The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c7.s3.t7: 7. The Controversy with the Buddhists concerning the Reality of the Outer World

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c7.s3.t7

Language: English

7. The Controversy with the Buddhists concerning the Reality of the Outer World

Just as Kant, along with transcendental idealism, maintained the empirical reality of the external world, and defended it (against Berkeley), so the Vedāntins are not prevented by their doctrine of Ignorance as the foundation of all Being expanded in name and form from maintaining the reality of the outer world against the Buddhists of idealistic tendencies. (In order to guard against misunderstanding, we must bear in mind the passage translated in note 31, above p. 55.) Because of the high importance of this question, and the difficulty of the section of our work which treats of it, we shall translate the passage here at length.¹⁰²

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¹⁰¹ A pañcīkaraṇam, such as the Vedāntasāra § 124 teaches, is already found in Govinda's Gloss, p. 139, 21. 733, 17; but not yet in Ҫaṅkara's Commentary to the Brahmasūtras.

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¹⁰² In what follows, we translate vijñānam presentation; jñānam knowledge; anubhava sensation, feeling; pratyaya perception; upalabdhi, upalambha apperception; grahaṇam comprehension; avagamanam apprehension; saṃskāra impression; pratyaksham observation;—the meaning of these terms is, however, not so much to be gathered from the modern terms which we have chosen (in default of others), but rather from the context.

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Immediately before this, stands the discussion on Buddhist realism (2, 2, 18—27), to which the Buddhist idealist refers in the opening words.

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The Buddhist speaks:

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[p. 566, 12ff.] “Because the attraction of many scholars towards external things has been noticed, this doctrine of (the reality of) the outer world was put forward for their sake. But this is not the Buddha’s view; [p. 567] on the contrary what he desired, is solely the doctrine of the sole category (skandha) of presentation (vijñānam). According to the doctrine of presentation, the outward form is only in the intellect, (buddhi), and the whole worldly action of knowledge, what is known and [the enjoyment of] fruit is only something interior; and even if there were exterior things, yet without being in the intellect, this worldly action of knowing etc. could not take place.”

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“How then can it be proved that the whole worldly action is only something interior, and that beyond the presentation, there are no external things?—For the reason that they are impossible! For let it be taken for granted that there are exterior objects, e.g., solid bodies, they must be either infinitely small (paramāṇu) or an aggregate of the infinitely small; now that of which our perception can trace the limit as a solid body, etc., cannot be infinitely small, because the infinitely small is not visible and knowable; so also no aggregate of the infinitely small; for this can neither be thought of, as different from the infinitely small, nor as identical with it [p. 568] [not different, for it is made up of the infinitely small, for it would then escape observation in all its parts]. The same is true of species [jāti, which exist only in individuals].”

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“Further: if knowledge (jñānam), which is in its nature general, because it is produced by sensation (anubhava) alone, varies according to objects, as knowledge of columns, knowledge of a wall, knowledge of a vessel, knowledge of a cloth, this is possible only through the differentiation (viçeṣha) which concerns the knowledge.—Therefore we must unquestionably “grant the identity (*sārūpyam*) of the knowledge with the object. If we grant this, however, as the form of the object is determined only by the knowledge of it, the hypothesis (*kalpanā*) of the existence of things is superfluous.”

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“Then too, as apperception (*upalambha*) of necessity combines both, no division of the object from its presentation (*vijñānam*) is possible; for it is impossible to apperceive the one without apperceiving the other; and that would not be so, if they were different in nature, for then nothing would exist to prevent it. For this reason also, external objects do not exist.”

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“In this it is, for example, like a dream. As in dreams or hallucinations (*māyā*) there arise perceptions (*pratyaya*) of water in a mirage, Gandharva cities, etc., without outward objects in the form of apprehender and something to be apprehended; just so [p. 569] in the state of waking, must be the case with the perception of columns, etc., because we cannot distinguish them from the former, in so far as they are both perceptions.”

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“But if no external object exists, whence comes the variety of perceptions?—We answer: from the variety of (subjective) phenomena (*vāsanā*). Because in the beginningless Samsāra, the presentations and the phenomena, like seed and plant, are in turn the cause and effect of each other, variety is explained without contradiction. Also it is to be understood that, for the rule (waking), as well as for the exception (sleep), variety of knowledge has its ground solely in phenomena. And we both agree that in dream, etc., without any outward things, a variety of knowledge is produced by phenomena; only that I admit no variety of knowledge caused by external objects and not by phenomena. And therefore again there are no external objects.”

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To this the Vedāntin answers:

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“It cannot be maintained that no external objects exist. Why? Because we apperceive them. For we apperceive an external object according to our perception of it as a column, a wall, a vessel, a cloth; and what we apperceive, cannot “not be. It is as though one who eats, while feeling completely satiated by what he is eating, should yet say: ‘I am not eating, and I have not been satiated.’ It is just the same when a person directly apperceives outward objets by touching them with the organs of sensation [p. 570] and at the same time assures us: ‘I do not apperceive them, and the objects are not there.’—How can we care for such talk?”

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The Buddhist:

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“But I do not say that I do not apperceive an object; I only maintain that I apperceive nothing beyond the apperception.”

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The Vedântin:

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“Yes indeed, you maintain that! But only because your trunk is not goaded [elephants are guided by goads], and not because you have reasons. For we are compelled to admit objects outside our apperception, and this by our apperception itself. For no one apperceives a column or a wall as a mere apperception, but everybody apperceives the column and the wall as objects of apperception. And that everybody thus apperceives, is shown by the fact that even those who deny outward objects bear witness to this when they say: ‘The form perceived interiorly seems as if it were outside.’ For they also call to their aid the consciousness of an outside that everyone in the world has, when, in order to deny the existence of outward objects with their ‘as if it were outside,’ they appeal to an assumed outside. For how otherwise could they say ‘as if it were outside?’ No one says: such a one looks as if he were the son of a barren woman. Therefore, when we according to our feelings conceive the nature of anything that exists, we must say: ‘It appears outside,’ but not ‘as if it were outside.’”

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“But was not from the fact that no external things are possible, the conclusion drawn that it only seems as if they were outside?—[p. 571] Yes, but this conclusion is not justified. For we determine what is possible or impossible, from what is proved or not proved; we do not, however, in the "opposite way, determine what is proved or not proved, from "what is possible or impossible. For what we apperceive "through one of the instruments of knowledge, perception, etc. "(above p. 88) is possible (or: real, *sambhavati*), and what we "do not apperceive, through any means of knowledge, is not "possible (real). External objects are, according to their "kind, apperceived by all means of knowledge; how then can "anyone, on the basis of such arbitrary reflections as those "concerning exceptions and non-exceptions [dream and waking], "maintain that they are not possible, since they are apper"ceived!"

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"And if knowledge has the same form as the object, this "is no reason to deny the object. For, were there no object, "there could not be a similarity of form; and, that the object "exists, follows from the fact that we apperceive it as external "(p. 572). Thus we are under the necessity of apperceiving "perception and object at the same time, on the ground that "they are related, as cause and effect, and not because they "are identical."

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"Further: if we distinguish between the knowledge of a "pot, and the knowledge of a cloth, the difference lies in the "things which make different, the pot and the cloth, and not "in what is made different, knowledge. A white cow differs "from a black cow in whiteness and blackness, not in the fact "that they are cows. Therefore, through the two, we are able "to distinguish the one, and the one through the two. [They "could not be distinguished if they were not alike in being,— "or should we read: *naikasmâc ca* 'and not through the one?'] "Therefore object and knowledge are different, and we can "also appeal to the fact that we distinguish between seeing "the pot, and remembering it. For here also, the difference "lies in that which is distinguished, seeing and remembering, "and not in that which distinguishes the pot; just as in the "case of the words, smell of milk and taste of milk, the differ"ence is in that which is distinguished, smell and taste, and "not in the milk, which distinguishes them."

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"Also, between two [mere] presentations (*vijñânam*), which "are different in time, as they destroy each other by their “own coming to consciousness, no mutual [p. 573] relation of “comprehended (*grāhya*) and comprehender (*grāhaka*) can “exist [as if the subject were also a presentation, *vijñānam*!], “for thereby the theories which the Buddhists themselves have “maintained . . . [the statement of which we here pass over] “would fall through.”

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“And besides: you assume a series of presentations, then “why do you not also take outward things, such as columns “and walls for granted?—You say, because we are conscious “of the presentation?—But we are also conscious of external “things!—Or do you say that we are conscious of the pre“sentations in themselves, because it is in their nature to “illumine, like a lamp, but not, on the other hand in the “nature of external things?—and so you take for granted that “which is in its nature an absolute contradiction, just as if “you said: ‘Fire burns itself up;’ but the general acceptation, “which does not contradict itself, that we are conscious of the “outward object, through the presentation which reaches beyond “itself [p. 574], you will not assume? Truly this is great wis“dom that you display! The presentation, in so far as it “extends beyond the object, is certainly not felt, for that would “be contrary to its own being.” [Here, as often before, the idea of the presentation changes into that of the presenting subject, and this is made easy by the use of the word *vijñānam*.]

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“It may be objected that, if, from its nature, the present“ation must be apprehended by something extending beyond it, “then this again by something beyond it, this, by something else “beyond it, and so in *infinitum*.—And further, if knowledge, “according to its nature, illumines like a lamp, and we assume “that this knowledge is known by another knowledge,—yet, “from the equality of these two, no relation of enlightener and “enlightened can exist, and the assumption becomes superfluous.”

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“But these two objections do not hold good. As only the “presentation is apprehended, and there is no need of the “apprehension of the subject (*sākshin*) of the presentation, “therefore we are not face to face with a *regressus in infinitum*: “for subject and perception are in their nature contrary to each other, and are related as the apperceiver, and the apperceived; the subject, however, is, in itself, certain, and cannot be denied [compare the discussion of this above p. 127]. And if it be further maintained that the presentation, like the lamp, needs no other to illumine it, but makes itself known by itself, then this means as much as a presentation which cannot be apprehended by any instrument of knowledge, and which has no apprehender, which would no more make itself known than would a thousand lamps if they were set together in the middle of a block of stone.—But if presentation is in its own nature sensation, have we not [p. 575] in this granted the thesis of our opponents?—No; but as the lamp, to illumine, requires yet another, to apprehend, namely, the eye, in just the same way the presentation requires the power of making itself seen, and only, as with the lamp, when another which apprehends it is present does its light become visible.—But, the opponent might say, if you explain the apprehending subject as self proved, that is just what I maintain about the presentation making itself known by itself, only expressed in other words.—But that is not so, because the presentation has as its characteristics, origin, perishability, and non-unity [accidentally, not as the subject is a necessity; this further concerns its contents only, not the form which is just what constitutes the nature of the subject]. Thus we have proved that, like a lamp, the presentation also must be apprehended by something lying beyond it.

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When, further, those who deny external objects maintain that, as in the case of perceptions in dream, so also perceptions of pillars, etc., in waking, arise without an external object, because the two cannot be separated, as both are perceptions [p. 576], we answer: Perceptions in waking cannot arise as do perceptions in dream. Why? Because they are of a different nature. For between dream and waking, there is a difference of nature. In what does this difference of nature consist? In the refutability or irrefutability. For that which is apperceived in dreams, refutes itself; for he who is awakened, says: ‘In error I apperceived a large assembly of people, for there is no large assembly, only my ‘soul was confused by sleep, hence this error arose.’ In the same manner, all illusions of the senses are refuted, according to their character. On the other hand, there is no condition in which the existence of an object perceived in the waking state, a pillar, for example, can be refuted. A dream-face is only a remembrance, whilst seeing in the waking state is apperception. The difference between remembrance and apperception is evident, and is felt of itself; for it consists in the fact that a person is either separated, or not separated, from an object; when, for example, a beloved son is remembered, he is not apperceived, but we wish to apperceive him. [p. 577] As this is so, we cannot maintain that what is perceived in the waking state deceives, because, like apperception in the dreaming state, it is [only] apperception. For the difference between the two makes itself felt. And that which is felt by pretended sages cannot be denied by them. But just because their feelings protest, and they cannot demonstrate to themselves the groundlessness of waking perception, therefore they wish to prove it by its relation with dreaming perception. But a quality that is not in a thing in itself, will not be put there by relating it to another thing. For when we feel that fire is hot, it does not become cold because [as an element] it is related to water. And we have demonstrated the difference between dream and waking.”

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“Finally we must answer the assertion that variety of knowledge can arise without objects, by a variety of [subjective] appearances (*vâsanâ*). We reply: The existence of appearances is not possible, if, as you take it, there is no apperception of external objects. For the appearances in forms which differ according to the object have their basis in the apperception of the object [p. 578]; if, however, no objects are apperceived, wherein have the various appearances their foundation? If we accept the idea of beginninglessness, like a row of blind people holding to each other, a *regressus in infinitum* steps in, with no supporting basis, thus abolishing the worldly action without proving your position. If, further, he who denies the external world, appeals to the rule and the exception [waking and dream] to prove that knowledge, “in order to come into being, has, as its ground, appearances, and not objects, we must regard this also as refuted, if it is as we said; for without the apperception of objects, appearances cannot arise. And as, further, the apperception of objects can exist without the appearance, while, on the other hand, the appearances cannot exist without the apperception of objects, the rule and the exception [under discussion] serve but to affirm the reality of objects. For appearances are only certain impressions (*saṃskāra*); and, as experience shows, impressions can only be brought about by means of a supporting basis; for you, however, there is no such basis of impressions, because you follow as your guide the axiom that apperception does not exist.”

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“[p. 579] If, finally, you set up a ‘presentation of inwardness’ (*ālaya-vijñānam*) as the basis of appearances, this can no more co-exist with your theory of non-duration than can the ‘presentation of outwardness’ (*pravṛtti-vijñānam*), and therefore cannot serve as the substratum of appearances. For unless we either admit a Continuous Substance, which binds past, present, and future together, or an overseer of all objects, an activity linking together remembrances—depending upon appearances conditioned by space, time, and cause—is impossible. If, however, the ‘idea of inwardness,’ implies a continuum, you have thereby given up your principle (of non-duration).”