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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c5.s5.t1: 1. General Remarks on the Indian Pramânas or Canons of Knowledge

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c5.s5.t1

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1. General Remarks on the Indian Pramânas or Canons of Knowledge

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WHAT are the sources from which we draw our knowledge? This question, of which every philosophy has to give an account, meets us in the Indian systems largely in the form of a consideration of the *Pramânas*, literally, “measures” or “canons,” of our knowledge; in which, therefore, not the concept of a source from which we draw is the basis, but on the contrary that of a means of control, by which we are to measure the knowledge already existing in us, and test its correctness, a concept which is explained by the fact that Indian philosophy did not start, as far the most part the Grecian did, from an investigation, free of assumptions, into “the existent,” but rather, like modern philosophy, from the critical analysis and testing of a complex of knowledge handed down (through the Veda)⁵². As such *Pramânas*, or canons of knowledge, the systems, as a rule, enumerate: 1) *Pratyaksham*, also called *drishtam*, the sensuously perceptible, as it is known to us by direct perception; 2) *Anumânam* “the measuring after something,” inference, by which that part of “the existent” which does not fall within direct perception,⁵³ becomes accessible; we know of it only because the perceptible points to something else, not perceptible, with which it is connected. This connection can be threefold, according as the element to be inferred is either the cause of the element perceived, or its effect, or as, thirdly, the two stand in a relation which does not fall under the conception of causality, for example, in that of analogy.

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⁵² An essential difference consists in modern philosophy in its fundamental character, even up to-day, being a toilsome struggle and gradual shaking off of the fetters of mediæval scholasticism,—while the Indian philosophy through all time has been the better, the more closely it has adhered to the basis laid down in the Vedic Upanishads. But in truth this basis is also of an eminently philosophical character.

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⁵³ By this is explained the fundamental proposition of the theory of knowledge, that where *Pratyaksham* exists, there is no *Anumânam* p. 657, 9: *pratyakshatvâd anumâna-apravritteh*.

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These two spheres of knowledge, the perceived and the inferred, embrace naturally the whole complex of "the existent." The position of the Cârvâkas (materialists) who will only allow validity to the first is crude but correspondingly little objection can be raised, when the Vaiçeshikas and Bauddhas (Buddhists) will not go further than these two pramânas. For it is very strange that the Sânkhyas and others add to these also 3) Âptavacanam, that is "right communication," which then, again, according as it is understood, means secular or religious tradition. For the former goes back again to Pratyaksham and Anumânam and the latter is, in philosophy, no legal component, and is one of the means by which the Sânkhyas and others, with all their heresy, were yet able to keep up an appearance of orthodoxy. Through further splitting up of Anumânam, not to the advantage of clearness, the adherents of the Nyâya reached four, the Mîmânsakas of the school of Jaimini six, and others even nine Pramânas (cf. Colebr. Misc. Ess. p. 240, 266, 303-304, 330, 403).