A History of Indian Philosophy v4.c38.s2.49.2

v4.c38.s2.49.2

*ghaṭa*) exists, and the effects also ultimately return to the cause. Various other reasons are also adduced in II. 1. 18 in favour of the *sat-kārya-vāda*. Madhva, however, takes the topic in quite a different way. Brahman creates the world by Himself, without any help from independent instruments or other accessories; for all the accessories and instruments are dependent upon Him for their power. Arguing against Śaṅkara’s interpretation, Vyāsa-tīrtha says that the unreal world cannot be identified with Brahman (*anṛtasya viśvasya satya-brahmābhedāyogāt*). Moreover, *abheda* cannot be taken in the sense in which the *Bhāmatī* takes it, namely, as meaning not “identity”, but simply “want of difference”; for want of difference and identity are the same thing (*bhedābhāve abhedadhranūyāt*). Moreover, if there is no difference (*bheda*), then one cannot be called true and the other false (*bhedābhāve satyānṛta-vyavasthāyogāc ca*). The better course therefore is to admit both difference and nondifference. It cannot be said that *ananyatva* (“no-other-ness”) is the same as imposition on Brahman (*brahmaṇy āropitatvam*).