* or *caritra*) by Rāmānanda in his *Manvartha-candrikā* and as dissociation of attachment and antipathy by Govindarāja: Kullūka takes it according to Hārīta's definition of *śīla* as involving the qualities of non-injury to others, absence of jealousy, mildness, friendliness, gratefulness, mercy, peace, etc. Self-satisfaction can in practice discern the nature of *dharma*, but only when there are no specified texts to determine it. Thus, though the other later commentators are slightly more liberal than Medhātithi, they all seem to interpret the slight concession that Manu had seemed to make to right character and self-contentment or conscience as constituent elements of *dharma*, more or less on Medhātithi's line, as meaning nothing more than loyalty to scriptural injunctions.

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¹ In interpreting the meaning of the word *hṛdaya* (heart) in the phrase *hṛdayena abhyanujñāta* Medhātithi says that the word *hṛdaya* may mean “mind” (*manas, antar-hṛdaya-varttīni buddhyādi-tattvāni*); on this supposition he would hold that contentment of mind could only come through following the Vedic courses of duties. But, dissatisfied apparently with this meaning, he thinks that *hṛdaya* might also mean the memorized content of the Vedas (*hṛdayaṃ vedaḥ, sa hy adhīto bhāvanā-rūpeṇa hṛdaya-sthito hṛdayam*). This seems to mean that a Vedic scholar is instinctively, as it were, led to actions which are virtuous, because in choosing his course of conduct he is unconsciously guided by his Vedic studies. A man may be prompted to action by his own inclination, by the example of great men, or by the commands of the Vedas; but in whichever way he may be so prompted, if his actions are to conform to *dharma*, they must ultimately conform to Vedic courses of duties.

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² *samādhiḥ śīlam ucyate ... yac cetaso’nya-viṣaya-vyākṣepa-parihāreṇa śāstrārtha-nirūpaṇa-pravaṇatā tac chīlam ucyate*. Medhātithi’s commentary, II. 6.

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It has been pointed out that Medhātithi definitely ruled out the Pañcarātra and the Pāśupata systems as heretical and therefore invalid for inculcating the nature of *dharma*. But in later times these too came to be regarded as Vedic schools and therefore their instructions also were regarded as so authoritative that they could not be challenged on rational grounds¹.

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¹ Thus *Yogi-yājñavalkya* says: *Sāṁkhyaṁ yogaḥ pañca-rātraṁ vedāḥ pāśupataṁ tathā ati-pramāṇānyetāni hetubhir na virodhayet*, quoted in *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 20, but not found in the printed text, Bombay. This *Yogi-yājñavalkya* is a work on yoga and the other a work on *smṛti*, and it is the former text that has been printed. The present writer has no knowledge whether the latter text has been published anywhere. *Viṣṇudharmottara* also speaks of Pañcarātra and Pāśupata as means of enquiry into Brahman:

v4.c36.s2.32

It is however a relief to find that in some of the later *Smṛtis* the notion of *dharma* was extended to morality in general and to some of the cardinal virtues. Thus Bṛhaspati counts kindness (*dayā*, meaning a feeling of duty to save a friend or foe from troubles), patience (*kṣamā*, meaning fortitude in all kinds of difficulty), the qualities of appreciating others' virtues and absence of elation at others' faults (*anasūyā*), purity (*śauca*, meaning avoidance of vices, association with the good and strict adherence to one's caste duties), avoidance of vigorous asceticism (*sannyāsa*), performance of approved actions and avoidance of disapproved ones (*maṅgala*), regular charity even from small resources (*akārpaṇya*), contentment with what little one may have and want of jealousy at others' prosperity (*aspṛhā*), as constituting the universal *dharma* for all¹. Viṣṇu counts patience (*kṣamā*), truthfulness for the good of all beings (*satya*), mind-control (*dama*), purity (*śauca* as defined above), making of gifts (*dāna*), sense-control (*indriya-saṃyama*), non-injury (*ahiṃsā*), proper attendance to teachers (*guru-śuśrūṣā*), pilgrimage, kindness (*dayā*), straightforwardness (*ārjava*), want of covetousness, adoration of gods and Brahmins, as constituting universal *dharma*. Devala considers purity (*śauca*), gifts (*dāna*), asceticism of the body (*tapas*), faith (*śraddhā*), attendance to teachers (*guru-sevā*), patience (*kṣamā*), mercifulness in the sense of pity for others' sufferings, showing friendliness as if these were one's own (*dayā*), acquirement of knowledge, Vedic or non-Vedic (*vijñāna*), mind-control and body-control (*vinaya*), truthfulness (*satya*), as constituting the totality of all *dharmas* (*dharma-samuccaya*). Yājñavalkya speaks of *ahiṃsā*, *satya*, *asteya* (avoidance of stealing), *śauca*, *indriya-nigraha* (sense-control), *dāna*, *dama*, *dayā*, and *kṣānti* as constituting universal *dharma* for all. The *Mahābhārata* counts truthfulness (*satya*), steadiness in one's caste duties (*tapas* as *sva-dharma-vartitva*), purity (*śauca*), con-

v4.c36.s2.33

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 32–4.

v4.c36.s2.34

*sāṃkhyaṃ yogaḥ pañcarātraṃ vedāḥ pāśupataṃ*
*tathā kṛtānta-pañcakaṃ viddhi brahmaṇaḥ parimārgaṇe*. *Ibid.* p. 22.

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But Mitra Miśra on the same page distinguishes between Pāśupata as a Vedic *āgama* and as a non-Vedic *āgama*. Similarly there was a Vedic and non-Vedic Pañcarātra too. *Ibid.* p. 23.

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tentment, meaning sex-restriction to one’s own wife and also cessation from sense-attractions (*viṣaya-tyāga*), shame at the commission of evil deeds (*hrī*), patience as capacity in bearing hardships (*kṣamā*), evenness of mind (*ārjava*), philosophic knowledge of reality (*jñāna*), peace of mind (*śama* as *citta-praśāntatā*), desire to do good to others (*dayā*), meditation, meaning withdrawal of the mind from all sense objects (*dhyāna* as *nirviṣaya*), as universal *dharmas*. Yājñavalkya says that the highest of all *dharmas* is self-knowledge through *yoga*.

v4.c36.s2.37

These universal *dharmas* are to be distinguished from the special *dharmas* of the different castes, of the different stages of life (*āśrama*), or under different conditions. We have thus three stages in the development of the concept of *dharma*, i.e. *dharma* as the duty of following the Vedic injunctions, *dharma* as moral virtues of non-injury, truthfulness, self-control etc., *dharma* as self-knowledge through *yoga*.

v4.c36.s2.38

But the *Bhāgavata* presents a new aspect of the notion of *dharma*. *Dharma* according to the *Bhāgavata* consists in the worship of God without any ulterior motive—a worship performed with a perfect sincerity of heart by men who are kindly disposed towards all, and who have freed themselves from all feelings of jealousy. This worship involves the knowledge of the absolute, as a natural consequence of the realization of the worshipfulness of the spirit, and naturally leads to supreme bliss¹. The passage under discussion does not directly refer to the worship of God as a characteristic of the definition of *dharma* as interpreted by Śrīdhara². The *dharma* consists of absolute sincerity—absolute cessation of the spirit from all motives, pretensions and extraneous associations of every description: and it is assumed that, when the spirit is freed from all such extraneous impurities, the natural condition of the spirit is its natural *dharma*. This *dharma* is therefore not a thing that is to be attained or achieved as an external acquirement, but it is man’s own nature, which manifests itself as soon as the impurities are removed. The fundamental condition of *dharma* is not therefore something positive but negative, consisting of the dissociation (*projjhita*) of extraneous elements (*kitava*). For, as soon as the extraneous elements are wiped out, the spirit shows itself in its own true nature, and then its relation to absolute truth and absolute good is self-evident: the normal realization of this relationship is what is called *dharma* or worship of God, or what Śrīdhara calls the tender worshipfulness towards God. The primary qualifications needed for a person to make a start towards a true realization of the nature of *dharma* in himself are, that he should have no jealousy towards others, and that he should have a natural feeling of friendliness towards all beings. The implications of this concept of *dharma* in the *Bhāgavata*, which breaks new ground in the history of the development of the notion of *dharma* in Indian Philosophy, are many, and an attempt will be made in the subsequent sections to elucidate them. That this dissociation from all extraneous elements ultimately means motiveless and natural flow of devotion to God by which the spirit attains supreme contentment, and that it is supreme *dharma*, is very definitely stated in I. 2. 6: If anything which does not produce devotion to God can be called *dharma*, such a *dharma* is mere fruitless labour¹. For the fruits of *dharma* as defined by the Vedic injunctions may lead only to pleasurable consequences which are transitory. The real *dharma* is that which through devotion to God leads ultimately to self-knowledge, and as such *dharma* cannot be identified with mere gain or fulfilment of desires. Thus *dharma* as supreme devotion to God is superior to the Vedic definition of *dharma*, which can produce only sense-gratification of various kinds.

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¹ *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, I. 1. 2, interpreted according to Śrīdhara’s exposition.

v4.c36.s2.40

² *komalam īśvarārādhana-lakṣaṇo dharmo nirūpyate*. Śrīdhara’s comment on the above passage.

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¹ *Ibid.* I. 2. 7.

Brahman, Paramātman, Bhagavat and Parameśvara

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The opening verse of the *Bhāgavata* is an adoration of the ultimate (*param*) truth (*satya*). The word *para* however is explained by Śrīdhara as meaning God (*parameśvara*). The essential (*sva-rūpa*) definitive nature of God is said to be truth (*satya*). Truth is used here in the sense of reality; and it is held that by virtue of this supreme reality even the false creation appears as real, and that on account of this abiding reality the entire world of appearance attains its character of reality. Just as illusory appearances (e.g. silver) appear as real through partaking of the real character of the real object (e.g. the conch-shell) or the substratum of the illusion, so in this world-appearance all appears as real on account of the underlying reality of God. The fact that the world is produced from God, is sustained in Him and is ultimately dissolved in Him, is but an inessential description of an accidental phenomenon which does not reveal the real nature of God.

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God is called by different names, e.g. Brahman, Paramātman and Bhagavat, but, by whatever name He may be called, His pure essence consists of pure formless consciousness (*arūpasya cidātmanaḥ*)¹. He creates the world by His *māyā*-power, consisting of the three *guṇas*. Underlying the varied creations of *māyā*, He exists as the one abiding principle of reality which bestows upon them their semblance of reality. The *māyā* represents only His external power, through which He creates the world with Himself as its underlying substratum. But in His own true nature the *māyā* is subdued, and as such He is in His pure loneliness as pure consciousness. Śrīdhara in his commentary points out that God has two powers called *vidyā-śakti* and *avidyā-śakti*. By His *vidyā-śakti* God controls His own *māyā-śakti* in His own true nature as eternal pure bliss, as omniscient and omnipotent. The *jīva* or the individual soul can attain salvation only through right knowledge obtained through devotion. On this point Śrīdhara tries to corroborate his views by quotations from Viṣṇusvāmin, who holds that Īśvara a being, intelligence, and bliss (*saccid-ānanda īśvara*) is pervaded with blissful intelligence (*hlādinī saṃvit*), and that the *māyā* is under his control and that his difference from individual souls consists in the fact of their being under the control of *māyā*. The individual souls are wrapped up in their own ignorance and are therefore always suffering from afflictions (*kleśa*)². God in His own nature as pure consciousness transcends the limits of *māyā* and *prakṛti* and exists in and for Himself in absolute loneliness; and it is this same God that dispenses all the good and bad fruits of virtue and vice in men under the influence of *māyā*³. That God in His own true

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¹ *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, I. 3. 30.

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² *Ibid.* I. 7. 6 (Śrīdhara’s comment):

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³ > *tvam ādyaḥ puruṣaḥ sākṣād īśvaraḥ prakṛteḥ paraḥ*

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*tad uktaṃ viṣṇu-svāminā*
*hlādinyā saṃvidāśliṣṭaḥ sac-cid-ānanda īśvaraḥ*
*svāvidyā-saṃvṛto jīvaḥ saṃkleśa-nikarākaraḥ*

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*tathā sa īśo yad-vaśe māyā sa jīvo yas tayārditaḥ, etc.* Jīva quotes the same passage and locates it in *Sarvajña-śukti Ṣaṭ-sandarbha*, p. 191.

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*māyāṃ vyudasya cic-chaktyā kaivalye sthita ātmani*
*sa eva jīva-lokasya māyā-mohita-cetaso*
*vidhatse svena vīryeṇa śreyo dharmādi-lakṣaṇam.* *Ibid.* I. 7. 23, 24.

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nature is pure consciousness and absolutely devoid of all duality and all distinctions is emphasized again and again in numerous passages in the *Bhāgavata*. In this He is ultimate and transcendent from all: the individual souls also lie dormant, and in this stage all the *guṇa* reals exist only in their potential forms; and it is by His own power that He rouses the *prakṛti* which is His *māyā* by which the individual souls are being always led into the experience of diverse names and forms. God in His own nature is therefore to be regarded as absolutely formless pure consciousness; by His power of consciousness (*cic-chakti*) He holds the individual souls within Him and by His power of materiality He spreads out the illusion of the material world and connects it with the former for their diverse experiences¹.

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¹ > *anantāvyakta-rūpeṇa yenedam akhilaṃ tatam* *cid-acic-chakti-yuktāya tasmai bhagavate namaḥ.* *Bhāgavata*, VII. 3. 34.

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It is thus seen that God is admitted to have three distinct powers, the inner power as forming His essence (*antaraṅga-svarūpa-śakti*), the external power (*bahiraṅga-śakti*) as *māyā* and the power by which the individual souls are manifested. This conception however may seem to contradict the view already explained that Brahman is one undifferentiated consciousness. But the interpreters reconcile the two views by the supposition that from the ultimate point of view there is no distinction or difference between "power" and "possessor of power" (*śakti* and *śaktimān*). There is only one reality, which manifests itself both as power and possessor of power². When this one ultimate reality is looked at as the possessor of power, it is called God; when, however, emphasis is laid on the power, it is called the great power which is mythologically represented as Mahā lakṣmī³. Thus the terms Brahman, Bhagavat and Paramātman are used for the same identical reality according as the emphasis is laid on the unity or differencelessness, the possessor of power, or the transcendent person. The *antar-aṅga*, or the essential power, contains within it the threefold powers of bliss (*hlādinī*), being (*sandhinī*) and consciousness (*saṃvit*), of which the two latter are regarded as an elaboration or evolution or manifestation of the former (the *hlādinī* power, or bliss). This threefold power is also called *cic-chakti* or *ātma-māyā* (essential *māyā*), and, as such, is to be distinguished from God's external power of *māyā* (*bahiraṅga-māyā*), by which He creates the world. His other power, by which He holds the individual souls (which are but parts of Himself) within Himself and yet within the grasp and influence of His external power of *māyā*, is technically called *taṭastha-śakti*. The individual souls are thus to be regarded as the parts of God as well as manifestations of one of His special powers (*taṭastha-śakti*). Though the individual souls are thus contained in God as His power, they are in no way identical with Him, but are held distinct from Him as being the manifestations of one of His powers. The unity or oneness (*advaya-tattva*) consists in the facts that the ultimate reality is self-sufficient, wholly independent, and standing by itself; and that there is no other entity, whether similar (e.g. the individual souls) or dissimilar to it (e.g. the matrix of the world, the *prakṛti*), which is like it; for both the *prakṛti* and the *jīvas* depend upon God for their existence, as they are but manifestations of His power. God exists alone with His powers, and without Him the world and the souls would be impossible¹. The nature of His reality consists in the fact that it is of the nature of ultimate bliss (*parama-sukha-rūpatva*), the ultimate object of all desires (*parama-puruṣārthatā*) and eternal (*nitya*). It is this ultimate eternal reality which has formed the content of all Vedānta teachings. Thus the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* points out that it is this reality which is the cause of the production, maintenance and destruction of all; it is this that continues the same in deep sleep, dreams and in conscious life; it is this that enlivens the body, senses, life and mind, yet in itself it is without any cause. It is neither born, nor grows, nor decays, nor dies, yet it presides over all changes as the one constant factor—as pure consciousness; and even in deep sleep, when all the senses have ceased to operate, its own self-same experience continues to be just the same².

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² *atha ekam eva svarūpaṃ śaktitvena śaktimattvena ca virājati.* *Ṣaṭ-sandarbha*, p. 188 (Śyāmalāl Gosvāmī's edition).

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³ *yasya śakteḥ svarūpa-bhūtatvaṃ nirūpitaṃ tac-chaktimattva-prādhānyena virājamānaṃ bhagavat-saṃjñām āpnoti tac ca vyākhyātam; tad eva ca śaktitva-prādhānyena virājamānaṃ lakṣmī-saṃjñām āpnoti. Ibid.*

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¹ *advayatvaṁ ca asya svayaṁ-siddha-tādṛśātādṛśa-tattvāntarābhāvāt sva-śaktyeka-sahāyatvāt, paramāśrayaṁ taṁ vinā tāsām asiddhatvāc ca.* *Tattva-sandarbha*, p. 37.

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² *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, XI. 3. 35–39.

v4.c36.s3.16

Now this reality is called Brahman by some, Bhagavat by some and Paramātman by others. When this reality, which is of the nature of pure bliss, is experienced by sages as being identical with their own selves, and when their minds are unable to grasp its nature as possessing diverse powers, and when no distinction between itself and its powers is realized, it is called Brahman. In such experiences this reality is only grasped in a general featureless way in its abstractness¹. But when this reality is realized by the devotees in its true nature as being possessed of diverse powers in their distinction from the former, He is called by the name Bhagavat. In this it is the pure bliss which is the substance or the possessor, and all the other powers are but its qualities. So, when the reality is conceived in its fulness in all its proper relations, it is called Bhagavat: whereas, when it is conceived without its specific relations and in its abstract character, it is called Brahman². So far as this distinction between the concepts of Brahman and Bhagavat is concerned it is all right. But in this system philosophy is superseded at this point by mythology. Mythologically Kṛṣṇa or the lord Bhagavān is described in the *Purāṇas* as occupying His throne in the transcendent Heaven (*Vaikuṇṭha*) in His resplendent robes, surrounded by His associates. This transcendent Heaven (*Vaikuṇṭha*) is non-spatial and non-temporal; it is the manifestation of the essential powers (*svarūpa-śakti*) of God, and as such it is not constituted of the *guṇas* which form the substance of our spatiotemporal world. Since it is non-spatial and non-temporal, it is just as true to say that God exists in *Vaikuṇṭha* as to say that He Himself is *Vaikuṇṭha*. Those who believed in this school of religion were so much obsessed with the importance of mythological stories and representations that they regarded God Himself as having particular forms, dress, ornaments, associates etc. They failed to think that these representations could be interpreted mythically, allegorically or otherwise. They regarded all these intensely anthropomorphic descriptions as being literally true. But such admissions would involve the irrefutable criticism that a God with hands, feet, and dress would be destructible. To avoid this criticism they held that God’s forms, abode, etc., were constituted of non-spatial and non-temporal elements of His non-material essential power. But forms involve spatial notions, and non-spatial forms would mean non-spatial space. They had practically no reply to such criticism, and the only way in which they sought to avoid it was by asserting that the essential nature of God’s powers were unthinkable (*acintya*) by us, and that the nature of God’s forms which were the manifestations of this essential power could not therefore be criticized by us on logical grounds, but must be accepted as true on the authoritative evidence of the *Purāṇas*.

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¹ *tad ekam eva akhaṇḍānanda-rūpaṁ tattvaṁ...parama-haṁsānāṁ sādhana-vaśāt tādātmyaṁ anupaśyamyaṁ satyām api tadīya-svarūpa-śakti-vaicitryāṁ tad-grahaṇa-sāmarthye cetasi yathā sāmānyato lakṣitaṁ tathaiva sphurad vā tad-vad eva avivikta-śakti-śaktimattābhedatayā pratipādyamānaṁ vā brahmeti śabdyate.* *Ṣaṭ-sandarbha*, pp. 49–50.

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² *evaṁ ca ānanda-mātraṁ viśeṣyaṁ samastāḥ śaktayaḥ viśeṣaṇāni viśiṣṭo bhagavān ityāyātam. tathā caivam vaiśiṣṭye prāpte pūrṇāvirbhāvatvena akhaṇḍa-tattva-rūpo'sau bhagavān brahma tu sphuṭaṁ aprakaṭita-vaiśiṣṭyākāratvena tasyaiva asaṁyag-āvirbhāvaḥ. Ibid.* p. 50.

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