Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Early History of the Vaishnava Faith and Movement in Bengal, from Sanskrit and Bengali Sources c9.s4: 4. The Saṃdarbhas of Jīva Gosvāmin

Early History of the Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal, from Sanskrit and Bengali Sources c9.s4

Language
English

Contents

4. The Saṃdarbhas of Jīva Gosvāmin

c9.s4.1

These works give us the entire philosophy as well as theology of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism in a systematic form. They consist of six Saṃdarbhas, viz. Tattva-, Bhagavat-, Paramātma-, Śrīkṛṣṇa-, Bhakti-, and Prīti-; there is also a supplementary work on the first three Saṃdarbhas, called Anuvyākhyā and named Sarva-saṃvādinī,¹ which contains explanatory comments on obscure points and dilates upon topics which have been imperfectly dealt with in the original texts. Jīva Gosvāmin also wrote a running commentary on the *Śrīmad-bhāgavata*, but since these Saṃdarbhas profess to give an exposition of the speculative ideas of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism chiefly by a direct explication of texts, skilfully selected and arranged from that work according to the philosophical design of the cult, they constitute in reality a sectarian commentary on a considerable portion of the *Bhāgavata*; and the general name of this collection of Saṃdarbhas is therefore appropriately given by its author as *Bhāgavata-saṃdarbha*. The word Saṃdarbha means a systematic stringing together or collection; and the work in question, though considerably original in its outlook and presentation, is deliberately designed to possess this characteristic. After acknowledging the inspiration of the work to Rūpa and Sanātana, the author informs us that a Bhaṭṭa friend of theirs, belonging to the South (Dākṣiṇātya Bhaṭṭa), had already composed a work on the subject, compiling it from the treatises of old Vaiṣṇavas (Vṛddha Vaiṣṇava). This acknowledgment is repeated at the commencement of each of the six Saṃdarbhas; and we are told that from this original, the present Saṃdarbhas were composed on the same lines but in a more orderly form and sequence. Jīva Gosvāmin himself explains in his *Sarva-saṃvādinī* that the phrase *vṛddha vaiṣṇava* includes what is written by old Vaiṣṇava writers like Rāmānuja, Madhvācārya, Śrīdhara-svāmin and others, and that there is nothing in it which is a figment of his own imagination. Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa informs us that this Dākṣiṇātya Bhaṭṭa was Gopāla Bhaṭṭa who was one of the six Gosvāmins and associates of Rūpa and Sanātana. Rūpa and Sanātana, again, not only preceded Jīva in life and thought but were also his acknowledged preceptors in the Vaiṣṇava doctrine and practice. In spite of this customary appeal to old authorities and modest disclaimer of originality, the work, however, is not a mere compilation but betrays a systematic plan and execution, as well as originality in its ideas and methods, and in spite of considerable affinities it cannot be regarded as belonging to the same schools of thought as those of Rāmānuja or Madhva. To Jiva Gosvāmin belonged the whole heritage of Vaiṣṇava philosophical thought, upon which, as a matter of fact, he freely draws, besides utilising Śruti (chiefly Upaniṣadic) and Purāṇa texts; and no important proposition is laid down which is not supported by some such text. But the system which he builds up on this foundation is essentially his own and deserves an independent consideration. As the work, however, consists chiefly of a string of Bhāgavata quotations and of a system of interpretation of that authoritative text, it is in appearance at least a series of Samdarbhas or systematic collections.

c9.s4.2

¹ Our references are to the following editions of the texts: Tattva, Bhagavat, Paramātma, Radharaman Press edition, Murshidabad, B.E. 1317, 1324, 1335 respectively; Śrīkṛṣṇa, edited by Prangopal Gosvami, Navadvipa, B.E. 1332; Bhakti, edited by Syamlal Gosvami (along with the five other Samdarbhas), Calcutta Saka 1822; Prīti, edited by Prangopal Gosvami, published from Noakhali (no date); Sarva-saṃvādinī, edited by Rasik Mohan Vidyabhusan, Vangiya Sāhitya Pariṣad, Calcutta B.E. 1327-1920 A.D. All the Samdarbhas has been published by Gauḍīya Mādhva Math (with notes and indices). The Krama-saṃdarbha has been printed along with the text (and the commentaries of Śrīdhara and Viśvanātha Cakravartin) by the Radharaman Press, B.E. 1310 (=1903 A.D.).

c9.s4.3

The scope and object of the work are indicated by the author himself in the Tattva-samdarbha, which informs us that they are identical with those of the Śrīmad-bhāgavata, of which his own work is merely an exposition. He states accordingly that the main Tattva or principle to which his work, like the Bhāgavata, is related (Sambandha) is Kṛṣṇa-tattva, which is higher than any other Tattva; that its subject-matter (Abhidheya) is Bhakti or the devotional attitude by which alone that Tattva is attainable; and that its motive (Prayojana) consists of Priti, or love for Kṛṣṇa as a means of worship. The six Samdarbhas are consequently arranged on this Śāstric plan. The first four are devoted to the Sambandha-tattva and are intended to establish Kṛṣṇa as the highest deity and the most exclusive object of worship; the Bhakti-samdarbha deals with the Abhidheya-tattva which is Bhakti; while the last Priti-samdarbha is concerned with the Prayojana-tattva, which is Priti considered as the best way of divine worship. In other words, Jiva Gosvāmin is concerned in the first Samdarbha, with a theory of knowledge (Pramāṇas) which leads on, in the next three Samdarbhas, to a theory of ultimate reality (Tattva), while the last two Samdarbhas are devoted to a theory of summum bonum (Niḥśreyasa or Puruṣārtha) and the means of attaining it. In the survey we propose to make in the following pages we shall generally follow this order of treatment, and give a brief résumé of the successive works with a view to setting forth the main doctrines in the general outline; but for convenience and continuity of treatment we shall occasionally have to gather together and deal in one place our author's remarks on various topics which are sometimes scattered over the different books. The method which Jiva Gosvāmin follows of laying down principles by the explication of texts naturally involves a great deal repetition and digression. We shall try to avoid them as far as possible, although in any faithful account of his works they are to a certain extent unavoidable.

a. The Tattva-saṃdarbha

c9.s4.t1.1

The *Tattva-saṃdarbha*, which is preliminary, deals chiefly with Pramāṇa or source of knowledge, and concludes with a general discussion of the Prameya or subject to be known, this last topic being further elucidated and elaborated in the succeeding Saṃdarbhas.

c9.s4.t1.2

Jiva Gosvāmin's theory of Pramāṇa, which is widely accepted by the school, is very simple. He rejects without much ceremony the conventional six or eight Pramāṇas, namely, Perception (Pratyakṣa), Inference (Anumāna), Testimony (Śabda), Analogy (Upamāna), Postulation or Assumption (Arthāpatti), Non-recognition (Abhāva or Anupalabdhi), Equivalence (Sambhava) and Tradition (Aitihya), on the ground that they are all, with the exception of Śabda, defective and unreliable. In his *Sarva-saṃvādinī*¹ he discusses the question at some length¹ and takes pains to show the limitations of each of these Pramāṇas, except Śabda. Besides, the ordinary man is naturally liable to four kinds of error, namely, Bhrama (error due to wrong perception of one thing for another), Pramāda (error due to heedlessness), Vipralipsā (error due to the wish to deceive) and Karaṇāpāṭava (error due to the insufficiency of the senses). The Pramāṇas are also not capable of comprehending the incomprehensible and superphysical. Jīva's analysis easily leads him to the conclusion that the other Pramāṇas being defective and insufficient, Śabda or Testimony alone as a Pramāṇa is valid; for in his opinion Śabda is free from these defects and is independent of

c9.s4.t1.3

¹ Here he speaks of ten Pramāṇas, adding Ārṣa (i.e. knowledge derived from the sayings of Gods and Ṛṣis) and Ceṣṭā (i.e. knowledge derived by physical effort, e.g. by lifting a thing) to the above eight; but Ārṣa may be included in Śabda and Ceṣṭā in Pratyakṣa. The Ceṣṭā is accepted by Tāntric writers.

c9.s4.t1.4

¹ Of the ten Pramāṇas with which Jīva Gosvāmin is concerned here, the Pratyakṣa or Perception is said to be of five kinds based respectively upon the five senses, but to these is added Mānasa Pratyakṣa or internal perception, which is independent of the sense-organs. Apart from the fact that each of these six kinds of Pratyakṣa may be either sa-vikalpa or nir-vikalpa, the Pratyakṣa may also be either vaiduṣa or avaiduṣa according as it belongs to the learned or the non-learned. While the former is free from error and becomes the basis of Śabda itself when it is the Pratyakṣa of the great seers, the latter is liable to error and is thus very defective as a Pramāṇa. The so-called universal Pratyakṣa, which is supposed to consist of what is perceived by all, can never be discovered as the standard of truth, because it is not possible to bring together the whole of the perceiving world. The Pratyakṣa can be accepted as a Pramāṇa only when (as in the case of Vaiduṣa) it involves Śabda, and not otherwise. The Anumāna, again, is essentially syllogistic, but syllogistic inference does not always lead us to truth. The validity of the Anumāna depends on that of the Vyāpti or invariable concomitance of the major and middle terms, but the Vyāpti is not always invariable. The existence of fire cannot invariably be inferred from the existence of smoke, for smoke may also arise where the fire is just extinguished. The Vyāpti is only probable and never certain; the Anumāna, therefore, is at best only a source of probable knowledge. The other Pramāṇas hardly require detailed consideration. They are not independent Pramāṇas at all but are valid in so far as they involve Pratyakṣa, Anumāna or Śabda, and can be accepted as Pramāṇas only to that extent. These minor Pramāṇas can never give us the knowledge of higher realities.

c9.s4.t1.5

1 Of the ten Pramāṇas with which Jīva Gosvāmin is concerned here, the Pratyakṣa or Perception is said to be of five kinds based respectively upon the five senses, but to these is added Mānasa Pratyakṣa or internal perception, which is independent of the sense-organs. Apart from the fact that each of these six kinds of Pratyakṣa may be either sa-vikalpa or nir-vikalpa, the Pratyakṣa may also be either vaiduṣa or avaiduṣa according as it belongs to the learned or the non-learned. While the former is free from error and becomes the basis of Śabda itself when it is the Pratyakṣa of the great seers, the latter is liable to error and is thus very defective as a Pramāṇa. The so-called universal Pratyakṣa, which is supposed to consist of what is perceived by all, can never be discovered as the standard of truth, because it is not possible to bring together the whole of the perceiving world. The Pratyakṣa can be accepted as a Pramāṇa only when (as in the case of Vaiduṣa) it involves Śabda, and not otherwise. The Anumāna, again, is essentially syllogistic, but syllogistic inference does not always lead us to truth. The validity of the Anumāna depends on that of the Vyāpti or invariable concomitance of the major and middle terms, but the Vyāpti is not always invariable. The existence of fire cannot invariably be inferred from the existence of smoke, for smoke may also arise where the fire is just extinguished. The Vyāpti is only probable and never certain; the Anumāna, therefore, is at best only a source of probable knowledge. The other Pramāṇas hardly require detailed consideration. They are not independent Pramāṇas at all but are valid in so far as they involve Pratyakṣa, Anumāna or Śabda, and can be accepted as Pramāṇas only to that extent. These minor Pramāṇas can never give us the knowledge of higher realities.

c9.s4.t1.6

the other Pramāṇas, which can never supersede it. Moreover, Śabda can touch things which the other Pramāṇas cannot. It must, however, be noted that the other Pramāṇas are not absolutely rejected, but they are rejected only as *independent* sources of knowledge. They may be employed as Pramāṇas subsidiary to Śabda. Thus, Inference is not altogether rejected as a Pramāṇa, and the author himself largely employs argumentation. But Inference, according to the Vaiṣṇava theory, is not a Pramāṇa if it is independent of the testimony of the scriptures. If it is based on the scriptures, the inferential process is a valuable aid to knowledge. It is clear, however, that even this attitude, by making the other Pramāṇas subordinate, exalts Śabda as the chief and infallible Pramāṇa.

c9.s4.t1.7

It is concluded, therefore, that as a source of knowledge the only authentic and reliable Pramāṇa is Śabda, which is the source of all superphysical knowledge and which consists of revealed words (*aprākṛta-vacana-lakṣaṇa*). This position, in the opinion of our author, is supported by the Vedānta-sūtra-kāra by the Sūtras ii. 1. 11 (*tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt*), i. 1. 3 (*śāstra-yonitvāt*) and ii. 1. 27 (*śrutis tu śabda-mūlatvāt*), as well as by the Vaiṣṇava scriptures. This is indeed the general position of the Vedānta, but the earlier Vedāntists appear to have believed not in Śabda in general but in Śruti, which denoted pre-eminently the Vedas and the Upaniṣads. But in later sectarian schools the word Śabda came to be employed in an extended sense so as to indicate other kinds of scriptures which the earlier philosophers regarded as Smṛtis but which now came to be recognised as of equal value with the Śrutis. It is argued that the Vedas in the present decadent age are difficult to master and understand, and the sages who interpret them do not agree. The scriptures which can rightly determine this obscure sense of the Vedas are the Itihāsa and Purāṇa, which therefore constitute the only kind of Śabda that is practically more valuable to us and, being of equal authority, the only authentic source of knowledge in the present age. The Purāṇas were brought into existence, for this specific purpose of rendering the unfathomable sense of the Vedas comprehensible to the ordinary mortal, by the great sage Vyāsa, who was himself the classifier of the four Vedas and an incarnation of the supreme being for that purpose. The Purāṇa is so called because it completes or fulfils (pūraṇa) the sense of the Veda. It is argued that a complement cannot be different from that which it completes; the defective parts of a gold bangle can be made good by gold alone and not by any baser metal. It is further stated that those topics of the Veda which are called Ākhyāna, Upākhyāna, Gāthā and Kalpa are elaborately dealt with in the Purāṇa; and in this sense also the Purāṇa elucidates and amplifies what is vaguely or implicitly contained in the Vedas. Thus, those who know the four Vedas with the Upaniṣads and the Vedāṅgas, but do not know the Purāṇas cannot, in the opinion of our author, be regarded as truly learned men. The two sets of scriptures, the Veda and the Purāṇa, are both revealed and are ultimately identical in purport, but they are sometimes regarded as different because of the use of accent (svara) and some peculiarities of arrangement (krama-bheda) in the earlier texts. But apart from its greater intelligibility and accessibility, the Purāṇa is even superior to the Veda, because it can be studied not only by the twice-born male (Brāhmaṇa) but also by women and Śūdras and does not suffer from the limitation of caste, sex or age. By these indications the denotation of the word Śabda as a Pramāṇa is not confined to Śruti alone, but is extended to the Itihāsa and Purāṇa, which must be regarded as a part (and in practice the most authentic part) of the Veda. This position is supported by a skilful compilation of texts, but as the texts are mostly selected from the Purāṇas we have the curious method of establishing their authenticity chiefly on the strength of statements made by themselves.

c9.s4.t1.8

Of the Itihāsa and Purāṇa, again, the Purāṇa is to be preferred as a source of knowledge. But we are told that in the present age the individual Purāṇas are not all available in their completeness, and they celebrate different gods. Hence, the average poor mortal is too puzzled by their diversity to understand their real sense. The doubt regarding the admissibility of some of them naturally arises from the fact that the different Purāṇas appeared at different periods of time, and that though they were suitable for the epoch for which they were composed, they are not all suitable for the present age. We find, therefore, the classification of Purāṇas into Sāttvika, Rājasika and Tāmasika groups. Verses from the Matsya-purāṇa are quoted to explain that the Sāttvika Purāṇas deal with the greatness of Kṛṣṇa, the Rājasika with that of Brahmā, and the Tāmasika with that of Śiva. There is a fourth miscellaneous kind (saṃkīrṇa) which speak of Sarasvatī, the Pitṛs and other deities or semi-divine beings.¹ In his Bhagavat-sandarbha (p. 143) Jiva Gosvāmin points out that Purāṇas like Skanda are sometimes full of errors,² and states that such Purāṇas as deal with the glory of Śiva and other gods should not be accepted by Vaiṣṇavas.³ It is the Sāttvika Purāṇas alone, which are devoted to Kṛṣṇa, that should be regarded as authentic. In other words, Jiva Gosvāmin would make us accept only those Purāṇas which are explicitly or implicitly Vaiṣṇava; for, like most other sectarian apologists, he believes that the Purāṇas of his own school alone are capable of revealing the entire truth to be found in the Vedas, the other Purāṇas either failing to understand or misrepresenting the import of the Śruti.

c9.s4.t1.9

¹ The words ascribed to the Buddha are not regarded as valid Śabda-pramāṇas; for the scriptures which ascribe divinity to him also state that his words were meant to delude the demons (Sarva-saṃvādinī, p. 5). In his Gopāla-campū (Uttara, p. 1079), Jiva speaks of śākya-durvākya, which may be good alliteration but perhaps not good taste.

c9.s4.t1.10

² skandādau kvacid bhrāmakam asti.

c9.s4.t1.11

³ tathāvidham śivādi-pratipādakam śāstram ca na vaiṣṇavair grāhyam.

c9.s4.t1.12

Even among the Vaiṣṇava Purāṇas, the highest place of authority is assigned to the *Śrīmad-bhāgavata*, which can on no account be superseded. It may be objected that since Vyāsa composed his *Brahma-sūtra* with the special view of determining the sense of all Veda, Itihāsa and Purāṇa, why should this treatise be taken as authoritatively final? In reply, it is stated that the *Brahma-sūtra* has not been accepted by the followers of the other sages who have composed other Sūtra works. Moreover, the Sūtras are brief and cryptic, and have been differently interpreted. Hence it is held more reasonable to accept one great available Purāṇa, which is revealed scripture, which gives us the essence of all Veda, Itihāsa and Purāṇa and which forms in reality Vyāsa's own commentary of the *Brahma-sūtra*. Such a Purāṇa, it is maintained, is the *Śrīmad-bhāgavata*, which is accepted as the one supreme authority and the greatest of all Pramāṇas¹ although our author very conveniently forgets that the *Bhāgavata* also, like the *Brahma-sūtra*, is not acknowledged on all hands.

c9.s4.t1.13

¹ *sarva-pramāṇa-cakravartibhūtam.*

c9.s4.t1.14

This exclusive authority of the *Śrīmad-bhāgavata* is maintained on the supposition that Vyāsa himself, after having composed the *Brahma-sūtra* and having brought the different Purāṇas into existence, was not completely satisfied; he therefore composed the *Bhāgavata* which he obtained through Samādhi or spiritual meditation. In this final work he found a synthesis of all Śāstras, and it forms the only genuine commentary of his own Sūtras.² The work proceeds with an exposition of the Gāyatrī, which forms the essence of the Vedas; but the chief reason of its authoritativeness is found in the fact recorded by itself that it was revealed to Vyāsa in his spiritual meditation. Because of this direct revelation by the Bhagavat (*sākṣād bhāgavatodita*), it is the most Sāttvika of all the Purāṇas, dear to the Lord and desired by all his devotees. The theory of the school, thus, believes that the themes of the *Brahma-sūtra* and the *Bhāgavata* respectively are identical, for what appeared to Vyāsa's mind in a subtle shape and was expressed by him in the form of brief Sūtras, is alleged to have been amplified in the *Bhāgavata* in the form of an extensive Bhāṣya on these Sūtras. To demonstrate the correctness of this belief, Jiva Gosvāmin makes several attempts to show directly that some of the *Bhāgavata* verses have the same meaning as some of the Sūtras of Vyāsa. In his *Paramātma-samdarbha*, pp. 257 f. for instance, he gives a detailed exposition of the first verse of the *Bhāgavata* as containing the entire gist of the *Brahma-sūtra* and the Gāyatrī. As the *Bhāgavata* is thus taken to be the only genuine and original Bhāṣya of the *Brahma-sūtra* written by Vyāsa himself, the other commentaries, written by later scholars according to their limited light, have to be rejected in its favour. It is for this reason that the *Bhāgavata* is studied with belief and devotion by those who desire to realise spiritual truths, for this work has undoubtedly attained the position of the lord of all scriptures.¹ The extensive popularity of the work, which has been widely accepted, praised and commented upon, also testifies to this position. A series of commentaries written by great scholars and devotees exists, and Jiva Gosvāmin gives a brief enumeration of those which he found most noteworthy, namely, Tantra-bhāgavata (mentioned in the *Hayaśīrṣa-pañcarātra*), Hanūmad-bhāṣya, Vāsanā-bhāṣya, Sambandhokti, Bṛhat-kāmadhenu, Tattva-dīpikā, Bhāvārtha-dīpikā, Paramahaṃsa-priyā and Śuka-hṛdaya; besides these, there are works on the *Bhāgavata* such as Muktāphala, Hari-līlā and Bhakti-ratnāvali, all of which are worthy of consideration.

c9.s4.t1.15

² *nija-sūtrāṇām akṛtrima-bhāṣya-bhūtam.*

c9.s4.t1.16

¹ *sarva-śāstra-cakravarti-padam āptam.*

c9.s4.t1.17

One might ask in this connexion as to why the great Śaṃkara did not accept the *Bhāgavata* as the original Bhāṣya of the *Brahma-sūtra*. This question is answered by a pious appeal to a mythical legend. We are assured that Śaṃkara did not entirely disregard the *Bhāgavata*, but for a special reason he only concealed his own predilection for the superior teaching of Bhakti and preached deliberately a doctrine of non-duality which tended to obscure it. This special reason is found in the pious legend recorded in the *Padma purāṇa* that Śaṃkara was an Avatāra of Śiva, who in Vaiṣṇava scriptures is a devotee of the Bhagavat, and was entrusted with the mission of making men disbelievers in order that the progress of the world might be continued.¹ Śaṃkara, however, is taken to have given expression to his true personal views on the matter in such works of his as the *Govindāṣṭaka*, which is concerned with Kṛṣṇa-līlā as described in the *Bhāgavata*. He has thereby implicitly subscribed to doctrines to which he appears to be explicitly indifferent in his other works. Even if he did not comment on it, Śaṃkara thus recognised the value of the *Bhāgavata* by writing hymns inculcating *Bhāgavata* ideas. Moreover, Madhvācārya, who was a direct pupil (*sākṣāc chiṣyatāṃ prāptaiḥ*)² of Śaṃkara, wrote a commentary on the *Bhāgavata* in order to combat wrong views promulgated by such other pupils of Śaṃkara as Puṇyāraṇya, who advocated Śaṃkara's Advaita-vāda.

c9.s4.t1.18

¹ The verse occurs in the *Padma-purāṇa*, *Uttara-khaṇḍa*, Ch. 62. 31. and cited in the *Paramātma-samdarbha*. It purports to be an address of the Bhagavat to Śiva: *svāgamaiḥ kalpitais tvaṃ hi janān mad-vimukhān kuru / māṃ ca gopāya yena syāt sṛṣṭir eṣottarottarā ||*

c9.s4.t1.19

² These words are omitted in some editions of the text (e.g. in editions by Nityasvarup Brahmachari and by Satyananda Gosvami) possibly to avoid an historical error on Jiva Gosvāmin's part. The words, however, occur in the Berhampore edition, as well as in the manuscripts of the *Tattva-samdarbha* which we have consulted in the Dacca University collection. That the words must have occurred in the original is clear from the fact that otherwise the word *antara* in the immediately following sentence (*tac-chiṣyāntara-puṇyāraṇyādi-ritika-vyākhyā-pravela-śaṅkayā*) would be meaningless. It appears that, in Jiva's opinion, Madhva in his commentary followed what Jiva considers to be the real teaching of Śaṃkara as embodied in such works as *Govindāṣṭaka* and thereby counteracted the evil effects of commentaries written by Śaṃkara's other disciples like Puṇyāraṇya, who followed the Śaṃkara-bhāṣya at Kṛṣṇa's bidding to serve a particular purpose of the deity.

c9.s4.t1.20

Having thus established the superiority of the *Śrīmad-bhāgavata* as the chief, original and unerring source of revelation and as the best of all Pramāṇas, Jīva Gosvāmin proceeds to state that in his own *Saṃdarbhas* he has only explained the drift of the *Bhāgavata* for determining the highest truth. This description is correct in so far as he proceeds to build up his doctrines on a system of interpretation chiefly of that religious text. It does not indeed mean that he has given us the true sense of the *Bhāgavata*. He may or may not have done so; but it certainly means that his own elaborate system is entirely based upon a direct explication of the *Bhāgavata* in the light of the peculiar tenets of his school. Other schools have also attempted explanations of the *Bhāgavata* but they have hardly gone to this extreme limit of basing their fundamental doctrines solely on the interpretation of that text. No doubt, the Bengal school, by this method, has attempted to secure for itself the authority of one of the greatest and most universally revered religious works of mediaeval times; but this gain has been counterbalanced by the fact that its doctrines stand or fall according as the *Bhāgavata* is accepted as possessing such exclusive authority or not. Indeed, the unquestioning acceptance of the *Bhāgavata* must be regarded as one of the fundamental postulates of the school; and even if there may be other interpretations, that of its own theologians must be unquestionably accepted. In this respect the commentary of Śrīdhara-svāmin is acknowledged by this school *minus* its Māyā-doctrine. Referring to this commentary, which attempts to reconcile the Advaita-vāda of Śaṃkara with the Bhakti-vāda of mediaeval Vaiṣṇava sects, Jīva Gosvāmin explains, in accordance with the belief of his school, that the real object of Śrīdhara was not to effect such a reconcilation but to teach the doctrine of Bhakti. If the great commentator diversified this teaching with Advaita-vāda it was done in order to lure the innumerable Advaita-vādins of the Madhya-deśa. The exposition of Śrīdhara, who is called a Parama Vaiṣṇava, is therefore accepted by this school in so far as it follows the pure Vaiṣṇava tradition. The Bhāṣya of Rāmānuja in the same way is accepted with great respect as coming from the South, which is a great stronghold of Vaiṣṇavism, although it cannot be said that, in spite of occasional borrowings, the peculiar tenets of Rāmānuja and his sect have been accepted in their entirety. As to the Advaita theory of Śaṃkara, Jīva Gosvāmin does not think it necessary to refer to it in detail in his work, as it is fairly well known. We are also informed that all the Vedic and Purāṇic texts cited are given as he found them himself in the original works; but some texts, which he himself had not seen, are derived from previous works of such Madhva writers as Vijayadvaja, Brahmatirtha and Vyāsatirtha, who have written commentaries respectively on the Bhāgavata, the Mahābhārata and the Brahma-sūtra.

c9.s4.t1.21

Having stated his theory of Pramāṇa, his sources and his method, Jīva Gosvāmin proceeds to indicate briefly the chief Prameya or object of knowledge. In this connexion he states the Sambandha, Abhidheya and Prayojana of his work, which we have indicated above, and which, the author himself informs us, is identical with those of the Bhāgavata. They are respectively the Bhagavat-tattva or Kṛṣṇa-tattva and the Prīti-tattva elaborated successively in the two succeeding Saṃdarbhas. In connexion with this statement of the scope and object of his work, Jīva Gosvāmin tells us about the origin of the Śrīmad-bhāgavata, which arose from the extraordinary illuminating Samādhi (or Īśvara-praṇidhāna, as the Yoga-sūtra puts it) of Vyāsa, in the course of which he obtained a complete revelation of the highest spiritual truth described in the work. Jīva Gosvāmin, by way of indicating the central themes, now discusses the character of that beatific vision and details some of the principal truths revealed to Vyāsa. This Samādhi is described in the Bhāgavata i. 6, 4-11, which is now quoted and its chief implications considered. Vyāsa had vision not only of the two partial aspects of the supreme being, namely, Brahman and Paramātman, but also of the Bhagavat who represents the most complete manifestation as the Perfect Person. This distinction, to be explained fully later on, forms one of the fundamental doctrines of the Bengal school, but the authority for this doctrine is found in the Bhāgavata itself, of which it is supposed to form the Sambandha-tattva. Vyāsa also realised the essential difference or duality, as well as identity, between the Jiva and the Parameśvara, which forms the very foundation of his inspired work; for, from Vyāsa's own words it appears that, although the Jiva consists of pure consciousness (cid-rūpa), it is yet overpowered by the Māyā-śakti, which is the cause of Saṃsāra, while Māyā, being an extraneous Śakti of the Bhagavat, the Bhagavat is superior to it and is untouched by its influence. Hence the Jiva and the Bhagavat are perceived as different in essence (Svarūpa) and capacity (Sāmarthya). In this connexion our author takes some pains to refute the view of the Advaita-vādins that the difference is not real but is due to a difference in attributes (Upādhi), by means of which the unconditioned Brahman conditions itself (Pariccheda-vāda) or limitedly reflects itself (Pratibimba-vāda)¹ as Jiva. As the implications of these theories are discussed more fully later on, it is not necessary to linger over them here. Our author does not in the same way believe in the theory that the Brahman is the only one so-called Jiva (Eka-jiva-vāda). He maintains, on the authority of the Bhāgavata, that there is a plurality of Jivas. Each of the individual Jivas, as pure consciousness, forms a part of the highest being, but it is also an agent and enjoyer of its own action. This capacity for activity, however, does not make the Jiva independent of the Lord, for the Jiva, as a subordinate or servant, merely carries out the will of the master. This relation of master (Sevya) and servant (Sevaka) of the Paramātman and the Jīvātman is a real and eternal distinction; and it continues even when the bondage, which is due to the Māyā-śakti of the Lord, is removed and his grace is obtained. As Bhakti or devotion to the Lord is the highest good, Mokṣa or emancipation is indeed a small matter, and the Jiva in its duality continues as a separate worshipping entity even after emancipation. In this way is established the Abhidheya of the Bhāgavata, namely, the necessity of worshipping the Bhagavat (Bhagavad-bhajana or Bhakti).

c9.s4.t1.22

¹ Explained as the theory which believes that the conscious principle which reflects itself in Vidyā is Brahman, and which reflects itself in Avidyā is Jiva, like the sun reflected respectively in an open lake and in a closed pitcher. The theory is discussed more fully in Sarva-saṃvādinī, p. 113 f.

c9.s4.t1.23

From the same indications is also affirmed the necessity of divine love or Prīti as the Prayojana or motive of the Bhāgavata; for the removal of the fetters of Māyā is possible only by this means. The Bhāgavata was specially composed to induce and direct deluded Jīvas to such worship as lead them to Bhakti, which is the sole way of salvation. The means of worship, of course, relates to Sādhana-bhakti, that is, Bhakti which arises from direct instruction of the Śāstra (upadeśāpekṣa), but Sādhana-bhakti is the first step to Prema-bhakti which arises only from the grace of the deity (tat-prasādāpekṣa). Even Jñāna or divine knowledge, such as the Advaita-vādins speak of, is not possible without Bhakti.¹ Thus, the Bhakti-tattva consists of the Upāsya (the deity to be worshipped), the Upāsaka (worshipper) and the Upāsanā (worship). The object of the Bhāgavata is to establish clearly that the only Upāsya is Kṛṣṇa, who is not an Avatāra but the Bhagavat or supreme deity himself. That the attainment of divine love (Bhagavat-preman) is a higher bliss than the bliss of attaining Brahman (Brahmānanda) or Mokṣa-nirvāṇa is also shown by the fact that Vyāsa composed the Bhāgavata with the express purpose of teaching it to Śuka, who had already attained Brahmānanda, and leading him further to Bhagavat-preman. The case of Śuka also indicates that it is possible to worship the Bhagavat even after the so-called emancipation consequent upon the attainment of Brahman.

c9.s4.t1.24

¹ jñānādes tu bhakti-sāpeksatvam eva.

c9.s4.t1.25

Jiva Gosvāmin then proceeds to show from the *Bhāgavata* that the spiritual truths or Tattvas, which Vyāsa attained in his Samādhi, are such as have been accepted by all Tattvajñas or philosophers, for they are testified to by the experience of all emancipated devotees.¹ The highest of all these Tattvas, which forms the central theme of the *Bhāgavata*, is stated briefly in i. 1. 2 and i. 2. 11, to the elucidation of which, as a fundamental principle, Jiva Gosvāmin now turns his attention. In the first of these verses it is stated that the Reality or Vāstava Vastu can be known only from the *Bhāgavata*, while the second verse describes what this Reality or ultimate principle is in the following terms:

c9.s4.t1.26

¹ *sarvātmarāmānubhavena sa-hetukam.*

c9.s4.t1.27

*vadanti tat tattvavidas tattvam yaj jñānam advayam |*
*brahmeti paramātmeti bhagavān iti śabdyate ||*

c9.s4.t1.28

"The Tattva which the knowers of reality call *advaya jñāna* is expressed by the designations of Brahman, Paramātman and Bhagavat."

c9.s4.t1.29

This verse is said to sum up the concept of absolute reality as propounded by the *Bhāgavata*, of which it forms, as it were, the main Sūtra. At any rate, it is accepted as such by Jiva Gosvāmin who practically deduces his whole philosophy on its basis; for the Advaya-jñāna-tattva, referred to in the first line of this verse, is now explained in the rest of his *Tattva-samdarbha*, while the three aspects of the divinity, embodied in the three concepts of Brahman, Paramātman and Bhagavat and mentioned in the second line of the verse, are dealt with in the three succeeding Samdarbhas. A preliminary analysis of the verse, therefore, is important from this point of view. In the first line of the verse the ultimate reality or Tattva is spoken of as Advaya-jñāna-tattva, while the second line designates three concepts of the same reality as Brahman, Paramātman and Bhagavat. It will be necessary to understand at the outset what is signified by the main concept Advaya-jñāna, which is the pivot round which the Vaiṣṇava concept of absolute reality propounded by Jīva Gosvāmin revolves. The rest of the Tattva-sandarbha, therefore, is devoted to the elucidation of this fundamental Tattva, from which fact the Sandarbha itself receives its name.

c9.s4.t1.30

The term Advaya-jñāna does not signify Nirguṇa Advaita-jñāna of the monistic idealists of the Advaita school, but a dualistic Saguṇa interpretation is given of the phrase. The term Jñāna is explained as consisting of pure consciousness (cideka-rūpa) which is self-luminous (sva-prakāśa). The word Advaya does not mean 'sole' or 'without a second,' but it signifies 'that like which there is no second Tattva or Reality.' The ultimate reality is called Advaya because there is no other self-existent conscious or unconscious principle which is similar to it.¹ The Jīva is no doubt a conscious principle similar to it, but the Jīva is not self-existent inasmuch as it is subordinate to the Paramātman as the ultimate conscious principle. Nor is there any other self-existent unconscious, that is, material, principle which is similar to it; for such principles as the phenomenal world, time, space etc., are not in their turn independent of the ultimate principle. Thus, there is nothing equal to it, as Jīva Gosvāmin further explains in his Sarva-saṃvādinī, in the same (svajātīya-bheda) or different (vijātīya-bheda) category. In itself also (svagata-bheda) the ultimate reality is Advaya, because it is an indivisible substance in which there is no difference between the essence and the form, such as is found between the conscious principle and the organic body in a human being. It is also called advaya in the sense that its own infinite Śaktis or Energies are the only things which accompany it (sva-śaktyeka-sahāyatvāt), but which cannot exist without its ultimate existence (tena vinā tāsām asiddhatvāt). But the ultimate reality as the Advaya is not mere consciousness; it is a unity of consciousness, existence and bliss. In other words, the word *tattva* or essential principle, indicating the highest good (*parama puruṣārtha*), implies by the qualification of *advaya* the unity of the highest knowledge or consciousness (Jñāna) and the highest bliss (Parama Sukha), as well as of eternal reality (Nityatva). The Advaya-jñāna-tattva is finally identified with the Bhagavat as the highest and most perfect manifestation of the Absolute; and as such it forms the essential theme of the *Bhāgavata*.

c9.s4.t1.31

¹ svayamsiddha-tādṛśatādṛśa-vastvantarābhāvāt.

c9.s4.t1.32

It is necessary to understand the true nature of the Jīva as a conscious principle in order to realise the nature of the Paramātman of which it is a part, and with which, as an eternal, pure and indivisible conscious principle, it is identical. As this subject, however, of the relation of the Jīva to the Paramātman is dealt with in more detail in the *Paramātma-sandarbha*, we shall advert to it later in that connexion. But since the Paramātman far transcends the Jīva and forms its ultimate support, it has been designated the Āśraya or the ground by the *Bhāgavata* (ii. 1. 70). In this connexion it is pointed out that the Purāṇa deals with ten topics, viz., Sarga, Visarga, Sthāna, Poṣaṇa, Ūti, Manvantara, Īśānukathā, Nirodha, Mukti and Āśraya. These terms are explained in the *Bhāgavata* ii. 10. 3-6 (also xii. 7. 10-15); Jīva Gosvāmin discusses them but shows that of these the last is the most important. This theory of Āśraya, however, is established by the mystical conception of the three kinds of Puruṣa (*Bh* ii. 10.8-9). It is shewn that the Ādhyātmika Puruṣa or Jīva is identical with the Ādhidaivika Puruṣa (e.g. Sūrya); while the Ādhibhautika Puruṣa is the visible body, the word *puruṣa* in the last case meaning only the Upādhi of the Jīva. None of these can be the ultimate ground or Āśraya, as they are dependent on each other. It is the Paramātman who is self-existent (*svayam-siddha*) and independent of every other Āśraya (*ananyāśraya*); he alone can be the Āśraya of these as well as of everything else. If the Jiva is sometimes called Āśraya, it is only because the Jiva is a part (aṃśa) of the Paramātman. Throughout the Bhāgavata, especially in its tenth book, Śrīkṛṣṇa, as the Paramātman, is described as the sole Āśraya.

b. The Bhagavat-saṃdarbha

c9.s4.t2.1

The principal object of this Saṃdarbha is to establish and explain the concept of the Bhagavat. Having explained the concept of the Absolute as implied by the phrase advaya-jñāna-tattva in the verse cited above from the Bhāgavata (i. 2. 11), Jiva Gosvāmin now turns to an interpretation of the second line of the same verse, which further amplifies that concept. The line signifies that although the Absolute is one and indivisible, it has threefold aspect, according to the particular capacity of realisation of the devotee (upāsaka-yogyatā-vaiśiṣṭyena). The same ultimate reality, therefore, can be viewed respectively as Brahman, Paramātman and Bhagavat, although it is never, as Jiva Gosvāmin carefully notes, designated by the term Jiva. Our author now proceeds in this Saṃdarbha to explain these three concepts of the Absolute, which he takes as three stadiums or gradations of one and the same Reality. Here he deals principally with the concept of Bhagavat as the highest and most perfect manifestation of the Advaya-jñāna-tattva. It is not perfectly clear if this peculiar doctrine of graded Trinity is actually and consistently implied in the Bhāgavata; but it is, at any rate, one of the fundamental postulates of the school which Jiva Gosvāmin represents. It is possible to find conflicting texts existing on the subject, but our author attempts to reconcile them, partly by rejecting those which go against the theory, partly by ingenuities of interpretation, and partly by presuming that the apparently contradictory terms or ideas are to be taken in different senses in different contexts; for instance, by presuming that some apply to the concept of the Brahman, some to that of the Bhagavat.

c9.s4.t2.2

The concept of the Paramātman and its relation to Prakṛti and Jiva are dealt with in detail in the *Paramātmā-samdarbha*; the present Samdarbha, as its title implies, has for its principal theme the concept of the Bhagavat. There is no need for a Brahma-samdarbha, for if the concept of the Bhagavat is clearly realised, that of the Brahman will also be understood, and the latter concept has already been fairly fully explained by the school of Advaita philosophers. The Brahman (neuter) is in fact the *nirviśeṣa* state of the Bhagavat, and as the non-differentiated substance it corresponds to the Brahman of the school of Śaṃkara. But the Bhagavat represents the higest being in the hierarchy of spiritual manifestations, the most perfect person in whom all the *viśeṣas* are most perfectly developed. In orther words, the Brahman is unqualified, but the Bhagavat is infinitely qualified by an infinity of blessed and perfect attributes. In the Bhagavat all the divine Śaktis or Energies eternally come into full play, but in the Brahman they remain in a potential or indiscrete state.¹ The essence of the Bhagavatā or Lordship consists in this actualisation of the Śaktis, the nature of which will be explained later on; and the Bhagavat, as the religious concrete, can be realised in the full display of his distinctive features, potencies, attributes, dwelling places and associates. The Brahman, on the other hand, is the philosophical Absolute, in which these attributes and powers remain undifferentiated; it is devoid of all *viśeṣas*² and forms an absolutely homogenous and indivisible substance. Thus, thought cannot be predicated as an attribute of the Brahman. but thought forms its very essence; that is, the Brahman is not a thinking being but the thought-substance itself; in the same way, the Brahman cannot be said to exist but it is existence itself. The Bhagavat is regarded as the Lord in full manifestation (*pūrṇa āvirbhāva*), because the appearance in this case is accompanied by all the divine Energies (*sa-śaktika āvirbhāva*), while the Brahman, from this point of view, constitutes an imperfect or incomplete manifestation (*asamyag āvirbhāva*). The sacred texts, therefore, describe the Brahman as the bodily lustre (*tanubhā*) of the Bhagavat; and in the *Gītā* the Bhagavat describes himself as the *pratiṣṭhā* of the Brahman. In other words, the realisation of the Bhagavat, as taught by the theistic Vaiṣṇava school, indicates a stage superior to the realisation of the Brahman of the Advaitavādins; and we are told that the Brahman is the object of realisation of the Paramahamsas who are Jñāna-yogins, but the Bhagavat reveals himself only to the Bhāgavata-paramahamsas, who are Bhakti-yogins. Although the Bhagavat is one and indivisible reality, this distinction is possible because some Sādhakas do not possess the fullest capacity of realisation; to them the highest reality therefore appears in the general or incomplete form of the Brahman.¹ Such Sādhakas

c9.s4.t2.3

¹ *avivikta-śakti-śaktimattā-bhedatayā pratipādyamānam.*

c9.s4.t2.4

² The idea of *Viśeṣa* is not specifically mentioned by Rūpa Gosvāmin, in his *Saṃkṣepa Bhāgavatāmṛta*, although we are not sure if it is not already there by implication. But it is difficult to believe that Rūpa and Jiva could differ on such a fundamental issue. The theory of *Viśeṣa* or differentiation, however, is dealt with in some detail by Rādhādāmodara in his *Vedānta-syamantaka* (ed. U. C. Bhattacharya, Lahore 1930, pp. 11-12), a work which, in spite of its name, belongs to the Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism and attempts to reconcile Vedānta doctrines with its sectarian tenets. The *viśeṣa* is also explained by Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his *Siddhānta-ratna* (ed. Sarasvati Bhavana Texts, Benares 1927). According to these writers the Viśeṣa is

c9.s4.t2.5

¹ *tri-bhagavān evākhaṇḍam sādhaka-viśeṣāṇām tādṛśa-yogyatvā-bhāvāt sāmānya-bhāvodayotvena tad-asamyak-mūrtir eva brahma.*

c9.s4.t2.6

not exactly a difference but it functions as a difference (*viśeṣaś ca bheda-pratinidhiḥ*) and produces the consciousness of difference when there is no real difference (*bhedābhāve'pi tat-kāryam pratyāyayan dṛṣṭaḥ*). It is thus the power by which there is a realisation of difference in non-difference (*bhedābheda*), or as Baladeva puts it: *yatra bhedābhāvo bheda-kāryam ca pramimite, tatraiva bheda-pratinidhir viśeṣaḥ kalpyate*. It is by means of this *viśeṣa* that the same substance appears as different, and this *viśeṣa* is a power inherent in the Lord, who as the Bhagavat thus exhibits himself as the Brahman and Paramātman. The whole Acintya Bhedābheda theory of the school is based upon this conception of differentiation of Viśeṣa.

c9.s4.t2.7

are the philosophers of the Advaita school, but the Bhaktas proceed a stage further. There is, however, no absolute difference between the two forms; for the difference is one of degree only, and the limitation is in relation to the capacity and stage of realisation of the devotee.

c9.s4.t2.8

In order to elucidate the concept of the Bhagavat further, Jiva Gosvāmin proceeds to discuss and analyse its attributes and explain its divine Energies or Śaktis. He begins by showing that these attributes reside really and eternally (*nitya*) in the Bhagavat in intimate or inner relation, which is understood in philosophical terminology as the Samavāya (perpetual co-inherence) relation, as opposed to the mere Samyoga or separable relation. In other words, the Guṇas and Śaktis are not adventitious or *āropita*, but essential or *svarūpa-bhūta*. In this connexion the author refers to the etymology or Nirukti or the word Bhagavat and shows, on the authority of the Purāṇas, that the various syllables indicate the various attributes and Śaktis which go to make up the concept! Thus, the syllable *bha* in the name implies the sense of supporter and protector (*bhartṛ* or *sambhartṛ*) and refers to his creating and sustaining the Bhakti of his devotee; while the syllable *ga* bears the sense of leading (*gamayātṛ* or *netṛ*) and signifies the idea of his making the devotee attain the bliss of divine love (Premānanda). Altogether the name is made to imply the totality of the virtues of Aiśvarya (power), Virya (potency), Yaśas (fame), Śrī (prosperity), Jñāna (Knowledge) and Vairāgya (non-attachment), which constitute the sixfold lordliness of the Bhagavat.² The terms are thus explained: Aiśvarya=power to subjugate all (*sarva-vaśīkāritā*), Virya=magical potency similar to that of precious stones, magic spells etc. (*maṇi-mantrāder iva prabhāvaḥ*), Yaśas=fame arising from excellent qualities of mind, body and speech (*vāṅ-manaḥ-śarīrāṇām sādguṇya-khyātiḥ*). Śrī= all kinds of prosperity (*sarva-prakāra-sampad*), Jñāna = omniscience (*sarvajñatvam*) and Vairāgya = non-attachment to the things of the phenomenal world (*papañca-vastvanā-sakti*). These attributes, however, must be conceived as having received their perfect and infinite development in the Bhagavat.

c9.s4.t2.9

² In another Purāṇic version these six virtues are enumerated as Jñāna, Śakti, Bala, Aiśvarya, Virya and Tejas.

c9.s4.t2.10

But Jīva Gosvāmin takes pains to show that the three Prākṛta Guṇas (Sattva, Rajas and Tamas) can be predicated only of the Jīva, and not of the Bhagavat, who is beyond their sphere. We shall see later that these Guṇas are due to the Māyā-śakti of the Lord, but having eternally subjugated or transcended this Śakti, which is extraneous to his essential self, the Lord himself is entirely unaffected by its influence. If therefore he has any Guṇa, it is *aprākṛta* or non-phenomenal. We are told that in the Vaikuṇṭha where he dwells, there is no Sattva, Rajas or Tamas; but there is only a function of his Svarūpa-śakti or Intrinsic Energy, namely, a pure existence or Śuddha Sattva, which is *prākṛtātita* or beyond the sphere of the phenomenal world. It is called Pure or Śuddha because it is untouched by the influence of his extraneous Māyā-śakti, to which are due the evolution of Prakṛti and the Guṇas. The absence of Rajas indicates, we are further informed, that the Lord is incapable of being created (*asṛjatva*), that of Tamas implies that he is indestructible (*anāśatva*) and that of Sattva signifies that he consists of pure existence (Sat), pure consciousness (Cit) and pure bliss (Ānanda).

c9.s4.t2.11

In order to understand the concept of the Brahman and the Bhagavat, as well as of the Paramātman, it would be necessary to understand the nature of Śakti or Divine Energy, upon whose degree and quality of display the distinction really rests. Jīva Gosvāmin now turns to the peculiar theory of Śakti which his theistic school teaches; but he points out at the outset that the Śaktis possess the two characteristics of Acintyatva and Svābhāvikatva. By Acintyatva is meant that the Śaktis in themselves are inscrutable and beyond the reach of human thought and reason (*tarkāsaha*) or that they are capable of bringing about impossible effects (*durghaṭa-ghaṭakatva*); but it also refers to the peculiar relation in which these Śaktis stand to the Śaktimat, the possessor of the Śakti, and which consists of an inscrutable relation of difference in non-difference (*acintya-bhedābheda*). By Svabhāvikatva is meant that the Śaktis are natural to the Lord and constitute in their totality his very self or essence, although in his infinite power he actually transcends them. These ideas will be made clear as we proceed with a detailed consideration of the theory of Śakti.

First 46 of 558 passages. Read on

Cites (25)