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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c6.s3.t3: 3. Brahman as the last, unknowable origin of the Existent

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c6.s3.t3

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3. Brahman as the last, unknowable origin of the Existent

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a) Sûtram 1, 2, 21-23.

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In the Introduction of the Muṇḍaka-Upanishad two doctrines are distinguished (in another sense than above, p. 98 ff.), a lower, which, as Śaṅkara remarks, has as its fruit ascent (abhyudaya, cf. p. 82), and a higher, which has as its fruit salvation (p. 203, 5). Under the lower the four Vedas besides the six Vedâṅgas (Phonetics, Grammar, Etymology, Metre, Ritual and Astronomy) are enumerated, and then it is said further, Muṇḍ. 1, 1, 5:

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"But the higher is that through which that Imperishable is known: the invisible, intangible, unoriginated, colourless, without eyes and ears, without hands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, all-present, very subtle, this is the Unchanging which the wise know as the womb of beings. As the spider puts forth [the threads] and draws them back again, as herbs grow up upon the earth, as from a living man the hair on head and body, so from this Imperishable arises all the world."

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Here, as Śaṅkara develops it, the highest God is to be understood, not primordial matter or the individual soul. For though the examples brought forward, the spider's body and the man's body, are only directed by an intelligent power, but are themselves non-intelligent (p. 200, 12), yet these are only comparisons, which must not be pressed too far (p. 204, 14); that an intelligent original Being is to be understood, is proved by what immediately follows, and is therefore to be applied here, "he who understands all, who knows all" (Muṇḍ. 1, 1, 9), which cannot be applied to a non-intelligent primordial matter (p. 201, 3).—One might also think of the individual soul, because it certainly according to its moral nature (p. 201, 9) conditions what arises as being, but what follows further on, shews clearly that only the highest Brahman can be meant. For it is said further, Muṇḍ. 2, 1, 1:

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"This is the truth:—As, from a well lit fire, sparks, of like nature to it, arise thousandfold, so, dear one, from the

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“Imperishable go forth manifold beings, and return into it “again. For divine is the spirit (purusha), the formless, who “is within and without, unborn, breathless, wishless, pure, yet “higher than the highest Imperishable. From him arises “breath, the understanding with all the senses, from him arise “ether, wind, and fire, the water, and earth the support of “all. His head is fire, his eyes the moon and sun, the cardinal- “points are his ears, his voice is the revelation of the Veda. “Wind is his breath, his heart the world, from his feet the “earth;—he is the inner Self in all beings.”

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From this passage, says Çañkara, it is clear, that neither the individual soul, to which such majesty of body does not belong, nor primordial matter is to be thought of, because it is not the inner Self in all beings (sarva-bhûta-antarâtman), (p. 207, 12). If at the same time an individualised form is attributed to the invisible womb of beings, this is not in order to ascribe to it a real individuality, but only to make it clear that it is the Self of the universe (sarva-âtman) (p. 208, 1).— A difficulty is caused by the fact that the Âtman, which (above p. 131) is called “the Imperishable,” is here spoken of as “higher than the highest Imperishable.” The way in which Çañkara tries to solve this difficulty, by here understanding the “Imperishable as the undeveloped subtle body [Chap. XXXI, 3], “forming the seed-power for names and forms, which serves as “the ground-work for the Lord, and is only a limitation (upâdhi) “ascribed to himself” (p. 206, 1), as well as the opinion of some, considered by Çañkara (p. 208), that in the concluding words of the text Prajâpati (a cosmogonic personification of Brahman) is to be understood, we may very well pass by.

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b) Sûtram 1, 3, 10–12.

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In the Brihadâranyaka-Upanishad (3, 8) Gârgî, the daughter of Vacaknu (not the wife of Yâjñavalkya, as Colebrooke, M. E.¹ p. 343 erroneously supposes) asks Yâjñavalkya in what is woven and interwoven that which exists above heaven, beneath the earth, and between heaven and earth, in what the past, the present, and the future, and receives as answer: in the ether (space) all this is woven and interwoven.—“But in what,”

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¹ p. 343 erroneously supposes

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she asks further, “is ether (space) then woven and interwoven?”—To this Yâjñavalkya:

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“It is that, o Gârgî, which the Brahmans call the Imperishable (*aksharam*); it is neither gross nor fine, nor short nor long, nor red [like fire] nor adhering [like water], not shady nor dark, not wind nor ether, not sticky [like gum], without taste, without smell, without eye or ear, without voice, without understanding, without vital-force, and without breath, without mouth and without measure, without inner or outer; nothing whatsoever does it consume, nor is it consumed by any. At the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, sun and moon are kept asunder from each other; at the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, heaven and earth are kept asunder from each other; at the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, the minutes and the hours, the days and nights, the half-months, months, the seasons, and the years are kept asunder. At the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, the streams run downward from the snowy mountains some to the east, some to the west, and whithersoever each one goes; at the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, men praise the generous man, gods strive for the sacrificer, the fathers for the offerings for the dead. Verily, o Gârgî, he who knows not this Imperishable, though in this world he offers and has offerings made, though he suffers penance many a thousand years, gains an unenduring [reward]; but he who knows not that Imperishable, o Gârgî, and departs from this world, he, indeed, is miserable; but he who, o Gârgî, knowing this Imperishable, departs from this world, he, indeed, is a Brâhmaṇa. Verily, o Gârgî, this Imperishable is seeing, not seen, hearing, not heard, understanding, not understood, knowing, not known. For outside him there is no seer, outside him there is no hearer, outside him there is no none with understanding, outside him there is none with knowledge. In this Imperishable, verily, o Gârgî, is the ether woven and interwoven.”

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In this passage, as Çañkara explains, the Imperishable (*aksharam*) means not “the syllable,” as usually is the case, generally the sacred syllable “*om*,” of which it is said (Chând.

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2, 23, 4) “the sound *om* is all this,” but the highest divinity (p. 242, 10); for of it only is it true that in it the ether and thereby the universe is woven (p. 242, 14), as even in the passage mentioned (Chând. 2, 23, 4) the sound “*om*” signifies Brahman (p. 243, 3), whose properties of eternity and all-permeation are signified etymologically by *aksharam* (*na ksharati*, *aṇnute ca*, p. 243, 4). Primordial matter can also not be understood as the Imperishable, for it is said: “at the bidding of this Imperishable,” and “this is seeing not seen” etc., which must refer to an intelligent power (p. 243, 12. 244, 8); but it cannot refer to the individual soul, because in the words: “without eye and without ear” etc., all limitations (*upâdhi*) are excluded, and without these the individual soul cannot exist (p. 244, 13).

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All the properties of the Brahman, which we have dealt with hitherto, were (so far as they are not to be taken figuratively) purely negative; now we turn to the two positive determinations of the being of the Godhead, which show it as 1) pure intelligence, 2) pure bliss.

Cites (4)