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The Philosophy of the Upanishads c9.s5.t3.3

The Philosophy of the Upanishads c9.s5.t3.3

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c9.s5.t3.3

Yâjñavalkhya begins his instruction of Maitreyî in Bṛih. 2. 4 with the words:—“In truth, not for the husband’s sake is the husband dear, but for the sake of the self (the soul, *âtman*) is the husband dear.” Similarly all the objects of the world,—wife, sons and possessions, the estate of a Brâhman or a warrior, worlds, gods, living beings and the entire universe are dear to us not in themselves or for their own sake, but only for the sake of our own self. How this is to be understood is shown by the conclusion which immediately follows, and which is inferred from it:—“The self, in truth, should be seen, heard, comprehended and reflected on, O Maitreyî; in truth, he who has seen, heard, comprehended and known the self, by him this entire universe is known.” This implies that all reality is and remains limited to our own self, and that we know love and possess all things in the universe only so far as they subsist in our consciousness, as they are grasped and entertained by our knowing self; there is no universe outside of the *âtman*, our self, our soul. This is the standpoint of complete idealism, which denies the reality of the manifold universe, as it is further expounded by passages like Bṛih. 2. 1. 16 and 20, where it is taught that all worlds, gods and living creatures spring from the spirit consisting of knowledge (*vijñânamaya purusha*) like sparks from the fire; or, as in Bṛih. 3. 4 and 3. 5, where inquiry is made for the “ Brahman that is within all as soul,” and the answer is given :—“ It is thy soul, that is within all,” which as the knowing subject remains unknowable¹ and with the consciousness of which the whole universe, all children, possessions and wisdom vanish into the nothingness which they really are.² In the latter passage an inclination is already revealed towards the realism which is natural to us all, inasmuch as the existence of the external world is not denied; the objects are there, but as far as their essential nature is concerned they are nothing but the âtman alone. Similarly in the important and well-known passage Chând. 6. 8–16, where a series of mysterious phenomena and relations of nature and life are traced back to their unknowable original source, and of this it is then said in a nine-times repreated refrain :— “ What that subtle being (that unknowable, aṇiman) is, of which this whole universe is composed, that is the real, that is the soul, that art thou, O S’vetaketu!”

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