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The Philosophy of the Upanishads c9.s4: IV. The Essential Brahman

The Philosophy of the Upanishads c9.s4

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Contents

IV. The Essential Brahman

1. Introduction

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In the later Vedânta, by a combination of his three essential attributes, Brahman is described as *sac'cidâ-nanda*, i.e. as " being (*sat*) mind (*c'it*) and bliss (*ânanda*). This name does not occur in any except the latest of the Upanishads, and has not yet been found in Bâdarâyaṇa or S'ankara. We are able however, with a measure of probability, to trace in the Upanishads the steps that led up to it, inasmuch as the more reflection on Brahman was emancipated from symbolic representations, the more it was concentrated on these three ideas, just as occasionally also a combination of them was attempted. Thus at the close of his great discussion with the nine interlocutors, Yâjñavalkhya declares, turning to them all :¹ " Brahman is bliss and knowledge" (*vijñânam ânandam brahma*); and in the following section,² where he reduces six symbolical methods of representation to their true value, *satyam*, *prajñâ* and *ânanda* also appear side by side with three other attributes of the divine being. Taitt. 2. 1 approximates yet closer to the character of the formula that was customary later, when it is said in a poetical passage that forms the climax of the development of thought :—

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¹ Bṛih. 3. 9. 28.

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² Bṛih. 4. 1.

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He who knows Brahman
As truth, knowledge, infinite (*satyam jñânam anantam*),
Hidden in the cavity (of the heart) and in farthest space,
He obtains every wish
In communion with Brahman, the omniscient.

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Since here, at the opening of the Ânandavallî, a reference to Brahman as *ânanda* (bliss) would be entirely in place, while there was no special occasion to describe the Brahman as *anantam* (infinite) just at this point where stress was to be laid especially on his indwelling in the heart, the suggestion has been made¹ that *anantam* might not improbably be an ancient error, ratified after a time by tradition, for *ânandam*, which arose from the fact that the three predicates were taken for nominative, a position very rarely occupied by *ânandam*. If this is accepted we should have here the earliest occurrence of the formula so celebrated in later times. It must be admitted however that the force of our argument is weakened by the consideration that it is apparently a quotation that lies before us, and that this as such may not so confidently be brought into harmony with the following words. It is also difficult to understand how, assuming the universality of the reading *anantam*, a tradition of *ânandam* (in *sac'cidânanda*) could have maintained itself by its side. A combination of the four predicates mentioned is found in the somewhat late Upanishad Sarvopanishatsâra, No. 21, where Brahman is defined as “true, knowledge, infinite, bliss.”² An explanation of these four conceptions is added, and then it is said:— “That of which these four realities (being, knowledge, infinite, bliss) are a characteristic, and which subsists without change in space, time, and causality (*des'a-kâla-nimitteshu*), is called the supreme âtman or the supreme Brahman, indicated by the word ‘that’ (in *tat tvam asi*).” Thus we see the origin of the formula *sac'cid-ânanda*, which appears as such first (apart from Taitt. 2. 1) in Nrisimhottaratâp. 4. 6. 7 and Râmapûrvatâp. 92, Râmottaratâp. 2. 4. 5, and is subsequently employed times without number. Let us also use it as a framework in order to summarise the most important conceptions of the Upanishads under the headings,—Brahman as *sat*, as *cit*, and as *ānanda*. In the present chapter we have yet to discuss the contradictory nature of Brahman and his unknowableness.

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¹ See Deussen, *Upan.*, p. 225.

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² *satyam jñânam anantam ânandam brahma*; for which Codex ↜, with a more definite reference to Taitt. 2. 1 and Brih. 3. 9. 28, reads,—*satyam jñânam anantam brahma, vijñânam ânandam brahma*.

2. Brahman as Being and not-Being (sat and asat), as Reality and not-Reality (satyam and asatyam)

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As early as Rigveda X. 129. 1, with a degree of philosophical insight remarkable when the date is considered, it is said of the primeval condition of things, the primeval substance, therefore of Brahman in the later sense, that at that time there was *na asad, na u sad*, “neither not-being nor yet being.” Not the former, for a not-being neither is nor has been; not the latter, because empirical reality, and with it the abstract idea of “being” derived from it, must be denied of the primeval substance. Since however metaphysics has to borrow all its ideas and expressions from the reality of experience, to which the circle of our conceptions is limited, and to remodel them solely in conformity with its needs, it is natural that in process of time we should find the first principle of things defined now as the (not-empirical) being, now as the (empirical) not-being. The latter occurred already in the two myths of the creation :¹—“This universe in truth in the beginning was not-being; for they say, What was this not-being?”² and “This universe in truth in the beginning was nothing at all. There was no heaven, no earth, no atmosphere. This being that was solely not-being conceived a wish, May I be,”³ etc. Similarly, in some passages of the Upanishads :—“This universe was in the beginning not-being; this (not-being) was being. It arose; thereupon an egg was developed,” etc.¹ And in Taitt. 2. 7, where the verse is quoted:—

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¹ See *Allgemeine Geschichte*, I. 1, pp. 199, 202.

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² S'atap. Br. 6. 1. 1. 1.

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³ Taitt. Br. 2. 2. 9. 1.

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¹ Chând. 3. 19. 1.

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Not-being was this in the beginning;
From it being arose.
Self-fashioned indeed out of itself,
Therefore is it named “well-fashioned.”

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The preceding words show clearly how this is to be understood, for there at the beginning the verse is quoted, “He is not as it were not-being, who knows Brahman as not-being,” and it is then further explained how Brahman creates the universe, and as the (empirical) not-being, the unreal, is contrasted with it as the being, the real. “After he had created it, he entered into it; after he had entered into it, he was:—

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The being and the beyond (sat and tyat),
Expressible and inexpressible,
Founded and foundationless,
Consciousness and unconsciousness,
Reality and unreality.

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As reality he became everything that existed; for this men call reality (*tat satyam iti âc'akshate*).” A similar distinction is drawn as early as Bṛih. 2. 3. 1,—“In truth, there are two forms of Brahman, that is to say:—

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The formed and the unformed,
The mortal and the immortal,
The abiding and the fleeting,
The being and the beyond (sat and tyam).”

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This passage, in spite of the air of a compilation which the chapter of which it forms the opening wears, gives an impression of greater age, and perhaps the passage from the Taittirîya is connected with it, and develops the thought further by more clearly contrasting Brahman as the beyond, inexpressible, foundationless, unconscious, unreal with the universe as the being, expressible, founded, conscious, real. At the same time this decides the question, which may well have agitated men's minds at that time, whether the universe originated from the being or the not-being; at which question the (probably older) passage Chând. 6. 2. 1 glances:—"Being only, my good sir, this was in the beginning, one only and without a second. Some indeed say that this was not-being in the beginning, one only and without a second; from this not-being being was born. But how, my good sir, could this be so? How could being be born from not-being? Being therefore rather, my good sir, this was in the beginning, one only and without a second." In harmony with the position thus taken up in the following exposition of Chând. 6, Brahman is usually named *sat* "being" or *satyam* "reality."

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The word *satyam* (reality) also is used precisely as *sat* with a twofold meaning. While it denotes Brahman in the section Chând. 6 just referred to (so especially in the well-known formulas,—*tat satyam, sa âtmâ, tat tvam asi*), and is found with this meaning in Bṛih. 5. 4, in the same Upanishad Bṛih. 2. 1. 20¹ *satyam* is on the contrary the reality of experience, and Brahman is contrasted with it as *satyasya satyam*, that which alone in this reality is truly real:—"Its secret name (*upanishad*) is 'the reality of reality'; that is to say, the vital breaths (*prâṇâḥ*) are the reality, and it is their reality." The same words recur in Bṛih. 2. 3. 6; that they are here borrowed is evident from the fact that reference to the empirical reality as "the vital breaths" (*prâṇâḥ*) was justified by the preceding words in Bṛih. 2. 1. 20 only, and not in Bṛih. 2. 3. 6. In Bṛih. 1. 6. 3 also, as in these passages, *satyam* denotes the real in an empirical sense:—"It is the immortal, veiled by the reality (*amṛitam satyena c'hannam*); the prâṇa, that is to say, is the immortal, name and form are the reality; by these that prâṇa is veiled." The words *amṛitam satyena c'hannam* appear to be one of those ancient mystical formulæ, accompanied by their explanation, which we have already conjecturally assigned as the oldest form of the Upanishads. Since the opposite of *satya* (true) is usually *anṛita* (untrue), it is perhaps conceivable that the formula in another recension took the form *anṛitam satyena c'hannam*. This would explain the curious play upon the word *satyam* which is carried out in Bṛih. 5. 5. 1 :—" This *satyam* consists of three syllables. The first syllable is *sa*, the second *ti*, the third *yam*. The first and the last syllables are the truth (*satyam*), in the middle is the untruth (*anṛitam*); this untruth is enclosed on both sides by the truth (*anṛitam ubhayataḥ satyena parigṛihītam*); by this means it becomes an actual being" (by Brahman the universe acquires its reality). The three syllables are differently explained in Chând. 8. 3. 5, *sa* as the immortal, *ti* as the mortal, and *yam* as the point of meeting (*yam, yac'chati*) of both; and again differently in Kaush. 1. 6 the syllable *-tyam* in the word *satyam* has reference to the gods and the vital breaths (external and internal nature), and the syllable *sat-* to the "being" distinct from the gods and the vital breaths, and exalted above them.

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¹ = 2. 3. 6.

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For the later Upanishads the question whether Brahman is (not-empirical) being or (empirical) not-being has no further significance. These, like all other pairs of opposites, are transcended by Brahman. He is "neither being nor not-being";¹ "higher than that which is and that which is not";² he comprehends in himself empirical reality, the realm of ignorance, and eternal reality, the kingdom of knowledge :—

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¹ S'vet. 4. 18.

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² Muṇḍ. 2. 2. 1.

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Two there are that in the eternal infinite supreme Brahman
Lie hidden, knowledge and ignorance ;
Ignorance is fleeting, knowledge eternal.
Yet he who as lord ordains them is that other.³

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³ S'vet. 5. 1.

3. Brahman as Consciousness, Thought (c'it)

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The conception of the *âtman* implies that the first principle of things must above all be sought in man's inner self. The inner nature of a man however is not accessible in the same way as his exterior. While the external appearance as body with all its organs and functions is exposed to view, and both the outer form and the inner play of bones and joints, of sinews, muscles and nerves, lie open to investigation on all sides, the knowledge of our inner nature is very limited and one-sided. We have no immediate perception of the body from within in the totality of its organs and their functions, like our view of it from without. Rather is our inner nature like a great house with many floors, passages and chambers, of which only a part is illuminated by a light burning in an upper storey, while all the rest remains in darkness, but is none the less real and existing. On first entering such a house, the mistake might easily arise of imagining the light the centre of the house, and that the accommodation of the latter extended only as far as the rays of the light reached, and all else since it was invisible might be regarded as altogether non-existent. It is due to this cause that the philosophising spirit of mankind in India, Greece, and modern times has with remarkable unanimity fallen into an error, which we can most briefly describe by the word *intellectualism*, and which consists in the belief that the innermost essence of man and of the universe, call it Brahman, first principle or deity, can bear any similarity or analogy or identity with that which we meet with here "behind man's pale forehead," as consciousness, thought or spirit. Yet whatever judgement may be passed on the value of this conception, in any case the entire development of philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to the present with few exceptions has been dominated by the thought that the nature of the soul, and in connection therewith the nature of god, is to be conceived as something related or analogous to human thought, as reason, spirit or intelligence. And as in Western philosophy the origin of this thought may be traced as far back as Xenophanes (οὖλος ὁρᾷ, οὖλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὖλος δέ τ’ ἀκούει), and Parmenides (ταὐτὸν δ’ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκέν ἐστι νόημα), so in India the leading advocacy if not the earliest origination of the very same idea is attached to the name of Yâjñavalkhya. All his views put forward in the Bṛihadâraṇyaka Upanishad centre in the conviction that Brahman, the âtman, is the knowing subject within us; and on this very account, as we shall see later on, is unknowable.

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Thus in Bṛih. 3. 4 he is invited by Ushasta to explain “the immanent, not transcendent Brahman, that as soul is within all.” For answer he refers to the soul, which by inspiration and exspiration, by the intermediate and the up-breathing, manifests itself as the vital principle. To the objection that this is only to point to the fact, not to give an explanation of it, he rejoins:—“Thou canst not see the seer of seeing, thou canst not hear the hearer of hearing, thou canst not comprehend the comprehender of comprehension, thou canst not know the knower of knowledge; he is thy soul, that is within all.” And to confirm the assertion that the knowing subject here characterised by him constitutes not only the essence of the soul but, in and with that, the essence of the godhead, he adds, “Whatever is distinct from that is liable to suffering.”

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He concludes therefore his description in Bṛih. 3. 8. 11 of the almighty being who sustains and pervades space, and with it the entire universe, with the words:—“In truth, O Gârgî, this imperishable one sees but is not seen, hears but is not heard, comprehends but is not comprehended, knows but is not known. Beside him there is none that sees, beside him there is none that hears, beside him there is none that comprehends, beside him there is none that knows. In truth, O Gârgî, in this imperishable one is space inwoven and interwoven.” (It cleaves, according to Kant, to the knowing subject.)

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In the instruction given to Maitreyî, in Bṛih. 2. 4. 11, Yâjñavalkhya compares the âtman to the ocean. As this is the meeting-place of all waters, so the âtman as eye is the meeting-place of all forms, as ear of all sounds, as nose of all smells, etc. For the correctness of our view of this passage let Bṛih. 1. 4. 7 in the first instance bear testimony:—“as breathing he is named breath, as speaking speech, as seeing eye, as hearing ear, as understanding mind; all these are but names for his operations.” So also Chând. 8. 12. 4:—“When the eye is directed on space, he is the spirit in the eye, the eye (itself) serves (only) for seeing; and if a man desires to smell, it is the âtman, the nose serves only for smelling; and if a man desires to speak, it is the âtman, the voice serves only for speaking; and if a man desires to hear, it is the âtman, the ear serves only for hearing; and if a man desires to understand, it is the âtman, the mind is his divine eye. With this divine eye, the mind, he perceives these joys and delights therein.” If we consider that this thought is here somewhat abruptly joined on to that which precedes, and in general occupies an isolated position in the circle of the ideas of the Chândogya, while with Yâjñavalkhya it forms the central point of all his reasoning, it becomes probable that borrowing has taken place on the side of the Chândogya. The same may be true of the entire exposition of Kaush. 3, which traces out in detail the dependence of the objects of sense on the organs of sense, and of the latter again on the prajñâtman, the “self-consciousness” (repeatedly explained as identical with the âtman); whereupon it is said in close accord with the above passages:—"Into him as eye all forms are gathered, by the eye he reaches all forms; into him as ear all sounds are gathered, by the ear he reaches all sounds," etc.

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The most complete exposition by Yâjñavalkhya of his theory of the âtman as the knowing subject persisting without change through the states of waking, dreaming, deep sleep, death, migration and final deliverance of the soul is found in the incomparable section Bṛh. 4. 3-4. Here the king Janaka first proposes the question,—"What serves man for light?" Yâjñavalkhya returns an evasive answer,—the sun serves him for light. When, however, the sun has set?—The moon. And when this also has set?—The fire. And when this also is extinguished?—The voice. And when this also is silenced?—"Then is he himself (âtman) his own light." "What do you mean by self?" "It is the spirit behind the organs of sense which is essential knowledge, and shines within in the heart." The further description is given how this spirit, while remaining the same, roves through this world in waking and dreaming, through the world of Brahman in deep sleep and death; how in waking it surveys the good and evil of this world without being moved thereby, "for nothing cleaves to this spirit" (the knowing subject stands opposed to everything that is objective); how in dreaming it builds up a world for itself, "for it is the creator"; how finally, in deep dreamless sleep, wrapped round by the self that consists of knowledge, the prâjña âtman, i.e. the absolute knowing subject, it has no consciousness of objects, and yet is not unconscious;—"when then he sees not, yet is he seeing, although he sees not; since for the seer there is no interruption of seeing because he is imperishable; but there is no second beside him, no other distinct from him for him to see.”¹ Compare the cognate passage Bṛih. 2. 1. 17–20, according to which on falling asleep all the *prāṇas* (eye, ear, etc.) enter into the *ātman*, and on waking all the vital spirits, worlds, gods and living beings spring forth from him again like sparks from the fire. The above passage Bṛih. 4. 4. 1 f. further describes how at death all the vital powers gather around the knowing subject, in order with him to go forth to a new incarnation,—“because he has become one, therefore he does not see, as they say” (in reality he continues ever seeing); and how finally after deliverance has been attained the body is cast off like the skin of a snake, “but the bodiless, the immortal, the life is pure Brahman and pure light” (*i.e.* the knowing subject). “In truth,” it is said in conclusion, “this great unbegotten self is of the vital organs that which consists of knowledge.” This identity of Brahman with the knowing subject, which forms the ruling conception in the thought of Yājñavalkhya, is most clearly expressed in a (certainly later) modification of the illustration of the lump of salt (preserved in its original form in Bṛih. 2. 4. 12):—“It is like a lump of salt, that has no (distinguishable) inner or outer, but consists through and through entirely of savour; so in truth this *ātman* has no (distinguishable) inner or outer, but consists through and through entirely of knowledge.”²

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¹ Bṛih. 4. 3. 23.

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² Bṛih. 4. 5. 13.

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How Yājñavalkhya’s conception of Brahman as the knowing subject has penetrated we see from the fact that it dominates the entire succeeding development of ideas, as we propose briefly to show.

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In the first place, we must here recall to mind the description of Brahman as “the light of lights.”³ This expression is nothing more than an epitome of the thought expounded above, that the *ātman* is itself its own light, when sun, moon and fire cease to shine. Thus too is to be explained the splendid verse that occurs thrice in different schools:¹—

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³ *jyotishâm jyotis*, Bṛih. 4. 4. 66 ; taken over thence in Muṇḍ. 2. 2. 9, Bhag. Gîtâ 13. 17.

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¹ Kâṭh. 5. 15, S’vet. 6. 14, Muṇḍ. 2. 2. 10.

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There no sun shines, no moon, nor glimmering star,
Nor yonder lightning, the fire of earth is quenched;
From him, who alone shines, all else borrows its brightness,
The whole world bursts into splendour at his shining.

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The original position of this verse is in the Kâṭhaka Upanishad, though this treatise otherwise frequently betrays its dependence on Bṛih. 4. 3-4.² Of Chând. 8. 12. 4 we have already spoken above. When further it is said, in the well-known passages Chând. 8. 3. 4 and 8. 12. 3,³ that the soul in deep sleep is raised from out of this body, enters into the purest light (*param jyotis*) and thereby assumes its proper form, the peculiar designation of Brahman as *param jyotis* may well recall Yâjñavalkhya’s conception of the âtman, which as the knowing subject is its own light.

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² cp. Kâṭh. 4. 3-5, 5. 8.

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³ cp. Maitr. 2. 2, Brahma Up. 1.

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Associated with this thought, and like it of great antiquity in India, is the conception of the divine world as an eternal kingdom of light, in contrast to the darkness of this earth.⁴ This conception is combined further on with the philosophical thought that the âtman as the knowing subject is its own light, to form the frequently recurring idea of the eternal day of Brahman. This is the case perhaps as early as Chând. 3. 11, where the description is given how the sun after the close of the thirty-one world-periods will “no longer rise or set, but remain stationary in mid-heaven”; how moreover for the wise this condition is already attained now, so that for them there is perpetual day (*sakrid-divâ ha eva asmai bhavati*).

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⁴ cp. the proverbial sayings quoted in Bṛih. 1. 3. 28, Chând. 3. 17. 6.

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More is found in Chând. 8. 4. 2, where Brahman is compared to a bridge :—" Therefore, in truth, even the night, if it crosses this bridge, is changed into day, for this world of Brahman " (which is in the heart) " is perpetual light (*sakṛid vibhâta*)." The following passages are dependent upon this :—" the darkness gives place, now there is no longer day nor night";¹ "when the darkness (of ignorance) is pierced through, then is reached that which is not affected with darkness; and he who has thus pierced through that which is so affected, he has beheld like a glittering circle of sparks Brahman bright as the sun, endowed with all might, beyond the reach of darkness, that shines in yonder sun as in the moon, the fire and the lightning";² meditation on *om* leads in the highest degree "to the eternal day of Brahman, whence is the source of lights";³ "for him (the sannyâsin) there is neither day nor night; therefore it was said also by the rishi,⁴ 'for it is a perpetual day';⁵ in yoga the spirit becomes "wholly the light of knowledge alone, the eternal, sleepless and dreamless, without name and form, altogether resplendent,⁶ omniscient,—to him worship is of no more account";⁷ "the eternal, free from slumber and dreams, is then his own light;⁸ for ever light⁹ is this being, this essential being in himself."¹⁰

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¹ S'vet. 4. 18.

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² Maitr. 6. 24.

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³ Nâdabindu 17.

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⁴ Chând. 3. 11. 3.

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⁵ Kaṇṭhas'ruti 2.

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⁶ Chând. 8. 4. 1.

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⁷ Gauḍapâda (on the Mâṇḍûkya) 3. 35.

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⁸ cp. Bṛih. 4. 3. 14, Kâṭh. 5. 15.

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⁹ Chând. 8. 4. 1.

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¹⁰ Gauḍapâda, *ib.*, 4. 81.

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That the âtman is the knowing subject within us, and cannot therefore be an object of worship, is enforced also in the opening verses of the Kena Upanishad. Here in connection with a verse preserved in two very different forms in Bṛih. 4. 4. 18 and Kena 2, which demands that the eye shall be acknowledged solely as eye, the ear solely as ear,¹¹ etc., and that accordingly they shall be regarded as mere instruments,¹ the thought is further developed that speech, thought, eye, ear and the organ of smell do not aid in perceiving Brahman, but themselves first, as objects, are perceived by Brahman as the subject.²

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¹¹ Bṛih. 4. 4. 18.

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¹ Kena 2; cp. in illustration Chând. 8. 12. 4, Kaush. 3. 8.

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² Kena 2-8.

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The conviction that the âtman is the knowing subject has finally found an entrance also into the schools of the Rigveda, although these are wont more usually to exalt the âtman as prâna or purusha (in the sense of Rigveda X. 90). With this is immediately connected, in Ait. 3, the doctrine that the âtman is not that with which we see, hear, smell, speak or taste (the organs of sense), but is solely and alone consciousness (prajñâ):—"Everything that this heart and mind are, reflection, meditation, deliberation, invention, intelligence, insight, resolve, purpose, desire, suffering, recollection, idea, force, life, love, will,—all these are names of consciousness." All gods, all elemental forces, all beings, "all this is guided by consciousness, grounded in consciousness; by consciousness this universe is governed, consciousness is its foundation, consciousness is Brahman."

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The second of the schools of the Rigveda, Kaush. 3 and 4, proceeds on somewhat different lines. Here the traditional view of Brahman as prâna is combined with the new recognition of Brahman as prajñâtman (the self of consciousness) by means of the assertion which accompanies an admirable proof of the dependence of all the objects and organs of sense on consciousness, and which is constantly repeated:—"what the prâna is, that is the prajñâ, and what the prajñâ is, that is the prâna." This identification of conceptions so heterogeneous seems to show that the doctrine of Brahman as the knowing subject (prajñâ) among the Kaushîtakins, and probably also among the Aitareyins, is borrowed, and presumably is adopted from the circle of thought of Yâjñavalkhya.

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In the later philosophy this doctrine has shaped itself into the broader conception of Brahman or the âtman as the "spectator" (*sâkshin*). This occurs first in S'vet. 6. 11 (*sâkshin*) and Pras'na 6. 5 (*paridrashtar*), perhaps in connection with Bṛih. 4. 3. 32 (*salila*).¹

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¹ Further references are given in the Index to the Upanishads under the word "spectator."

4. Brahman as Bliss (ânanda)

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It is essential to the deeper religious consciousness to regard the earthly life not as an end in itself, but merely as a road by which we must travel to our true destination. The three great religions of mankind therefore, Brâhmanism, Buddhism, and Christianity, and not less the philosophy of Schopenhauer, which represents Christianity in its purest form, agree in teaching that the highest aim of our endeavour is deliverance from the present existence. This view assumes that this earthly existence is a condition from which we need deliverance, and is to that extent a conception of it which has been briefly and well described as pessimism,—although recently the sensational philosophy has laid its hands upon this word, and has practised so childish a play upon it that we shrink from using it any longer. The pessimistic view of life is only so far justified as it is a presumption of the doctrine of deliverance, so far therefore as it belongs, for example, to the real and original Christianity : ὁ κόσμος ὅλος ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ κεῖται.² In this sense pessimism is also the latent underlying view of the Upanishad teaching. And the later systems of Buddhism and the Sânkhya philosophy which are founded upon it, as well as some of the more recent Upanishads, take pleasure in dwelling upon this theme, as will subsequently be shown; for men lend a willing ear to the story of their own sufferings. In contrast to these the older Upanishads are content in a discreet and, as it were, modest style to recall occasionally the nature of existence, full of suffering and exciting longings for deliverance. Nor is this ever done in a better or more fitting manner than in the difficult words that suggest a wide experience,—ato 'nyad ârtam, “what is distinct from him, that is full of suffering.”¹ Contrasted with all that is distinct from him and therefore involved in suffering, Brahman is described in one of the passages where this formula occurs as that which “oversteps hunger and thirst, pain and illusion, old age and death,”² or according to other passages as “the self (âtman), the sinless, free from old age, free from death and free from suffering, without hunger and without thirst.”³ “His name is ‘exalted,’ for he is exalted above all evil,”⁴ etc. All these frequently recurring descriptions are summed up in the designation of Brahman as ânanda, “bliss.”

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² 1 Jo. 5¹⁹.

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¹ Bṛih. 3. 4. 2, 3. 5. 1, 3. 7. 23.

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² Bṛih. 3. 5. 1.

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³ Chând. 8. 1. 5, 8. 7. 1.

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⁴ Chând. 1. 6. 7.

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The view that the gods, in contrast to the suffering world of men, enjoy an untroubled felicity, is probably common to all peoples. But in the Upanishads bliss appears not as an attribute or a state of Brahman, but as his peculiar essence. Brahman is not ânandin, possessing bliss, but ânanda, bliss itself. This identification of Brahman and ânanda is effected through the medium of the view that, on the one hand, the deep, dreamless sleep, by destroying the existing contrast of subject and object, is a temporary union with Brahman; while on the other hand, since all suffering is then abolished, the same state is described as a bliss admitting of no enhancement.⁵

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⁵ cp. Plato, Apol. 40d, where Socrates speaks of a night ἐν ᾗ οὕτω κατέδαρθεν ὥστε μηδ’ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, and is of opinion that even the King of Persia has not many days or nights which are comparable with this in happiness; cp. Shakespeare also, Hamlet, III. i.,— “and by a sleep to say we end The heartache and the thousand natural shocks That flesh is heir to,—’tis a consummation Devoutly to be wish’d.”

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We propose now to show how the conception of Brahman as bliss is originally based on these ideas. Here too the Bṛihadāraṇyaka takes the leading place.

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“When however he is overcome by deep sleep, when he is conscious of nothing, then the veins called hitāḥ (“beneficent”) are active, seventy-two thousand of which ramify from the heart outwards in the pericardium; into these he glides, and reposes in the pericardium; and like a youth or a great king or a great Brāhman enjoying an excess of bliss (atighnīm ānandasya) reposes, so he also then reposes.”¹ This passage² appears to be traceable back to the detailed description of deep sleep in Bṛih. 4. 3. 19–33, which, although it does not yet define the number of veins, in its exaltation of bliss in 4. 3. 33 gives the key to the atighnīm ānandasya, and in general (apart from interpolations) makes an impression of greater originality. Here, after a description of deep sleep as the state “in which he, fallen asleep, experiences no further desire, and sees no dream image,” and after mention of the veins, the transition is described from the dream consciousness to the consciousness of deep sleep,—from the consciousness of being this or that to the consciousness of being all (aham eva idam sarvo ’smi), whereby subject and object become one; it is then said:—“That is his real form, in which he is exalted above desire, and is free from evil and fear. For just as one who dallies (the original meaning of ānanda) with a beloved wife has no consciousness of outer or inner, so the spirit also, dallying with the self whose essence is knowledge (prājñena ātmanā, i.e. with Brahman) has no consciousness of inner and outer. That is his real form, wherein desire is quenched, and he is himself his own desire, separate from desire and from distress. Then the father is no longer father, the mother no longer mother, the worlds no longer worlds, the gods no longer gods, the vedas no longer vedas," etc., all contrasts have disappeared, "then is he unaffected by good or evil, then has he subdued all the griefs of his heart." This state is then further described as one of pure knowledge, of existence as subject without object (cf. the νόησις νοήσεως), and it is then added,—"This is his supreme goal, this is his supreme happiness, this is his supreme world, this is his supreme bliss; by a small portion only of this bliss all other creatures live." In explanation of this sentence (which for that reason is probably original here, and borrowed from this place in Taitt. 2. 8, where the thought is further developed) the proof is finally offered by means of a progressive advance through six (in Taitt. 2. 8, ten) grades, how the highest human bliss is only a billionth part (in Taitt. 2. 8, a hundred trillionth) of bliss in the world of Brahman,—"and this is the supreme bliss, this is the world of Brahman" (which is in the heart).

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¹ Bṛih. 2. 1. 19.

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² Like its parallel, Kaush. 4. 19.

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In this passage of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka we evidently have before us the origin of the doctrine of Brahman as bliss. The entire passage treats of deep sleep, and describes it on the one hand as union with Brahman, on the other as a state of supreme unsurpassable bliss, until in the concluding words,—"this is the supreme bliss, this is the Brahman world,"—the identification of Brahman and bliss is complete. That by "the Brahman world" is to be understood not the world of Brahman, but Brahman as the world (not brahmaṇo lokaḥ, but brahma eva lokaḥ) is already justly remarked by the commentator, p. 815. 5. and 915. 7. Accordingly the entire doctrine of Brahman as bliss appears to rest upon this passage, in which we are able to observe its birth,¹ and the consideration of the remaining passages that contain this doctrine makes it appear quite possible that they are all derived from our passage, Bṛih. 4. 3. 19–33. We have already discussed Bṛih. 2. 1. 19 (and Kaush. 4. 19). The word *ānanda* does not occur in the Chând. Up. ; but when it is said in Chând. 4. 10. 5 :—" Brahman is life (*prāṇa*), Brahman is joy (*kam*), Brahman is space (*kham*)," *kham* stands here for *ākāśa* and *kam* for *ānanda*; and the formal setting side by side of the three ideas, *prāṇa*, *ānanda*, *ākāśa* gives the impression of a later attempt at harmonisation. Chând. 7. 23 also, where pleasure (*sukham*, here = *ānanda*) is identified with Bhûman (*yo vai bhûmâ tat sukham*) by the following description which is given of *bhûman* as the knowing subject without object suggests the conjecture of a dependence again on the circle of thought of Yâjñavalkhya. The Kaushîtaki Upanishad celebrates Brahman, as noticed above, as the *prāṇa* identical with the *prajñâ*, and accordingly employs the word *ānanda* only in its original meaning of "sexual desire." It is all the more surprising that in Kaush. 3. 8, after it has just been said that we ought not to seek for *ānanda* but for the *ānandasya vijñâtar*, there is immediately added :—" This *prāṇa* however is the *prajñâtman*, is bliss (*ānanda*), never ageing, and immortal." Here the borrowing of the word *ānanda* from another circle of thought is quite unmistakable.

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¹ The description of all the gods as ānanda-ātmānaḥ, given as early as S'atap. Br. X. 3. 5. 13, is an entirely different thing.

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The chief passage treating of Brahman as bliss is the Ânandavallî, Taitt. 2.¹ Where the *annamaya*, *prâṇamaya*, *manomaya* and *vijñânamaya âtman* are in turn stripped off as mere husks in order to penetrate to the *ânanda-maya âtman* as kernel. Of this *âtman* consisting of bliss it is then said :—" Love is his head, joy his right side, joyousness his left side, bliss his trunk, Brahman his under part, his base." Brahman, that is here described as the base of the self consisting of bliss, is originally non-existent (*i.e.* only metaphysically existing), and fashions himself out of himself, as is further said, therefore is he named well-fashioned. “What this well-fashioned one is, in truth, that is the essence; for when a man receives this essence, then is he full of bliss; for who could breathe, who live, if that bliss were not in the *âkâśa* (the void, from which the universe originated). For it is he who creates bliss. For when a man finds his peace, his resting-place, in that invisible, unreal, inexpressible, unfathomable one, then has he attained to peace.” Further, a warning is given against pushing the craving for knowledge too far, and against continuing to distinguish in the self consisting of bliss a subject and object, whereby again a man would fall under the dominion of fear. Then Taitt. 2. 8 follows with the heading,—“This is the treatise on bliss (*ânandasya mîmânsâ*).” Here we find the very same ascription of power to bliss which is already known from Bṛih. 4. 3. 33; in the latter passage it stands naturally as explanatory of the preceding sentence, while in Taitt. 2. 8 it is introduced under an especial title, and without such connection with the preceding. This circumstance, as well as the increase of endowment from six limbs to ten with several details, makes it probable that the two texts do not spring from a common source, but that Taitt. 2. 8 depends directly on Bṛih. 4. 3. 33. If this is accepted, then Taitt. 2 might prove to be directed polemically against Bṛih. 4. 3–4. For the expression *vijñânamaya âtman* (*purusha*) denotes, in Bṛih. 4. 3. 7, 4. 4. 22,¹ the knowing subject apart from object, and therefore the supreme; while in Taitt. 2. 5 this *vijñânamaya* is conceived as subject contrasted with object, and contrary to Bṛih. 4. 3 is brought down to a mere preliminary grade of the *ânandamaya*.

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¹ Taitt. 3 is only an imitation.

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¹ cp. 2. 1. 16.

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All later passages depend partly on Bṛih. 4. 3,² partly on Taitt. 2, as for example Mahânâr. 63. 16, Maitr. 6. 13, 6. 23, 6. 27, 7. 3, Tejobindu 8 (*ānandam nandanatītam*), Sarvop. 9–13, etc. The earliest description of the annamaya, etc. as “sheaths” (*kos'as*) is found perhaps in the verse Maitr. 6. 27. Several of the later passages add the conception of the *ānandamaya* as the innermost kernel (corresponding to the original intention); others, in the poetical description of it in Taitt. 2. 5, still discern a multiplicity (*priyam, moda, pramoda, ānanda*), and conceive it therefore as a fifth sheath, in which brahman, designated in Taitt. 2. 5 the “foundation,” holds its place as kernel; a view which gave rise in the later Vedānta to an important discussion.

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² cp. Muṇḍ. 2. 2. 7, Mâṇḍ. 5 with Gauḍ. 1. 3–4.

5. Negative Character and Unknowablenesss of the essential Brahman

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We have seen how the descriptions of Brahman as being, thought and bliss (*sac-c'id-ānanda*), which are common in the later Vedānta, are founded on the ancient Upanishads, and how their statements concerning Brahman may be comprehended under these three ideas. But no definite conclusion is by this means reached on these lines as to the nature of Brahman. For the being, which Brahman is, is not to be understood as such being as is known to us by experience, but is rather, as we saw, in an empirical sense a not-being. The descriptions of Brahman as the knowing subject within us are usually accompanied by the assertion that this knowing subject, the “knower of knowing,” remains himself always unknowable, the intention being merely to deny thereby of Brahman all objective existence. The bliss also, which is described as the essence of Brahman, is not such a bliss as we know or experience, but is only such as holds sway in deep dreamless sleep, when the distinction of subject and object and therefore consciousness has ceased. Accordingly all three definitions of Brahman as being, thought or bliss are in essence only negative. Being is the negation of all empirical being, thought the negation of all objective being, bliss the negation of all being that arises in the mutual relation of knowing subject and known object; and therefore as the final result and main dogma of the Upanishad teaching the conclusion is reached, as far as his peculiar and essential being is concerned, Brahman is absolutely unknowable.

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This unknowableness of Brahman, the âtman, is already most emphatically declared by the ancient Upanishads. Yâjñavalkhya sums up his speculations concerning the âtman no less than four times¹ in the celebrated formula:—"He however, the âtman, is not so, not so (neti, neti). He is incomprehensible, for he is not comprehended; indestructible, for he is not destroyed; unaffected, for nothing affects him; he is not fettered, he is not disturbed, he suffers no harm." "In truth, this great unbegotten self does not grow old or decay, and is immortal, fearless, is Brahman."² "That it is, O Gârgî, which the wise call the imperishable (aksharam); it is neither thick nor thin, neither short nor long, neither red (like fire) nor fluid (like water), neither shadowy nor dark, neither wind nor ether (space), not adhesive (like gum), without taste or smell, without eye or ear, without speech, without understanding, without vital force and without breath, without mouth or size, without inner or outer; never consuming anything, nor consumed by any."³

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¹ Bṛih. 4. 2. 4, 4. 4. 22, 4. 5. 15, 3. 9. 26,—a fifth occurrence, Bṛih. 2. 3. 6, is borrowed.

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² Bṛih. 4. 4. 25.

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³ Bṛih. 3. 8. 8.

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It is upon these passages that the amplifications of the later Upanishads depend. Thus in Kâṭh. 2. 18, where it is said of the "seer" (vipaścit, i.e. the knowing subject):—

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The seer is not born and does not die,
He does not originate from any, nor become any,
The Ancient One, from everlasting abides everlastingly,⁴
Nor is he slain, for it is the body that is slain.

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⁴ Bṛih. 4. 4. 18.

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Similarly in Muṇḍ. 1. 1. 5:—"The higher (knowledge) however is that by which that imperishable one¹ is known; that which

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¹ aksharam, cp. Bṛih. 3. 8. 8.

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Invisible, incomprehensible, without genealogy, colourless,
Without eye or ear, without hands or feet,
Eternal, pervading all and over all, scarce knowable,
That unchangeable one
Whom the wise regard as being's womb."

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Further:—

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"That which remains inaudible, intangible, invisible,
Which can neither be tasted nor smelt, imperishable,
That abides eternal, without beginning or end, greater than the greatest,
He who knows that has escaped from the jaws of death."²

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² Kâṭh. 3. 15.

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And:—

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"He stretches himself around, without frame or sinews,
Pure, unsullied, invulnerable, free from evil,
Gazing forth, by himself alone, all-embracing,
For each after its kind has he for all time determined the goal."³

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³ Îs'â 8.

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The passage Chând. 8. 1. 5⁴—"that is the âtman, the sinless, free from old age, free from death and suffering, without hunger or thirst," seems to depend on Bṛih. 3. 5, —"that (âtman), who oversteps hunger and thirst, pain and illusion, old age and death." In Chând. 6. 8–16, on the other hand, the various phenomena of nature that engage attention are traced back to their unknowable source, of which it is said in the celebrated refrain nine times repeated:—"What that subtle being (i.e. that unknowable, aṇiman) is by which this universe subsists, that is the real, that is the soul, that art thou (tat tvam asi), O S'vetaketu?"

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⁴ =8. 7. 1.

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The unknowableness of Brahman, which in the above passages led to a denial to him of all empirical predicates, is expressed in poetic style also by ascribing to Brahman the most contradictory and irreconcilable attributes, as shown in the following two passages :—

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“He stays, yet wanders far from hence,
He reposes, yet strays everywhere around,
The movement hither and thither of the god,
Who could understand besides me?”¹

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¹ Kâṭh. 2. 21.

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“One,—motionless and yet swift as thought,—
Departing, not even by gods to be overtaken;
Standing still he yet overtakes all runners,—
In him the god of the wind interwove the primeval waters.

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Resting is he and yet restless,
Afar is he and yet so near!
He is within all,
And yet yonder outside of all.”²

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² Îs’â 4-5.

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Here the opposite predicates of nearness and distance, of repose and movement, are ascribed to Brahman in such a manner that they mutually cancel one another, and serve only to illustrate the impossibility of conceiving Brahman by means of empirical definitions.

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The impossibility of knowing Brahman is however most clearly expressed in the formula of Yâjñavalkhya already quoted,—neti, neti (na iti, na iti), “it is not so, it is not so.” As to its original meaning there is some doubt. According to Hillebrandt,³ na is not the negative, but an affirmative particle signifying “in truth,” “it is.” Or the formula might be rendered ‘na iti na’ iti, Brahman “is not not,” is the negation of negation, “a denial of a denial,” the “nihtesniht, daz ê was denne niht,” as M. Eckhart expresses it.⁴ These ideas however are opposed not only to the consistency with which in the four passages in which this formula originally appears⁵ it is applied to the elucidation of a series of negative predicates,⁶ but also to all the Indian explanations of the formula with which we are acquainted. Such an explanation is already offered in Brih. 2. 3. 6:—*na hi etasmâd—iti neti—anyat param asti*, “for there is no other (definition) beyond this, that it is not so”; or (less appropriately), “for there no other beside this (Brahman), therefore it is said, it is not so.” According to this explanation *na iti* stands for *na evam*, as Bâdarâyaṇa already explains:¹—*prakrita-etâvattvam hi pratishedhati*, “for it (the passage) denies the aforesaid² being-so-and-so,” and Śaṅkara (while giving the two explanations quoted above) confirms this sûtra. Similarly at an earlier period:—

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³ In a review of my translation of the Upanishads, Deutsche Literaturz., 1897, p. 1929.

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⁴ ed. Pfeiffer, pp. 322, 539.

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⁵ Bṛih. 4. 2. 4, 4. 4. 22, 4. 5. 15, 3. 9. 26.

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⁶ agrihyo na hi gṛihyate, etc.

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¹ Sûtram 3. 2. 22.

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² Brih. 2. 3. 6.

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The saying, “it is not so, not so,”
Rejecting all that can be expressed in word;
As the assertion of unknowableness proves,
Can only be referred to Him.³

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³ Gauḍapâda, Mâṇḍûkyakârikâ 3. 26.

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We have already learnt from the philosophy of Kant that the entire empirical order of things is subject to the laws of space, time and causality,⁴ and that the self-existent, or in Indian language Brahman, in contrast with the empirical system of the universe, is not like it in space but is spaceless, not in time but timeless, not subject to but independent of the law of causality. This proposition could not express an eternal truth valid alike for all ages and peoples without having been anticipated by all the metaphysicians of the past, and therefore also in the Upanishads. We propose to investigate this point here, merely prefacing the remark that those ancient times were frequently unable to formulate the idea of a spaceless, timeless, causeless existence in its abstract simplicity, but only to conceive its representation in experience. On this assumption spacelessness is regarded as a disengagement of Brahman from the laws of space, which assigns limits to everything and appoints it a definite place and no other, while Brahman is described as omnipresent, all-prevading, unlimited, infinitely great and infinitely small. Similarly the timelessness of Brahman appears as freedom from the limitations of time, as an eternity without beginning or end, or again as instantaneous duration occupying no time (as lightning). And finally, Brahman's independence of causality is exhibited as freedom from all the laws of becoming, the universal rule of which is causality, as causelessness, absolute self-existence, and unchanging endurance.

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⁴ *des'a-kâla-nimitta*, as it is already expressed in a later Upanishad, and quite a dozen times by Śaṅkara.

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(1) Brahman as spaceless. In Bṛih. 3. 8. 7 it is said :—"That which is above the heaven, O Gârgî, and that which is beneath the earth, and that which is between them, the heaven and the earth, that which men call the past, present and future, that is woven within and throughout in space." "But wherein then is space woven within and throughout?" The answer is given in a magnificent description of Brahman as the imperishable (*aksharam*), and in conclusion it is said :—"In truth, in this imperishable one is space woven within and throughout, O Gârgî." "This Brahman is independent of earlier and later, of inner and outer; this âtman is Brahman, the all-perceiving." ¹ "The front (eastern) regions of the heaven are his front organs, the right (southern) regions of the heaven are his right organs, the hinder (western) regions of the heaven are his hinder organs, the left (northern) regions of the heaven are his left organs, the upper regions of the heaven are his upper organs, the lower regions of the heaven are his lower organs, all the regions of the heaven are all his organs." ² "It however (the unlimited, the *bhûman*) is beneath and above, in the west and the east, in the south and the north; it is this whole universe. — Next for the self-consciousness: I (aham) am beneath and above, in the west and in the east, in the south and in the north; I am this whole universe.—Next for the soul (âtman): The soul is beneath and above, in the west and in the east, in the south and in the north; the soul is this whole universe.”¹ Cp. the passage Maitr. 6. 17:—“Brahman in truth was this universe at the beginning, the one, the infinite; infinite towards the east, infinite towards the south, infinite in the west, infinite in the north, and above and beneath, infinite on all sides. For him there is no eastern, or any region of the heaven at all, no athwart, no beneath or above.” In Chând. 3. 14. 3 also:—“This is my soul (âtman) in my heart, smaller than a grain of rice or barley or a mustard-seed, than a grain or the kernel of a grain of millet; this is my soul in my heart, greater than the earth, greater than the air, greater than the heaven, greater than these worlds.” Passages like these are in the mind of the writer when in a frequently recurring verse² Brahman is named “the smallest of the small and the greatest of the great”; and when the epithets “omnipresent”³ and “all-prevading”⁴ are applied to him. The description also of him as “indivisible”⁵ implies independence of space, since all that is in space is divisible. Since further all that is in space as being divisible involves a plurality, to deny all plurality of Brahman⁶ amounts to a rejection of the predicates of space as in Kâṭh. 4. 10–11:—

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